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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • BENGAL AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS ACT
  • Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.10. Art. 181
  • Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Order XXI, rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • points:(1) Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.17.
  • (6) (52 C.W.N 64), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Sec. 45 of the Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • 495), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act
  • Agricultural Debtors Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Act II B.C of 1942,
  • rule 5(4)(6)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • BENGAL AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS ACT
  • Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.10. Art. 181
  • Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Order XXI, rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • points:(1) Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.17.
  • (6) (52 C.W.N 64), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act
  • sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Sec. 45 of the Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • 495), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act
  • Agricultural Debtors Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Act II B.C of 1942,
  • rule 5(4)(6)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule was obtained by judgment-debtors arising from proceedings under section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935 ("the Act"). In execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by opposite party No. 1, that party auction-purchased the disputed property on May 16, 1939. After the enactment of Act II B.C of 1942 (which added section 37A to the Act), the petitioners initiated proceedings under section 37A before the Debt Settlement Board, Tamluk.

On October 28, 1945, the Board made an award under section 37A(5). The award included forms and schedules describing the parties, the decretal particulars, the debts and the properties to be restored. The award was presented for registration on February 2, 1946, and registered on March 13, 1946.

On June 15, 1948, the records were examined by the Special Officer, Deputy Commissioner, Tamluk, who recorded that the previous Board had disposed of the case and made an award, that the award had not been registered and that the time for registration had expired; the case was disposed of on maintaining the award. On January 17, 1950, the petitioners presented a copy of the award to the First Court of the Munsif, Tamluk, seeking relief under section 37A(8). Opposite party No. 1 contested on the ground of limitation.

The learned Munsif upheld the limitation objection and refused relief; the petitioners appealed to the District Judge who affirmed the Munsif's decision and expressed doubt about the competence of the appeal. The petitioners then moved in revision before the present Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to a proceeding for relief under section 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act.
  2. Whether the Indian Limitation Act is applicable at all to proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, given section 29 of the Limitation Act and section 45 of the Agricultural Debtors Act.
  3. Whether, if Article 181 is applicable, the period of limitation was extended by continuation of proceedings under section 52 of the Act up to June 15, 1948 (as contended by petitioners).
  4. Whether, if Article 181 applies, time began to run only when the final order was made in the proceedings under section 37A (i.e., June 15, 1948), as contended by the petitioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Mr. Jana, Advocate)

  • Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply and therefore there was no period of limitation for obtaining relief under section 37A(8) of the Act.
  • If Art. 181 was applicable, proceedings under section 37A were pending until June 15, 1948, and section 52 of the Act extended the period from October 28, 1945 to June 15, 1948, thereby saving the prayer under section 37A(8) from the bar of limitation.
  • If Art. 181 applied, time did not begin to run until June 15, 1948, when the final order was made in the proceedings under section 37A of the Act.

Opposite Party No. 1's Arguments (Mr. Chakraborty, Advocate)

  • The presentation of the award under section 37A(8) should, by implication, be regarded as an "application" within the meaning of Article 181 of the Limitation Act (thereby attracting the period of limitation).
  • The exclusion of Article 181 by implication is impermissible in construing statutes of limitation; the Court should construe limitation provisions strictly and not imply the absence of limitation unless compelled by language.
  • It was further argued (referred to in the opinion) that excluding Art. 181 in such cases would lead to hardship, an argument rejected by the Court as inappropriate in this context.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (L.R. 59 I.A. 283 : 36 C.W.N. 803) Illustrates that a decree-holder/auction-purchaser is bound to restore possession on award and that delay in presentation of an award does not necessarily prejudice the decree-holder. Used to buttress the view that a decree-holder cannot complain unduly of delay and that presentation of the award is not to be treated as an "application" attracting limitation.
Vdthal Janardan v. Vithojirav Putlajirav (I.L.R. 6 Bom. 586) Proposition that provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to applications to a Court to do what it has no discretion to refuse. Relied on to support the principle that where a court is bound to act and has no discretion, Limitation Act articles relating to applications do not apply.
Kalu v. Latu (I.L.R. 21 Cal. 260) That there is no limitation for an application under the relevant statutory provision where the Court has a duty (e.g., to amend a decree) and no discretion to refuse. Used to analogize to section 37A(8) as imposing a duty rather than a discretionary power, supporting non-application of Art. 181.
Shri Prakash Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. (L.R. 56 I.A. 30 : 33 C.W.N. 267) The rule (Order XXI, r.2(1) CPC) imposes a duty on a decree-holder to certify payment and on the Court to record it — an example of a duty where Limitation Act provisions for applications were held inapplicable. Quoted for the general proposition that where statute places a duty on parties/courts, application-type limitation rules do not apply.
Co-operative Credit Society, Arun-ganan v. Chinna Swami Udayan (I.L.R. 1937 Mad. 495) Held Art. 181 applicable to an application to enforce an award by Registrar of Co-operative Societies because the rules (rule 5(4)(6)) expressly provided for making an application. Distinguished: relied on to show that where a statute or rule expressly requires an application, Art. 181 will apply; thus the case is not analogous to sec. 37A(8) where no application is required.
Asmat-ali Sharif v. Mnjahabali Sardar (52 C.W.N. 64) Held Art. 181 applicable to proceedings under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act because those proceedings commence on filing an application by the co-sharer tenant. Distinguished on the ground that proceedings under sec. 26F start by application, unlike sec. 37A(8) which requires presentation of an award and imposes a duty.
Jatindranath Naskar v. Baharuddi Molla (55 C.W.N. 64) Stated that procedure in sec. 37A(8) proceedings is as prescribed in the Code regarding execution of decrees. Noted as not throwing light on the limitation question before the Court; therefore not relied upon for deciding Art. 181's applicability.
Nandalal Haldar v. Dinendranath Chatterji (unreported, Jan. 19, 1949) Held that the Court in sec. 37A(8) proceedings has jurisdiction to see what the award was and whether it affected parties' interests. Observed as not directly addressing the limitation issue; treated as not determinative of the question whether Art. 181 applies.
Mrityunjoy Mukherji v. Ashutosh Thakur (S.M.A. 17 of 1949; decided May 3, 1950) Roxburgh, J., held that presentation of an award under section 37A(8) cannot be regarded as making an application and that there is no period of limitation in such cases. Followed by the present Court as consonant with its view; the decision was later affirmed (Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1950) though on a different ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in distinct steps, each grounded in the statutory text and established principles of construction applicable to limitation statutes:

  1. Applicability of the Limitation Act to the Agricultural Debtors Act:

    The Court noted section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, which makes the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under other Acts unless expressly excluded. Section 45 of the Agricultural Debtors Act excludes only the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act; it does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act or Article 181. Consequently, the Limitation Act is prima facie applicable to proceedings under the Agricultural Debtors Act unless another principle excludes it.

  2. Nature of Article 181 and the "application" concept:

    Article 181 belongs to the First Schedule (3rd Division) dealing with "applications" that must be filed under an express statutory provision. The Court emphasized that those Articles apply where an express application is required by statute; they do not apply where the court is called upon to do an act it is bound to perform and has no discretion to refuse.

  3. Textual analysis of section 37A(8):

    Section 37A(8) does not speak of an "application"; instead it provides that the debtor may "present a copy of the award" to the court or certificate officer, who "shall thereupon direct" that the sale be set aside and restore possession. The wording imposes a duty ("shall") on the Court/Officer rather than conferring a discretion. The award contains the materials necessary for the Court or Officer to act; no time limit for presentation is prescribed in the Act or Rules; no statutory requirement of notice to the decree-holder/auction-purchaser is prescribed.

  4. Rule of construction for statutes of limitation:

    The Court reiterated the settled rule that statutes of limitation, which restrict rights, must be construed strictly and not by implication in a manner that penalizes rights unless the language compels such an interpretation. Applying this rule, the Court rejected treating presentation of the award as an "application" within Article 181 by implication.

  5. Treatment of the opposite party's hardship argument:

    The Court rejected the hardship argument advanced by the decree-holder/auction-purchaser, noting that on the making of an award under section 37A(5) the decree-holder is legally bound to restore possession and cannot complain of delay by the judgment-debtor in presenting the award.

  6. Reliance on and distinction of authorities:

    The Court distinguished authorities where an express rule/statutory provision required an application (e.g., the Co-operative Credit Society case) and relied upon authorities (e.g., Vdthal Janardan, Kalu v. Latu, Shri Prakash Singh) for the proposition that Article 181 does not apply where the court is bound to act. The Court found consonance with Roxburgh, J.'s decision in Mrityunjoy Mukherji v. Ashutosh Thakur that presentation is not an application and no period of limitation applies; that decision was cited with approval.

  7. Conclusion from the analysis:

    The Court concluded that presentation of the award under section 37A(8) cannot be regarded as an "application" within Article 181 and therefore Article 181 does not apply to proceedings under section 37A(8) of the Act. Consequently, the lower courts were wrong in holding that the petition was barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition succeeds. The orders made by the courts below are set aside, the Rule is made absolute, and the case is remitted to the trial court for giving relief to the debtors in terms of section 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The petitioners are awarded their costs in this Court and in the courts below.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree in the lower courts refusing relief under section 37A(8) on the ground of limitation is set aside, and the trial court is directed to grant relief to the debtors in accordance with section 37A(8).
  • The Court's reasoning establishes (for purposes of this decision) that presentation of an award under section 37A(8) is not an "application" within Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act and that no period of limitation for presentation is prescribed by the statute or rules; the opinion notes alignment with prior judicial authority (Roxburgh, J.) and the desirability of legislative provision specifying a time limit for presentation.
  • The opinion does not elaborate broader, novel legal consequences beyond the decision in this case; it remits the matter for implementation of section 37A(8) relief and awards costs.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those stated by the Court.

    Makhanlal Roy Pramanik And Ors. v. Pramathanath Basu And Ors. Opposite Parties.

    Das, J.:— This Rule which was obtained by the judgment-debtors arises out of proceedings under section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, hereinafter called the Act.

    2. In execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by opposite party No. 1, the latter auction-purchased the disputed property on May 16, 1939. After the enactment of Act II B.C of 1942, which added section 37A to the Act, the petitioners initiated proceedings under the section before the Debt Settlement Board, Tamluk.

    3. On October 28, 1945, the Board made an award under section 37A(5) of the Act. The award recites that as the applicants, the decree-holders, the landlords and the mortgagees have failed to come to an amicable settlement, the Board has determined the debt under section 37A(5). The award was drawn up in Form No. 19(B). Schedule (Ka) of the award gave a description of the debtors, Schedule (Kha) (1) that of the decree-holders, Schedule (Kha) (2) that of the mortgagees which was blank in the present case. Schedule (Ga) gave particulars of the decree, Schedule (Gha) particulars of the debts of the debtors, Schedule (Una) a description of the properties to be restored to the possession of the debtors.

    4. Schedule (Gha) stated that the decretal dues of the opposite party No. 1 (decree-holder and auction-purchaser) amounted to Rs. 1,595-5-6 pies only, that the annual income of the property sold was Rs. 511 and that the opposite party No. 1 had realised Rs. 3,066 and nothing was due to the opposite party No. 1.

    5. The award was presented for registration on February 2, 1946, and was registered on March 13, 1946.

    6. It appears that on June 15, 1948, the records were put up before the Special Officer, D.C Tamluk. The Officer recorded the following order on that date:

    “The records were found after the investment of powers under section 7. On an examination of the records it appears that the previous Board has disposed of the case and made an award. It appears that the award has not been registered and that the time for registration has expired. In these circumstances this case is disposed of on maintaining the award of the Board. The parties may be informed and the records may be sent to the Record Room after proper classification.”

    7. On January 17, 1950, the petitioners presented a copy of the award to the First Court of the Munsif, Tamluk, for relief under section 37A(8) of the Act. The opposite party No. 1 contested the prayer on the ground of limitation. The learned Munsif gave effect to the objection raised by the opposite party No. 1 and refused the prayer of the petitioner on the ground of limitation the petitioners preferred an appeal before the District Judge who affirmed the decision of the Munsif. The learned District Judge while dismissing the appeal expressed a doubt about the competency of the appeal.

    8. Mr. Jana learned Advocate for the petitioner, raised three points:

    (1) Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply and there was no limitation for obtaining relief under sec. 37A(8) of the Act;

    (2) Even assuming that Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable, the proceedings under sec. 37A of the Act were pending till June 15, 1948, and sec. 52 of the Act extended the period from October 28, 1945, till June 15, 1948, and the prayer for relief under Sec. 37A(8) of the Act was consequently saved from the bar of limitation, and

    (3) Assuming that Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act applied, time did not begin to run till June 15, 1948, when the final order was made in the proceedings under sec. 37A of the Act.

    9. I shall take up the above points in the order mentioned above. The main question for consideration is whether Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to a proceeding for relief under sec. 37A of the Act. The first question is whether the Indian Limitation Act is at all applicable to proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act makes that Act applicable to proceedings under other Acts unless the applicability thereof is expressly excluded. Sec. 45 of the Agricultural Debtors Act excludes only the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. It follows therefore that Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act is not excluded in proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act in the absence of an express provision. The question, however, remains whether the said section is attracted to a proceeding under sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.

    10. Art. 181 is one of the Articles in the First Schedule, 3rd Division, which deals with applications. All the Articles in the 3rd Division commencing with article 158 down to article 183 deal with cases where the Court has to be moved by an application which is required to be filed under the express provision of the relevant Statute. None of these Articles deal with cases where no application is necessary to be filed and where the Court is asked to do an act which it is bound to do and which it has no discretion to refuse to do, Sec. 37A(8) runs as follows:

    “The debtor may present a copy of the award made under sub-sec. (5) to the Civil Court or Certificate Officer at whose order the property was sold and such Court Or Certificate Officer shall there upon direct that the sale be set aside, that the debtor together with any person who was in possession of the property sold or any part thereof at the time of delivery of possession of such property to the decree-holder as an under-raiyat of the debtor and who has been evicted therefrom by reason of such sale be restored to possession of the property and with effect from the 1st day of Baisak next following or the 1st day of Kartick next following whichever is earlier.”

    11. Neither the sub-section nor the rules framed under the Act speak of the making of an application by the debtor. The debtor has merely to present a copy of the award. No time limit has been prescribed for such presentation. On such presentation the Civil Court or the certificate Officer is bound to act as provided in the sub-section. It is significant to note that the award contains all the materials which may be necessary for the Court or the Certificate Officer to know before action can be taken in terms of the sub-section.

    12. There is no express provision either in the Act or in the Rules for a notice to be issued on the decree-holder auction-purchaser or the landlord or mortgagee before the Court or the Certificate Officer can take action under the sub-section. It has to be borne in mind that the restoration of possession is the main relief which has to be made in the original application under sec. 37A(1) of the Act. A period of limitation for such an application is provided for in sec. 37A(2) of the Act. Sec. 37A(8) only prescribed the extent of such relief and the procedure by which and the Tribunal by which the relief already prayed for in the application under sec. 37A(1) will be worked out.

    13. The contention of Mr. Chakraborty, learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1, that the presentation of the award should by implication be regarded as an application is opposed to the rule of construction applicable to cases of limitation, namely, that the Court ought not to put such an interpretation upon a Statute of limitation by implication and inference as may have a penalising effect unless the Court is forced to do so by the irresistible force of the language used. It is well settled that the Limitation Act, being an Act which takes away or restricts the right to take legal proceedings, must, where its language is ambiguous, be construed strictly, i.e, in favour of the right to proceed.

    14. The further contention of Mr. Chakraborty that if the operation of Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act is excluded in this case and if it is held that there-is no period of limitation it will lead to great hardship, cannot be accepted. Statutes of limitation are, in their nature, strict and inflexible and in construing the provisions of such Statutes, equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide. In a case like the present an argument based on the ground of hardship comes with an ill grace from the decree-holder auction-purchaser. On the making of an award under section 37A(5) the decree-holder auction-purchaser is under the law bound to restore possession to the judgment-debtor, and can hardly complain of any prejudice if the judgment-debtor makes a delay in presenting the award. In such a case the decree-holder auctionpurchaser obtains the boon of delay which is so dear to him and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent him from giving up possession. See Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (1) (L.R 59 I.A 283 : 36 C.W.N 803). In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the presentation of the award under sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act cannot be regarded as an application within the meaning of the word occurring in Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act and that the Article therefore does not apply to cases under section 37A(8) of the Act.

    15. The view taken by me is in consonance with the principles which underlie the cases of an application for the issue of a sale certificate, vide Vdthal Janardan v. Vithojirav Putlajirav (2) (I.L.R 6 Bom. 586), where the learned Chief Justice laid stress on the fact that “the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to applications to a Court to do what it has no discretion to refuse…………”, or of an application for amendment of a decree, vide Kalu v. Latu (3) (I.L.R 21 Cal. 260), where Banerji, J., opined that “there is no limitation for an application under sec 206, it being the duty of the Court to amend a decree under that Section whenever it is found to be not in accordance with its judgment”, or of an application by a decree-holder for certifying a payment made out of Court under Order XXI, rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, vide Shri Prakash Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. (4) (L.R 56 I.A 30 : 33 C.W.N 267) where Sir Lancelot Sanderson delivering the opinion of the Board stated the ratio decidendi in the following words: “The rule imposes a duty upon the decree-holder to certify the payment and a duty upon the Court upon such certificate being given to record such payment.”

    16. The view taken by me 13 also supported by the fact that the Agricultural Debtors Act and the rules framed thereunder prescribe diverse periods of limitation in diverse cases but are silent as regards the period of limitation for the presentation of an award under sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act.

    17. I shall now deal with certain cases cited by Mr. Chakraborty on behalf of opposite party No. 1. In the case of the Co-operative Credit Society, Arun-ganan v. Chinna Swami Udayan (5) (I.L.R 1937 Mad. 495), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable to an application to enforce an award made by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. But in that case rule 5(4)(6) framed under the Act expressly provided for the making of an application for the purpose of enforcing the award. The decision is therefore distinguishable. In the case of Asmat-ali Sharif v. Mnjahabali Sardar (6) (52 C.W.N 64), Art. 181 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable to proceedings under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The decision is distinguishable on the ground that the proceedings under sec. 26F of the Ben gal Tenancy Act start on an application being filed by the co-sharer tenant. The case of Jatindranath Naskar v. Baha-ruddi Molla (7) (55 C.W.N 64) merely laid down that the procedure to be followed in proceedings under sec. 37A(8) of the Agricultural Debtors Act is that prescribed in the Code as regards execution of decrees. This decision does not throw any light on the question before us. In the unreported case of Nandalal Haldar v. Dinendranath Chatterji (7) (decided on January 19, 1949), Chakravartti, J., merely held that the Court in proceedings under sec. 37A(8) of the Act has jurisdiction to see what the award was and whether on the face of the award it did not affect; their interests. This case also does not deal with the question which falls to be decided in the present case.

    18. The view taken by me is in consonance with the opinion of Roxburgh, J., in the case of Mrityunjoy Mukherji v. Ashutosh Thakur (9) (S.M.A 17 of 1949) decided on May 3, 1950. The learned Judge held that the presentation of an award under section 37A(8) cannot be regarded as the making of an application and that there is no period of limitation in such cases. I share the hope express ed by the learned Judge in that case that “it is necessary that some provision should be made at some stage limiting the time within which such award may be presented to the Court or Certificate Officer for carrying out the provisions laid down in section 37A(8) of the Act”. The decision of Roxburgh, J., in the above case was affirmed on the 7th of March, 1951, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1950, but on a different ground. I am therefore of opinion that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the application was barred by limitation.

    19. In this view of the matter the other points raised by Mr. Jana need not be gone into. I may point out that Mr. Chakraborty did not dispute the competence of the present application on the ground that a second appeal lay to this Court.

    20. The lower appellate Court seemed to be in doubt on the question whether an appeal lay to that Court but did not decide the question presumably because the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. 1 may point out that in the unreported decision in the case of Nandalal Haldar v. Dinendranath Chatterji (8) (Supra), referred to above, Chakravartti, J., was of the opinion that an appeal lay in such cases. It is not necessary for me to express an opinion on this question because even if a second appeal was competent, the facts of the case are such as would have justified us in converting this petition in revision in-to a Memorandum of Appeal and in giving relief to the petitioner on that footing.

    21. The result, therefore, is that the revision petition succeeds, the orders made by the courts below are set aside and this case is remitted to the trial court for giving relief to the debtors in terms of sec. 37A(8) of the Act.

    22. The Rule is accordingly made absolute.

    23. The petitioners will have their costs in this Court and in the courts below.

    Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

    A.K.D.G

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    Comments

    Makhanlal Roy Pramanik And Ors. v. Pramathanath Basu And Ors. Opposite Parties.
    (Jan 28, 1952)