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  • provisions contained in Section 423 of the Cr PC.8. Under Sub-s. (1) of Section 423
  • case.9. Mention of Section 411-A of the Cr PC in S. 423 of that Code
  • clause (b) of Sub-s. (1) of Section 423
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions contained in Section 423 of the Cr PC.8. Under Sub-s. (1) of Section 423
  • case.9. Mention of Section 411-A of the Cr PC in S. 423 of that Code
  • clause (b) of Sub-s. (1) of Section 423
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — R.P. Mookerjee, J. (with Lahiri, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

After hearing Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1950 (Parvati Devi v. The State), the Bench concluded that the evidence was insufficient to substantiate a charge against Parvati Devi under Section 120-B read with Section 366 of the Penal Code. Having reached that conclusion, the Court considered the related case of Shew Nath Shaw, who was alleged to be Parvati's conspirator. Shew Nath had not himself appealed. The Court issued a Rule suo motu on the State to show cause why Shew Nath's conviction and sentence should not be set aside, or why such other order as the Court thought fit should not be made.

At the trial before the Criminal Sessions, the case was put on the basis of a criminal conspiracy between Shew Nath and Parvati only; there was no allegation or evidence of conspiracy with any other persons. Following the re-assessment of evidence in Parvati Devi's appeal, the Bench concluded that, in the absence of evidence to support conspiracy between Parvati and Shew Nath, it was impossible to sustain a conviction for conspiracy against Shew Nath alone.

The State contested the Court's jurisdiction to issue the Rule attacking a conviction and sentence imposed after a Sessions trial in the Original Side of the High Court. After considering statutory provisions and inherent jurisdiction, the Court made the Rule absolute and directed that Shew Nath Shaw be acquitted and set at liberty. Lahiri, J. agreed. The Rule was made absolute.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this High Court may, in respect of a conviction and sentence imposed after a Sessions trial in the Original Side of the High Court, issue a Rule or otherwise exercise jurisdiction to set aside such conviction and sentence—particularly where the convicted person (Shew Nath) has not himself appealed.
  2. What is the scope of the High Court's powers in relation to convictions by the Court of Session in the Original Side, especially as framed by Sections 411-A, 423 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  3. Whether, even if statutory powers are doubtful or circumscribed, the High Court may exercise inherent jurisdiction (recognized in Section 561-A CrPC and earlier jurisprudence) to prevent or correct manifest injustice arising from a conviction after an Original Side Sessions trial.

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments (as presented by the learned Standing Counsel)

  • The High Court is to be taken as a single Court; different branches or sections (for example, the Original Side and the Appellate/Criminal Bench) are not different Courts and therefore one branch cannot be treated as exercising jurisdiction over another as a superior over an inferior Court.
  • There is no question of the trial in the Original Sessions of the High Court being a trial before a subordinate or inferior Court; consequently the Bench hearing an appeal or passing orders should not be treated as exercising revisional jurisdiction over an inferior Court.
  • Reference to Debendra Nath v. Bibudhendra Mansingh was relied on for the proposition that a single Judge's decision in the Appellate Side cannot be regarded as the decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court; the Standing Counsel argued this supports the view that the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue the Rule.
  • Reliance on provisions of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes: if a particular section of the High Court were deemed subordinate, various complications would follow (e.g., transfer powers under Section 24 CPC, or provisions like Section 526 CrPC). In particular, the State argued that Section 439 does not vest jurisdiction to call records or make orders in revision of an order passed after a Sessions trial in the Original Side, and that Section 411-A circumscribes the High Court's powers in this situation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parvati Devi v. The State (Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1950) The Court found that the evidence was insufficient to substantiate a charge against Parvati Devi under S.120-B read with S.366. The Bench relied on its conclusion in that appeal (insufficiency of evidence as to Parvati) as the factual and legal basis to reconsider Shew Nath's conviction; because conspiracy could not be sustained as between Parvati and Shew Nath, it was impossible to sustain conviction of Shew Nath.
Debendra Nath v. Bibudhendra Mansingh, 43 Cal. 90 Observations about the position of a single Judge in the Appellate Side and whether such a judgment could be regarded as of a subordinate Court. The Court held that the casual observation in that case did not support the broad proposition advanced by the State; it was not treated as authority for denying the present Court's jurisdiction.
Emperor v. Krishnaji Vithal, 50 Bom. L.R. 293 Held that revision lay from an order made by the Judge presiding over Sessions in the Original Side of the High Court (even before S.411-A was introduced). Cited to show that revisionary jurisdiction over Original Side Sessions orders has been recognized in prior decisions; the Court considered this supportive of its power to entertain corrective jurisdiction.
Nobin Kristo v. Basiklal Laha, 10 Cal. 268 Stated a test for whether a Court is inferior: whether the particular Court was one over which appellate or revisional jurisdiction was exercised. The Court noted the test but said it may not be strictly attracted in relation to the High Court's own Original Side; the observations in Nobin Kristo were not accepted as fully determinative for the present context.
Pratul Chandra v. Commandant, Hijli Detention Camp, 61 Cal. 197 Authority recognizing the inherent power of the Court in criminal matters (cited alongside other decisions). Used to support the proposition that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice in criminal matters.
Bogers v. Srinivas, 42 Bom. L.R. 478 Authority cited in relation to inherent powers of the Court in criminal matters. Cited by the Court as part of the body of authority affirming inherent jurisdiction to prevent manifest injustice.
Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed, 47 Bom. L.R. 245 (P.C.) Another decision referenced for recognition of the inherent powers of the criminal Court. Cited to show that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to act in criminal matters had been recognized prior to statutory codification (S.561-A).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first examining the facts established in the related appeal of Parvati Devi and the nature of the trial evidence. It concluded that the record contained no evidence to substantiate a charge of criminal conspiracy between Parvati Devi and Shew Nath.

The State's primary contention was that the High Court must be treated as a single Court whose branches (Original Side and Appellate/Criminal Bench) were not in a superior-inferior relationship; therefore, the Bench lacked jurisdiction to issue a Rule or exercise revisional powers over a conviction produced by a trial in the Original Side.

To address the jurisdictional question, the Court analyzed relevant statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

  • Section 411-A — provides that a person convicted after trial by the High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction may, notwithstanding certain provisions, appeal to the High Court; the section sets out the availability of appeal but does not itself prescribe the precise appellate powers to be exercised.
  • Section 423 — specifies the powers of an appellate Court on appeal, including the power (clause (b) of sub-section (1)) to reverse findings and sentences, acquit, discharge, order retrial by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the Appellate Court, alter findings, or reduce/alter sentences (but not enhance them subject to S.106(3)). The Court observed that express mention of S.411-A in S.423 indicates that, for the purposes of appeals from the Original Side under S.411-A, the Appellate Bench possesses certain powers over the Original Side akin to those exercised by a superior Court over a subordinate Court.
  • Section 439 and other provisions were discussed by the State, but the Court focused on S.423 as delineating relevant appellate/revisional powers.

The Court concluded that, "for this limited purpose," a decision given after a Sessions trial in the Original Side is to be treated as the decision of a subordinate Court and that the appellate Bench has the statutory powers described in S.423 when hearing appeals under S.411-A. The Court relied on clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 423 (quoted in the opinion) as authorizing reversal and acquittal, or ordering retrial by a subordinate court, among other remedies.

The Court also reviewed precedent (including Emperor v. Krishnaji Vithal) indicating that revision or corrective jurisdiction had been recognized historically in respect of the Original Side. While the Court rejected some of the broader technical propositions advanced by the State (drawing on Debendra Nath and Nobin Kristo), it found those authorities not decisive against the exercise of corrective jurisdiction.

Crucially, the Court held that even if there remained doubt about the precise statutory limits of its revisionary powers over the Original Side, the High Court nonetheless possesses inherent jurisdiction to pass a proper order to prevent manifest injustice. The opinion referred to prior authorities and observed that Section 561-A of the CrPC merely recognizes the inherent power of the Court in criminal matters; in any event, the inherent power existed before statutory recognition.

Applying these conclusions to the facts, the Bench determined that because the evidence did not support a conspiracy conviction as between Parvati Devi and Shew Nath, continuing Shew Nath's conviction would perpetuate manifest injustice. It was therefore both appropriate and the Court's duty to exercise jurisdiction—statutory and inherent—to correct the situation despite the fact that Shew Nath had not himself appealed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court made the Rule absolute and directed that Shew Nath Shaw be acquitted and set at liberty.

Implications (direct effect): The immediate consequence of the judgment is the quashing of Shew Nath's conviction and his release. The Court exercised its jurisdiction—derived from the interplay of Sections 411-A and 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, where necessary, its inherent powers (recognized in Section 561-A and earlier case law)—to prevent a manifest injustice, even though the convicted person had not himself filed an appeal.

The opinion addresses the exercise of the High Court's corrective and inherent jurisdiction in the specific factual context; it does not state that it establishes a general new rule of law beyond the reasoning and statutory interpretation applied in this case.


Summary prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added that was not explicitly present in the opinion.

    Parbati Devi v. The State

    R.P Mookerjee, J.:— After we had heard criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1950, Parvati Devi v. The State, and came to the conclusion that the evidence on the record was not sufficient, to substantiate a charge as against Parvati Debi under S. 120-B read with S. 366, Penal Code, it led us to consider the case of Shew Nath Shaw, the alleged conspirator with Parvati Devi. As Shew Nath had not appealed, we thought it proper to issue a Rule suo motu on the State to show cause why the conviction and sentence passed on Shew Nath should not be set aside or such further or other order or orders made as to this Court might seem fit and proper.

    2. The case as made before the Criminal Sessions was that there had been criminal conspiracy between Shew Nath and Parvati. There was no allegation, far less any evidence of any conspiracy between either of these persons with any other or more persons. We have already delivered our judgment in Parvati Devi v. The State, Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1950 (cal.), and we have found on the evidence that there is nothing on the record to substantiate a charge under S. 120-B read with S. 366, Penal Code, so far as Parvati is concerned. In this state of things, it is impossible to substantiate a charge of conspiracy against Shew Nath alone. There is no evidence under which Shew Nath can be found guilty of the offence charged and for which he is now undergoing sentence. On behalf of the State, cause has been shown by the learned Standing Counsel, and it has been contested that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue any Rule in respect of a conviction and sentence after a trial in the Sessions in the Original Side of this Court.

    3. The principal argument advanced on behalf of the State is that this High Court must be taken to be one Court, and if jurisdiction is exercised in different branches of the same Court, such branches or sections of the Court are not different Courts. There is no question of a trial in the Original Sessions of this Court being a trial by a Subordinate or by an inferior Court.

    4. In support of the above contention, reference was made to the observations in Debendra Nath v. Bibudhendra Mansingh, 43 cal. 90, where Jenkins, C.J was considering the position of a single Judge in the Appellate Side of the High Court from whose decision a Letters Patent Appeal was allowed. The suit had been filed in the Cuttuck Court, and had come up on second appeal to this Court, and had been disposed of by a single Judge as under the Rules of this Court. Against the decision of the single Judge, there was a decision by a Division Bench in which the judgment passed by the Subordinate Judge was affirmed after reversing the judgment of the single Judge of this Court. While dealing with an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, it was observed that the judgment of the single Judge, apart from and independent of the judgment of the Division Bench, could not be regarded as the judgment of a Court, subordinate to High Court. Leave was, however, granted as there was a substantial question of law involved in the case. We do not think that the casual observation in this case can be referred to as any authority for the broad proposition for which the learned Standing Counsel is contending.

    5. It was farther urged on behalf of the State with reference to the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure that if one particular section of the High Court be deemed to be a Court subordinate to or inferior to the High Court various complications would arise; further, the powers which the High Court have admittedly got over subordinate Courts cannot be exercised over such different sections of the High Court. As for instance, it is competent for the High Court to direct, under Section 24 of the CPC, the transfer of a suit pending in one subordinate Court to another Court, or to transfer it to be heard by the High Court itself. Can this power be exercised by the High Court in respect of a proceeding which is pending before the Original Side of this Court or before a single Judge who is entitled to hear such matter under the Rules of the Court? Prima facie this Court has not exercised that jurisdiction and cannot have that power. Similarly about the provisions contained, in Section 526 of the Cr PC. It is, however, not necessary for us to refer to the other provisions to determine the powers of this Court in relation to the decisions made or the convictions after a Sessions trial in the Original Side of this Court as we have to refer to certain particular and special provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure for this purpose.

    6. Under Section 439 of the Cr PC, the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by Ss. 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by S. 338 and may enhance the sentence. It is contended that S. 439, does not vest any jurisdiction in this Court to call for the records or to make any orders in revision of an order passed in the Original Side of this Court after a Sessions trial had been held. It is contended that so far as the conviction and sentence by the Court of Session in the Original Side of this Court is concerned, specific provision is made under Section 411-A of the Cr PC, and the powers of the High Court are circumscribed by the provisions contained in that section.

    7. It may immediately be pointed out that Section 411-A of the Cr PC, does not refer to the procedure to be followed by the Court, but merely promulgates the rule that without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 449 of the Cr PC, any person convicted after a trial by the High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction may, notwithstanding anything contained in S. 418, or S. 423, Sub-s. (2), or in the Letters Patent of the High Court, appeal to the High Court. And then follows the scope of the appeals in particular cases. The powers which are to be exercised thus are not to be found in S. 411-A, but reference has to be made to the provisions contained in Section 423 of the Cr PC.

    8. Under Sub-s. (1) of Section 423 of the Cr PC, the appellate Court can send for the records of the case if such records are not already in Court. After perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under S. 411-A, Sub-s. (2), or S. 417, the accused, if he appears, the Court may, if it considers that there is not sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may give certain other directions, as may be appropriate in the particular case.

    9. Mention of Section 411-A of the Cr PC in S. 423 of that Code unmistakably indicates that this Court, while hearing an appeal from the conviction of an accused by the Court of Session in the Original Side of this Court has in relation to the latter Court powers and jurisdiction in certain respects over the latter Court which a superior Court has over a subordinate Court. This is so though the relationship between the two branches of this Court is not in all particulars the relationship of a superior and inferior tribunal.

    10. Particularly, reference may be made to clause (b) of Sub-s. (1) of Section 423 of the Cr PC which is in the following terms:

    “The Court……….may in an appeal from a conviction, (1) reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be retried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Coust or committed for trial, or (2) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, reduce the sentence, or (3) with or without such reduction and with or without altering the finding, alter the nature of the sentence, but subject to the provisions of S. 106, sub-s. (3), not so as to enhance the same.”

    11. Whatever might be the position technically speaking the decision given in the Original Side of this Court after a trial by the Court of Session is deemed for this limited purpose as the decision of a subordinate Court, though it may not be of an inferior Court.

    12. Reference was made to Emperor v. Krishnaji Vithal, 50 Bom. L.R 293, where it had been held that an application in revision did lie from an order made by the Judge presiding over the Sessions in the Original Side of the High Court, even before the introduction of Section 411-A of the Cr PC. The Bombay High Court referred to old decision of this Court in Nobin Kristo v. Basiklal Laha, 10 Cal. 268, where it was laid down that the test for determining whether a Court was inferior to another or not would depend on the fact whether it was judicially inferior, i.e, it was a Court over which the particular Court was exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction. We do not think that the interpretation put by the Bombay High Court on the observations in Nobin Kristo's case was quite apposite. The test which was applied in that case may not be strictly speaking attracted in the case of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction over the Court of Session in the Original Side of this Court. We do not think that the very observations of the Bombay High Court may be accepted.

    13. It is sufficient for our present purpose if we come to the conclusion that under the specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, certain jurisdiction is given to the Bench dealing with criminal matters, and particularly when an appeal under S. 411-A is being heard to exercise jurisdiction under the revisionary powers. There are certain anomalies no doubt, as have been pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel.

    14. Even if there be any doubt about the extent of the jurisdiction of this Court under the revisionary powers, there is no doubt that under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, it has the power to pass a proper order when a manifest injustice is being done. Therefore, even if there had been any doubt as to the applicability of Section 433 of the Cr PC, we can have no doubt whatsoever that the Court has, in the absence of any direct provisions in the Code, the inherent power to adopt a procedure to secure the ends of justice. This inherent power had always been recognised even before the introduction of Section 561-A of the Cr PC, S. 561-A merely gives recognition to the existence of the inherent power of the Court in criminal matters. Vide Pratul Chandra v. Commandant, Hijli Detention Camp, 61 cal. 197, Bogers v. Srinivas, 42 Bom. L.R 478 and Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed, 47 Bom. L.R 245 (P.C).

    15. When we were considering the appeal by Parvati Devi we came to the definite conclusion that there was no evidence on the record which would justify a conviction for conspiracy as between Parvati Devi and Shew Nath. It is not only in the exercise of the inherent power, but we consider it to be the duty of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in such a manner that manifest injustice may not be continued to be perpetrated. It does not matter that Shew Nath has not appealed. This matter having come to the notice of the Court, we think that we have got sufficient jurisdiction under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 561-A of the Cr PC, to pass appropriate orders in the case of Shew Nath also. For the reasons given above, we make this Rule absolute. We direct that Shew Nath Shaw be acquitted and set at liberty.

    Lahiri, J.:— I agree.

    A/V.S.B

    16. Rule made absolute.

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    Parbati Devi v. The State
    (Sep 4, 1951)