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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 105 of Order XXI
  • Rule 1 to Rule 104 of Order XXI.
  • Rule 65. Rule 106(1) of Order XXI
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Rule 15. Rule 15 of Order XXXII
  • Order XXI, Rule 106(3). Ext. P1
  • Rule 105(3) of Order XXI, CPC
  • Rule 106(3) of Order XXI
  • Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 105
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 106
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 105
  • Rule 15 of Order XXXII
  • Order IX Rule 13, CPC
  • Order IX, Rule 13,
  • Rule 15 of Order
  • Order IX, Rule 7,
  • sub-rule (4)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 105 of Order XXI
  • Rule 1 to Rule 104 of Order XXI.
  • Rule 65. Rule 106(1) of Order XXI
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Rule 15. Rule 15 of Order XXXII
  • Order XXI, Rule 106(3). Ext. P1
  • Rule 105(3) of Order XXI, CPC
  • Rule 106(3) of Order XXI
  • Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 105
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 106
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 105
  • Rule 15 of Order XXXII
  • Order IX Rule 13, CPC
  • Order IX, Rule 13,
  • Rule 15 of Order
  • Order IX, Rule 7,
  • sub-rule (4)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition under Article 227 challenges two orders, Ext. P1 and Ext. P2, passed by the execution Court in execution proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent, South Indian Bank, against the 1st judgment-debtor. Ext. P1 is a common order dismissing applications for setting aside an ex parte order and for condonation of delay. Ext. P2 is an order rejecting an execution application filed by the petitioner seeking impleadment as the next friend of the 1st judgment-debtor on grounds of alleged mental infirmity. The petitioner contests both orders in this writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution Court was justified in dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order and refusing condonation of delay under Rule 105(3) and Rule 106(3) of Order XXI, CPC.
  2. Whether the Court erred in rejecting the application for impleadment as next friend of the 1st judgment-debtor without conducting a judicial enquiry under Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC regarding alleged mental infirmity.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The learned counsel contended that the dismissal of the application on the ground of delay was unjustified as there was no actual delay; the condonation application was filed as a precaution.
  • It was argued that ex parte orders under Rule 105(3) of Order XXI, CPC refer only to orders finally disposing of execution petitions, not interim ex parte orders at earlier stages.
  • The limitation period under Rule 106(3) applies only to final orders, not to interim ex parte orders.
  • A parallel was drawn between applications under Order IX Rule 13 and Rule 7, submitting limitation applies only to the former, not the latter.
  • The petitioner asserted a right to participate in further execution proceedings despite the ex parte order.
  • Regarding Ext. P2, reliance was placed on precedents (Balakrishnan v. Kalliyani and Syed Hassan Baffakki Thangal v. Kalliath Thazha Chirutha) to assert that the Court was obliged under Order XXXII, Rule 15 to conduct an enquiry into the petitioner's alleged mental infirmity before rejecting the next friend application.

Respondent Bank's Arguments

  • The Bank's counsel argued that having filed for condonation of delay, the petitioner cannot now claim absence of delay.
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to execution applications; thus, the Ext. P1 order dismissing the application on limitation grounds was correct.
  • Regarding Ext. P2, the Bank contended there was no material before the Court to prove mental infirmity or ongoing treatment of the petitioner.
  • The Bank alleged collusion between the petitioner and the 2nd judgment-debtor (petitioner's wife) to delay execution proceedings and frustrate the decree-holder's rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balakrishnan v. Kalliyani (AIR 1957 Kerala 51) Requirement of judicial enquiry under Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC in cases of alleged mental infirmity Supported the obligation of the Court to conduct enquiry before rejecting next friend application
Syed Hassan Baffakki Thangal v. Kalliath Thazha Chirutha (AIR 1988 Kerala 160) Judicial enquiry for persons alleged to be incapable due to mental infirmity under Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC Reinforced the principle that a Court must conduct enquiry before denying protection to mentally infirm persons

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court distinguished between applications under Order IX, Rule 13 and those under Rule 7, recognizing the former as seeking cancellation of decrees and the latter as seeking cancellation of ex parte orders setting aside participation in proceedings. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that no limitation period applies to applications under Rule 7, holding that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, prescribing a three-year limitation, governs such applications.

The Court interpreted Rule 105(3) of Order XXI as applying to all ex parte orders, whether final or interim, and observed that Rule 106(3) prescribes limitation for setting aside such orders. The Court found no power in the execution Court to condone delay under this rule, thus upholding Ext. P1.

However, the Court accepted the petitioner's submission that an ex parte order setting the judgment-debtor ex parte on a particular application does not bar participation in other proceedings in the execution petition, depending on the nature of the matter.

Regarding Ext. P2, the Court held that the application filed should have been treated as one for appointment of guardian rather than next friend, as next friends are appointed for plaintiffs or decree-holders, not judgment-debtors. The Court found the rejection of the application without conducting any enquiry under Order XXXII, Rule 15 improper.

The Court noted that the execution Court erred in relying on the absence of medical evidence, the non-filing of a similar petition by the spouse, and the petitioner's locus standi without conducting the mandatory enquiry. The Court emphasized that upon receiving information or affidavit alleging mental infirmity, the Court must conduct a judicial enquiry, including appearance of the person concerned and possibly medical examination, before concluding on capacity to litigate.

Accordingly, the Court set aside Ext. P2 and directed the execution Court to decide the application afresh following the prescribed enquiry procedure.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed.

The Court upheld Ext. P1, dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order on limitation grounds, thereby affirming the execution Court's order on condonation of delay. However, Ext. P2 was set aside for failure to conduct the mandatory judicial enquiry under Order XXXII, Rule 15 regarding alleged mental infirmity of the 1st judgment-debtor. The execution Court was directed to reconsider the application after conducting the necessary enquiry.

This decision directly affects the parties by affirming the limitation principles applicable to execution applications and ensuring procedural safeguards for persons alleged to be mentally infirm. No new precedent beyond the application of existing rules and principles was established.

    C.L Cleetus v. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Anr.

    1. The 1st judgment-debtor in a decree obtained by the 1st respondent, the South Indian Bank impugns in this writ petition filed under Article 227, Exts. P1 and P2 orders passed by the execution Court. Ext. P1 is the common order passed on execution applications for setting aside ex parte order and for condonation of delay. Ext. P2 is the order passed on an execution application filed by the signatory to this writ petition seeking his impleadment as the next friend of the 1st judgment-debtor.

    2. I have heard the submissions of Mr. T. Krishnanunni, learned counsel for the petitioner and also those of Sri K. Prabhakaran, learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent Bank.

    3. Sri T. Krishnanunni would flay both Ext. P1 and Ext. P2. As regards Ext. P1, the learned counsel would submit that the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in dismissing the applications filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay. There really was no delay and the condonation application was filed only by way of abundant caution. According to the learned counsel, ex parte orders contemplated under Rule 105(3) of Order XXI, CPC are orders finally disposing of the execution petition and not orders setting the judgment debtor ex parte at some earlier stage of the execution proceeding. Period of limitation prescribed by Rule 106(3) of Order XXI applies only in respect of ex parte orders finally disposing of the execution proceedings. Learned counsel drew a parallel between applications filed on the original side under Order IX Rule 13, CPC and those filed under Order IX, Rule 7. Counsel submitted that the period of limitation applies only in respect of applications filed under Order IX, Rule 13 and not in respect of applications filed under Order IX, Rule 7. Counsel would further submit that at any rate the petitioner should be permitted to participate in the further proceedings in the Execution Petition.

    4. As regards Ext. P2, Mr. Krishnanunni would rely on the judgments of this Court in Balakrishnan… v. Kalliyani…. (AIR 1957 Kerala 51) and in Syed Hassan Baffakki Thangal v. Kalliath Thazha Chirutha (AIR 1988 Kerala 160) and submit that it was obligatory under Order XXXII, Rule 15, CPC that the Court conducted an enquiry as to whether the petitioner had become incapable due to any mental infirmity of protecting his interest in the litigation.

    5. Sri. K. Prabhakaran, Standing Counsel for the decree-holder-Bank, resisting the submissions of Mr. Krishnanunni would submit that having filed an application for condonation of delay, it is futile for the petitioner to contend that there was no delay. The position of law is trite that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to execution applications and therefore Ext. P1 order is perfectly in order. As regards Ext. P2, the learned Standing Counsel would support Ext. P2 on the various reasons stated in Ext. P2 itself. No material has been placed before the Court below to prove that the petitioner has any mental ailment or that he is underdoing treatment for several years. The present move is a collusive affair between the petitioner and the 2nd judgment-debtor, the petitioner's own wife to protract the execution proceedings to the maximum extent possible so that the decree-holder Bank can be prevented from securing the fruits of the decree.

    6. It is difficult to accept Mr. Krishnanunni's arguments in respect of Ext. P1 order. It is true that there is distinction between applications which are filed under Order IX, Rule 13 and those filed under Order IX, Rule 7, in that While the former seeks cancellation of decrees, finally disposing of suits, the latter seeks cancellation of only orders setting the applicant ex parte, thus preventing him from participating in further proceedings in the suit. It is also true that unlike applications under Order IX, Rule 13, there is no article in the Limitation Act providing any specific period of limitation for applications under Order IX, Rule 7. But Mr. Krishnanunni's argument that since no time limit is specifically provided in the Limitation Act for filing applications under Order IX, Rule 7, such applications can be filed at any time cannot be accepted. Such applications, in my opinion, will be governed by Article 137, the residuary article which prescribes a period of three years. Mr. Krishnanunni's argument was that sub-rule (3) of Rule 105 of Order XXI deals only with orders finally disposing of execution petitions and not orders passed at various earlier stages of the execution proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the word “application” used in Rule 105 refers only to execution petitions and not to execution applications. The above argument is to be repelled straightway since sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 speaks clearly of applications “under any of the foregoing rules”, i.e Rule 1 to Rule 104 of Order XXI. The Civil Rules of Practice which regulates the procedure and practice of subordinate civil Courts in the State gives an inclusive definition for the word “application” which takes in execution petitions, execution applications, cheque applications and interlucutory applications, whether oral or written. Rule 105 deals with the hearing of applications which can either be the main execution petition or an execution application. The Rule says that if the opposite party who has been issued with notice fails to appear, the Court shall hear the application ex parte and proceed to pass any order deemed fit. These orders, according to me, can be orders finally disposing of the execution petition or orders deciding any specific issue, say, regarding the executability of the decree which is often decided on the basis of objections filed by judgment-debtors in response to notice under Rule 22 or the liability for arrest often decided pursuant to notice under Rule 37 or even settlement of draft proclamation decided in response to notice under Rule 65. Rule 106(1) of Order XXI contemplates cancellation of all types of ex parte orders passed under Rule 105(3) and orders for default passed under Rule 105(2). It follows therefore that the period of limitation prescribed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 106 applies to applications submitted by petitioner for setting aside ex parte orders passed against him at any given stage of the proceedings. The position could have been different under the old Rule 105 which had sub-rule (4) also in it. But in view of the existing rule position, the execution Court has no power to condone the delay caused in the matter of filing applications under Order XXI, Rule 106(3). Ext. P1 therefore does not suffer from any infirmity and is only to be approved.

    7. However, Mr. Krishnanunni's further argument that at any rate the order setting the 1st judgment-debtor ex parte cannot preclude him from participating in further proceedings in the execution petition on matters not concluded by the ex parte order can be accepted. It is clear from sub-rule (3) of Rule 105 itself that the consequence of the failure of a party, to appear before the Court at the time of hearing of an application is that the application concerned will be heard and decided: ex parte. Whether a judgment-debtor who has thus been set ex parte should be allowed to participate in the further proceedings in the execution petition will depend on the nature of the application or the matter regarding which the notice was given to him. For e.g, if the notice received by the judgment-debtor at the hearing of which he remained ex parte was one under Rule 22 regarding the executability of the decree, an ex parte order passed against him in the matter of that notice will not preclude him from participating in further proceedings in the execution petition where the decree is sought to be executed by various modes such as arrest, attachment, sale, delivery etc. The said order will preclude him only from raising contest regarding executability. In the instant case, I am told that the notice at the hearing of which the petitioner was set ex parte was one regarding settlement of a draft proclamation for sale and the ex parte order will not preclude him from raising contentions which are legally available to any other judgment-debtor at the time of sale, notwithstanding settlement of proclamation.

    8. The challenge against Ext. P2 stands on a different footing. As already stated, the application submitted by the signatory to the writ petition was one seeking his impleadment as the next friend of the 1st judgment-debtor on the reason that the 1st judgment-debtor has become incapable of protecting his interest by reason of mental infirmity. Though the prayer in the application was couched in that manner, the application should have been construed as one for appointment of guardian for the 1st judgment-debtor, since appointment of next friend is contemplated when plaintiffs or decree-holders file suits or execution petitions and not when defendants or judgment-debtors defend suits or execution petitions filed against them. In fact, Courts do not ordinarily appoint next friends. Courts only grant permission to person to sue on behalf of minors and persons having mental infirmity as their next friends.

    9. It is seen from Ext. P2 that a contention was raised that the application is not maintainable since security has not been furnished by the next friend under Order XXXII, Rule 2A and that contention has apparently found favour with the Court. It should have been noticed that Order XXXII, Rule 2A does not have any application in this case where somebody seeks permission on behalf of a person allegedly under mental infirmity. Even though under Rule 15 of Order XXXII all the earlier rules in that order relating to minors have been made applicable to persons of unsound mind also, Rule 2A which deals with furnishing of security for costs is expressly excluded. Even otherwise, the question of furnishing security by the next friend will arise only after permission is given by the Court to the next friend for instituting a given proceeding on behalf of the concerned minor and not earlier.

    10. Three other reasons which weighed with the learned Subordinate Judge for dismissing the application and passing Ext. P2 were that no medical evidence has been produced to show that the 1st judgment-debtor is suffering from any mental ailment and that the 2nd judgment-debtors, his wife has not chosen to file a like petition and that the signatory to the present writ petition who is a stranger has no locus standi to file the application. These reasons should not have deterred the Court from following the mandates of Rule 15. Rule 15 of Order XXXII contemplates an enquiry by the Court also in respect of persons who are alleged to be incapable of protecting their interest on account of any mental infirmity. When the Court is informed by affidavit or otherwise that a person has become insane or incapable by reason of mental infirmity and therefore is unable to protect his interest himself, it is obligatory that the Court conducts a judicial enquiry with notice to the person concerned or any other person competent to represent on his behalf. In this case, no enquiry has been conducted by the Court and the Court has ignored the information furnished to the Court through the affidavit in support of the present application at the threshold. The legal position in that regard is trite and is covered by various pronouncements including those cited at the Bar by Mr. Krishnanunni, such as Balakrishnan… v. Kalliyani…. (AIR 1957 Kerala 51) and Syed Hassan Baffakki Thangal v. Kalliath Thazha Chirutha (AIR 1988 Kerala 160). The ideal course would have been to direct the appearance of the 1st judgment-debtor allegedly under mental infirmity and the Court conducts a voir dire by putting questions to him so as to verify whether there is any substance in the information furnished to the Court by the self-styled next friend. The Court also could have directed production of documentary evidence regarding the alleged mental illness of the 1st judgment-debtor, as yet another preliminary step in the enquiry under Rule 15 of Order XXXII. Without holding at least an initial equiry as suggested above, the Court should not have concluded that the 1st judgment-debtor is capable of protecting his interest in the litigation. If the initial enquiry reveals that there is no truth at all in the information conveyed to the Court regarding the mental health or capacity of the petitioner, the Court can very well dismiss the application. But if in that enquiry it is revealed that there is warrant for further enquiry, the Court can hold such further enquiry deemed fit, i.e by referring the alleged insane/infirm person to a medical board etc. before coming to final conclusions and granting the permission sought for.

    11. Ext. P2 in as much as the same is not preceded by any enquiry is liable to be set aside. The same is set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge is directed to take fresh decision on the application in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.

    The writ petition is allowed as above. No costs.

    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    C.L Cleetus v. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Anr.
    (Jul 3, 2007)