AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provision of the Benami Transanctions (Prohibition) Act of 1988, Act
  • provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.7.
  • provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
  • S. 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provision of the Benami Transanctions (Prohibition) Act of 1988, Act
  • provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.7.
  • provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
  • S. 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988,
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from O.S. No. 265 of 1978 (Munsiff's Court, Cannanore) concerning 36 cents of land in R.S. No. 69/6, Elavoor Amsom, Chovva Desom. The plaintiff alleged title and possession of the entire 36 cents, including a "samadhi sthanamnagam" (place of worship) on the eastern side, claiming continuous possession for about 50 years and that income from the property funded religious ceremonies there. In 1967 an R.C.C. building was erected at the place of worship. The defendants are the widow and son of Chaliloth Krishnan, who, they assert, acquired the property through transactions traced back to partition and successive transfers (including Ext. A11 dated 23-11-1961 to Yesodha and Ext. A12 dated 4-12-1961 to Krishnan).

The plaintiff amended the plaint to add paragraph 5a, alleging that the deed in favour of Krishnan (4-12-1961) had not come into effect, that Krishnan never enjoyed or possessed the property, and that any title in his name was lost by adverse possession and limitation. After the plaintiff's death, her children were impleaded as legal representatives. The Munsiff's Court entered a decree in terms of the plaint and granted a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants. The Sub-Court, Tellicherry, on appeal, affirmed that finding of possession and confirmed the injunction. The defendants (appellants here) challenge those judgments and decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents (the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff) are entitled to raise a plea that Exts. A11 and A12 are invalid because they were benami or sham transactions in view of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which came into force on 19-5-1988.
  2. Whether the findings of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff was in possession (and the consequent decree and permanent prohibitory injunction) are sustainable on the evidence before the courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The appellants contended that the findings of possession by the courts below are clearly illegal and unsustainable.
  • They referred to and relied upon the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, to rebut the plaintiff's case that Exts. A11 and A12 did not confer title on Krishnan.
  • Factual contention: the property originally belonged to Chaliloth Ramunni (per partition/final decree in O.S. No. 123 of 1945), passed through sale to Yesodha and then to Krishnan by Ext. A12; after Krishnan's death the property devolved on his wife and son, and the plaintiff was never in possession.
  • Defendants also asserted that Krishnan constructed the "samadhi stanam nagam" and that the plaintiff and her children tried to trespass after his death.

Respondents' (Plaintiff-Respondents') Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that the plaint schedule property belonged to the plaintiff and that she had continuous possession for decades, with income used for religious purposes at the samadhi.
  • They alleged that Exts. A11 and A12 were either sham transactions or not effective—i.e., the documents did not operate to transfer title to the persons named in them.
  • At trial P.W.1 (son of the original plaintiff) deposed that Exts. A11 and A12 were executed at the instance of the plaintiff Madhavi and that she paid the consideration; P.W.1 stated the documents were executed in others' names to avoid strangers acquiring the land or to facilitate temple construction.
  • The respondents relied on Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner (AIR 1957 SC 49) to argue the distinction between a benami transaction and a sham transaction, contending their case concerns sham transfers (in which no consideration passed) rather than benami transactions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Velayudhan v. Rajeev, AIR 1989 Kerala 12 : (1988) 2 Ker LJ 271 Interpreted Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, holding that the prohibition on suits/defences in respect of benami property applies even to suits pending when the provision came into force and that courts must consider and disallow a benami defence at every stage. The court expressed respectful agreement with this decision and applied its principle to conclude that Section 4, as interpreted in Velayudhan, prevents the respondents from relying on a benami defence to recover property or to deny title of the named assignee.
Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner, AIR 1957 SC 49 Defined the term "benami" and distinguished two classes: (i) genuine transactions where the named transferee is a benamidar of the real purchaser (where inquiry into who paid consideration is relevant), and (ii) sham transactions where the transferor never intended to pass title (where the issue is whether any consideration was paid). The respondents relied on this definition to argue their case was of a sham transfer, not benami. The court considered the distinction but concluded, on the pleadings and evidence, that the respondents had in fact set up a case of benami (i.e., property transferred to one person for consideration paid by another), making Section 4 applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the factual matrix, the pleadings, and the evidence led at trial and on appeal. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court had found in favour of the plaintiff on possession, principally based on documents and evidence showing plaintiff's involvement in construction of the "samadhi stanam nagam" and P.W.1's testimony.

The appellate scrutiny focused on whether the plaintiffs' factual case amounted to a plea of benami such that Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, would bar the suit or the defence. The court observed that:

  • The plaintiff's pleadings and evidence (including P.W.1's testimony) indicated that Exts. A11 (transfer to Yesodha) and A12 (transfer to Krishnan) were executed at the instance of the plaintiff Madhavi and that Madhavi had paid the consideration for these transactions.
  • Although the plaint did not initially plead the transactions as benami, the amended pleadings and trial evidence effectively set up the case that the named transferees were not the real purchasers—i.e., that the transfers were to persons in whose names property was held but the consideration was paid by another (fitting the definition of "benami transaction" under Section 2(a) of the Act: "any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person").
  • Section 4 of the Benami Act prohibits suits or defences to enforce rights in respect of property held benami against persons in whose name the property is held; the court accepted the reasoning in Velayudhan v. Rajeev that Section 4 must be applied to suits pending when the Act came into force and that courts are bound to disallow a benami defence when it is put forward.
  • The respondents had argued, drawing on Sree Meenakshi Mills, that their case was of a sham transaction (where the test is whether any consideration was paid) rather than a benami transaction. The court considered that distinction but concluded that the respondents' own pleadings and evidence established that Madhavi paid consideration and that the transfers were effected in others' names—precisely the pattern the Act describes as a benami transaction.
  • Consequently, the respondents (plaintiff's legal representatives) were held not entitled to base their suit on the alleged benami/sham character of Exts. A11 and A12 in view of Section 4; the court thus found that the plaintiffs' plea that Krishnan did not acquire title under Ext. A12 could not be accepted.
  • On the broader evidentiary record, the court also noted that the documents produced by the plaintiff at best showed participation by the plaintiff and P.W.1 in constructing the samadhi, and there was no evidence that Krishnan had given up his rights over the property. There was material suggesting Krishnan had business and residence ties and that, on his death, the property devolved on his wife and son.

Synthesizing the legal and factual analysis, the court concluded that the trial Court and the appellate Court erred in holding that the plaintiff was in possession and in decreeing relief in her favour.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, and the suit is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree and injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff were set aside; the defendants (successors of Krishnan) prevail and the suit as instituted by the plaintiff (now represented by her legal representatives) is dismissed.
  • Costs: In view of the close relationship between the parties, the court ordered that they shall bear their respective costs.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 as interpreted in Velayudhan v. Rajeev to the facts of this case. The judgment does not state that it establishes a new legal principle beyond applying the existing statutory provision and precedent; its direct consequence is the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on the basis that the pleaded/evidential case amounted to a benami plea barred by Section 4.
Appeal allowed.

    Chaliloth Theroth Mohanan And Another v. Chaliloth Yesoda And Others

    1. The defendants in O.S No. 265 of 1978 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Cannanore are the appellants. The suit relates to 36 cents of land comprised in R.S No. 69/6 in Elavoor Amsom, Chovva Desom. The plaintiff filed a suit alleging that the plaint schedule property belongs to her. There is a “samadhi sthanamnagam” on the eastern side of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff claims title and possession of the entire 36 cents inclusive of this “samadhi stanamnagam”. The plaintiff alleged that she had been in possession of the plaint schedule property for the last 50 years and the income from this property was set apart for the conduct of poojas and other ceremonies in the aforesaid samadhi stanamnagam. In 1967, an R.C.C building was put up in the property at the place of worship according to the wishes of the ‘Gurunadhan’. Religious Ceremonies are being performed in the “samadhi”. Plaintiff further alleged that the defendants have no title or possession over the property. After the filing of the written statement by the defendant, plaintiff amended the plaint and added para 5a to the plaint. An additional prayer for declaration was incorporated in the plaint. In para 5a of the plaint, plaintiff alleged that the document executed in favour of Chaliloth Krishnan on 4-12-1961 in respect of the plaint schedule property had not come into effect and as per that document the property was not intended to be conveyed to the said Krishnanand who never enjoyed or possessed the plaint schedule property. It is also alleged that the title deed, if any, of Krishnan was lost by adverse possession and limitation.

    2. The defendants are the widow and son of Chaliloth Krishnan. They alleged that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Ramunni. He got the same in the partition effected as per final decree in O.S No. 123 of 1945. Ramunni died and his wife and children executed the sale deed in favour of Yesodha. The said Yesodha transferred the property on 4-12-1961 in favour of Krishnan, the husband of 1st defendant. Defendants also alleged that after the death of Krishnan the property devolved on the defendants and the plaintiff was never in possession of the property. They also contended that the deceased Krishnan had constructed the “samadhi stanam nagam” in the plaint schedule property and after the death of Krishnan, the plaintiff and her children tried to trespass into the property.

    3. After the filing of the suit, plaintiff died and her children were impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff. The Munsiff's Court decreed the suit in term of the plaint and a permanent prohibitory injunction was issued against the defendants. Defendants filed appeal before the Sub-Court, Tellicherry and the learned Sub-Judge held that the plaintiff had been in possession of the property and decree for parmanent prohibitory injunction was confirmed. Defendants challenge the judgment and decree passed by the courts below.

    4. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court found that the disputed property has been in the possession of the plaintiff. The finding regarding the possession has been entered on the basis of some documents produced by the plaintiffs. These documents showed that it was at the instance of P.W 1, the son of original plaintiff Madhavi, the “samadhi stanam nagam” was constructed in the eastern side of the property. On the basis of the documents produced by the plaintiff it was held that Krishnan, the husband of 2nd defendant, had no possession over the land. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the finding of the courts below is clearly illegal and the same is not sustainable especially in view of the provision of the Benami Transanctions (Prohibition) Act of 1988, Act No. 45 of 1988.

    5. Admittedly, the disputed plaint schedule property comprised in R.S No. 69/6 of Chovva Desom was allotted to the heirs of one Chaliloth Ramunni as per final decree passed in O.S No. 123 of 1945. Chaliloth Ramunni died and the property devolved on his wife and children and they assigned the property as per Ext. A-11 dt. 23-11-1961 to Yesodha, who is the additional 2nd respondent in the appeal. Yesoda is the daughter of plaintiff Madhavi. Thereafter, Yesoda transferred this property to her brother Krishnan as per Ext. A12 dt. 4-12-1961. The assignee Krishnan is the husband of 2nd defendant Janaki. On the date of Ext. A12 document, plaintiff Madhavi had purchased 36 cents of land under Ext. A10 document from the wife and children of Ramunni. Ext. A10 property is on the northern side of Ext. A12 property. The plaintiffs case is that both Exts. A10 and A12 documents were executed at the instance of plaintiff Madhavi and she paid consideration for both these transactions. Plaintiff would further say that Ext. A11 document, though executed in the name of Yesoda, her daughter in fact consideration was paid by plaintiff. That seems to be the present case of the plaintiff. It is important to note that the plaintiff did not plead any such case in the plaint. However, by an amendment of the plaint, certain additional pleadings were incorporated and even then plaintiff did not specifically allege that plaintiff Madhavi purchased property in the name of Yesoda and that Ext. A12 also was executed at the instance of the plaintiff and that she paid consideration for that. The plaintiff only alleged that Krishnan never possessed or enjoyed this property and even before Ext. A12 sale deed, the property was in continuous enjoyment by the plaintiff along with her northern portion of the property as a single item. At the time of evidence P.W 1 specifically deposed that both Exts. A11 and A12 documents were executed by plaintiff Madhavi and plaintiff Madhavi paid consideration for the Ext. A11 document. P.W 1 deposed that the property was never, in the possession of Yesoda and Ext. A12 document was executed in the name of Krishnan as he was the eldest member of the family. In the cross examination he stated.

    (Matter in vernacular omitted — Ed.)

    (The substance of the same can be translated as follows: The plaintiff purchased the property, in the name of Yesoda to avoid the property being purchased by strangers. This document was executed in the name of eldest member of the family in order to facilitate the construction of the temple. It is not stated in the plaint that property was purchased as benami. He had instructed so. Probably it might have been omitted).

    6. From the pleading and the evidence of the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff has set up a case of benami and according to her Exts. A11 and A12 documents have not come into effect and these are sham transactions and the title still vested with her. The question that Would arise for consideration is whether the present respondents, who are the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff are entitled to raise such a plea in view of S. 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988, came into force on 19-5-1988. The relevant portion of S. 4 reads as follows:

    “4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami. — (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of property held benami against the persons in whose name the property is held or against any other persons shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.

    (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on 1 behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property”.

    It may be noted that this Court in Velayudhan v. Rajeev, AIR 1989 Kerala 12 : (1988) 2 Ker LJ 271, considered the scope and effect of S. 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 on a pending suit and it was held (at p. 18 of AIR):

    “The words no defence; convey an emphasis of extraordinary rigor they rope in all that is within the vision and in the horizon. The succeeding words, ‘shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action’, are equally wide and equally sweeping in their effect and operation. The deprivation of a defence is not confined to a suit hereafter to be filed; it extends to the projected areas of a claim, or an already initiated action. The words ‘no defence shall be allowed’ necessarily mean that no such defence shall be allowed by the Court. The Court, is therefore, bound to consider at every stage, to find out whether there is a defence of benami put forward before it. There is no option left to the court. Plainly, that duty is cast on the Court to be discharged in suits hereafter to be instituted, when such a defence is raised. It is equally there when such defence is noticed in suits already pending”.

    I am in respectful agreement With the above said decision and if the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 are applied to the facts in this case, the plaintiffs plea must fail. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents contended that the plaintiff has not alleged any benami, but in fact, only alleged that Exts. All and A12 transactions are sham documents and that the title never passed to the assignee shown in those documents. Reliance was placed on the decision in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd v. I.T Commr., AIR 1957 SC 49. There the Supreme Court has defined the term ‘Benami’. It was held (at Pp. 66-67):

    “the word benami is used to denote two classes of transactions which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which is real, as for example, when A sells properties to B but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B, X being his benamidar. This is the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the word ‘benami’, is also occasionally used, perhaps not quite accurately, to refer to a sham transaction, as for example, when A purports to sell his property to B without intending that his title should cease or pass to B. The fundamental difference between these two classes of transactions is that whereas in the former there is an operative transfer resulting in the vesting of title in the transferee, in the latter there is none such, the transferor continuing to retain the title notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed. It is only in the former class of cases that it would be necessary, when a dispute arises as to whether the person named in the deed is the real transferee or B, to enquire into the question as to who paid the consideration for the transfer, X or B.

    But in the latter class of cases, when the question is whether the transfer is genuine or sham, the point for decision would be, not: who paid the consideration but whether any consideration was paid”.

    Based on the above decision it was contended that the plaintiff had not set up any case of benami but Exts. A11 and A12 documents are sham documents and have not come into existence. It was contended that Krishnan had not acquired any right over the property under Ext. A12 since that transaction is a sham transaction and the case pleaded by the plaintiff is not benami and this sort of plea is not prohibited by the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.

    7. The above contention cannot be accepted. The specific case of the plaintiff Madhavi is that she purchased the property in the name of Yesoda under Ext. A11 document. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, she is the real owner and Yesoda is only a benamidar. Plaintiffs further case is that Yesoda though executed Ext. A12 benami in favour of Krishnan, it was executed since Krishnan was the eldest member of the family and that the parties never intended to transfer the property in favour of Krishnan. This would show that the plaintiff wanted to set up a case of benami. Moreover, the present contention of the plaintiff that the transaction was not a benami transaction cannot be accepted in view of the definition of the “benami transaction” under S. 2(a) of the said Act. Sec. 2(a) reads as follows:

    “Benami transaction” means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person”.

    Here the case is that the plaintiff paid consideration and that Krishnan never obtained the possession under Ext. A12 transaction. The plaintiff-respondents are not entitled to raise such a plea and the court cannot enforce any right against the defendants on that basis. This is clear from S. 4 of the said Act. Therefore, the plea of the plaintiff that the property did not belong to Krishnan as per Ext. A12 cannot be accepted.

    8. The evidence in this case also would show that the plaintiff wanted to deny the rights of the defendants. The property was purchased from Yesoda by Krishnan in 1961. Admittedly Krishnan was having some business. Even during the last period of his life Krishnan was running a shop. After the death of Krishnan, the property devolved on his wife and son. The documents produced by the plaintiff, would only go to show that the plaintiff and her children, who constructed the “samadhi sthanam nagam” on the eastern side of the property. Krishnan being the son the Plaintiff might have allowed Krishnan and others to construct the “samadhi sthanam nagam” on the property. The defendants have produced documents to prove that they have purchased the tenancy right in respect of this property. There is also evidence to show that Krishnan was for sometime residing in the house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was residing on the northern side of the property. The Commission report also shows that there was some boundary in between the plaint schedule property and the northern property held by the plaintiff. The courts below were swayed by the plaintiffs documents. They would only show that the plaintiff and P.W 1 spent some amount and actively participated in constructing the “samadhi sthanam nagam”. There is absolutely nothing in evidence to show that Krishnan gave up his rights in respect of this property.

    The trial Court as well as the appellate Court seriously erred in finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the property. After the death of plaintiff the property devolved on the defendants. Therefore the suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed I set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. In view of the close relationship between the parties I order that they shall bear their respective costs. The appeal is allowed and the suit will stand dismissed.

    Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Chaliloth Theroth Mohanan And Another v. Chaliloth Yesoda And Others
    (Mar 21, 1989)