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Case Number

Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 380 of 1967 and Original Petn. No. 563 of 1968

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: K. Chandrasekharan, T. Chandrasekhara Menon, Advocates.
For the Respondent: Advocate General, State Prosecutor.

Judges

T.C Raghavan, J.

Acts

clause A.14 Appendix B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955.
clause A.14 Appendix B of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.3.
Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. A.14
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,
Section 13(3)). Sub-section (5) of Section 13
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
sub-section (5) of Section 13

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, owner of a tea factory, was charged with selling tea adulterated by the addition of a prohibited coal‑tar dye. He was convicted under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to rigorous imprisonment for nine months and a fine of Rs. 1,000. The Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal.

The factual sequence leading to prosecution, as set out in the opinion, is:

On 28 January 1967 a Food Inspector visited the petitioner's tea factory and purchased 375 grams of tea dust from stock exposed for sale.
The sample was divided into three parts, packed and sealed in three bottles: one bottle given to the petitioner, one sent to the Public Analyst the same day, and one retained by the Food Inspector.
The Public Analyst’s report (Ex. P6) bears a signature dated 7 May 1967. Prosecution was initiated on 4 July 1967 and prosecution witnesses examined on 15 July 1967.
On 18 July 1967 the sample was sent to the Central Food Laboratory at the instance of the petitioner; the Director’s certificate (Ex. C1) is dated 10 August 1967.

The primary question argued before the court was the validity and effect of the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (Ex. C1) in relation to the Public Analyst’s report (Ex. P6) and whether the certificate could be treated as conclusive evidence of adulteration.

Legal Issues Presented

What is the legal effect of a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (Ex. C1) vis‑à‑vis a report by the Public Analyst (Ex. P6) under Section 13(3) and sub‑section (5) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act?
Does the proviso to sub‑section (5) of Section 13 render the Director’s certificate final and conclusive as to both the facts (data) and the opinion derived therefrom, or only as to the facts stated in the certificate?
Where the Public Analyst’s report and the Director’s certificate conflict on analytical data (including presence or absence of added colouring matter), can the court safely convict for adulteration on the basis of the Director’s certificate?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner

The opinion records that "the main question argued" before the court related to the validity, effect, etc., of the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (i.e., the petitioner challenged the legal effect and reliability of Ex. C1).
The petitioner exercised the statutory right to have the sample tested at the Central Food Laboratory; this procedural step is part of the factual background relevant to the petitioner's challenge.

Food Inspector / Prosecution

The counsel for the Food Inspector argued that once the Director’s certificate has superseded the Public Analyst’s report, the Public Analyst's report "can no more be looked into" even for ascertaining the reliability of the certificate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
P.K. Ali v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry, 1967 Ker LT 1095	Referred to in support of the proposition regarding the evidentiary status of analyst reports and certificates under Section 13(5) — that what is relevant as evidence are the facts (data) stated and not the analyst's opinion.	The court cited this decision as one of several to support its interpretation that sub‑section (5) makes the facts stated in reports/certificates admissible, and that the certificate of the Director has statutory finality as to the facts stated therein.
Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur v. Ram Niwas, AIR 1964 All 349	Referred to for the same general proposition about admissibility and the nature of evidentiary effect of analyst reports/certificates under the Act.	The court listed this case among authorities which may be referred to in support of its textual interpretation of sub‑section (5) and its proviso.
Mohanlal Chhaganlal Mithaiwala v. Vipanchandra R. Gandhi, AIR 1962 Guj 44	Referred to both for the general proposition on reports/certificates and specifically in the opinion as an authority indicating that if the court decides to act on a certificate, it must accept the data as final while other evidence on adulteration may still be allowed.	The court relied on this decision to explain that the proviso to sub‑section (5) does not necessarily bar the admission of other evidence on the question whether the sample is adulterated when acting upon the Director’s certificate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s analysis proceeded in distinct steps, limited to the material and legal text provided in the opinion:

Comparative analysis of standards and reports:
- The court divided A.14 of Appendix B (the tea standard) into two parts for analysis: (i) clauses (a) to (f) dealing with numerical/physical standards and (ii) the clause prohibiting any added colouring matter.
- It compared the Public Analyst’s report (Ex. P6) with A.14 and found that the numeric data given in Ex. P6 satisfied the requirements of the first part (clauses (a) to (f)), while Ex. P6 explicitly reported the presence of a non‑permitted orange coal‑tar dye (i.e., failure as to the colouring matter prohibition). The Public Analyst’s opinion saying the sample “does not conform to the standards … and is therefore Adulterated” was observed to erroneously relate to the first part, since the data met that part’s requirements; the Public Analyst was, however, correct that a prohibited coal‑tar dye was present.
- In contrast, the Director’s certificate (Ex. C1) displayed different analytical data: it recorded that added colouring matter was absent, but that certain numeric parameters (clauses (a) to (e)) did not meet the prescribed standards (e.g., certain percentages were higher or lower than allowed).
Statutory framework and effect of reports/certificates:
- Under Section 11 the sample must be divided into three parts (Public Analyst, Food Inspector, vendor). The prosecution relies on the Public Analyst’s report. During trial either the Food Inspector or the accused can have their sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory and obtain a certificate from its Director (Section 13(2)).
- Section 13(3) provides that a certificate obtained from the Director supersedes the report of the Public Analyst. Sub‑section (5) states that documents purporting to be a report signed by a Public Analyst or a certificate signed by the Director may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein, and the proviso declares that a Director’s certificate shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
- The court interpreted sub‑section (5) to mean that what is admissible and relevant from both the report and the certificate is the factual data (results of analysis), not the analyst’s or director’s opinion. The proviso makes the facts stated by the Director final and conclusive for the purpose of obviating the need to call the Director as a witness and to prevent protraction of proceedings. The Director cannot normally be called as a witness; the Public Analyst can be.
- However, the court emphasized that the certificate’s statutory finality applies only to the data or facts stated in it. Whether the certificate is reliable evidence and whether, on the basis of those facts, the sample is adulterated are questions for the court to decide. If the court chooses to act on the certificate it must accept the data found by the Director as final and conclusive; but other evidence on adulteration may still be admitted.
Application to the facts of this case:
- There was a direct conflict between two expert analyses: the Public Analyst (Ex. P6) found a prohibited coal‑tar dye present but otherwise recorded data satisfying the numeric standards; the Director (Ex. C1) found no added colouring matter but recorded numeric deviations from clauses (a) to (e).
- Microscopic examination in both reports indicated the sample consisted of tea only (no extraneous structures).
- The court found it difficult to treat Ex. C1 as reliable evidence regarding the factual data because of the conflict between two expert analyses and the fact that the Director’s examination occurred approximately six and a half months after the original sampling, raising the possibility that ash content and related measures might have changed with the lapse of time.
- The court rejected the Food Inspector’s contention that, because the Director’s certificate superseded the Public Analyst’s report, the latter could not be considered even for assessing the certificate’s reliability. The court held it unsafe to convict the petitioner for adulteration on the basis of the conflicting certificate and report in these circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the revision petition: the conviction and sentence of the petitioner were set aside and the petitioner was acquitted. The writ petition (which had been filed but was not pressed following the acquittal) was dismissed without costs.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s conviction under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a) and the sentence of nine months rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 1,000 fine were set aside; the petitioner was acquitted.
On evidentiary law under the Act: The opinion clarifies the court's understanding of Section 13(3) and sub‑section (5): a Director’s certificate is final and conclusive as to the factual data it records (to avoid calling the Director and to prevent delay), but the certificate’s overall reliability and whether the data establish adulteration remain matters for the court to decide. The court may consider conflicting expert reports and other relevant circumstances (including delay between sampling and subsequent testing) before convicting.
No broader or novel precedent was expressly declared beyond the court’s application and interpretation of Section 13(3) and sub‑section (5) to the facts: the immediate legal consequence was the acquittal of the petitioner, and the opinion emphasizes caution where conflicting expert analyses and time lapses raise doubts about the Director’s certificate as reliable proof of adulteration.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Revision petition allowed." (The conviction and sentence are set aside and the petitioner is acquitted.)

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M.A Thomas, v. P.J Abraham And Another,

1. The petitioner, the owner of a tea factory, has been convicted under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 9 months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate; and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge. The charge against the petitioner was that he sold tea adulterated by adding prohibited coal-tar dye. The Food Inspector visited the tea factory on 28th January, 1967 and purchased 375 grams of tea dust from a stock stored and exposed for sale. The sample was divided into three parts and packed and sealed in three clean dry bottles; one bottle was handed over to the petitioner, another was sent to the Public Analyst the same day and the third was retained with the Food Inspector. The report of the Public Analyst (Ex. P6) appears to have been signed on 7th May, 1967; and the prosecution was started on 4th July, 1967. The prosecution witnesses were examined on 15th July; and thereafter, the petitioner applied for having his sample tested by the Central Food Laboratory. On 18th July, the sample was sent to the Central Food Laboratory; and Ex. C1 dated 10th August, 1967, is the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Several contentions have been raised and have also been considered by the Lower Courts. Before me the main question argued relates to the validity, effect, etc., of the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory.

2. The standard that tea has to satisfy is prescribed by A.14 in Appendix B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. A.14 is as follows:

“Tea means tea derived exclusively from the leaves, buds and tender stems of plants of the Camellia genus and tea species. It shall conform to the following specifications:

(a) Total ash deter-mined on tea dried to constant weight at 100°C. 5.0 to 8.0 per cant (b) Total ash soluble in boiling distilled water. Not lees than 40.0 per cent of total ash. (c) Ash insoluble in HCI Not more than 1.0 per cent (d) Extract obtained by boiling dry tea (dried at constant weight at 100°C.) with 100 parts of distilled water for one hour under reflux. Not less than 85 per cent.

(e) Alkalinity of soluble ash. Not less than 1.8 per cent, and not more than 2 per cent, expressed as K2O. (f) Grade fibre. Not more than 15 per cent.

It shall not contain any added colouring matter.”

Ex. P6, the report of the Food Analyst, discloses:

“Microscopic examination: The sample consists of tea only. Total ash determined on tea dried to the constant weight at 100°C. 8.0 per cent Alkalinity of soluble ash. 2.0 per cent as K2O Water soluble ash. 61.6 per cent of the total ash. Ash insoluble in HCI 0.2 per cent Crude fibre. 11.2 per cent Aqueous extract obtained by boiling dry sample (dried to constant weight at 100°C) with hundred parts of distilled water for one hour under reflux. 35.5 per cent A non-permitted orange coal-tar dye. Present.

and (I) am of the opinion that the said sample does not conform to the standards prescribed for tea under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and is therefore Adulterated. I am further of opinion that the Sample contains coal-tar dye. The addition of coal-tar dye to tea is prohibited as per clause A.14 Appendix B of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.”

3. The relevant portion of the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (Ex. C1) shows:

“Total ash (on dry weight basis). 8.7 per cent. Ash soluble in boiling distilled water. 82.9 per cent of total ash. Ash insoluble in HCI. 1.7 per cent. Alkalinity of soluble ash. 1.15 per cent as K2O. Hot water extract (on dry weight basis). 81.8 per cent. Crude fibre. 13.4 per cent. Added colouring matter. Absent. Microscopic examination. Structures other than tea are absent.

Opinion: The sample of tea is adulterated.”

4. I have quoted the above extracts in extenso as I feel that, for a proper appreciation of the discussion hereinafter, the extracts are essential.

5. For the purpose of comparison of the aforesaid three extracts, I shall treat clauses (a) to (f) in A.14 as one part and the portion relating to the colouring matter as another part. Now, comparing A.14 and Ex. P6, what appears is that all the requirements of the first part of A.14 are satisfied by the data given in Ex. P6 relating to that part. On the second part, Ex. P6 says that non-permitted orange coal-tar dye is present Again, the result of microscopic examination is that the sample contains tea only. In the opinion portion of Ex. P6, the Public Analyst says that “the sample does not conform to the standards prescribed for tea under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and is therefore adulterated”. This obviously relates to the first part in A.14; and this opinion of the Public Analyst appears to be wrong, because, as I have already pointed out, all the requirements of the first part of A.14 have been satisfied by the data relating to the same in Ex. P6. The Public Analyst then says that “the sample contains coal-tar dye: the addition of coal-tar dye to tea is prohibited as per clause A.14 Appendix B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955”. Here the Public Analyst is right.

6. Now, I shall compare Ex. C1 with A.14 Ex. C1 shows that on microscopic examination, no structures other than those of tea are present: it also discloses that crude fibre, one of the requirements in the first part of A14, is less than 15 per cent. The sample however does not satisfy the standards prescribed by cls. (a) to (e) in the first part of A.14 On the second part relating to the addition of colouring matter, Ex. C1 says that there is no added colouring matter. (It may be remembered at this stage that the charge against the petitioner was that he sold tea adulterated by the addition of prohibited coal-tar dye).

7. Under Section 11 of the Act the sample taken has to be divided into three parts: one part has to be sent to the Public Analyst another has to be kept with the Food Inspector and the third has to be given to the vendor. The prosecution is based on the result of the report of the Public Analyst. During trial, both the Food Inspector and the accused person (the vendor) are given the right to have the samples with them sent to the Central Food Laboratory for test and a certificate from its Director (vide Section 13(2)). When a certificate is obtained from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, the certificate supersedes the report of the Public Analyst (vide Section 13(3)). sub-section (5) of Section 13 then prescribes:

“Any document purporting to be a report signed by a Public Analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-sec. (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act………:

Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein”.

8. Under sub-section (5), both the report of the Public Analyst and the certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein and under the proviso to the sub-section, any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. From the wording of this sub-section, it is clear that what is relevant as evidence in both the report and the certificate are only the facts stated therein, in other words, the data relating to the analysis, and not the opinion of the Analyst or the Director. This is clear from the wording of the sub-section itself and I do not think there is any need for any decision in support thereof. At any rate, P.K Ali v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry, 1967 Ker LT 1095, Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur v. Ram Niwas, AIR 1964 All 349, Mohanlal Chhaganlal Mithaiwala v. Vipanchandra R. Gandhi, AIR 1962 Guj 44 and similar decisions may be referred to.

9. The language of sub-section (5) in relation to the proviso thereto may now be considered. Both the report and the certificate may be used as evidence: this is what the sub-section says. But, when we come to the proviso, it says that the facts contained in the certificate of the Director shall be final and conclusive evidence. I may also reiterate that under sub-section (3) the certificate supersedes the report.

10. In my opinion, the questions that arise when a report or a certificate comes up for consideration are whether it may be admitted in evidence and whether it is reliable. What sub-section (5) does is to make the certificate and the report admissible in evidence: it does not make them reliable evidence. In other words, they are by themselves evidence; and the Analyst or the Director need not be examined before the report or the certificate is admitted in evidence. What the proviso to the sub-section does further is to make the data or the facts found on analysis or test by the Director to be final in my opinion, finality and conclusiveness are enjoined on the certificate of the Director to obviate the necessity of the examination of the Director as a witness and also to prevent the protraction of the proceeding by asking for a further or a better test or analysis. The Public Analyst may be called as a witness; and the court or the parties are not precluded from calling him. On the other hand, the Director of the Central Food Laboratory cannot be called as a witness. If the right to call him as a witness is also given, the proceeding will naturally be protracted. Thus, the purpose of enjoining finality on the report of the Director is only to achieve these ends.

11. Whether the certificate is reliable and good evidence and whether it discloses adulteration are questions to be decided by the Court. On these questions the certificate is not final and conclusive, excepting that, if the court decides to act on the certificate, it has to accept the data found by the Director as a result of his test as final and conclusive; and must then decide whether the sample is adulterated. On the last question, whether there is adulteration on the basis of the data supplied by the Director, even other evidence may be allowed vide, AIR 1962 Guj 44; and the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 13 does not appear to be a bar to this.

12. In this case, both the Lower Courts have held that the report of the Public Analyst has been superseded; and since the certificate of the Director discloses facts which show adulteration, the petitioner is liable to be convicted.

13. Both the Public Analyst and the Director of the Central Food Laboratory are experts; and they use scientific methods to analyse, test and find out the constituents of the samples sent to them. In this case, the analysis by one discloses that the sample contained coal-tar dye: the analysis by the other discloses that the sample did not contain coal-tar dye. The analysis by the former discloses that the constituents mentioned in the first part of A.14 were all satisfied: the analysis by the latter discloses that the constituents or their percentages do not correspond to the standards prescribed by clauses (a) to (e) of the first part of A.14 Microscopic examination by both shows that the samples contained only tea in view of these, I find it difficult to treat the certificate (Ex. CI) as reliable evidence regarding the facts or the data found by analysis by the Director. It is pointed out by the counsel of the Food Inspector that since the certificate has superseded the report, the latter can no more be looked into even for ascertaining whether the certificate is reliable.

14. Even accepting this, what the certificate shows is that nothing was found added in the sample (the sample was tea only and it did not contain added coal-tar dye); and that the percentages of total ash and of ash insoluble in hydro-chloric acid were a little higher than the standards prescribed and the percentages of eilkalinity of soluble ash, of total ash soluble in boiling distilled water and of hot water extract (on dry weight basis) were lower than the prescribed standards. Adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act may be by the addition of baser or cheaper ingredients, by the addition of prohibited colouring matter, by the addition of prohibited preservatives, by not keeping the prescribed standards, by not keeping proper sanitary conditions, etc. In this case, it may be remembered that the charge against the petitioner is that he sold tea adulterated with added coal-tar dye; and that the certificate of the Director discloses that no coal-tar dye was present in the sample. The test by the Director took place about six months and a half after the samples were taken; and there is no knowing whether there was any possibility of the ash content and its alkalinity changing by lapse of time.

15. In view of all the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I feel it is quite unsafe to hold that the tea sold by the petitioner was adulterated.

16. The revision petition is allowed; the conviction and sentence are set aside; and the petitioner is acquitted. In view of the acquittal of the petitioner, the writ petition is not pressed; and the same is dismissed without costs.

MVJ/D.V.C

17. Revision petition allowed.

M.A Thomas, v. P.J Abraham And Another,

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner

Food Inspector / Prosecution

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

M.A Thomas, v. P.J Abraham And Another,

Comments

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