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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants. The suit was to enforce a bond (Ext. A-1) executed by the 1st defendant, with the 2nd defendant as surety, in favour of the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant conducted a kuri; the 1st defendant subscribed for one ticket, bid half-a-ticket and executed Ext. A-1. The 1st defendant defaulted in payment of future instalments on 9-8-1953 (having subscribed for 43 instalments and defaulting from the 44th), and the kuri broke down on account of defaults of the 3rd defendant. According to the 3rd defendant, Rs. 742-8-0 (Rs. 742-50) was due from the 1st defendant.

The plaintiff, also a subscriber in the same kuri, sued the 3rd defendant for money due, obtained a decree, and in execution brought to sale the right under the bond executed by defendants 1 and 2 and other movables of the 3rd defendant and purchased them. The 3rd defendant was declared insolvent in I.P. No. 1/54 and an Official Receiver was appointed.

Before the Receiver, the 1st defendant filed a petition asserting that, if accounts were taken, amounts would be due to him from the insolvent's estate. The Official Receiver passed Ext. B-1 fixing the amount due from the 1st defendant to the insolvent's estate at Rs. 57. Subsequently the order adjudicating the 3rd defendant as insolvent was annulled.

In the suit by the plaintiff to realise the amount under Ext. A-1, the 1st defendant contended the suit was barred by limitation and that only Rs. 57 (as found by the Official Receiver in Ext. B-1) could be recovered. Both courts below held that the plaintiff could recover Rs. 742-50 with interest and decreed the suit. The present appeal challenges that result.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. B-1 (the order of the Official Receiver fixing the amount due from the 1st defendant at Rs. 57) is an "act" within the meaning of Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, and therefore remains valid after annulment of the adjudication.
  2. Whether, in consequence, the plaintiff is limited to recovering only the amount found by the Receiver in Ext. B-1 (Rs. 57) in the suit to enforce Ext. A-1.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The 1st defendant contended the suit was barred by limitation.
  • The 1st defendant also argued that, since Ext. B-1 fixed his liability at Rs. 57, no more than Rs. 57 could be recovered from him under the bond.

Respondent's Arguments

  • It was argued on behalf of the respondent that, under Section 37(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, Ext. B-1 is binding despite annulment of adjudication and thus limits recovery to Rs. 57.
  • Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Venkiteswara Iyer) relied on precedents (Bank of Chettinad v. Saw Yu Byan, Official Receiver v. Succaram, Md. Hussain v. Md. Rowther, Daw Hnit v. Anamalai Chettiar) to submit that an order settling a list of creditors is not an "act" by the Receiver within the meaning of Section 37; thereby suggesting schedules/orders of that nature should not bind creditors after annulment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brandon v. McHenry, 1891-1 QB 538 Held that when a proof in bankruptcy is rejected by the trustee, and the bankruptcy is subsequently annulled, the rejection of the proof remains valid and the amount cannot be recovered; the rejection was an "act" done within the meaning of the corresponding section of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that a rejection/admission by the Receiver is an "act" within the meaning of Section 37 and therefore survives annulment; this case contributed to the court's conclusion that Ext. B-1 is an act of the Official Receiver and remains valid.
Bank of Chettinad v. Saw Yu Byan, AIR 1935 Rang 498 Used by respondent to argue that orders (such as schedules of creditors) become ineffective on annulment and that scheduled creditors revert to plain creditors; observed that a schedule of creditors is "waste paper" after annulment. The court considered the passage quoted from this decision but held that such rulings do not go to the extent of deciding whether rejection or admission of proofs by the Official Receiver is not an "act" under Section 37; the court did not accept that this authority decisively negated the characterisation of admissions/rejections as acts.
Official Receiver v. Succaram, AIR 1935 Rang 328 Discussed the meaning of "all acts theretofore done" as including acts done with a view to making sales and dispositions of property for the benefit of the estate and creditors. The court noted this exposition but treated it as not deciding the narrow question whether the admission/rejection of proofs is an "act" under Section 37; thus the decision did not preclude treating Ext. B-1 as an act of the Receiver.
Md. Hussain v. Md. Rowther, AIR 1953 Mad 620 Relied upon by respondent in support of the general proposition that certain orders relating to schedules may not operate as acts binding after annulment. The court recorded that this authority was cited by respondent but stated that these rulings do not go to the extent of deciding that rejection or admission of proof by the Official Receiver is not an "act" within Section 37.
Daw Hnit v. Anamalai Chettiar, AIR 1938 Rang 335 Also cited by respondent to support the view that certain insolvency orders (schedules) do not operate after annulment in a way that binds creditors. The court observed that this precedent was relied on but concluded it did not decide the specific point whether an admission/rejection of proof by the Receiver is not an "act" under Section 37; it therefore did not prevent the court from holding Ext. B-1 to be an act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory context. It noted that Section 33 requires creditors to tender proofs to the Receiver and that the Receiver must admit or reject proofs. Section 46 contemplates set-off in determining what the insolvent estate can recover. Section 80 grants the Official Receiver power (including to admit or reject proofs) and provides that acts done by the Official Receiver in exercise of those powers shall be deemed acts of the Court.

The short question framed by the court was whether Ext. B-1 is an "act" within the meaning of Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, because Section 37 preserves "all acts theretofore done" on annulment of adjudication. The court examined authority bearing on whether orders or actions by a Receiver (including admission or rejection of proofs) fall within that language.

The court relied on Brandon v. McHenry and the accompanying statement of principle that a trustee's rejection of a proof is an act which remains valid after annulment. The court also cited a doctrinal statement in Mulla's work to the like effect that rejection of a proof by the Official Assignee or Receiver is an "act" not nullified by annulment.

The respondent's reliance on Rangoon decisions (and other cited cases) was considered. The court extracted the passages relied upon (observing that schedules may be ineffective after annulment and that certain acts relate to sales and dispositions) but concluded those authorities did not go so far as to decide that admission or rejection of proofs by the Receiver are not "acts" within Section 37.

Applying these principles, the court held that an order passed by the Insolvency Court or the Official Receiver (such as Ext. B-1) is an "act" within the meaning of Section 37. Therefore Ext. B-1 remains valid notwithstanding annulment of the adjudication, and the plaintiff is limited to recovering the amount fixed by that order (Rs. 57).

The court also observed, by way of additional comment, that the plaintiff (as assignee of the bond) takes subject to equities against the assignor and that an equitable set-off might be permissible; but the court explicitly stated it was not necessary to decide the set-off question for the present disposition.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is partly allowed. Ext. B-1 is an "act" within the meaning of Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and remains valid after annulment of adjudication; accordingly the plaintiff can recover only the amount found by the Official Receiver in Ext. B-1 (Rs. 57), with interest as ordered.

Implications:

  • The decrees of the Courts below granting recovery of Rs. 742-50 with interest were incorrect to the extent they awarded more than the amount established by Ext. B-1; the plaintiff is entitled only to a decree for the amount admitted/found by the defendants (i.e., as fixed in Ext. B-1).
  • The court directed a decree for the amount so admitted (Rs. 57) with interest at 6% from the date of Ext. B-1 up to the date of the decree, and awarded proportionate costs in this Court and the lower appellate court to the appellants. No broader precedent contrary to Section 37 was established; the decision applies the statutory preservation of "acts theretofore done" to the Receiver's order in this case.
  • The court noted but did not decide the question whether an equitable set-off is permissible between the parties' claims arising from the same chitty.

Disposition: Appeal partly allowed.

    Kumaran And Others, v. Cheriyambadan Ayidru And Others,

    1. Defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants. The suit was to enforce a bond executed by the 1st defendant, with 2nd defendant as surety, to the 3rd defendant.

    2. The 3rd defendant conducted a kuri. The 1st defendant was a subscriber for one ticket in the Kuri. He bid half-a-ticket and executed Ext A-1, bond. The 1st defendant committed default in the payment of future instalments on 9-8-1953. Thereafter the Kuri broke down on account of the default of the 3rd defendant. The 1st defendant had subscribed for 43 instalments and it was from the 44th instalment that he defaulted. According to 3rd defendant, an amount of Rs. 742-8-0 (Rs. 742-50) was due to him from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff was also a subscriber in the Kuri conducted by 3rd defendant and for money due to him from the 3rd defendant he filed a suit against the 3rd defendant and obtained a decree and in execution of the decree he brought the right under the bond executed by defendants 1 and 2 and other moveables of the 3rd defendant to sale and purchased them. The 3rd defendant was declared insolvent in I.P No. 1/54 and the Official Receiver was appointed to administer the estate. Before the Receiver, the 1st defendant filed a petition stating that if an account is taken, amounts will be due to him from the estate of the insolvent. The Official Receiver considered the petition and passed Ext. B-1 order fixing the amount due from the 1st defendant to the estate of the insolvent, at Rs. 57. Subsequently, the order adjudicating the 3rd defendant as insolvent was annulled. In the suit filed by the plaintiff to realise the amount due under Ext. A-1 bond, the 1st defendant contended that the suit is barred by limitation and that not more than Rs. 57 as found by the Official Receiver in Ext. B-1 order can be recovered from him. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover Rs. 742-50 with interest and decreed the suit.

    3. It was argued that under Section 37(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, Ext. B-1 order was binding on the plaintiff even though the order of adjudication has been annulled and that he can recover only Rs. 57 as found by the Receiver in Ext. B-1. Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is as follows:—

    “Where an adjudication is annulled, all sales and dispositions of property and payments duly made, and all acts theretofore, done, by the Court or receiver, shall be valid; but, subject as aforesaid, the property of the debtor who was adjudged insolvent shall vest in such person as the Court may appoint, or, in default of any such appointment shall revert to the debtor to the extent of his right or interest therein on such condition (if any) as the Court may, by order in writing, declare”.

    4. It is clear from Section 33 that all the creditors have to tender proofs of their claims to the Receiver and he has to admit or reject the proofs. Under Section 46, what can be recovered by the estate of the insolvent is what is due after setting off the claims due from the insolvent. Section 80 of the Act reads as follows:

    “(1) The High Court, with the like sanction, may from time to time direct that, in any matters in respect of which jurisdiction is given to the Court by this Act, the Official Receiver shall, subject to the directions of the Court, have all or any of the following powers, namely:—

    (b) to frame schedules and to admit or reject proofs of creditors;

    (2) Subject to the appeal to the Court provided for by Section 68, any order made or act done by the Official Receiver in the exercise of the said powers shall be deemed the order or act of the Court”.

    5. The short question for consideration is whether Ext B-1 order is an ‘act’ within the meaning of Section 37 of the Act.

    6. In Brandon v. McHenry, 1891-1 QB 538 it was held construing the corresponding section of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869 that when a proof in bankruptcy is rejected by the trustee, and the bankruptcy is subsequently annulled, the rejection of the proof remains valid and that the amount sought to be proved cannot be recovered. Lord Esher M.R said:

    “It seems to me that the rejection of a claim by the trustee is an act done by him within the meaning of the section, and therefore, such rejection holds good after the annulment of the bankruptcy.”

    7. In “the Law of Insolvency in India”, by D.F Mulla, 2nd Edition, at page 335, it is observed:

    “At the same time if a proof was rejected by the Official Assignee or Official Receiver, the creditor cannot, after annulment, enforce the claim, the rejection of the proof being an “act” done by the Official Assignee which is not nullified by the annulment”.

    8. Mr. Venkiteswara Iyer appearing for the respondent submitted on the strength of the rulings in Bank of Chettinad v. Saw Yu Byan, AIR 1935 Rang 498; Official Receiver v. Succaram, AIR 1935 Rang 328; Md. Hussain v. Md. Rowther, AIR 1953 Mad 620 and Daw Hnit v. Anamalai Chettiar, AIR 1938 Rang 335 that an order passed by the Court settling a list of the creditors is not an ‘act’ done by Receiver or Court within the meaning of Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. I do not think that these rulings go to the extent of deciding the question that rejection or admission of proof by the Official Receiver is not an ‘act’ done by him within the meaning of Section 37 of the Act.

    9. In AIR 1935 Rang 498 it was observed:—

    “Any order setting aside a transfer under either of these sections presupposes an existing insolvency, and as a matter of fact, at the present moment, there is no existing insolvency upon which an order in favour of the receiver or the scheduled creditors as such can be based. The receiver has ceased to exist. The schedule of creditors is waste paper and all the creditors of the insolvents have reverted to their original position as plain creditors and are no longer scheduled creditors in the insolvency. The annulment of the insolvency dates back to the date on which the order of adjudication was passed. The whole insolvency had become null and void. The question of subsequent res judicata is not one with which we are primarily concerned.”

    10. In AIR 1935 Rang 328 it was held:—

    “Therefore, the words “all acts theretofore done” mean all acts done with a view to making sales and dispositions of property, including the setting aside of transfers made by the insolvent with a view ultimately of making sales of the property so recovered for the benefit of the estate in his hands and therefore, ultimately for the benefit of the creditors even though the actual final disposal of the property has not been made on the date of the annulment of the adjudication and therefore, the date on which the receiver in insolvency qua receiver ceases to exist”.

    11. I think, an order passed by the Insolvency Court or the Official Receiver would be an “act” within the meaning of Section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. I, therefore, hold that Ext B-1 order was an “act” of the Official Receiver, and therefore, the order would remain valid even after the annulment of the order of adjudication. If that be so, no other question will arise in this case. Under that order, the plaintiff can recover only the amount as found by the Receiver.

    12. Even otherwise, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only the balance of the amount after setting off the amount due to the 1st defendant from the 3rd defendant in the same chitty. The plaintiff is an assignee of the bond and the assignment is subject to the equities which could have been claimed against the assignor. I think, an equitable set off is permissible in this case. But it is not necessary for me to decide that question.

    13. I think, the Courts below were wrong in decreeing the suit. The plaintiff is entitled only to a decree for the amount admitted by the defendants. I pass a decree for the same with interest at 6 per cent from the date of Ext. B-1 order upto the date of the decree and thereafter, with proportionate costs here and the Courts below. The appellants will get proportionate costs here and in the lower appellate Court. The appeal is allowed to the above extent.

    HGP/D.V.C

    14. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Kumaran And Others, v. Cheriyambadan Ayidru And Others,
    (Jan 24, 1968)