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AMICUS AI
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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: D.A. Krishna Warrier P. V. Rama Warrier
  • For the Appellant: C. K. Viswanatha Iyer T. K. Ramaswami Iyer
  • For the Respondent: 1 to 4 in both appeals N. Sundara Iyer V. R. Venkitakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 8th S. Gopalakrishna Iyer
  • For the Respondent: 10 & 11 C. S. Venkiteswara Iyer C. J. Balakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 9
Judges
  • M.S Menon
  • T.K Joseph, JJ.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: D.A. Krishna Warrier P. V. Rama Warrier
  • For the Appellant: C. K. Viswanatha Iyer T. K. Ramaswami Iyer
  • For the Respondent: 1 to 4 in both appeals N. Sundara Iyer V. R. Venkitakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 8th S. Gopalakrishna Iyer
  • For the Respondent: 10 & 11 C. S. Venkiteswara Iyer C. J. Balakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 9
Judges
  • M.S Menon
  • T.K Joseph, JJ.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by M.S. Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit (O.S No. 248 of 1951, Court of the District Munsiff of Palghat) sought recovery of immovable property described in the A Schedule to the plaint, totaling about 8½ cents. Approximately 2½ cents comprised the B Schedule property and the balance the C Schedule property. The whole property had been purchased under Ext. B-3 dated 5-9-1876 by Suppa Ammal (wife of Pathan Asari), who was found by the lower Courts to have been the real owner until her death sometime prior to 1879. The properties devolved on her three daughters — Ayya Ammal, Vella Ammal and Meenakshi Ammal — with later deaths recorded (Meenakshi pre-1909, Vella about 1941, Ayya on 27-5-1948).

The parties are related descendants: the 1st plaintiff and defendants 7 and 8 are surviving sons of Ayya Ammal; plaintiffs 2 and 3 are sons of a deceased son of Ayya Ammal; Vella Ammal left a daughter (the 4th plaintiff) and a son (the 9th defendant); Meenakshi Ammal's son died without issue.

Two documents were challenged in the plaint: Ext. A-14 (sale-deed dated 16-3-1907 covering the B Schedule property) and Ext. B-17 (sale-deed dated 4-8-1909 covering the C Schedule property). Ext. A-14 was executed by Ayya Ammal and the 7th defendant in favour of the 1st defendant, who later assigned rights to his wife (the 2nd defendant) by Ext. B-24 dated 1-3-1932. Ext. B-17 was executed by Ayya Ammal, her father and all her children in favour of Sheik Rawther and his brother; their rights passed to the 3rd defendant by Ext. B-19 dated 23-1-1939.

The Sub-ordinate Judge (in A.S No. 52 of 1953) observed that it was admitted the property originally belonged to Suppa Ammal and that after the death of Suppa Ammal's daughters, the 4th plaintiff (daughter of Vella Ammal) would be entitled to claim succession. The lower appellate Court granted a decree for possession in favour of the 4th plaintiff on 29-11-1954. The present proceedings are Second Appeals (S.A No. 541 of 1955 and S.A No. 542 of 1955) from that judgment; the 2nd defendant in the original suit is the appellant in S.A No. 541 of 1955 and the legal representatives of the 3rd defendant are appellants in S.A No. 542 of 1955.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. A-14 (16-3-1907) and Ext. B-17 (4-8-1909) are valid and binding on the reversionary heirs, given that they were executed without the concurrence/consent of co-heirs (specifically Vella Ammal).
  2. Whether the items of consideration recited in Ext. B-17 are binding on the estate and on reversioners, and whether minors who were parties could be bound.
  3. Whether the suit by the reversioners is barred by limitation/adverse possession (particularly the applicability of Article 141 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908).
  4. Whether the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (sub-sections (1) and (2)) converts a female's limited estate into absolute ownership for succession purposes in this case (notably in relation to the 4th plaintiff who died in 1958), and whether a decree obtained before the Act's commencement or before the decree became final affects that status.
  5. What relief the 1st plaintiff is entitled to if Exts. A-14 and B-17 are held not binding.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • It was contended that Article 141 of the Limitation Act would not apply where a widow or daughter behaved as if she were a full owner and claimed adversely to the estate; in such cases, the period of adverse possession would begin on the commencement of hostile possession and the reversioners must sue within twelve years from that commencement.
  • The appellants suggested that sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 indicates that acquisition of unrestricted rights under a decree (before or after commencement of the Act) should bring the person within sub-section (1) — and hence that the decree in favour of the 4th plaintiff made her die "possessed" of the property.
  • It was contended that the Avakasa Ozhumuri (Ext. A-1 dated 25-1-1950), being a surrender to the first plaintiff alone, was invalid and therefore the 4th plaintiff should be deemed to have died possessed of the property.

Plaintiffs' / Respondents' Contentions (as recorded)

  • The plaintiffs challenged Exts. A-14 and B-17 on grounds that they were executed without the consent or concurrence of co-heirs (specifically Vella Ammal), and thus could not bind the reversioners.
  • It was maintained that the items of consideration recited in Ext. B-17 (including sums reserved for discharge of certain debts) were not properly shown to be debts binding on the estate and hence not binding on reversioners.
  • It was asserted (or presented to the Court) that the 1st plaintiff and the father of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were minors at the dates of certain documents and therefore could not be bound by them; while they were parties to Ext. B-17, they were represented by their father acting as guardian.
  • The plaintiffs relied on the contention that the assignment Ext. A-1 (25-1-1950) was an assignment of the 4th plaintiff's life rights to the 1st plaintiff for consideration (Rs. 1000/-) and therefore she was not "possessed" of the property when the Hindu Succession Act took effect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gauri Nath Kakaji v. Mt. Gaya Kuar, AIR 1928 PC 251 Quoted a passage from Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee regarding co-widows: they succeed as one estate in coparcenary with right of survivorship and one widow cannot alienate without concurrence of the other. Used to support the general principle that the incidents of an estate taken by limited heirs (daughters) are similar to a widow's estate; supported the conclusion that extant sale-deeds executed without consent of co-heir (Vella Ammal) could not be sustained.
Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee, 11 Moo Ind App 487 (PC) “Where a childless Hindu dies leaving two widows surviving they succeed by inheritance to their husband's property as one estate in co-parcenary, with a right of survivorship and there can be no alienation or testamentary gift by one widow without the concurrence of the other.” Quoted (via Gauri Nath Kakaji) to establish the rule of survivorship and the inability of one co-heir to alienate corpus to prejudice survivors.
Yelumalai Chetty v. Natesachari, AIR 1944 Mad 310 Headnote: “Daughters succeeding to the estate of their father are joint tenants and as such are exactly in the same position as if the estate had devolved on co-widows. Accordingly an alienation by one of the daughters even for family necessity without the consent of others does not bind the reversioners... In order to bind the reversioner all the daughters must join in the alienation.” Cited to analogize daughters' rights to co-widows' rights and to hold that alienation by one daughter without consent does not bind the reversioners; applied to conclude Exts. A-14 and B-17 were not binding.
Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendra Nath, ILR 23 Cal 480 Principle: “A widow cannot, by any act or declaration of her own, while retaining possession of her husband's estate, give her possession or estate a character different from that attaching to the possession or estate of a Hindu widow.” Cited to reject the notion that a widow/daughter could convert her limited estate into a different character of ownership by her own acts while retaining possession; applied against the adverse-possession contention.
Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal, AIR 1929 PC 166 Where there has been no decree against the widow or other act in law depriving the reversionary heir of the right to possession during the widow's lifetime, the heir is entitled after the widow's death to rely upon Article 141 (Limitation) to determine whether title is barred. Relied upon to support the proposition that the cause of action for reversioners accrues on the death of the female limited owner (so Article 141 runs from death) unless there was a prior legal act depriving heirs of right to possession.
Kalipada Chakraborti v. Sm. Palani Bala Devi, AIR 1953 SC 125 Except where a decree has been obtained fairly and properly and without fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir, the cause of action for a reversioner to recover property held as a limited estate accrues only on the death of the female heir; the right of reversionary heirs is in the nature of Spes Successionis. Cited to reinforce the rule that the limitation period for reversioners begins on the death of the female heir, and that adverse possession by the widow/daughter before death does not start the running of limitation against reversioners.
G.T.M. Kotturuswami v. S. Veerawa, AIR 1959 SC 577 Interpretation of “property possessed by a female Hindu” in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: possession must exist at the date of commencement of the Act; possession might be actual, constructive or in any form recognized by law. Quoted to determine whether Section 14(1) applied (i.e., whether the female was in possession when the Act commenced); Court used the reasoning to conclude s14(1) did not apply in this case because the 4th plaintiff had executed an assignment (Ext. A-1) prior to commencement.
Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, AIR 1957 Cal 557 “The opening words ‘property possessed by a female Hindu’ obviously mean that ... the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act. ... possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law...” Quoted (via Kotturuswami) to explain the meaning of “possessed” for Section 14(1); used to assess whether the 4th plaintiff was in possession at commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
K. Venkamma v. K. Venkatareddi, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 158 Principle that acquisition under a decree should be a decree other than one which has not become final and which is the subject-matter of an appeal when using such decree to claim protection under Section 14. Cited to reject the submission that sub-section (2) of Section 14 would operate where the decree was not final or was the subject of appeal; applied to hold that the appellate decree could not be relied on as conferring possession for Section 14(1) purposes.
V. Annapurnamma v. V. Bhima Sankararao, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 359 Similar principle to K. Venkamma regarding the finality requirement of a decree relied upon for conversion to absolute ownership under Section 14. Cited along with K. Venkamma to support the Court's conclusion that the decree in the present case (being the subject of appeal) could not render the 4th plaintiff “possessed” for Section 14(1) purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations grounded in Hindu succession principles, limitation law, and statutory interpretation as follows:

  1. Nature of title and succession: The Court accepted the concurrent findings of the lower Courts that Suppa Ammal was the original owner and that on her death the daughters succeeded as qualified owners with rights of survivorship (analogous to co-widows). The Court relied on established precedent equating daughters' limited estate to that of co-widows (citing Gauri Nath Kakaji and Bhugwandeen Doobey), thereby establishing the rule that one co-heir cannot alienate corpus to the prejudice of the survivor without concurrence.
  2. Invalidity of Exts. A-14 and B-17 for lack of concurrence: Applying the above principle, the Court concluded (agreeing with the lower appellate Court) that both challenged documents could not be sustained because they were executed without the consent or junction of Vella Ammal (a co-heir). The Court treated daughters' status as joint tenants with survivorship rights (citing Yelumalai Chetty) and held that an alienation by one daughter without the others does not bind reversioners.
  3. Minors and binding character of Ext. B-17: The Court noted that the 1st plaintiff and the father of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were minors at the dates of the documents; they did not feature in Ext. A-14 and therefore could not be bound by it. Although they were parties to Ext. B-17 via their father acting as guardian, the Court considered the Sub-ordinate Judge's careful analysis of the recited consideration. The subordinate Court found major portions of the recited consideration were reserved for discharge of debts that were not shown to be debts binding on the reversioners or the estate. The present Court agreed that it was impossible to accept the binding character of any of the items of consideration in Ext. B-17 and therefore the minors (and plaintiffs) were not precluded from challenging the document.
  4. Limitation/adverse possession (Article 141): The Court examined the appellants' contention that Article 141 should not apply where a widow or daughter behaved as full owner and claimed adversely, thereby starting the limitation period from the commencement of hostile possession. The Court rejected this, relying on authorities (Sham Lall Mitra; Jaggo Bai; Kalipada Chakraborti) to hold that a widow/daughter cannot, by her acts in possession during her lifetime, alter the character of her limited estate so as to start a limitation period running against the reversioners; absent a decree or other legal act in law depriving the reversioners during the female's lifetime, the cause of action accrues on the death of the female and Article 141 runs from the date of death. In the present case, Ayya Ammal died on 27-5-1948 and the suit was filed on 19-6-1951 (well within twelve years), so the suit was not barred by limitation.
  5. Effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Section 14): The Court considered whether Section 14(1), which makes property possessed by a female Hindu full ownership, applied to the 4th plaintiff (who died in 1958, after the Act came into force). Quoting G.T.M. Kotturuswami and Gostha Behari, the Court observed that Section 14(1) applies only where the female was in possession at the date of commencement of the Act (possession in its widest legally recognized sense). However, Ext. A-1 dated 25-1-1950 (an "Avakasa Ozhumuri") executed by the 4th plaintiff in favour of the 1st plaintiff for consideration (Rs. 1000) operated as an assignment/conveyance of her life rights; therefore she was not "possessed" of the B and C Schedule properties on commencement of the Act. The Court also rejected the appellants' reliance on Section 14(2) to argue that the appellate decree (which was the subject of appeal) conferred possession for Section 14(1) purposes, citing authorities (K. Venkamma; V. Annapurnamma) that the decree relied upon must be final and not the subject of appeal.
  6. Monetary direction in Ext. A-14: The Court noted that the Sub-ordinate Judge had directed payment of Rs. 946-8-0 out of Ext. A-14's consideration. That direction was not challenged before the Court and was left to stand.
  7. Remedial conclusion: Given the holdings above, the Court concluded that the 1st plaintiff was entitled to absolute rights to a specified share (one-third of the B Schedule and one-fourth of the C Schedule). The Court chose to grant a declaratory judgment that Exts. A-14 and B-17 were not binding on the 1st plaintiff and to leave the precise partition and working out of rights to a separate suit for partition. The Court therefore dismissed both Second Appeals and confirmed the lower appellate Court's decree subject to the qualification regarding the monetary direction mentioned above.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Second Appeals (S.A No. 541 of 1955 and S.A No. 542 of 1955) are dismissed and the decree of the lower appellate Court is confirmed subject to the monetary direction already noted. The Court declared that Exts. A-14 and B-17 are not binding on the 1st plaintiff and that he is entitled to absolute rights to a one-third share of the B Schedule property and a one-fourth share of the C Schedule property.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The declaration as to non-binding nature of Exts. A-14 and B-17 in favour of the 1st plaintiff is granted.
  • The 1st plaintiff's entitlement is described (one-third of B Schedule; one-fourth of C Schedule) and he is left to obtain partition and work out his rights in a separate proceeding.
  • The payment of Rs. 946-8-0 out of the consideration for Ext. A-14, as directed by the Sub-ordinate Judge, is not disturbed.
  • The appeals are dismissed and the parties are ordered to bear their respective costs in this Court and in the Courts below.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies established principles of Hindu succession, limitation, and statutory interpretation (as shown by cited precedents and statutes) to the facts; it does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities. No broader or novel precedent is declared in the text beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts of this case.

Judgment: Appeals dismissed.
Show full summary ...

    Pathumma Beebi v. Krishnan Asari And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    M.S Menon, J.:— The 2nd defendant in O.S No. 248 of 1951 of the Court of the District Munsiff of Palghat is the appellant in S.A No. 541 of 1955. The legal representatives of the 3rd defendant in that suit are the appellants in S.A No. 542 of 1955.

    2. The suit was for the recovery of the property described in the A Schedule to the plaint. The total extent of the land comprised therein is about 8½ cents. Of these, about 2½ cents constitute the property specified in the B Schedule to the plaint and the balance constitutes the property specified in the C Schedule thereto. The whole of the property was purchased under Ext. B-3 dated 5-9-1876. The purchaser was one Suppa Anunal, wife of a Pathan Asari. Both the lower Courts have concurrently found that she was, till her death sometime prior to 1879, the real owner of the property.

    3. On her death the properties devolved on her three daughters, Ayya Animal, Vella Animal and Meenakshi Animal. Meenakshi Animal died before 1909, Vella Ammal about 1941 and Ayya Ammal on 27-5-1948.

    4. The 1st plaintiff and defendants 7 and 8 are the surviving sons of Ayya Ammal. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the sons of a deceased son of Ayya Ammal. Vella Ammal left behind her a son and a daughter. The daughter is the 4th plaintiff and the son, the 9th defendant. Meenakshi Ammal had a son. He died without issue.

    5. In the appeal from the judgment of the trial Court, A.S No. 52 of 1953, the Sub-ordinate Judge of South Malabar at Palghat said:—

    “It is now admitted on all sides that the property originally belonged to Suppa Ammal only, and that after the death of Suppa Ammal's daughters it is the 4th plaintiff (the daughter of Vella Ammal) who is entitled to claim succession”. (Paragraph 9)

    6. The validity of two documents are challenged in the plaint, Exts. A-14 and B-17. Ext. A-14 dated 16-3-1907 is a sale-deed of the property described in the B Schedule to the plaint and Ext. B-17 dated 4-8-1909 is a sale-deed of the property described in the C Schedule to the plaint.

    7. Ext. A-14 was executed by Ayya Ammal and the 7th defendant in favour of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant assigned his rights to his wife, the 2nd defendant, by Ext. B-24 dated 1-3-1932. Ext. B-17 was executed by Ayya Ammal, her father and all her children in favour of one Sheik Rawther and his brother. The Rawthers transferred their rights to the 3rd defendant by Ext. B-19 dated 23-1-1939.

    8. The lower appellate Court has held — we think quite correctly — that neither of the two documents can be sustained as both of them were executed without the consent or the junction of Vella Ammal. The incidents of an estate taken by a limited heir like a daughter are similar to those of a widow's estate and there can be no doubt that on the death of Suppa Ammal her daughters took the property as qualified owners with rights of survivorship. In Gauri Nath Kakaji v. Mt. Gaya Kuar, AIR 1928 PC 251, a case of co-widows — the Board quoted the following passage from Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee, 11 Moo Ind App 487 (PC):—

    “Where a childless Hindu dies leaving two widows surviving they succeed by inheritance to their husband's property as one estate in co-parcenary, with a right of survivorship and there can be no alienation or testamentary gift by one widow without the concurrence of the other”;

    and said:—

    “The general law is so well-settled that it scarcely requires restatement. If a Hindu dies leaving two widows, they succeed as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. They are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the income accruing therefrom. Each can deal as she pleases with her own life interest but she cannot alienage any part of the corpus of the estate by gift or will so as to prejudice the rights of the survivor or a future reversioner. If they act together they can burden the reversion with any debts contracted owing to legal necessity, but one of them acting without the authority of the other, cannot prejudice the right of survivorship by burdening or alienating any part of the estate”.

    9. In Yelumalai Chetty v. Natesachari, AIR 1944 Mad 310 — a case of daughters succeeding to the estate of their father — the Court said:—

    “Daughters succeeding to the estate of their father are joint tenants and as such are exactly in the same position as if the estate had devolved on co-widows. Accordingly an alienation by one of the daughters even for family necessity without the consent of others does not bind the reversioners of the other daughters. In order to bind the reversioner all the daughters must join in the alienation.” (Headnote).

    10. The fact that the estate to which the daughters succeeded in this case was not the estate of their father but of their mother makes no difference and it may be unnecessary to go into the question of the binding character or otherwise of the consideration for Exts. A-14 and B-17.

    11. The 1st plaintiff and the father of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were minors on the dates of Exts. A-14 and B-17. They did not figure in Ext. A-14 and they cannot possibly be bound by anything stated therein. They were, however, parties to Ext. B-17, with their father acting as their guardian.

    12. The Sub-ordinate Judge has dealt with the items of consideration recited in Ext. B-17 as follows in paragraph 14 of his judgment:—

    “Out of the consideration of Rs. 800/- recited in the document, a sum of Rs. 595-15-9 was reserved with the vendees for discharge of two debts of the assignors. One of them is a debt for Rs. 385-11-9 due to Irulappan Asari as per the decree in O.S No. 378 of 1906 evidenced by Ext. B-18. This decree, as I have already pointed out, was against all the assignors. It is not known for what purpose the debt under that decree was incurred. At any rate, it cannot be argued that if must be treated as a debt incurred by Ayya Ammal for purposes binding on the estate. It may be that it was a debt binding on the family of the judgment-debtors as such, but that family, we find, is a much bigger unit towards which the estate of Suppa Ammal had no legal obligation. Then the second item is a sum of Rs. 210-4-0 being a debt alleged to be due from the assignors as per a possessory mortgage and lease back in favour of one Vellayanna Rawther dated 15th Meenam 1081 (28-3-1908). The possessory mortgage and the lease back are evidenced by Exhibits B-15 and B-16. These were executed by Ayya Ammal, her husband Arumugom Asari and her son the 7th defendant. It is recited in the mortgage deed that the mortgagors and some others had executed a kuri hypothecation bond in favour of one Singily Chetty and another for Rs. 200/-, that Rs. 80/- was due to him under that bond, that the balance sum of Rs. 70 out of Rs. 150/- shown as the consideration for the mortgage was borrowed by them for meeting the expenses of the seemantham ceremony of 7th defendant's wife and for giving her some jewels. Here also the property, viz., the B Schedule property which, was mortgaged, was described as belonging in jenmam exclusively to Ayya Ammal. The necessity is generally described as a family necessity. It is difficult to hold that this sum of Rs. 210-4-0 was also a debt binding on the reversioners of Suppa Ammal. About the balance consideration of Rs. 203-0-3 the recital in the document is that it was taken for the purpose of discharging some sundry debts incurred by them on behalf of their family. Here again, it is not possible to say whether any portion of those debts was for any purpose binding on the estate. The estate had no liability to maintain the family of the assignors as such, especially Ayya Ammal's father and her husband. We cannot forget the fact that the document was executed as if the property belonged to Pathan Asari, and that the consideration for the sale was necessary for discharging the debts binding on the family consisting of all the members who have executed the assignment deed. Having made such a bargain, the alienees of persons claiming under them cannot be heard to say that the necessity was something else than that recited in the document. At any rate, there was no such evidence also adduced here.”

    13. In view of the fullness of the discussions we need only say that we are in entire agreement with the conclusion that it is impossible to accept the binding character of any of the items of consideration recited in Ext. B-17. It must follow that the fact that the 1st plaintiff and the father of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were represented by their father in Ext. B-17, cannot in any way preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the document in this litigation.

    14. The next question for consideration is whether the suit is barred by adverse possession as contended by the appellants before us. Article 141 of the first Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, deals with suits by a Hindu or Muhammadan for possession of immovable property where such Hindu or Muhammadan becomes entitled to such possession on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female. It provides for a period of twelve years from “when the female dies”. In this case Ayya Ammal died only on 27-5-1948 and the suit was filed within less than four years thereafter, on 19-6-1951.

    15. The contention is that Article 141 is not applicable to a case where a widow or daughter; behaved as if she was a full owner and claimed adversely to the estate. It is suggested that in such, cases she will perfect a title by adverse possession if no suit is brought within twelve years of the date of the commencement of such possession. The submission is wrong.

    16. As pointed out in Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendra Nath, ILR 23 Cal 480:—

    “A widow cannot, by any act or declaration of her own, while retaining possession of her husband's estate, give her possession or estate a character different from that attaching to the possession or estate of a Hindu widow.

    17. In Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal, AIR 1929 PC 166 the Board said:—

    “In their Lordships' judgment where there has been no decree against the widow or other act in the law in the widow's lifetime depriving the reversionary heir of the right to possession on the widow's death, the heir is entitled, after the widow's death, to rely upon Article 141 for the purpose of determination of the question whether the title is barred by lapse of time.”

    18. The words “other act in the law”, perhaps, are not too clear. They may refer to a bona fide compromise by the widow. It is certain they do not refer to any hostile act of the widow by which she proposed to perfect a title by adverse possession.

    19. In Kalipada Chakraborti v. Sm. Palani Bala Devi, AIR 1953 SC 125 the Court said:—

    “The law can now be taken to be perfectly well settled that except where a decree has been obtained fairly and properly and without fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir in respect to a property held by her as a limited owner, the cause of action for a suit to be instituted by a reversioner to recover such property either against an alienee from the female heir on a trespasser who-held adversely to her accrues only on the death of the female heir. This principle, which has been recognised in the law of Limitation in this country ever since 1871, seems to us to be quite in accordance with the acknowledged principles of Hindu Law. The right of reversionary heirs is in the nature of Spes Successionis and as the reversioners do not trace their title through or from the widow, it would be manifestly unjust if they are to lose their rights simply because the widow has suffered the property to be destroyed by the adverse possession; of a stranger.”

    20. There is no reason to hold that the position is in any way different where the widow or daughter has attempted to destroy the property by her own hostile possession and that the reversioners in such a case are bound to sue within twelve years of the commencement of the adverse possession and not within twelve years of her death.

    21. The 4th plaintiff died in 1958, that is after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Came inter force on 17-6-1958. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of that Act provides that “any property possessed by a female Hindu”, whether acquired before or after the commencement of that Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The meaning of the word ‘possessed’ used in the sub-section came up for consideration in G.T.M Kotturuswami v. S. Veerawa, AIR 1959 SC 577. The Court quoted the following passage from Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, AIR 1957 Cal 557:

    “The opening words ‘property possessed by a female Hindu’ obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement’ of the Act. They clearly contemplate the female's possession when the Act came into force. That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law, but unless the female Hindu whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into absolute estate under this particular section, was at least in such possession taking the word ‘possession’ in its widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply;”

    and said—

    “In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct view as to how the words ‘any property possessed by a female “Hindu” should be interpreted.”

    22. The sub-section, however, has no application to the present case in view of Ext. A-1 dated 25-1-1950 and executed by the 4th plaintiff in favour of the 1st. The document no doubt is styled as an “Avakasa Ozhumuri”, and the contention is that the surrender being to the first plaintiff alone it is invalid and the 4th plaintiff should be deemed to have died “possessed” of the property.

    23. We entertain no doubt that the document is an assignment of the rights of the 4th plaintiff to the 1st plaintiff for valuable consideration — Rs. 1000/- — that it operated as a conveyance to him of her limited rights for the duration of her life in the B and C Schedule properties, and that she cannot be considered as having been “possessed” of those items subsequent to the date of that document.

    24. The lower appellate Court gave a decree for possession of the plaint B and C Schedule properties in favour of the 4th plaintiff. The decree was granted on 29-11-1954. It is contended that sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession. Act, 1956, indicates that the acquisition of unrestricted rights under a decree before or after the commencement of that Act should come within the ambit of sub-section (1) of Sec. 14, and that in view of the decree of the lower appellate Court, the 4th plaintiff should be considered as having died ‘possessed’ of the property. This is dearly wrong. As pointed out in K. Venkamma v. K. Venkatareddi, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 158 and V. Annapurnamma v. V. Bhima Sankararao, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 359, the decree by which the acquisition was made should be a decree other than a decree which has not become final and which is the subject-matter of the appeal in which the question is raised.

    25. The Sub-ordinate Judge has held that a sum of Rs. 946-8-0 out of the consideration for Ext. A-14 is binding and directed its payment. This direction is not challenged and will stand.

    26. It is not disputed that if our conclusions are as given above, the 1st plaintiff gets absolute rights to a third of the B Schedule and a fourth of the C Schedule properties. We think we need do no more than grant a declaration to the effect that Exts. A-14 and B-17 are not binding on him and that he is entitled to the shares above-mentioned, and leave him to work out his rights by a separate suit for partition. It follows that both the Second Appeals have to be dismissed and that the decree of the lower appellate Court, subject to what is stated above, confirmed. Judgment accordingly. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their respective costs here and in the Courts below.

    FE/A.

    27. Appeals dismissed.

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