Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petitioner is the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance based on an agreement for sale dated 28 March 1982 executed by the first defendant. The second defendant is the first defendant's wife and the third defendant is his son. The second defendant sought to be removed from the suit by an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), contending she had been improperly joined. The trial court (the court below) allowed that application, and the present revision petition challenges that order.

Material factual statements in the record relevant to the joinder question include: (a) The agreement of 1982 contains recitals conceding that the first defendant owns the property, and also states that although the first defendant had executed a "ground rent deed" in favour of the second defendant leasing the land where a theatre building and other structures stand, the second defendant had no interest in or possession of those buildings or any part of the schedule property; the second defendant was made a formal party "for the purpose of getting an effective decree for specific performance." (b) In contrast, the first defendant's written statement asserts that the second defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of twenty-five cents and virivu of garden land on ground rent since 1950, that she put up theatre buildings and other structures and let them out for film exhibition, and that a leasehold right was renewed by Document No. 2081 of 1971. (c) The first defendant also contends in his written statement that the agreement is contingent on the second defendant joining in the execution of the sale deed and transferring her rights, and until that happens the agreement cannot be enforced. (d) There is also a separate suit instituted by the second defendant against the plaintiff for arrears of rent before the Munsiff's Court, which the plaintiff alleges is collusive with the first defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second defendant (the wife of the first defendant) has been validly joined as a party to the suit for specific performance—i.e., whether she is a proper or a necessary party within the meaning of Order 1, Rule 10(2), C.P.C.
  2. Whether the order of the court below allowing the second defendant's application to be removed from the party array should be set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Second Defendant / Respondent (application to be removed)

  • The second defendant applied under Order 1, Rule 10(2) read with Section 151, C.P.C., on the ground that she had been improperly joined as a party to the suit and her name should be struck out. (The opinion records that the court below allowed that application.)

Revision Petitioner / Plaintiff (opposing removal)

  • The plaintiff argued that the recitals in the agreement show that the second defendant has no right, title or interest in the property or in the theatre buildings and other structures, and therefore she had been included formally only to secure an effective decree.
  • To support that position, the plaintiff relied on particular documents: (1) rent receipts showing receipt of rent by the first defendant during 1974 and 1983, and (2) an order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P. 5/85 under Section 11(2) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in which the second defendant's claim that she had constructed the theatre building out of her own funds was rejected. These documents were said to show that the second defendant had no right over the property.
  • The plaintiff contended that impleading the wife of the first defendant as the second defendant could be sustained under Section 19(c) of the Specific Relief Act (specific performance may be enforced against persons claiming under a prior title who might have their title displaced by the defendant).

First Defendant / Counsel (arguing for removal or narrower joinder)

  • The first defendant's written statement took a stance inconsistent with the recitals of the agreement by asserting that the theatre building and other structures belong to his wife (the second defendant) and by describing her possession and leasehold rights.
  • The first defendant's counsel argued that, in deciding whether the second defendant is a necessary party, the court should consider: (1) whether the plaintiff has claimed any specific relief against the second defendant; and (2) whether a suit for specific performance should be enlarged into a title suit between a party to the contract and a stranger to it. The counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148) to support a narrower view.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raziabegum v. Sahebzadi Anvarbegum, AIR 1958 SC 886 In a suit relating to property, a person may be added as a party only if he/she has a direct interest (as distinct from a mere commercial interest) in the subject-matter; necessary to adjudicate effectively under Order 1, Rule 10(2). The court relied on this Supreme Court principle as the governing test. Applying it, the court held that the second defendant has a direct interest (given the written statement and other circumstances) and therefore is at least a proper, if not a necessary, party.
Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan, (1882) ILR 5 Mad 52 Supports the proposition that a party may be added if from the pleadings and circumstances that party is interested in the subject-matter and is necessary for final adjudication. Cited as an earlier authority in support of the power to add parties when necessary to dispose of all questions effectively; applied to conclude the second defendant could be a proper/necessary party.
Mokarala Pitchayya v. Bhoggabarapu Venkatakrishnayya, AIR 1943 Mad 497 Illustrates application of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act: specific performance may be enforced against persons claiming under a title which, though prior and known to the plaintiff, might be displaced by the defendant. Used to support the proposition that the apparent title of the second defendant would not prevent a decree for specific performance if that title could be displaced, and therefore she is a necessary party.
Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148 (Full Bench) Full Bench principle that scope of a suit for specific performance should not be widely enlarged so as to convert it into a title suit between a contracting party and a stranger. The court explicitly disagreed with the broader view as stated by the Full Bench and held that the Raziabegum test (direct interest) is the proper approach for Order 1, Rule 10(2) joinder questions; thus the Full Bench ruling was held to have no application in the instant facts.
AIR 1975 Guj 178; AIR 1981 Delhi 237; AIR 1984 Pat 218; AIR 1985 Orissa 93 (Various propositions cited by counsel in support of a narrower joinder approach in particular contexts.) The court found these rulings inapplicable to the facts of this case and therefore did not apply them.
(Two decisions of this Court) (1987) 2 Ker LT 132 : AIR 1988 NOC 79 and (1987) 2 Ker LT 334 Decisions of the same Court cited by counsel (specific content not detailed in the opinion) apparently not directly addressing the precise joinder question decided here. The court observed that those decisions did not consider the specific question decided in this case and therefore their principles had no application.
Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. XXX (sections cited in Full Bench ruling) Statements about which persons are necessary or proper parties — particularly that persons whose interests will be affected by a decree are necessary parties; persons whose interests will not be affected are not ordinarily necessary parties. The court relied on the same conceptual distinction to hold that because the second defendant's alleged interest would be affected by any decree, she is a necessary party (and to avoid multiplicity of suits).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the pragmatic conflict between the agreement's recitals (which suggest the second defendant had no interest or possession of the buildings and was named only formally) and the first defendant's written statement (which affirmatively asserted the second defendant's possession and leasehold rights dating from 1950, and a renewal by Document No. 2081 of 1971). Given this conflict in pleadings, the court considered the legal standard for adding or striking out parties under Order 1, Rule 10(2), C.P.C.

The court relied upon the Supreme Court's formulation in Raziabegum v. Sahebzadi Anvarbegum: in property suits a person should be added as a party only if he or she has a direct interest (not merely a commercial interest) in the subject-matter such that the court cannot effectively and completely adjudicate without that person's presence. The court explained that Order 1, Rule 10(2) empowers the court to add a party when the pleadings and circumstances show that the party is interested in the subject-matter and that without their joinder the issues cannot be finally and effectively decided.

Applying this test to the record before it, the court concluded:

  • The written statement of the first defendant asserts that the second defendant has had possession and enjoyment of the disputed land and has constructed and let out the theatre buildings; this is a direct interest in the subject-matter.
  • Even though the plaintiff relied on documents (rent receipts and a Rent Control Court order) arguably showing the second defendant lacked title, those documents did not eliminate the second defendant's asserted interest as pleaded by the first defendant.
  • Section 19(c) of the Specific Relief Act was relevant: a person claiming under a title prior to the contract, of which the plaintiff was aware, but which might be displaced by the defendant, can be made subject to specific performance. Thus, the second defendant's apparent title (if any) could be displaced and her presence is necessary for an effective decree.
  • Persons whose interests will necessarily be affected by the decree are necessary parties; deletion of such persons may prevent an effective decree and produce conflicting or multiplicity of suits.

The court expressly rejected the broader rule urged from the Madhya Pradesh Full Bench decision (Panne Khushali) that the scope of a specific performance suit should not be enlarged to become a title suit, holding that the question for joinder under Order 1, Rule 10(2) is governed by the Raziabegum test of a direct interest and the need for effective adjudication. Several other authorities cited by counsel were found inapplicable on the facts.

On this basis the court concluded that the second defendant was at least a proper and, for the purposes of rendering an effective decree and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, a necessary party. Consequently, the order below allowing her removal from the suit was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the order of the lower court that had struck the second defendant from the party array. The revision petition (C.R.P.) was allowed and the order under challenge was set aside. The court allowed the petition but awarded no costs. (The opinion records "Petition allowed" and that the order under challenge is set aside.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The second defendant remains a party to the suit for specific performance and cannot be removed from the array on the basis then advanced; any effective decree may require her presence in the suit.
  • The court applied and reaffirmed the Raziabegum test (direct interest as the criterion under Order 1, Rule 10(2)) and rejected the broader Full Bench approach (Panne Khushali) urged by the opposing counsel as inapplicable on these facts. The decision therefore limits the application of the Full Bench view in the facts of this case and confirms the necessity of considering whether a party's direct interest will be affected by the decree when deciding joinder questions.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond its application of the established tests; its immediate consequence is to restore the second defendant to the suit and to allow the revision petition with no costs.
Petition allowed.

    K.S Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma And Others

    1. The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale of the plaint schedule property dated 28th March, 1982 executed by the first defendant, is the revision petitioner. The second defendant is his wife, whereas the third defendant is his son.

    2. Taking the stand that she has improperly been joined as a party to the suit, the second defendant preferred an application under O. 1, R. 10(2) read with S. 151, C.P.C to have her name removed from the party array. The Court below by the order under challenge, has allowed the said petition.

    3. A resume of facts essential and requisite to dispose of the question, whether the second defendant has validly been joined as a party to the suit, is stated hereunder: The first defendant in the agreement has conceded that the property is owned by him. It has further been stated therein to the effect that, though he had executed ‘a ground rent deed’ in favour of the second defendant leasing the land where the theater building, other structures etc. have been constructed, the second defendant thereby has not got any interest in or possession of the said building, structures etc. or any part of the schedule property. Yet one other statement in the agreement which is relevant in the context, is this:

    (Vernacular matter omitted — Ed.)

    The second defendant has accordingly, been made a formal party to the suit “for the purpose of getting an effective decree for specific performance”.

    4. The first defendant in his written statement however, has taken a stand inconsistent with the above stand, he has taken in the agreement in regard to the alleged right, the second respondent is having in the property. He has positively stated in the written statement that the theater building and other structures belong to his wife. This is what is stated in the written statement:

    “Twenty five cents and virivu of garden land referred to in the plaint has been in the possession and enjoyment of the second defendant on ground rent from 1950 and she had put up theater buildings and other structures and has been giving them on rent to film exhibition for conducting cinema shows”.

    This leasehold right, it is said, has been renewed by Document No. 2081 of 1971 of the Sub Registry, Kanjirapally. Regarding the agreement, the first defendant had stated thus in the written statement:

    “The agreement at best is only a contingent agreement capable of performance only in the event of the 2nd defendant joining in the execution of the sale deed envisaged in the agreement and transferring her rights and interests also….. The agreement is enforceable only in the event of the second defendant agreeing to dispose of the property and join in the execution of the sale deed. Until that event happens the agreement cannot be enforced and the agreement has therefore become void and there is no contract which, can be made the basis of a decree for specific performance”.

    5. Going by the above statements in the Written statement it cannot be said that the second defendant has no direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation. In this connection it is relevant to make specific reference to the suit instituted by the 2nd defendant against the plaintiff for arrears of rent before the Munsiff's Court which, according to the plaintiff, is nothing but a collusive action with the 1st defendant. At the same time as already noted, the statements in the agreement disclose that the 2nd defendant has no manner of right, title or interest in the property, leave alone the theater building and other structures.

    6. The law dealing with the addition or striking out of the parties as plaintiffs or defendants is stated in Cls. 2, 4 and 5 of R. 10, O. 1, C.P.C Here we are concerned only with Cl. 2. It reads:

    “The Court may at any stage of proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added”.

    The content of this clause can be stated thus: A person may be added as a party to the suit provided it is shown that he has a direct interest in the suit property and hence his presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Construing this provision the Supreme Court has observed that “in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation”. Raziabegum v. Sahebzadi Anvarbegum, AIR 1958 SC 886. To put it differently under O. 1, R. 10(2) the Court, has the power to add a party in a suit if from the pleading and other circumstances it is found that, that party is interested in the subject matter of the litigation and without the junction of that party the issues cannot finally and effectually be decided. (See also Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan, (1882) ILR 5 Mad 52). The Court can thereby also avoid conflicting decisions on the same questions. Going by this principle the 2nd defendant at any rate, is a proper party if not a necessary party to the suit because, as already noted, she claims tenancy rights over the property in dispute under a ground rent deed which, no doubt, according to the plaintiff was not acted upon.

    7. The question as to whether the second defendant is a necessary party to the suit can be viewed from another angle also. The arguments of the counsel for the petitioner in this regard can be stated thus: According to the 1st defendant the 2nd defendant is no one against whom a decree for specific performance can at all be granted since she is not a party to the agreement. However, it could be inferred from the recitals in the agreement that the alleged ‘ground rent deed’ executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant was not intended to be acted upon. Had it been otherwise the first defendant who is the husband of the 2nd defendant, would not have stated thus in the agreement:

    (Matter in vernacular omitted — Ed.)

    In support of this argument, the learned counsel made paricular reference to certain documents; (1) Rent receipt showing receipt of rent of the property by the 1st defendant during the years 1974 and 1983; and (2) the order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P 5/85, a petition filed by the 2nd defendant under S. 11(2) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act against the petitioner for evidence, rejecting the claim of the 2nd defendant that it was she who had constructed the theater building and other structures out of her own fund after she took the land from her husband on lease. These documents are more than sufficient to show that the 2nd respondent has no manner of right over the property, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues. The impleadment of the wife of the 1st defendant as 2nd defendant therefore can be sustained under S. 19(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the counsel submits.

    8. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act reads:—

    “Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against—

    (a) & (b) …..

    (c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff might have been displaced by the defendant;”

    Under this section specific performance can be declared not merely against a party to the contract but also against a person claiming under a title, which, though prior to the agreement and about which the plaintiff was aware of, might have been displaced by the defendant. (See Mokarala Pitchayya v. Bhoggabarapu Venkatakrishnayya, AIR 1943 Mad 497). If the case of the plaintiff is accepted the apparent title of the 2nd defendant over the property is of no consequence in regard to the right of the petitioner to get a decree for specific performance, because the said title of the 2nd defendant can be displaced by the first defendant. That means the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to the suit.

    9. The above position in law notwithstanding the learned counsel for the 1st defendant argues that in deciding the question as to whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to the suit the factors that should be taken into account are: (1) whether the plaintiff has claimed any specific relief against the second defendant, (2) whether the scope of a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale be enlarged and the suit turned also into a title suit between one or either of the parties to the contract and stranger of the contract. In support of this argument the learned counsel relied on a Full Bench ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148.

    10. Regarding the first aspect it is true that the 2nd defendant is not a party to the agreement. It is also true that the plaint does not contain a specific prayer for relief against the 2nd defendant. Nonetheless it should be conceded, going by the statements in the written statement of the 1st defendant and also the recitals in the agreement that the 2nd defendant is definitely having a direct interest in the property. It therefore follows that in the event of the suit being decreed the alleged interest of the 2nd defendant will definitely be affected. To put it differently it may not be possible to pass an effective decree if the second defendant is deleted from the party array. Such persons are necessary parties, although no specific relief is sought against them. Similarly persons whose interests will necessarily be affected by any decree that can be rendered are necessary and indispensable parties and the Court will not proceed to a decree without them on the party array…… The parties whose interests will not be affected by the decree sought, although they may have an interest in the subject matter, are not ordinarily necessary parties, although, they may sometimes be proper parties under general rule, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. (See Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. XXX, Ss. 142 and 146 to 148 referred to in the Full Bench ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court). At least to avoid multiplicity of suits, the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to the suit. (See the facts stated supra).

    11. Regarding the second aspect, the Full Bench, in my judgment, has stated the principle that the scope of a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale ought not to be enlarged and the suit turned also into a title suit between one of either of the parties to the contract and stranger of the contract, very widely. The question whether the suit is for specific performance or otherwise, is unnecessary to be considered to decide the issue whether a person has been properly joined in the suit within the meaning of Cl. (2) of R. 10 of O. 1 C.P.C What is required to be considered in making a person a party to a suit following the procedure prescribed under O. 1 R. 10(2) is, as observed by the Supreme Court in Razia Bagum's case, (AIR 1958 SC 886) is has he/she a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Such person shall be made a party to the litigation; or else the Court cannot finally and effecatually dispose of the dispute which is in respect of the property, the subject matter of the suit. I therefore am constrained to observe that, with respect, I cannot agree with the view expressed by the Full Bench referred to above. Viewed in this background the other rulings cited by the learned counsel namely, AIR 1975 Guj 178, AIR 1981 Delhi 237, AIR 1984 Pat 218, AIR 1985 Orissa 93 also have no application here. The learned counsel has also cited two decisions of this Court namely, (1987) 2 Ker LT 132 : (AIR 1988 NOC 79) and (1987) 2 Ker LT 334. This Court in those decisions had no occasion to consider the question decided in this case and therefore the principles enunciated therein also have no application.

    The order under challenge in the light of what is stated above is liable to be set aside. I accordingly set aside the same. The C.R.P is allowed but in the circumstances no costs.

    Petition allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    K.S Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma And Others
    (Sep 27, 1988)