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  • earlier.5. Section 256 Cr. P.C corresponds to Section 247 of Cr. P.C 1898 and that section
  • Section 247 of the old Code and Section 256 of the New Code
  • Criminal Procedure Code consisting of Sections 251
  • sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 256
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 256 of Cr. P.C
  • Sections 256 and 302 of Cr. P.C, 1973
  • provisions of Section 256 Cr. P.C
  • Sections 143, 147, 149, 324, 326, 342
  • Sections 143, 147, 324, 326 and 342
  • Section 247 of the Code, 1898
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • Section 256 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 302(1) Cr. P.C
  • Section 247 Cr. P.C
  • Section 256 Cr. P.C
  • Section 302 Cr. P.C
  • Section 200 Cr. P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • earlier.5. Section 256 Cr. P.C corresponds to Section 247 of Cr. P.C 1898 and that section
  • Section 247 of the old Code and Section 256 of the New Code
  • Criminal Procedure Code consisting of Sections 251
  • sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 256
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 256 of Cr. P.C
  • Sections 256 and 302 of Cr. P.C, 1973
  • provisions of Section 256 Cr. P.C
  • Sections 143, 147, 149, 324, 326, 342
  • Sections 143, 147, 324, 326 and 342
  • Section 247 of the Code, 1898
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • Section 256 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 302(1) Cr. P.C
  • Section 247 Cr. P.C
  • Section 256 Cr. P.C
  • Section 302 Cr. P.C
  • Section 200 Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion by B.N. Mallikarjuna, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The deceased complainant, Dr. S.V. Sunkappa, on December 5, 1989 through an advocate filed a written complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. in the Metropolitan Magistrate III Court, Bangalore alleging an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arising from cheque No. 604458 dated October 30, 1989 for Rs. 3,75,000/-, which was dishonoured with the endorsement "Refer to Drawer". The complaint alleged that a statutory notice was sent to the accused but the accused failed to make payment.

The Magistrate took cognizance on January 11, 1990, recorded the sworn statement of the complainant and registered the case (C.C. No. 2392/1990). Summons and later non-bailable warrant were issued; the accused eventually appeared and the warrant was recalled. The accused pleaded not guilty on October 29, 1991 and the matter was posted for trial.

The complainant died on January 15, 1992. Subsequent hearings were repeatedly adjourned (dates recorded from January 21, 1992 through April 3, 1992). On April 3, 1992 the revision petitioner, S. Reddappa (son of the deceased complainant), filed an application under Section 302(1) Cr.P.C. seeking substitution in place of the deceased complainant and permission to continue the proceedings. The accused opposed the application. By order dated February 9, 1993 the Learned Magistrate dismissed the application and acquitted the accused. The present revision challenges that acquittal order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a summons case instituted on a private complaint, the accused is entitled to acquittal upon the death of the complainant.
  2. Whether, on the death of the complainant in such a summons case, a "fit and proper person" (for example, a relative such as the son) may be permitted to be substituted and continue the complaint under provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (notably Section 256 and Section 302 Cr.P.C.).

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Applicant) — S. Reddappa

  • Contended that the exercise of power under Section 256 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate in this case was improper.
  • Argued that cognizance of a summons case on a private complaint does not abate with the death of the complainant.
  • Relied on sub‑section (2) of Section 256 Cr.P.C., which, he submitted, empowers the Magistrate to consider substitution when the non-appearance of the complainant is due to death and, if a person is fit and proper, to substitute him in place of the complainant and permit continuation of the complaint.

Respondent (Accused)

  • Relied on the decision in Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda (1980 1 Kar. L.J. 384) to contend that on the death of the complainant the only option available to the Magistrate was to acquit the accused, and therefore the Magistrate's acquittal was correct and not open to disturbance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda (1980 1 Kar. L.J. 384) Held (as relied on by the Magistrate) that where complainant has died the only alternative left to the Magistrate is to acquit the accused; adjournment for a future date when complainant is dead is not meaningful. The Learned Magistrate relied on this decision in making the impugned order; the revising Court examined its applicability and concluded the accused could not derive support from this decision in the present facts.
Subbamma v. V. Kannappachari (AIR 1969 Mys. 221) Stated that in circumstances of the complainant's death it is within the discretion of the trying Magistrate to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit person if one is willing. The revising Court cited this decision as authority for permitting substitution and continuation of the complaint after the complainant's death.
Krishnaji v. Bhimaji (1977 1 Kar. L.J. 316) Held similarly that Magistrate has discretion to allow a proper and fit person to continue a complaint when the original complainant is absent/dies. Used by the revising Court to support the proposition that criminal prosecution need not abate on the complainant's death and substitution may be permitted.
A.S. Nayagam v. M. Shivakumar (ILR 1978 KAR 1174) Held that death of a complainant in a non-cognizable offence does not abate the prosecution and Magistrate may allow a proper person to continue the complaint. The revising Court relied on this case to show consistency of High Court authority permitting continuation in non-cognizable cases (Section 138 NI Act is a summons/non-cognizable off ence as classified).
Maddipatta Govindaiah Naidu v. Yalakaluri Kamalamma (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Expressed that criminal proceedings legally instituted do not terminate or abate merely on the death of the complainant. Referenced by the revising Court as supportive High Court authority from Andhra Pradesh for allowing continuation despite complainant's death.
T.N. Jayarajan v. Jayarajan (Kerala High Court — Justice M.M. Pareed Pillay) Held that Sub-section (2) of Section 256 Cr.P.C. is intended to allow continuation and the Magistrate is not compelled to acquit when complainant is dead; in appropriate cases substitution (e.g., by son) can be permitted. Applied by the revising Court to support the view that Section 256 empowers substitution and continuation in appropriate cases, including under Section 138 NI Act.
Goutam Ranjan Basu v. Smt. Shanta Mukherjee (Calcutta High Court) Held that there is no automatic termination of criminal proceedings on the complainant's death; the Magistrate may allow substitution based on subjective satisfaction from the record. Used by the revising Court to demonstrate the Calcutta High Court's position that substitution may be permitted if the Magistrate is satisfied from the surrounding circumstances and record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework: offences punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are summons cases (punishable with up to one year imprisonment or fine) and Chapter XX (Sections 251–259) of the Cr.P.C. governs trial of summons cases, including Section 256 which addresses non-appearance or death of the complainant.

The Court examined the language of Section 256 Cr.P.C. It noted that subsection (1) ordinarily requires acquittal if the complainant is absent on the appointed day unless the Magistrate thinks proper to adjourn, and that the proviso to subsection (1) allows the Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate considers personal attendance unnecessary. Subsection (2) extends the operation of subsection (1) "so far as may be" to cases where the complainant's non-appearance is due to death.

The Court compared Section 256 of the 1973 Code with Section 247 of the 1898 Code and observed that the new Code expressly introduces the proviso and subsection (2), which were not present earlier. The Court interpreted these additions as indicating legislative intent to permit the continuance of proceedings in appropriate circumstances even when the complainant has died.

The Court considered existing authorities. It noted prior decisions of this Court (Subbamma and Krishnaji) holding that the Magistrate has discretion to allow a proper person to continue the complaint on the complainant's death. The Court observed that the Magistrate in the present case relied on the Subbanna Hegde decision, which had held that death of the complainant left the Magistrate no alternative but to acquit. The revising Court examined Subbanna Hegde and concluded that it was distinguishable on facts and law (noting that in Subbanna Hegde the offences involved were cognizable offences) and that the other authorities and the provisions of the 1973 Code support discretion to permit substitution.

The Court also relied on High Court decisions from Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Calcutta, which had held that criminal proceedings do not automatically abate on the complainant's death and that substitution may be permitted subject to the Magistrate's satisfaction from the record and circumstances.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the Court observed that the essential ingredients to prove the offence under Section 138 NI Act (issue of cheque, dishonour, service of statutory notice) could be proved from the record despite the complainant's death. It also noted that the complainant was represented by a pleader who continued to represent the applicant, and that the applicant was the son of the deceased and had expressed willingness to continue. The Court concluded that the Magistrate's exercise of discretion in rejecting substitution and acquitting the accused was not based on sound judicial principle or proper appreciation of the facts and law.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The revision is allowed. The impugned order dated February 9, 1993 rejecting the application under Section 302 Cr.P.C. is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Learned Magistrate with directions to take the case on file in its original number, grant permission to the applicant (the son) to continue the proceedings, and to continue the proceedings from the stage at which the interruption occurred and to dispose of the matter in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The acquittal of the respondent-accused based on the complainant's death is vacated; the applicant (son of the deceased complainant) is to be permitted to continue the complaint and the trial is to proceed.
  • Broader implications: The Court's reasoning affirms that, consistent with section 256(1) proviso and subsection (2), a Magistrate has discretion in appropriate cases to allow substitution and continuation of a summons case instituted by private complaint after the complainant's death. The opinion does not purport to make findings beyond the facts and authorities considered in this judgment.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    S. Reddappa v. Vijaya M.

    B.N Mallikarjuna, J.:—

    The only question involved in this revision is whether in the trial of a summons case instituted on a private complaint, accused is entitled to an acquittal on the death of the complainant or whether a fit and proper person could be permitted to continue the complaint.

    2. Few facts relevant for the disposal of this revision petition needs to be stated:

    Deceased Dr. S.V Sunkappa on December 5, 1989 through an advocate made a written complaint under Section 200 Cr. P.C in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate III Court, Bangalore against the respondent-accused alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    It is stated that cheque No. 604458 dated October 30, 1989 for Rs. 3,75,000/- issued to him by the accused drawn on Mandya District Co-operative Bank, Naguvanahally Branch when presented for encashment through Canara Bank, Srirampuram Branch, Bangalore was bounced with endorsement “Refer to Drawer”. The accused failed to reply or make payment despite receiving a notice sent to him both by registered post and under certificate of posting as required under the Act.

    The Learned Magistrate, on January 11, 1990 took cognizance of the offence, recorded the sworn statement of the complainant, registered a case in C.C No. 2392/1990 for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and process issued for the appearance of the accused. Summons issued on many occasions for his appearance returned unserved and after service remained absent. Therefore, non-bailable warrant was issued and in the mean time on 8.7.1991 accused appeared in Court, filed an application for re-calling the warrant and therefore warrant was re-called and the proceedings continued.

    On October 29, 1991 plea of the accused recorded. The accused pleaded not guilty and therefore posted for trial by January 21, 1992. In the meantime, on January 15, 1992 complainant died and therefore from January 21, 1992 it was adjourned time and again and finally for hearing on April 3, 1992. On April 3, 1992 revision petitioner S. Reddappa son of the deceased complainant filed an application under Section 302(1) Cr. P.C praying the Court to substitute him in place of complainant and permit him to continue the proceedings. Accused opposed the application. The Learned Magistrate therefore after hearing the parties by order dated February 9, 1993 dismissed the application and acquitted the accused. Hence this revision challenging the said order of acquittal.

    3. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner contended that exercise of power under Section 256 of Cr. P.C is improper, cognizance of a summons case which was taken on a private complaint does not abate on the death of the complainant. Sub-section (2) of Section 256 of Cr. P.C empowers the Magistrate in such circumstances, to consider the application and if the person is found fit and proper, to substitute him in place of complainant and permit him to continue the complaint.

    Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that in view of the decision of this Court in Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda . 1980 1 Kar. L.J 384. the Court had no option but to acquit the respondent-accused and as such, the order cannot be disturbed.

    4. An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both, it is a summons case.

    Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code consisting of Sections 251 to 259 contemplates the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate in the trial of a summons case, whether it be on a police report or on a private complaint. Section 256 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate in case the complainant remains absent on the appointed day for the appearance of the accused or any day subsequent thereto which the hearing may be adjourned.

    Section 256 of Cr. P.C reads thus:

    “Non-appearance or death of complainant:

    (1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:

    Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.

    (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death.”

    A plain reading make it clear that if the complainant remains absent on the date of hearing, the Magistrate need not automatically acquit the accused, but he is vested with certain amount of discretion on whether or not to adjourn the hearing and continue the complaint. Proviso to sub-section (1) empowers the Magistrate to adjourn the hearing if the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of the opinion that personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, to dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. Sub-section (2) says that the above provision shall so far as may be apply, where non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death.

    Adjourning the hearing of the case in cases where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution and application of this provision even in the case of death of the complainant was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and it was not there earlier.

    5. Section 256 Cr. P.C corresponds to Section 247 of Cr. P.C 1898 and that section reads thus:

    “Non-appearance of complainant: If the summons have been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto, to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything herein before contained, acquit the accused unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day.

    Provided that where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case.”

    A comparison of Section 247 of the old Code and Section 256 of the New Code makes it clear that whole of the provisions contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 256 were not there in Section 247 Cr. P.C Even then several High Courts while interpreting Section 247 of the Code, 1898 said that there is no abatement of a criminal case on the death of a complainant and the case can proceed even in his absence.

    However, there was divergent opinion as to what should happen to a criminal case on the death of the complainant. It is perhaps, therefore, sub-section (2) is introduced in the New Code saying that provisions of sub-section (1) shall so far as may be applied where non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death. The learned counsel invited my attention to catena of decisions on the point, rendered by several courts. Suffice it to mention the decisions of this Court in Subbamma v. V. Kannappachari . AIR 1969 Mys. 221. and Krishnaji v. Bhimaji . 1977 1 Kar. L.J 316.. In those cases it is held that in such circumstances it is within the discretion of the trying Magistrate to allow the complaints to continue by a proper and fit person if the later is willing.

    6. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate in making the order impugned has relied on the decision of this Court rendered by a Learned Single Judge on March 3, 1980 in Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda, wherein it is said that on the death of the complainant the only alternative left to the Magistrate is to acquit the accused. It is also observed that the provisions of Section 256 Cr. P.C do not empower the Magistrate automatically to make an order of acquittal in the absence of the complainant. The relevant portion reads thus:

    “Though the provisions do not empower the Magistrate automatically to make an order of acquittal on the absence of the complainant, the adjournment of the case to any future date contemplated is where it is possible for the complainant to appear on the adjourned date. Where the complainant had died there being no such question of his appearing on a future date, adjournment of the case for any future date does not arise. The provisions also make it clear that the Magistrate has to either adjourn the case or acquit the accused on the very date on which the complainant is absent. It is not open to him to adjourn the case to any date and then to make an order for acquittal for the reason of the absence of the complainant when the summons has been issued for the appearance of the accused.”

    (under-lining is mine)

    In the case on hand, the complainant died on January 15, 1992, the hearing of the case was on January 21, 1992. It is seen from the notings in the order-sheet that from January 21, 1992 the hearing is adjourned to 31.1.1992, 22.2.1992, 29.2.1992, 27.3.1992 and finally to April 3, 1992. The dates would indicate that the Learned Magistrate has exercised his discretion in adjourning the case from time to time till April 3, 1992 knowing that the absence of the complainant is by reason of death, only with the object of continuing with the case even in the absence of the original complainant. It is on April 3, 1992, the revision petitioner makes an application for permission to continue the complaint expressing his willingness, being the son of the deceased complainant.

    7. In A.S Nayagam v. M. Shivakumar . ILR 1978 KAR 1174., this court on June 7, 1978 has said that the death of a complainant in a case of non-cognizable offence does not abate the prosecution and it is within the discretion of the trying Magistrate in a proper case to allow the complainant to continue by a proper and fit complainant, if the later is willing. While rendering this judgment, the court has relied on the decision of this Court in Subamma's case (cited supra) and has considered the decision in the case of Krsihnaji (cited supra).

    An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is also non-cognizable in accordance with the classification of offences, against other laws in the first schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In Subbanna Hegde's case, the complainant alleged that A-1 to 8 therein committed offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 324, 326, 342 and 506 of I.P.C….. Offences under Sections 143, 147, 324, 326 and 342 are cognizable.

    It would appear that at the hearing of Subbanna Hegde's case and the above mentioned three decisions of this court, have not been brought to the notice of the court and therefore, perhaps the object and purport of proviso to sub-section (1) has not been considered.

    In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the respondent-accused cannot derive or draw any support neither on law nor on facts from the decision in Subbanna Hegde's case.

    8. On reading the whole of Sections 256 and 302 of Cr. P.C, 1973 keeping in mind that a criminal case does not abate on the death of the complainant and the above three decisions of this Court, I am of the considered view that Section 256 of the Code empowers the Magistrate in a given case to permit a fit and proper person to continue the prosecution on the death of the complainant.

    9. The view I take in the matter is supported by the decisions of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh5, Kerala6 and Calcutta7.

    In Maddipatta Govindaiah Naidu v. Yalakaluri Kamalamma, Learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has said that criminal proceedings legally instituted do not terminate or abate merely on the death of the complainant, the cause of action for civil action bears no analogy to complaints of crime.

    In T.N Jayarajan v. Jayarajan, Justice M.M Pareed Pillay (as he then was) considering the scope and purport of Section 256 Cr. P.C in a case arising out of complaint for an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, has said that sub-section (2) of the Section is intended to achieve this objective, it cannot be held that the Magistrate has no option but to acquit the accused when the complainant is dead. In other words, in appropriate cases the Magistrate can grant permission to the son of the deceased complainant to proceed with the complainant.

    In Goutam Ranjan Basu v. Smt. Shanta Mukherjee, Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has said that in case of demise of the complainant there cannot be any ipso facto termination of the criminal proceedings, Magistrate has every power to allow substitution upon the demise of the original complainant if he is satisfied from the other surrounding circumstances and materials on record that such permission should be given, that satisfaction is to be subjective satisfaction derived from the records of the case and a satisfaction derived on fact available on record.

    10. Here, the allegation is that the cheque issued by the accused was bounced when presented for encashment with an endorsement “Refer to Drawer”. The important and necessary ingredients to prove are the issuance of cheque, dishonour of the cheque, issue of legal notice to the accused after it was bounced and before the complaint as required under the Act, which can be proved in the absence of the complainant by reason of his death. The complainant was represented by a pleader and continues to represent the applicant and the applicant is the son of the deceased. I am therefore of the view that the exercise of power by the learned Magistrate is not based on sound judicial principles nor on proper appreciation of facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, impugned order is not sustainable in law.

    In the result, revision is allowed and the order impugned dated February 9, 1993 rejecting the application under Section 302 Cr. P.C is set aside. Matter is remitted to the Learned Magistrate with a direction to take the case on file in its original number, grant permission to the applicant and to continue the proceedings from the stage at which the interruption has occurred and to dispose of the matter in accordance with law.

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    Comments

    S. Reddappa v. Vijaya M.
    (Aug 7, 1996)