AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner sought a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash a resolution (Annexure-A) dated 27-12-1993. The writ petition itself contained a typographical error in its relief clause which stated the date as 8-3-1993; the record shows the correct date is 27-12-1993 and the interim relief clause correctly referred to 27-12-1993.

Annexure-A records that the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), in its meeting dated 27-12-1993, considered an application under Rule 1 for grant of a permit to run a mini-bus in Bellary City on a specific route for 10 trips per day on a trial basis and directed the secretary to conduct timing discussions with KSRTC before issuing the permit. The petitioner, aggrieved by the RTA resolution, filed the writ petition.

Notice of the petition was issued and service was deemed made on Rules 1 and 2. The petitioner insisted on hearing the petition on merit ex parte; an earlier order of this Court dated 16-8-1989 had accepted that notice was properly served. The Court proceeded to hear the petition ex parte.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative statutory remedy (revision under Section 90 of the Act), in light of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop (1985 1 SCC 260).
  2. Whether the RTA's grant of the permit was without jurisdiction because the route for which the permit was granted formed part of a nationalised route / scheme published under Section 100(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and hence was restricted by Section 104 of the Act.
  3. Whether, on the facts before the Court, there existed a clear question of law or jurisdictional error sufficient to relieve the petitioner from resorting to the statutory remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner sought quashing of Annexure-A (27-12-1993) which granted a permit to run a mini-bus on the Bellary route.
  • Although a statutory remedy existed under Section 90 (revision), the petitioner argued that the RTA's order was without jurisdiction because the route is part of a nationalised route covered by the Bellary Approved Scheme and Section 104 forbids granting permits in respect of notified areas/routes covered by a published scheme.
  • The petitioner relied on several authorities (including Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Karnataka, Kalaivani Ammal v. KSRTC, and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Regional Transport Authority) to support the contention that where routes overlap nationalised schemes, the authority cannot grant permits to private operators.

Respondent / KSRTC / RTA Arguments (as recorded)

  • The D.T.O., KSRTC, Bellary, objected to the grant of the permit before the RTA on the grounds that KSRTC already provided 22 city services in Bellary City, that they served school-going children, that two mini buses were kept ready for immediate registration, and that granting the route would affect KSRTC's revenue collection. (This objection is recorded in the RTA's resolution.)
  • The record does not show that any party before the RTA (including the petitioner) specifically pleaded that the route is covered by a scheme under Section 100(3) or that there was total exclusion of private operators under such a scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop (India) Limited, 1985 1 SCC 260 Article 226 is not intended to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures; it is for extraordinary situations and should be used to bypass alternate remedies only for good and sufficient reasons. The Court required the petitioner to show why the statutory remedy should be bypassed and applied the Dunlop principle to conclude that ordinarily the petitioner must pursue the alternative statutory remedy unless exceptional circumstances are shown.
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Karnataka (Single Judge decision referred; W.P. Nos. 23697 to 23704 of 1992) Obligation on RTAs/STAs to examine whether a route for which permit is sought falls within a notified area/route covered by a scheme under Section 103(2) read with Section 104; the authority must examine overlap/intersection. The Court acknowledged the legal obligation identified by the Single Judge but distinguished the present facts: in the instant case the petitioner did not raise the specific factual plea before the RTA, so the decision there did not provide assistance to the petitioner here.
Kalaivani Ammal v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (W.A. Nos. 2388 and 2389 of 1992) Related Division Bench observations concerning the need for authorities to examine overlap with nationalised routes and the duty to consider such questions before granting permits. The Division Bench's view that the STA had erred by not examining overlap was noted; the present Court treated those observations as fact-sensitive and found them distinguishable because the present petitioner had not raised the relevant factual issues before the RTA.
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Regional Transport Authority, 1985 1 Kar. L.J. 199 Authority on jurisdictional limits when permits overlap nationalised routes (as cited by the petitioner). The Court considered the authority but held it was inapplicable to the present facts because, unlike that case, here the RTA had not been asked to investigate overlap and no comparable failure to consider the overlap was shown.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded to hear the petition ex parte and first required the petitioner's counsel to demonstrate why the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised despite the availability of a statutory remedy (revision under Section 90). The Court applied the guiding principle from Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop that Article 226 is not to be used to circumvent statutory procedures except in extraordinary circumstances where good and sufficient reasons exist to bypass alternative remedies.

The petitioner contended that Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act prohibited the grant of permits for routes covered by a scheme published under Section 100(3) and that, because the route was part of a nationalised (Bellary Approved) Scheme, the RTA's grant was without jurisdiction. The Court quoted Section 104 and examined its legal effect: where a notified route is part of a published scheme, permits cannot be issued except in accordance with that scheme; whether a notified route is covered by a scheme is a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law.

Because the determination whether the route was covered by a scheme (and whether the scheme imposed total or partial prohibition on private permits) involved mixed questions of fact and law, the Court held the proper course was for the aggrieved party to raise the point before the RTA or STA and use the statutory remedies available. The Court declined to decide the factual question of overlap at the writ stage.

The Court considered authorities relied on by the petitioner that required RTAs/STAs to examine possible overlap with nationalised routes before granting permits. It distinguished the present facts from those decisions: in earlier cases the authority had not investigated overlap at all or the point was specifically raised before the authority; in this case, no such plea or documentary evidence (for example, objections filed before the RTA asserting that the route was part of a scheme and excluded private operators) was placed before the Court showing that the RTA failed to consider that question. The RTA's resolution, as quoted, recorded only the KSRTC DTO's objection on operational and revenue grounds, not a plea of complete exclusion under a published scheme.

Given the absence of a clear factual record showing that the RTA ignored a jurisdictional limit or that the authority acted wholly without jurisdiction, and because the matter involved mixed questions of fact and law that should be raised and considered by the statutory authority, the Court concluded it should not exercise writ jurisdiction in this instance.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ petition is DISMISSED on the ground that the petitioner has an adequate alternate statutory remedy.

Implications and consequences:

  • The petitioner is relegated to pursue the statutory remedy (by way of filing a revision under the Act) and/or raise the factual contention before the RTA/STA so that the question of whether the route falls within a published scheme and whether there is total or partial exclusion of private operators can be investigated and decided by the authority.
  • The Court made no final determination on whether the RTA acted without jurisdiction or whether the route in question formed part of a nationalised scheme; the Court specifically stated it was not recording a final finding on those questions because they involve questions of fact and mixed law which ought to have been raised before the RTA.
  • The Court observed that any comments made in the judgment should not be taken to affect the mind of the authority concerned when deciding the matter on statutory reconsideration.
  • No new legal precedent or novel principle was laid down by the Court; the decision follows established guidance about restraint in exercising Article 226 where adequate alternative remedies exist and about fact-sensitive treatment of alleged jurisdictional errors under Section 104.

This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been added.

    Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. B. Vasthanna And Another

    1. By this petition, the petitioner has prayed for a direction in the nature of writ of certiorari, for quashing the resolution Annexure-A, dated 27-12-1993 annexed to the writ petition. In relief Clause (2), the date has been wrongly given as 8-3-1993. The correct date of Annexure-A as appears from Annexure-A is 27-12-1993. This fact that 8-3-1993 mentioned in the relief clause in the writ petition is a typographical error stands fortified from the fact that in the interim relief clause, the date of Annexure-A ‘is mentioned as 27-12-1993 as is given in Annexure-I.

    2. That as per, Annexure-A, the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) in its meeting dated 27-12-1993 considered the application of Rule 1 for grant of permit to run the mini bus in Bellary City on the route mentioned in OPD-CB, Bellary-Mothi Circle, Vaddarabande, Sangam Circle, Gadagichannappa Circle, Durgamma Temple, Havambhavi (up and down) for 10 trips per day, on trial basis and has further directed the secretary to conduct the timing meeting with KSRTC authorities, Bellary, before issue of permit. Feeling aggrieved by the above order of granting permit, this petition has been filed. Notice was issued of this petition, and the service thereof has been deemed to have been made on Rules 1 and 2. I desired that the service be made again, but the petitioner's counsel insisted on hearing and decision of the petition on merit ex parte Learned counsel drew my attention to the earlier order of the court dated 16-8-1989 passed on his application for declaration that notice has been properly served and submitted that the said application has been allowed. No doubt, the service has been accepted to have been made. So I do proceed with the hearing of writ petition ex parte.

    3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been required in the first instance to satisfy the court if the petitioner has got any alternative remedy if yes, why the petition is not liable to be dismissed on that ground, in the light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop (India) Limited . 1985 1 SCC 260. In this case, their Lordships have laid down that Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only to meet the demands of extraordinary situations as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up that the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be allowed to be had to Article 226 of the Constitution particularly keeping in view that it is a case where there exist good and sufficient reasons to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute.

    4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though remedy is provided under the Act vide Section 90 by way of the revision but here is a case where the permit could not be granted as the route in respect of which permit has been granted to run mini-bus i.e, on the route in question is part of nationalised route and is covered by Bellary Approved Scheme, as such in view of Section 104 of the Act the order is without jurisdiction and so the petition need not be thrown or dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Single Judge decision of this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Karnataka . W.P Nos. 23697 to 23704 of 1992, DD. The learned counsel further made a reference to the Division Bench decision of this Court in Kalaivani Ammal v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation . W.A Nos. 2388 and 2389 of 1992, DD. He invited my attention to another Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Regional Transport Authority . 1985 1 Kar. L.J 199..

    5. I have applied my mind to the above contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and to the facts of the case as well as to the authorities referred to above and in my opinion there is no substance in petitioner's counsel's submission and petitioner is to be relegated to have recourse to remedies available under the Act for the reasons hereinafter.

    6. It is no doubt true that alternative remedy by itself does not create a bar to this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 as rule of law. It is a rule of guidance for exercise of judicial discretion that ordinarily the jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised where the party has got an alternative remedy. But there may be some exceptional cases in the sense that either the tribunal or the subordinate court has acted under a provision which is ultra vires or that tribunal or court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it at all, that the order suffers from lack of jurisdiction or that order impugned is the result of gross negligence of the judicial authority and exercise of the jurisdictional power by the authority in violation or in breach of principles of natural justice and fair play or the like where this Court does exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. There may be cases where order is such that the consciousness of the Court is touched, in those cases also the court may, no doubt, exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 but it is well settled principle of judicial guidance that any party should not be allowed to take recourse under Article 226 of the Constitution to circumvent the remedies provided under law.

    7. Learned counsel for the petitioner while submitting that the order is without jurisdiction invited my attention to Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act reads thus:—

    “Restriction on grant of permits in respect of notified area or notified route:— Where a scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of Section 100 in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be shall not grant any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme:

    Provided that where no application for a permit has been made by the State Transport undertaking in respect of any notified area or notified route in pursuance of approved scheme, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant temporary permits to any person in respect of such notified area, or notified route subject to the condition that such permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to State Transport undertaking in respect of that area or route”.

    8. In view of Section 104 of the Act, if any notified route forms part of the Scheme published under Section 100(3) of the Act, no doubt, permits can not be issued except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. Whether the notified route is covered by the Scheme issued under Section 100(3) of the Act is a question of fact, such a question of fact has got to be raised that the particular route falls within the scope of the scheme, published under Section 100(3) of the Act, and it is to be asserted and shown by person concerned. Under the scheme there may be total or partial prohibition in the matter of granting of permit. When these questions are raised before the Regional Transport Authority, then the authority may be said to be required to consider and to form an opinion as well as to come to the conclusion if the route in question is covered by such a scheme and whether there is a case of complete prohibition or partial prohibition and thereafter on the basis of the findings on the above question the authority may come to a finding if it can or cannot and should or should not grant permit. Further, whether the notified area is under the scheme of nationalisation is a question of fact and that question of fact had to be raised before RTA or STA concerned in view of Section 104 of the Act. Any way, this question, I am not deciding in one way or the other, as regards the plea that the authority acted without jurisdiction in granting permit at this stage of writ petition. It does not appear to me nor it has been shown or established that it is a pure question of law. There is a mixed question of fact and law. The proper course for the aggrieved party was that they should have raised that plea before the RTA or should have made representation and in such cases where a mixed question of law and fact arises, it is open to this Court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 and compel the party to have the statutory remedy under law.

    9. The case of Regional Transport Authority, supra, is of no assistance to the petitioner in view of the facts of the case and in that case not only the plea was raised to the effect the route in respect of which respondents-2 and 3 of that case had applied for grant of permit, did overlap the notified route included in Kolar Pocket Scheme and as such respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to grant the permit to private operators, but further in that case prayer was as well made for the appointment and issuance of commission to inspect the route and to find out whether there was any overlapping of notified area or notified route. But the authority did not consider the matter at all nor did try to find out if there was any overlapping. It is the context of these facts of the case that learned Single Judge took the view that there was a case jurisdiction involved, as without investigating the question if route in question did or did not overlap the scheme route (Nationalised Route) the RTA had granted permit to private persons. So it was case exercise of jurisdiction not vested and the observations made therein have got to be read in light facts of the case. Here in the present case no such plea was raised before RTA nor was he required to consider if route in question did form part of scheme published under Section 100(3) of the Act or did that route in question did overlap the notified route.

    10. In the case of KSRTC v. State of Karnataka, supra, the learned Single Judge after making reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court has opined that:—

    “Therefore, there is an obligation on the part of the concerned RTAs, and STAs, to examine the question whether the route in respect of which the permit is sought for falls within the notified area or notified route, covered by a scheme under Section 103 of the Act. In some of the cases, in fact, the petitioners raised objections for the grant of permits and in fact stated that route survey has to be done to ascertain whether the route overlaps or otherwise over the notified routes. Without examining this aspect of the matter, whether objections are raised or not, the RTAs or the KSTAs. have granted permits to respondents”.

    11. The learned Single Judge further observed that:—

    “So there is an obligation on the part of the concerned RTA to take notice of the law and give effect to the same and in doing so, must examine before grant of permit whether it overlaps the notified route or not. That exercise has not been done by the authority at all”.

    12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge remitted the matter to the STA for fresh consideration in accordance with law. Aggrieved by this order writ appeals were preferred (Writ Appeal Nos. 2388 and 2389 of 1992). The Hon'ble Judges constituting the Division Bench have observed at page 2 as under:—

    “The learned Single Judge has accepted the contention of the KSRTC that the STA ought to have considered the question as to whether the route in question overlaps the nationalised route viz., Kolar Pocket Scheme, Anekal Scheme and Kanakapura Scheme; that the STA has not examined this aspect of the matter and there is no indication in the resolution of the STA that it has applied its mind to this aspect of the matter. The learned Single Judge has taken a view that whenever the question is as to whether the route overlaps the nationalised route, it is the duty of the STA to examine whether there is overlapping or there is only an intersection with reference to the provisions of the scheme as per Section 103(2) read with Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter be referred to as the ‘Act’)”.

    13. The Division Bench after considering the matter took the view that the authorities committed a mistake in granting permit.

    14. In the present case, it does not appear that the said question has been raised, as no copy of the objections if any, filed before the RTA has been annexed to this writ petition to show that really the question was raised to the effect that the notified route in respect of which the permit is going to be granted forms part of the nationalised route or route covered under Section 103(2) of the Act or there is overlapping and further there is complete exclusion of private operators from the said route under the scheme. In the present writ petition it is stated that the petitioner's representative had appeared before the second respondent and objected for granting a permit to the first respondent on the ground that entire route is ‘Bellary approved scheme’. But it is not clear whether there is complete or partial exclusion. The proceedings before the RTA do not indicate any such plea to have been raised. What has been contended before the authority is quoted in paragraph 2 of the resolution which reads as under:—

    “The D.T.O, KSRTC, Bellary, was present and heard. He has stated that the above permit sought is to be rejected as the said authorities are providing 22 city services in Bellary City to cater to the need of the public, even also they are serving the said services to school-going children and also pleaded that at present two mini buses are kept ready for the said purpose and to be registered immediately and once the said route was granted, it will affect the revenue collection to the KSRTC and requested strongly to reject the said grant”.

    15. It appears from the perusal of the above paragraph that no such plea was raised before the RTA that the route in respect of which the permit to run mini bus is being granted to respondent-1 is a part and parcel of the nationalised route or of the scheme under Section 100(3) of the Act. It does not appears to have been pleaded that there was total exclusion of the private operators under the scheme. Any way, I do not record any final finding or observation on the question if permit was granted to respondent in excess of jurisdiction or the like as in its questions of fact and of law are involved in this case and determination of facts is also required which ought to have been raised before the RTA. I hereby dismiss the petition only with the observation that no clear cut question of law relating to jurisdiction or error of jurisdiction has been raised nor is involved as such, so as not to relegate the party to the alternative remedy of filing a revision or moving the authority for granting of a permit in accordance with law, after bringing out necessary facts, so that they may consider and investigate on this question of fact, and to see whether the permit could be granted or not.

    16. Petition is hereby dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has got an alternative remedy to approach the statutory authority in the matter by way of filing a revision. Any observation made herein shall not be considered to be affecting the mind of the authority concerned when they are called upon to decide on the question.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. B. Vasthanna And Another
    (Sep 19, 1994)