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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Vasanatha Kumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition (C.R.P.) challenges the order dated 4-2-92 passed in G & W 5/91. The parties are husband (respondent) and wife (petitioner). The parties were married at Mysore and thereafter resided at Bombay. The petitioner returned to Mysore in 1990 for confinement and the child was born there. The wife and child subsequently went to Bombay to reside with the husband. The petitioner alleges that while residing in Bombay she was driven out of the house (together with her mother) and that custody of the child was not given to her, prompting her to seek court intervention for custody.

A preliminary objection was raised below challenging the maintainability of the petition in Mysore on the ground that the child was not residing at Mysore on the date of presentation of the petition and that jurisdiction therefore lay in Bombay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the phrase "where the minor ordinarily resides" must be construed as the place where the minor (child) actually resides at the commencement of proceedings, or whether it is to be determined by reference to the mother's residence when the mother is the primary caregiver for an infant.
  2. Whether the petition filed by the mother in Mysore was maintainable despite allegations that the child had been living with the father in Bombay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Wife)

  • The petitioner (mother) was residing at Mysore when she presented the petition there seeking custody of the child.
  • The child was of tender age and, as alleged, had been left in the father's custody because the mother was driven out of the matrimonial home; thus jurisdiction should follow the mother's place of residence at the time of presentation.

Respondent's Arguments (Husband)

  • The respondent contended that because the child was residing with the father in Bombay at the time the petition was presented, the Bombay court had jurisdiction and the petition in Mysore was not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jeewanti v. Kishan . 1982 1 KLJ Sh. N. 13 Item No. 35. The word “resides” means the actual place of residence and not a legal or constructive residence; jurisdiction depends on the actual residence of the wife at the commencement of the proceedings. The court relied on this principle to focus on the actual residence relevant to commencement of proceedings and to support construing "ordinarily resides" by reference to the caregiver's (mother's) residence before presentation of the petition.
Mst. Firoza Begum v. Akhtaruddin Laskar . AIR 1963 Ass 193 The expression “ordinarily resides” indicates the minor's ordinary place of residence and is intended to exclude places to which the minor may have been removed at or about the time of filing; emphasis is on the minor’s ordinary place of residence. The court cited this authority to support the view that temporary or recent movements of the minor at the time of filing should not displace the ordinary residence; this bolstered the view that the mother's residence at presentation determines jurisdiction for an infant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by referencing Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which requires applications regarding guardianship of the person of a minor to be made to the District Court having jurisdiction where the minor "ordinarily resides."

Applying precedent, the court noted the established interpretation that "resides" ordinarily denotes the actual place of residence at the commencement of proceedings. The court considered the particular facts: the child was an infant (about 10–11 months), and such a child is generally expected to be in the custody of the mother. Given the child's tender age, the mother's residence at the time the petition was presented was taken as determinative of the minor's "ordinary" residence for jurisdictional purposes.

It was an admitted fact in the record that the mother was residing at Mysore when she presented the petition there and she had pleaded circumstances in the petition alleging that the child had been left in the father's custody after she was driven out of the house. Relying on the cited authorities, the court concluded that these facts justified treating Mysore as the minor's ordinary residence for the purposes of Section 9.

Because the Court-below had found that the petition filed by the mother in Mysore had jurisdiction, the present court found no legal infirmity in that finding and declined to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P.) is dismissed. The order dated 4-2-92 in G & W 5/91 (upholding jurisdiction in Mysore) is left undisturbed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the lower court's determination that Mysore had jurisdiction to entertain the mother's petition for custody stands; the revision court refused to interfere. No costs were awarded. The opinion does not articulate any broader precedent beyond applying established authorities on the meaning of "ordinarily resides."

Judge: Vasanatha Kumar, J. — the opinion concludes with dismissal of the C.R.P. under the stated reasoning.

    K.C Sashidhar v. Roopa

    Vasanatha Kumar, J.:—

    This petition is directed against the order dated 4-2-92 passed in G & W 5/91.

    2. A few facts briefly to state are that the petitioner is the wife and the respondent is the husband in the Court below. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner and the respondent got married at Mysore and thereafter they started marital life at Bombay. The petitioner came to Mysore, her parental home, in the year 1990 for her confinement and the child was born at Mysore. It is an admitted fact that the wife along with her child went to Bombay to reside with her husband; while they were living at Bombay, it is the case of the wife that while she was residing with her husband, she was driven out of the house along with her mother and the custody of the child was not given to her as such the circumstances warranted her to seek the intervention of the Court for the custody of the child. A Preliminary objection has been raised regarding the maintainability of the Petition on the ground that the child was not residing at Mysore, as on the date of the presentation of the Petition.

    3. It is submitted that since the child was residing with the father, the jurisdictional court would be at Bombay and not at Mysore. So, the arguments centre round about as to what is to be construed to the word ‘ordinarily resides’. Section 9 of the Gaurdians and Wards Act, 1890 reads thus:

    “Court having jurisdiction to entertain application. (1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.”

    In Jeewanti v. Kishan . 1982 1 KLJ Sh. N. 13 Item No. 35., the Supreme Court in a matter arising out of Hindu Marriage Act, has dealt regarding the scope of the word “ordinarily resides”, it is held:

    “That the word “resides” must mean the actual place of residence and not a legal or constructive residence, it certainly did not connote the place of origin. It was the actual residence of the wife at the commencement of the proceedings that had to be considered, for jurisdiction.”

    4. Invariably, a minor child that too at the age of 10 to 11 months is expected to be with the custody of the mother. So the words “ordinarily resides” should be construed as the place where the mother resides before the presentation of the Petition. It is an admitted fact that, in the instant case, the mother was residing at Mysore when she presented the Petition at Mysore seeking custody of the child. Further, it is to be noted that she has alleged in her Petition circumstances under which the child was forced to be left in the custody of the father. When such is the case, the place of residence has to be construed as the place where mother resided before presenting the Petition. In view of that, the finding given by the Court below that the Petition filed by the petitioner, namely the mother, at Mysore, having jurisdiction does not suffer from any legal infirmities. In Mst. Firoza Begum v. Akhtaruddin Laskar . AIR 1963 Ass 193. wherein the Assam High Court observed:

    “It is contended by Mr. Ghose that the expression “ordinarily resides”, does not mean casual or factual residence of the minors at the time of the application being made, and that normally the residence of the minor should be taken as the place where the legal guardian is residing…. That the expression “where the minor ordinarily resides” appears to have been deliberately used to exclude places to which the minor may be removed at or about the time of the filing of the application for the enforcement of the guardianship and custody of the minor, and that the phrase “ordinarily resides” indicates ordinary residence even at the time of the presentation of the application under Section 25 of the Act, and that the emphasis is undoubtedly on the minor's ordinary place of residence.”

    5. In the instant case, since the child is of tender age, the legal guardian would be the mother and the place of her residence, on the date of the presentation of the Petition, is the place where it is to be construed as the minor “ordinarily resided” and as such the finding arrived at by the Court-below does not suffer from any legal infirmities. Hence the circumstances do not warrant interference of this Court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the C.P.C Accordingly, this C.R.P is dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    K.C Sashidhar v. Roopa
    (Jul 7, 1992)