Murlidher Rao, J.:—

This is a tenant's petition challenging the order of eviction passed by 4th Additional Small Causes Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, in HRC No. 10561/1981. Premises No. 15/1 (old No. 8) New No. 15/181, Cambridge Road, Ulsoor, belonged to R. Srinivasa. On 29-11-1979, he sold it to N. Sargunam, the present land lady-respondent. On 30-11-1979, Srinivasan's advocate issued a notice to petitioner-tenant to attorn his tenancy to the purchaser with effect from 30-11-1979. On 12-2-1980 the petitioner-tenant filed a suit for specific performance of contract against R. Srinivasan and present land lady, which is still pending. The plea set up was, R. Srinivasan had executed an agreement of sale in favour of petitioner-tenant on 14-6-1979. One significant fact found in the plaint in respect of sale deed executed by R. Srinivasan is-

“It is curious that the said sale deed has been registered in pursuance of an agreement between the defendant 1 and defendant No. 2 which in fact was cancelled earlier and the defendant No. 2 has full knowledge of agreement dated 14-6-1979.”

(Emphasis supplied)

2. Implicit in this statement is a fact that prior to the agreement dated 14-6-1979, set up by the petitioner-tenant, there was an agreement between R. Srinivasan and the landlady, which culminated in the execution of the sale deed dated 29-11-1979, but according to petitioner-tenant the said agreement was cancelled.

3. The landlady sought eviction under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, on the ground that the premises are required for self-occupation for her family which consists of herself, husband, five children, in addition, her husband's second wife, who is also staying with her. Landlady's husband is a gold-smith, his monthly income being Rs. 500/-. An ex parte eviction decree was passed. Landlady secured possession in execution. Thereafter the ex parte decree was set aside. The tenant got the possession restored and thus he continues to be in possession. Landlady's family is staying in one room in a friend's house, who is examined as PW-2.

4. The tenant resisted the petition. His main contention was that landlady has no right; sale in her favour was “sham, bogus, without consideration, fraudulent and is in collusion with her vendor.” The other allegations were denied.

5. On the pleadings the Court below raised points for determination as found in para 9 of the impugned order. After appreciating the evidence, the Court below held that respondent is the owner of the premises. She has established that she requires the premises bona fide and reasonably and she would suffer greater hardship. The petition is allowed.

6. In this petition, Mr. Mujeeb, the learned Counsel for petitioner-tenant urged that the sale in favour of landlady was sham and not genuine and it did not convey title, as such, she had no locus standi to initiate eviction proceedings. He strenuously urged that since the tenant had already filed a suit for specific performance of contract these proceedings must await the result of that suit, in the alternative, the matter should be remanded to the lower Court to be tried along with O.S 8296/80 (old No. O.S 54/80). He submitted that being an intending purchaser in possession he can protect his possession under Section 53-A Transfer of Property Act. The agreement dated 14-6-1979, executed by R. Srinivasan, predecessor-in-title of landlady is binding on her and she being a party to civil suit, she cannot seek eviction. The net conclusion of his submission was the petitioner-tenant should not lose his possession before his suit for specific performance is finally decided. Mr. Shivaprakasham, on the contrary submitted that the present proceedings are independent and civil suit has no bearing on the matters in issue. He submitted that petitioner is admittedly inducted as tenant in 1945, during his father's life time; as such, his status continues to be so, till it gets altered by law or by decree. Pendency of civil suit, the result of which is uncertain, has no impact on the proceedings under the Rent Control Act. The reliefs and grounds in these two proceedings are distinct. He submitted that even if the petitioner is dispossessed, he can amend his prayer and ask for possession in the suit. He submitted that Section 53-A T.P Act has no application to an eviction proceeding under the Rent Control Act, which is based on the relationship of landlord and tenant; the non-obstante clause in Section 21 excludes the application of T.P Act.

7. On the question of bona fide requirement, landlady's husband is examined as PW-1. He states that his family consists of eight members. He and his family members are staying in a friend's house by name Kannan. The accommodation available is one room. They are not permitted to use bathroom and lavatory meant for others. They go out. The accommodation available with the tenant is one hall, one room, kitchen, bathroom and lavatory. Kannan is examined as PW-2, who supports PW-1. After going through the evidence the conclusion that landlady's need is bona fide and reasonable and she suffers greater hardship has to be confirmed, indeed it is a matter of necessity, as the family members have no essential amenities of bathroom and lavatory. To deny eviction, in these circumstances, would be unjust and harsh. A learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court observed thus, with which I respectfully agree in Shankar v. Durgapur Projects . AIR 1988 Calcutta 136.:

“To ask a person to live in sub-human conditions by depriving him even of the benefit of two small rooms which is the minimum requirement for a family to live, and compelling him to live in one single room with his wife and children and to share the bath, toilet and kitchen with another family, if it connotes anything, is mere animal existence and nothing more. An important facet of the right to life is the right to live like a human being, which conforms to a much lesser degree the State's obligation to ‘ensure a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure’ to all its workmen as provided by Article 43 of the Constitution. Compelling a person to live in sub-human condition also amounts to the taking away of his life, not by execution of a death sentence but by a slow and gradual process by robbing him of all his human qualities and graces, a process which is much more cruel than sending a man to the gallows. To convert human existence into animal existence no doubt amounts to taking away human life, because a man lives not by his mere physical existence or by bread alone but by his human existences.”

Therefore on facts the only conclusion possible is the one drawn by the Court below, which does not call for interference.

8. Petitioner-tenant filed the suit after the issue of notice dated 30-11-1979. The copy of the agreement, on which the said suit is based, is not filed in these proceedings. It is admitted that petitioner's father was inducted as tenant and the petitioner has succeeded him. The assertion is while he was a tenant, R. Srinivasan had agreed to sell the premises on 14-6-1979. This agreement is said to be the basis of the suit in O.S 8296/1980. It is neither permissible nor is it possible to predict the outcome of this suit. Specific performance is a discretionary relief; it may or may not be granted. In the eviction proceedings, the landlady has based her right on the basis of registered sale deed dated 29-11-1979. The khata of the premises stands in her name (Ext. P-8). R. Srinivasan in his written statement in O.S 8296/80, admits the execution of sale deed and the receipt of consideration. Prima facie, there is enough material to hold that she is the owner and hence she has a right, as a “landlady” to seek eviction. Petitioner-tenant admits that he was inducted as a tenant. This legal status remains until it is terminated or altered by a process known to law. In any eviction petition under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act, the relevant consideration is the relationship of landlord and tenant. Petitioner-tenant has yet to acquire an altered status in the premises. Therefore there is no impediment in finalising these proceedings. In this context it was held thus by a learned Judge of Patna High Court in N.P Tripathi v. Dayamanti Devi . AIR 1988 Patna 123.:

“…..Therefore, the title to the property can pass to the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract only after the fulfilment of the following conditions:

(1) The plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the agreement upon which he based his claim is a true and genuine one;

(2) He has already performed his part of the contract by payment of earnest money:

(3) He is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; and

(4) If there is any subsequent purchaser to the agreement before the institution of the suit such a transferee was not a bona fide transferee and had not been able to prove either his bona fide or lack of notice on his part and even after the decree is passed compelling the defendant in such a case it would be in the terms of directing the plaintiff to perform his part of the imperfected bargain within a certain specified time on the performance of which the defendant in such a suit is ordered or directed to execute a sale deed and get it registered either voluntarily or under the due process of law as specified in the decree. So long as the sale deed is not executed, no title in the property passes to the plaintiff of the suit for specific performance of contract. Merely because he institutes a suit saying that there was an agreement for contract of sale he cannot be said to be the owner of the property, even if it were so held because no sale deed had been executed in his favour till then.

Therefore, it is manifest that the question with regard to the ownership of the property is not the subject-matter of dispute either indirectly or directly and substantially in such a suit vis-a-vis the landlord, who is alleged to be a party to the agreement for sale and who was the original owner thereof.”

I respectfully agree. The subject matter of the two proceedings being distinct and independent, each proceedings has to be conducted to its end, in the respective forums. It may be that tenant may lose his possession in the Rent Control proceedings, he may have to amend his relief in the suit and ask for possession on the basis of sale deed. But there can be no justification to stay the eviction proceedings on this ground. The issues in the two proceedings are distinct and the reliefs to be granted are also different. The cause of action in a suit for specific performance of contract is the alleged agreement of sale, refusal of performance and willingness on the part of the purchaser to do his part of the contract, whereas in the eviction proceedings the cause is based on one or more grounds in Section 21(1) of the Rent Control Act, and the relief granted is as contemplated by the Rent Control Act. Indeed when eviction is granted under Clauses (h) and (j) the evicted tenant has a right of re-entry in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, his right remains only as a tenant and relationship with his landlord continues. In the case of specific performance of contract, if the suit is decreed and sale is executed, the relationship between the parties ends and decree holder-purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. Further a tenant may be a contractual tenant, allottee-tenant or a statutory tenant under the Statute, has a ‘status’ which can be put to an end by following the procedure in the Act. He has a right to ask for restoration of amenities and for fixation of fair rent. In the case of intending purchaser his only right is to seek performance of contract and if he is in possession under the agreement, resist his dispossession. He may file a suit for refund of purchase money or part of it, if it is paid. But in the property he gets no right. These being the distinguishing features of two proceedings, any attempt to stall or obstruct the eviction proceedings has to be strictly curbed. By providing summary trial, legislature has made it clear that the disposal must be expeditious and unlike civil suit, it should not be a long drawn innings. By making the order non-appealable the intention is reinforced. By not providing for any time, the legislature has made it clear that the eviction order must be enforced forthwith. Indeed granting of time is a Judge-made practice.

9. To achieve speedy disposal of these cases, Rules, corresponding to several provisions of Civil Procedure Code, are framed. In this framework of legislation, any attempt to delay the proceedings would be defeating the object of the Act. Therefore there cannot be any justification to stay these proceedings, nor can it be clubbed with a civil suit which goes on for years. Indeed it will lead to anomaly. In civil suits issues are framed, no such procedure is contemplated for summary proceedings. Further, time to bring L.Rs on record in civil suit is 90 days, whereas under the Rent Control Act, it is only 15 days. Certain interlocutory orders in the suit are appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C The decree in the suit is appealable and thereafter a second appeal is also provided. To club an eviction proceedings, which has to be tried summarily and where no appeal is provided is clearly illegal and impermissible. The very purpose of enacting a special legislation is defeated. Therefore this request of Sri Mujeeb is rejected.

10. The second limb of his submission is that the tenant is entitled to protect his possession under Section 53-A T.P Act; he also submitted that the complicated question of title to the property is involved, the parties be directed to establish the same in civil suit. As pointed out earlier, the landlady's title is supported by registered sale deed, khata extract and notice of attornment issued by R. Srinivasan. Tenant's contention is, he held an agreement from Srinivasan and on that basis he has filed a suit for specific performance of contract. An agreement of sale does not create a right in the property, it creates a personal right to demand specific performance. In Rangarao Ramarao Deshpande v. Channappa Basappa Lakamanahalli . ILR 1974 KAR 797., it is observed thus:

“It is therefore not necessary to decide the question whether the rights of a tenant became merged in case the tenant acquires rights of a transferee under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Since only the right to ask for specific performance had been acquired by the plaintiff under Exhibit P-3, and since such a right does not constitute an interest in immoveable property, there was no merger of the tenancy rights of the plaintiff under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act.”

The above observation makes it clear that the right of tenant remained intact as a tenant and there can be no merger of his right in any other form of higher right in the property.

11. As mentioned above, the eviction petition is based on the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant; in such a proceedings there can be no investigation regarding the title to the property. In Suryakanth Kashibai Patel v. S.C Chavan,4 it is observed thus:

“(1) It is no part of the duty of a Rent Control Court to examine the validity or legality of the title to the property possessed by the landlord and that the Rent Court is concerned only with a question whether the parties are related as landlord and tenant.

(2) It is clear from the material placed on record that the previous landlord, whose right to receive rent has not been disputed by the tenant in any manner, had clearly notifed the tenant about the sale to the petitioner and called upon him to attorn to the petitioner by the issue of an appropriate notice under Exhibit P-3.”

12. Mr. Mujeeb however placed reliance on Rukamoddia Dastagirsab v. Basawwa,5 to contend that in such a situation the parties should be directed to seek relief in civil suit and no relief can be granted under the Rent Control Act. In the said case the trial Court directed eviction of tenant. In appeal, by tenant, the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and held that “the petitioner had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondents”. In revision to this Court the learned Judge set aside that finding. In para 16, it is observed thus:

“In view of the foregoing, I hold that the findings of the Additional District Judge, Bijapur, that the petitioner has failed to establish the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondents, is to be set aside and the Judgment of the Additional District Judge in other respects, is to be confirmed.”

13. Once it is held that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant, the relief under the Rent Control Act cannot be refused. On the facts of that case the Court directed the parties to establish their title to the property in the civil suit. In the instant case, such a course cannot be adopted for the following reasons:—

1) The alleged agreement is not made a part of the record;

2) The tenant has already filed a suit for specific performance of contract, if he succeeds, he will get title and not otherwise;

3) It is not known whether the landlady is a bonafide purchaser without notice of agreement;

4) The vendor of landlady namely R. Srinivasan is himself contesting the claim of tenant.

14. Mr. Mujeeb also placed reliance on the Judgment of Supreme Court in Devidas v. Mohanlal.6 In that case the landlord's petition for eviction was allowed. Their Lordships in appeal did not disturb the findings regarding the need of the landlord being bona fide. The matter was remitted to the trial Court to record a finding on the question whether the sale was a bona fide transaction as the allegation was “there was no sale and it was a paper transaction”. In the instant case the tenant's contention is that he is entitled to protect his possession, firstly on the ground that there is an agreement of sale executed by landlady's vendor and secondly he has filed a suit for specific performance of contract. To presume that the sale in favour of landlady is illegal and sham would be prejudging the issue involved in the civil suit. Mr. Shivaprakasham submitted that if at this stage the eviction petition is dismissed, the tenant may withdraw his suit for specific performance or may allow it to be dismissed for default, in which event he will be squatting on the property, without paying the rent compelling the landlady who is a bona fide purchaser for value and who has established that she needs the premises bona fide and reasonably to file a suit for possession against the petitioner treating him as trespasser. This argument cannot be brushed aside.

15. Petitioner-tenant is interested in continuing his possession. If as apprehended by Mr. Shivaprakasham, the eviction order is set aside, petitioner-tenant would not be interested in pursuing his suit. He would very much desire the landlady to file a suit. Therefore landlady cannot be denied the just relief on a speculative and uncertain defence of petitioner-tenant. Hence the contentions of Mr. Mujeeb are rejected.

16. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and it is rejected. No costs.

17. The petitioner-tenant is in possession. These proceedings are initiated in July 1981, as it is seven years have elapsed. The landlady's family is staying in one room in conditions which betray human living. In these circumstances, petitioner-tenant is given time to vacate, once and for all, by 30-4-1989, subject to payment of rents. Petitioner-tenant shall vacate and surrender vacant possession to the landlady on or before 30th April 1989.