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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • G.N.Hagroo
  • B.A.Rather
Judges
  • Hon'ble Sh. Justice R.P. Sethi
  • Hon'ble Dr. Justice Adarsh Sein Anand
  • Hon'ble Sh. Justice G.A. Kuchhai
Acts
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • G.N.Hagroo
  • B.A.Rather
Judges
  • Hon'ble Sh. Justice R.P. Sethi
  • Hon'ble Dr. Justice Adarsh Sein Anand
  • Hon'ble Sh. Justice G.A. Kuchhai
Acts
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants appealed against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jammu, dated 20 November 1981. The appeal was filed on the 95th day after the date of the award. The appellants contended that the Tribunal had improperly appreciated evidence, that there was no evidence proving the driver was driving rashly and negligently, and that there was no evidence regarding the annual income of the deceased, Abdul Aziz, making the Tribunal's award unjustified.

The appeal was admitted for hearing before a Full Bench by a Division Bench of this Court on 3 March 1982, subject to just exceptions about limitation. The Division Bench referred a question of law for Full Bench consideration because counsel for the appellant contended that the Division Bench judgment in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad conflicted with the Supreme Court decision in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons and therefore required reconsideration.

The Full Bench (R.P. Sethi, J., for himself and G.A. Kuchhai J.) heard counsel, perused written submissions, and examined the statutory provisions and precedent authorities relevant to limitation under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act and the operation of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench judgment in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad required reconsideration because it conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons.
  2. Whether, and to what extent, the principles of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (concerning exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy) are applicable when determining "sufficient cause" under the proviso to section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  3. On the facts of this case, whether the appellant showed "sufficient cause" for filing the appeal beyond the 90-day period prescribed by section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether the period spent in obtaining a copy of the award should be excluded and whether any remaining delay was satisfactorily explained).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Tribunal wrongly appreciated the evidence; specifically, there was no evidence to prove the driver was plying the vehicle rashly and negligently.
  • There was no evidence relating to the annual income of the deceased, Abdul Aziz, and therefore the Tribunal was not justified in passing the award.
  • The Division Bench judgment in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad was said to be in conflict with the Supreme Court decision in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons and thus required reconsideration by a Full Bench.

The opinion does not set out any detailed, competing arguments by the respondent(s) in the record excerpt provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6 The Division Bench there held that an appellant must establish "sufficient cause" to entitle the High Court to entertain an appeal after the 90-day period under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act; on the facts that appellant had not shown sufficient cause. The Full Bench held there is no conflict between that judgment and other authorities; it relied on the reasoning in Manzoor Ahmad that the underlying principle of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (though not strictly applicable) is relevant to determine "sufficient cause," and applied that approach to the facts to deny commutation beyond the day excluded for obtaining a copy.
CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons, [1976] 38 STC 543; (1976) 4 SCC 464; AIR 1977 SC 523 The Supreme Court held that "time requisite" in section 12(2) is not to be understood as the absolute minimum time and that where a copy served on a party is lost and a fresh copy must be obtained, the time spent obtaining that copy should be excluded under section 12(2). The appellants relied on this case to argue conflict with Manzoor Ahmad. The Full Bench considered the Supreme Court's principle relevant, accepted that it supports exclusion of time spent obtaining a copy when justified, but concluded that there was no conflict with Manzoor Ahmad's approach and that the principle may be considered in deciding "sufficient cause."
Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Basra, [1973] ACJ 358 (Full Bench, Mysore) Held that the period under section 110D is a special law attracting section 29 of the Limitation Act, and by virtue of section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from is to be excluded. The Full Bench cited this authority as one of the decisions bearing on whether time to obtain a copy must be excluded. The court reconciled this case with Manzoor Ahmad and the Supreme Court authority and treated the principle as part of the considerations for "sufficient cause."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework governing appeals against Claims Tribunal awards: section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes a 90-day limitation period with a proviso permitting the High Court to entertain an appeal after that period if satisfied that the appellant was prevented by "sufficient cause" from preferring the appeal in time.

The Court then examined the Limitation Act provisions invoked in argument: section 29 (which makes certain provisions of the Limitation Act applicable where a special law prescribes a different period), section 12(2) (which excludes the day of pronouncement and "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" when computing limitation), and the Explanation to section 12 (which defines "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" as the period from payment of the estimated cost for the copy to the date when the copy is ready and notice is put up, excluding the day of payment and the day of delivery).

The Court reviewed prior authorities: the Division Bench decision in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, the Supreme Court decision in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons, and the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court in Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Basra. The Full Bench found no conflict among these authorities. It explained the analytical reconciliation as follows:

  • Although section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not, in terms, made applicable to appeals under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the principle embodied in section 12(2)—that time reasonably spent in obtaining a copy should not be counted against a litigant—is grounded in justice, equity and good conscience and therefore is a judicially recognized ground relevant to the determination of "sufficient cause."
  • Consequently, while the literal provisions of section 12(2) may not directly apply, the underlying principle can and should be taken into account by the High Court when deciding whether "sufficient cause" exists to extend the time under the proviso to section 110D.
  • Where a party demonstrates that it was not supplied a copy despite efforts and therefore had to obtain one afresh, the court may commute the period reasonably required to obtain that copy for the purposes of computing limitation under section 110D.

Applying these principles to the facts: the appellant applied for a copy of the award on 7 January 1982 and paid the estimated cost on 11 January 1982; the copy was ready and supplied on 11 January 1982. Under the Explanation to section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining the copy in this case amounted to excluding one day (the period between payment and delivery, with the day of payment and day of delivery excluded). On that basis the filing deadline would have been moved from 18 February 1982 to 19 February 1982, but the appeal was not filed until 23 February 1982.

The Court observed there was no explanation from the appellant as to why the appeal was not filed on the 19th or 20th of February 1982. Since the appellant failed to show any additional "sufficient cause" beyond the single day attributable to obtaining the copy, the Court concluded that the appellant had not established "sufficient cause" within the meaning of the proviso to section 110D.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench concluded that the appeal was barred by time and therefore DISMISSED. The interim stay order issued by the Court on 3 March 1982 was vacated, and C.M.P. No. 38 of 1982 was disposed of.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's appeal was dismissed as time-barred; the stay previously granted was vacated and the connected miscellaneous petition disposed.
  • On legal principle: The Full Bench held there was no conflict between Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad and the other authorities cited (including the Supreme Court decision in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons and the Mysore Full Bench decision in Vanguard Insurance). It clarified that while section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not expressly applicable to appeals under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the principle underlying section 12(2) (exclusion of reasonable time to obtain copies) may be taken into account in determining "sufficient cause" under section 110D. Thus, a party may be entitled to commutation of the period reasonably spent in obtaining a copy, but only to the extent justified on the facts.
  • On precedent: The Court did not state that it was creating a new rule of law; rather, it reconciled earlier authorities and affirmed the approach that the underlying principle of section 12(2) may inform the "sufficient cause" inquiry. The decision applies that reconciled approach to the present factual matrix and does not purport to depart from Supreme Court authority.

All statements above are drawn exclusively from the opinion provided. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text have been introduced.

Show full summary ...

    Managing Director v. Mst. Fatima Begum.

    R.P Sethi, J. (For Himself and G.A Kuchhai J.):— Aggrieved by the judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jammu, dated November 20, 1981, the appellants filed the present appeal in this court on the 95th day from the date of the award. It is submitted that the Tribunal has not properly appreciated the evidence led by the parties. It is alleged that there was no evidence on the record to prove that the driver was plying the vehicle rashly and negligently. It is further alleged that there being no evidence regarding the annual income of the deceased, Abdul Aziz, the Tribunal was not justified in passing the award impugned in this appeal.

    2. This appeal was admitted for hearing before the Full Bench subject to just exceptions about limitation by a Division Bench of this court on March 3, 1982. It was submitted that the law laid down in Union of India v. Man-zoor Ahmad., [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6, being in conflict with the judgment of the Supreme Court in CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons, [1976] 38 STC 543; (1976) 4 SCC 464 : AIR 1977 SC 523, was not good law and required reconsideration. The Division Bench, vide the order of reference, found that the argument of learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench requiring reconsideration, was debatable which required consideration by a Full Bench. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the written submissions filed by them.

    3. Filing of an appeal against the order or award of the Claims Tribunal is governed by the provisions of section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter called “the Act”, which reads as under:

    “Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within 90 days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

    Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 90 days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.”

    4. According to section 29 of the Limitation Act, it is provided that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply as if such period was prescribed therefor in that Schedule and for the purposes of determining any period of such limitation, the provisions contained in sections 4, 9 to 13 and 22 of the Limitation Act shall apply only so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local laws. section 12(2) of the Limitation Act provides:

    “In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. In an appeal from an appellate decree or order, so much of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment of the court of first instance for the purpose of being filed with the memorandum of appeal shall also be excluded as may be in excess of the time spent in obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against and that of the judgment on which the said decree is founded, but no part of the time common to the copies shall be counted twice over.”

    5. The Explanation to section 12 of the Limitation Act specifies the time requisite for obtaining a copy as:

    “The time requisite for obtaining a copy will be the time between the date when the estimated cost of a copy is paid by the applicant in accordance with the order passed in this respect and the date when the copy is ready and a notice is put up notifying the fact. The day of paying the cost of the copy and the day on which the copy is delivered will both be excluded.”

    6. While dealing with the question regarding the applicability of the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, this court held in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6 as under (at page 11 of AIR 1982 J & K):

    “The proviso to section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that the court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 90 days ‘if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time’. For what we shall presently state, we find that the appellant has not been able to establish that there was any ‘sufficient cause’ which prevented it from preferring the appeal in time”.

    7. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon CST v. Madanlal Das and Sons, [1976] 38 STC 543; (1976) 4 SCC 464 : AIR 1977 SC 523, to urge that the Division Bench judgment of this court is in conflict with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in that case has held that (at pages 526 and 527):

    “This court, while holding the appeal to be within time, observed that the expression ‘time requisite’ in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order and that what is deductible under section 12(2) is not the minimum time within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. If that be the position of law in a case where there was no allegation of the loss of any copy, a fortiori it would follow that where as in the present case the copy served upon a party is lost and there is no alternative for that party except to apply for a fresh copy in order to be in a position to file revision petition, the time spent in obtaining that copy would necessarily have to be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.”

    8. A Full Bench of the Mysore High Court in Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Basra, [1973] ACJ 358, held:

    “The period prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act for an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal is the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal by a special law to which section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is attracted. By virtue of sec-tion 12 of the Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order appealed from is excluded. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to deduction of the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order appealed against.”

    9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that there is no conflict between the Division Bench judgment of this court in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6 and the other authorities cited at the Bar. In all the aforesaid cases, it was conceded that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 90 days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from preferring the appeal in time. The provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, even though not specifically made applicable to the appeals filed under the provisions of the Act, are in fact based upon the principles of justice, equity and good conscience which have been codified as judicially recognized grounds of sufficient cause. It follows, therefore, that even though, strictly speaking, the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable, yet the principle underlying the section has to be taken into consideration while determining the “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 110D of the Act. The appellant, therefore, as already held in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6, would be entitled to commutation of the period for which he was prevented by “sufficient cause” from preferring an appeal in time. As no appeal could be filed without the copy of the judgment of the Tribunal, if the appellant satisfied the court that he was not supplied the copy of the judgment despite his efforts, he would be entitled to commutation of such period as is permissible for obtaining a copy, for the purposes of limitation, in filing the appeal after the expiry of 90 days as provided under section 110D of the Act.

    10. On the facts we find that the appellant filed an application for the supply of the copy of the award on January 7, 1982, and paid the estimated costs of the copy presumably in accordance with the order passed in that regard on January 11, 1982. The copy was ready and was actually supplied to the appellant on January 11, 1982. The Explanation attached to section 12 of the Limitation Act provides that the time requisite for obtaining a copy will be the time between the date when the estimated cost of a copy is paid in by the applicant in accordance with the order passed in this respect and the date when the copy is ready and a notice is put up notifying the fact. The day of paying the cost of the copy and the day on which the copy is delivered will both be excluded. In this case, the appellant is entitled to the exclusion of one day only. The appeal which was required to be filed in the court on February 18, 1982, was in fact filed on February 23, 1982. If one day spent by the appellant for obtaining the copy of the award is excluded, the appeal should have been filed on February 19, 1982. There is no explanation submitted by the appellant as to why the appeal was not filed either on the 19th or 20th day of February, 1982. The appellant has, therefore, failed to show “sufficient cause” preventing him from preferring the appeal within the time prescribed under section 110D of the Act. The present appeal is barred by time which is, accordingly, dismissed. The stay order issued by the court on March 3, 1982, shall stand vacated and C.M.P No. 38 of 1982 is disposed of.

    11. I agree with the conclusions drawn and the note prepared by my Lord the Hon'ble Chief Justice on the question involved.

    Dr. Anand, C.J:— I have gone through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Sethi J. I agree with him that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this court in Union of India v. Manzoor Ahmad, [1982] Kash LJ 78; AIR 1982 J & K 6, does not require any reconsideration. The Bench had nowhere held that the time spent for obtaining a copy of the award can never be excluded while considering the existence of “sufficient cause” for filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation. On the contrary, it was laid down that under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 90 days “if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.” It was on the facts of the case that the appellant had not been found to have established “sufficient cause” which prevented it from preferring the appeal in time. It was also held that section 12(2) of the Limitation Act was in terms not applicable to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act but it was not said that, while considering the question of sufficient cause, the court could not take into consideration the time spent for obtaining a copy of the judgment. While construing the import of “sufficient cause” for not preferring an appeal in time within the meaning of the proviso to section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the High Court has the jurisdiction to consider all such causes which satisfy it about the justification to entertain an appeal after the prescribed period of 90 days. Even though the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act are not specifically applicable to the appeals filed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, yet the principle underlying that section can be taken into consideration for determining the existence or otherwise of “sufficient cause” for computing the period of limitation within the meaning of the proviso to section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act,

    12. I also agree with brother Sethi J. that since the appellant in this case has failed to show “sufficient cause” preventing him from preferring the appeal within the time prescribed under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, his appeal be dismissed and the stay order vacated.

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    Comments

    Managing Director v. Mst. Fatima Begum.
    (Oct 3, 1988)