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  • Articles 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
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  • Articles 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Smt. Sumendra Devi, filed a civil suit on 14-8-1963 in the Court of the Sub Judge, Nurpur, seeking a decree for joint possession of disputed land and claiming a one-half share as a co-owner. The jamabandi for 1917-18 recorded her as a co-owner, her name having been entered after the death of her father, Larjoo. After her marriage (about 1912) she left the village. By about 1930 the two widows of Damodar (Malto and Makno) applied to revenue authorities saying the appellant's whereabouts had been unknown for more than seven years; following proclamation and enquiry the revenue officer concluded the appellant had not been heard of and struck her name off the revenue record. Since 1930 the land was recorded in the names of Malto and Makno and later in the names of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (daughters' sons of Damodar); a portion was transferred in favour of respondent No. 3 sometime before 1956-57.

The respondents challenged the appellant's claim to be Larjoo's daughter and defended on the ground of limitation, asserting adverse possession for more than 30 years and continuous, open and peaceful enjoyment as owners without claim or demand by the appellant.

The trial Judge found the appellant to be Larjoo's daughter, held that she had no notice of the 1930 mutation and granted the decree. On appeal the Senior Sub Judge confined the contest to limitation, held that the 1930 mutation evidenced ouster, and set aside the trial court's decree. The appellant's second appeal (No. 145 of 1967) to the High Court (Ansari, J.) was disposed of on 13-3-1970, the Single Judge treating several facts as undisputed and holding the suit barred by limitation. The present Letters Patent Appeal to the Chief Justice arises from that judgment; the appeal is dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant's claim to joint possession of the suit land is barred by limitation because respondents and their predecessors were in adverse possession from the year 1930.
  2. Whether, in the context of co-sharers, actual knowledge of the ousted co-owner is a necessary prerequisite for completion of title by adverse possession (i.e., whether ouster requires actual notice to the co-owner).
  3. Whether deletion of the appellant's name from revenue records on the ground of her being "not heard of" for seven years can constitute an assertion of hostile title or evidence of ouster.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • As a joint owner, the law presumes that other joint owners are possessing and enjoying the land on behalf of absent co-owners; mere non-participation in profits for several years does not automatically confer title by adverse possession on the other co-owners.
  • Reliance on P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy (AIR 1957 SC 314): so long as the person pleading adverse possession does not prove that the ousted joint owners had actual knowledge of assertion of hostile title, title by adverse possession cannot be said to have been completed because there would be no ouster.
  • The deletion of the appellant's name from revenue records on the ground she was not heard of for seven years cannot be equated with an assertion of hostile title (i.e., it was not an open ouster).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Challenged the appellant's parentage (that she was Larjoo's daughter) and resisted the suit on limitation grounds.
  • Asserted that since at least 1930 (and for over 30 years before the suit) they had been in actual, continuous, open and peaceful possession as owners adverse to the appellant, that the appellant did not participate in the profits, did not pay land revenue, and did not assert any claim — so the suit is barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 As between co-sharers, ouster requires evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other. The Court treated the decision as recognising the need for open, hostile assertion but interpreted it (in light of other authorities) to mean that actual knowledge need not be proved; capability of knowledge if the co-owner had been vigilant is sufficient.
Ganda Singh v. Ram Narain, AIR 1959 Punj 147 (Full Bench) Observations that a person claiming adverse possession must show when he came into possession, nature of possession, whether possession was known to legal claimants, and duration. The Court referred to the Full Bench but treated its references to "knowledge" as capable of being read as requiring that legal claimants could, by due diligence, have known of the hostile claim rather than that their actual knowledge must be proved.
Mohomed Baqar v. Naim-un-Nisa Bibi, AIR 1956 SC 548 Position under Article 144 Limitation Act (1908): possession of a co-sharer is possession of all co-sharers and cannot be adverse unless there is denial of rights to their knowledge with exclusion/ouster for statutory period. The Court relied on the principle that ouster requires denial/exclusion to the knowledge of the co-sharer but treated knowledge as not necessarily actual notice — the hostile assertion must be such that the co-sharer could know it if diligent.
Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal, AIR 1934 PC 23 (Privy Council) Adverse possession need not be proved to have been brought to the actual knowledge of the Crown; it is sufficient that possession be overt and without concealment so that the person ought, if vigilant, to be aware of it. The Court relied on and approved this passage to support the view that adverse possession by co-sharers is established by overt, public possession capable of being known by the absent co-owner.
N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, AIR 1919 PC 44 Referenced by the Supreme Court to show that notorious exclusive possession may lead to an inference of ouster if other circumstances concur. Used as supporting authority (via P. Lakshmi Reddy) for inferring ouster from notorious exclusive possession and other corroborating circumstances.
Culley v. Doe d. Taylerson, (1840) 3 Per & Dav 539 English authority supporting presumption of ouster from long exclusive possession by one tenant in common without claim by another. Referred to (through Supreme Court citations) as an authority consistent with presuming ouster from long exclusive possession.
Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim, AIR 1942 Mad 622 (Full Bench) Held that possession overt and without concealment is sufficient; the person affected ought, if diligent, to be aware of what is happening. The Court relied on the Full Bench reasoning to support the proposition that adverse possession begins from open possession capable of being known, not necessarily from actual notice.
Bhavrao v. Rakhmin, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 137 Full Bench view consistent with the position that open possession will be noticed by co-sharers exercising due diligence. Referred to as another judicial view supporting the proposition that overt possession may give rise to adverse possession without proof of actual knowledge.
Mst. Bhago v. Deep Chand, AIR 1964 Punj 187 Explained that references to knowledge in earlier Full Bench decisions should be read as requiring that legal claimants, by due diligence, could know of the hostile claim, not that their actual knowledge must be proved. The Court cited this decision to justify reading "knowledge" as capability of knowledge and to support its conclusion that actual notice is not invariably required.
Muraduddin v. Mt. Umraobi, AIR 1933 Nag 27 Held that open assertion of title at partition rebutted presumption that possession was on behalf of all co-owners; true owner must be vigilant and actual ignorance does not prevent time from running. Applied as authority that open assertion and exclusive enjoyment suffice to establish ouster despite the excluded co-owner's ignorance.
Gangadhar v. Parashram, (1905) ILR 29 Bom 300 Held sole possession by one of tenants in common continuously for a long period without claim by others is evidence from which actual ouster may be presumed. Relied upon to support inference of ouster from long non-participation by the appellant and long exclusive possession by respondents.
Kirori Mal v. Man Bai, 62 Punj LR 499 : AIR 1960 Punj 485 Illustrates Punjab High Court views that a mere ex parte change in mutation without notice may not by itself prove ouster (particularly where mutation is clandestine or fraudulent). The Court distinguished this line of cases on the facts, noting that where mutation and change were open (as here, with proclamation and enquiry) those decisions do not apply.
Mst. Bui v. Gurdip Singh, (1976) 78 Pun LR 461 Another Punjab decision on mutation/ouster; reference used to show Punjab cases limit effect of clandestine or fraudulent mutations. The Court noted these decisions but held they are inapplicable because the mutation in this case was public and accompanied by enquiry and proclamation.
Amar Singh v. Shiv Datt Kaur, AIR 1937 Lah 890 Earlier Lahore High Court view that changed entry in mutation itself constituted evidence of ouster (later questioned/rejected in other Punjab decisions). The Court noted that later Punjab decisions rejected this earlier view; it distinguished present facts as involving open assertion rather than clandestine mutation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first identified the dispositive question: whether the appellant's claim was barred by limitation because of adverse possession/ouster since 1930. The Court examined the legal tests for adverse possession as requiring possession that is adequate in continuity, publicity and extent so as to show it is adverse to the true owner; these classical requirements (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario) were treated as well established.

The Court reviewed decisions from the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and several High Court Full Benches to determine whether actual knowledge by the ousted co-owner is an absolute requirement. It summarized the authorities to the effect that while knowledge of the ousted co-owner is strong evidence of ouster, the law does not require proof of actual notice. Rather, the hostile assertion must be open and public so that the co-owner "can know such hostile assertion if he cares to know the same" — i.e., the assertion must be capable of being known by due vigilance.

Applying the legal standard to the undisputed facts, the Court noted:

  • The appellant's name was removed from the revenue records in 1930 after proclamation and enquiry; the change was not secret or clandestine.
  • The appellant had left the village around 1912 and did not return up to 1963; she had not participated in profits, had not paid land revenue and had not received any share from respondents from 1930 to 1963.
  • These facts showed continuous, open and exclusive enjoyment by respondents and their predecessors that was capable of being known to the appellant if she had exercised due diligence.

The Court rejected the appellant's submission that deletion from revenue records because she was "not heard of" for seven years could not amount to an assertion of hostile title. The Court held that the precise reason recorded for deletion is not germane if, on the facts, the predecessors of the respondents had in fact publicly asserted hostile title. The Court found that the mutation backed by proclamation and enquiry provided sufficient evidence of an open assertion of hostile title, and that the long period of non-participation by the appellant (over 30 years) supported an inference of ouster and completion of title by adverse possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court affirmed the Single Judge's conclusion that the appellant's suit for joint possession is barred by limitation because the respondents and their predecessors were in adverse possession (ouster) from the year 1930.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's claim for joint possession was dismissed; the decree in her favour previously granted by the trial court was set aside and the respondents' possession was held to have perfected title by limitation. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • Broader legal implication: The judgement applies established principles rather than announcing a new rule; it emphasises that adverse possession by co-sharers may be established by open, public, exclusive possession which is capable of being known by the co-owner if he or she had exercised due diligence — actual notice is not invariably required. The opinion relies on and synthesises existing authorities rather than creating new precedent.


End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion text.

    Smt. Samundra Devi v. Chand Singh, And Others

    T.U Mehta, C.J:— This Letters Patent Appeal arises out of the second appeal No. 145 of 1967 which has been decided by a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, HP Bench, against the present appellant Smt. Sumendra Devi. The appeal is filed on a certificate of fitness having been given by the learned Single Judge who has decided the second appeal.

    2. The facts of the case are that the appellant Sumendra Devi filed a civil suit in the Court of Sub Judge, Nurpur on 14-8-1963 for a decree of joint possession of the disputed land claiming one-half share in the land as co-owner owner with the respondents. It is contended by the appellant that up to the year 1917-18 the jamabandi of the land in question showed the appellant-plaintiff as co-owner. Her name as co-owner was entered in the jamabandi after the death of her father Larjoo. The appellant's case is that soon after her marriage she had gone to reside at her husband's house in another village and for some years the respondents and their predecessors went on giving her share in the produce from the land, but thereafter they stopped the same. According to the appellant, she came to know in the year 1963 by reference to Jamabandi for the year 1956-57 that her name as the co-owner of the land was removed from the jamabandi and the land stood mutated only in the name of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. She also came to know that some time before 1956-57 a portion of the land was transferred by the respondents 1 and 2 in favour of the respondent No. 3. It is on there allegations that she has filed the present suit for the joint possession of the land claiming one-half share in the land which is mutated in the names of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The pedigree which is proved in the case shows that there was one Ram Chander who was the original ancestor. This Ram Chander had two sons named Budhu and Parsa. Budhu's line became extinct with the death of his grand-son Dattu. We are in this matter concerned with the line of Parsa, the second son of Ram Chander. This Parsa had two sons named Tara and Tika. Tara's son was Larjoo who was the father of the present appellant Sumendra Devi. Tika, the other son of Paras had three sons named Inder, Govind and Damodar. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are the sons of Damodar's daughter. The evidence reveals that Damodar had two wives, named Malto and Makno.

    3. It is found from the evidence recorded in the case that after the death of the appellant's father, Larjoo, the appellant's name was mutated in the revenue record as co-owner of the land. Thereafter the appellant married and left the village at a very young age. Up to 1930 A.D her whereabouts were not known, therefore, Malto and Makno, the two widows of Damodar applied to the revenue authorities that the whereabouts of the present appellant were not known for more than seven year and, therefore, her name should be struck off from the revenue record. It transpires from the appellant's own evidence that thereafter proclamation were issued in the village and some enquiry was made as a result of which the concerned revenue officer came to the conclusion that whereabouts of the appellant were not known for more than the last seven years. She was therefore, presumed to have died and her name was struck off from the revenue record. Thus since 1930 A.D the disputed land stands in the name of Malto and Makno, the two widows of Damodar, and thereafter in the names of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who, as stated above, are daughter's sons of Damodar.

    4. The respondents have challenged the claim of the appellant-plaintiff that she is the daughter of Larjoo. They have also resisted the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation claiming that since last more than 30 year before the institution of the suit they have been enjoying the possession of the land as owners adversely to the present appellant. It is contended that during the course of these more than 30 years the appellant-plaintiff has not claimed any share in the produce derived from the land and the adverse possession of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has been continuous, open and peaceful.

    5. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant was proved to be the daughter of Larjoo, that the had no notice or knowledge about the mutation which took place in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the year 1930 and that therefore, there could be no ouster of the appellant from the joint ownership of the land. The learned trial Judge, therefore, granted the decree in favour of the appellant as prayed for by her.

    6. When the appeal was taken before the Senior Sub Judge, the only question which was contended before him was about the limitation. The learned Senior Sub Judge held that mutation which took place in the year 1930 was sufficient evidence of ouster of the present appellant and since the evidence established that during the more than 30 years' period before the institution of the suit, the appellant Sumendra Devi has neither enjoyed nor claimed any share in the produce, her suit was barred by limitation. He accordingly set aside the decree passed by the trial court and allowed the appeal.

    7. Against this, the present appellant preferred second appeal No. 145 of 1967 in the High Court. The appeal has been disposed of by Ansari, J. of Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench, on 13-3-1970. It is evident from the judgement recorded by the learned Single Judge that at the time of hearing, following points were not disputed:—

    (1) that the appellant was Larjoo's daughter and that originally she was entitled to a joint one-half share in the suit land and that her name was also entered in the revenue records in the jamabandi for the year 1917-18 as co-sharer in respect of the suit land;

    (2) that the appellant left the village at the age of 18 years i.e in about the year 1912 and did not return to the village at any time till 1960 (sic 1963), the year in which she actually filed the suit;

    (3) that the appellant's name was removed from the revenue records in 1930 as a co-sharer and the name of the predecessor-in-title of the respondents was entered as the sole owner of the suit land; and

    (4) that the appellant did not participate in the profits of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the suit by her.

    8. The judgement of the learned Single Judge shows that it was on these undisputed facts that the question which arose for his consideration was whether the appellant's claim to a joint possession of the suit land was barred by limitation. The learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that it was barred by limitation inasmuch as the change in the mutation which took place in the year 1930 was made openly and after there was a proclamation in the village. Therefore, there was an open adverse possession of title ever since be year 1930, and since the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were found to be in adverse possession and enjoyment of the land in question, and since at no time from the year 1930 up to the time of the institution of the suit the present appellant has asserted her right to the suit land, there is a complete evidence of ouster. The learned Single Judge rejected the appellant's contention that there would not be any ouster inasmuch as the appellant's name was deleted from the revenue record on the ground that she was not heard of for last seven years. It is against this judgement that this Letters Patent Appeal is preferred.

    9. Mrs. P. Malhotra, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, strenuously urged that in case of a joint owner it is always presumed that the other joint owners are possessing and enjoying the land on his behalf and, therefore, the mere fact that the appellant has not participated in the profits of the land for a number of years would not confer any title to the other co-owners by adverse possession and, therefore, there would be no question of limitation in such cases. By referring to the decision given by the Supreme Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, reported in AIR 1957 SC 314, she emphasised that so long as the person who pleads adverse possession does not prove that the other joint owners against whom the adverse possession is claimed had actual knowledge about the assertion of hostile title, the title by adverse possession cannot be said to have been completed because, in such cases, there is no ouster. It was pointed out that since the respondent's case was that the appellant was not heard of since last more than seven years in the year 1930, they have not made any attempt to assert their hostile title, and, therefore, it cannot be held that there was any satisfactory evidence of ouster.

    10. In view of these contentions, it is first necessary to consider whether in law, when a person claims title by adverse possession, it is absolutely necessary that the person against whom the adverse possession is claimed must have actual knowledge of the assertion of a hostile title. Now the requirements of law in cases where adverse possession is claimed, are that the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in the extent to show that it is adverse to competitor. This position in law is so well established that it need not be reinforced by citations. It is true that in several decisions it has been observed that the adverse possession should be to the knowledge of the person against whom the hostile title is asserted. For instance, a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court has observed in Ganda Singh v. Ram Narain, reported in AIR 1959 Punj 147 (FB), that a person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued.

    11. In Mohomed Baqar v. Naim-un-Nisa Bibi, reported in AIR 1956 SC 548, the Supreme Court has observed with regard to Articles 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, but the possession of a co-sharer is the possession of all the co-shares and, therefore, it cannot be adverse to the co-sharers unless there is denial of their rights to their knowledge by the person in possession and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. Even in the decision of P. Lakshmi Reddy (supra), on which reliance is placed by the learned Advocate of the appellant, the Supreme Court has observed that it is settled rule of law that as between co-sharers there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster.

    12. Relying upon these decisions, it was pointed out that, unless it is proved by the respondents, that the change in mutation of the disputed land exclusively in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and their predecessors, was brought to the knowledge of the appellant, it cannot be believed that the appellant, who was co-owner, was ousted from the land.

    13. On perusal of the relevant decisions on the point, we find that though knowledge of the ousted co-owner would be the best evidence of assertion of the hostile title openly and publicly, the law on the subject does not require that these should be the conveyance of the actual knowledge that hostile title is asserted. What the law requires is that the hostile title should be asserted openly and publicly in such a manner that the co-owner affected can know such hostile assertion if he cares to know the same. In other words, it is the capability of the hostile assertion being known which is contemplated by law. This is the position accepted even by the Supreme Court as we shall presently see.

    14. Before touching the observations made by the Supreme Court on this point, it would be first necessary to refer to an early decision of the Privy Council on this subject. This is the decision given in Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal, reported in AIR 1934 PC 23 where the limitation was claimed, with reference to certain land, against the State, and on behalf of the Crown a contention, which was exactly the same as raised on behalf of the present appellant in the appeal before us, was raised. It was contended before the Privy Council that adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown. Dealing with this contention the Privy Council has observed as under:—

    “The classical requirement is that the possession should be nec vi nec clam nec Presario. Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown, but in their Lordships' opinion there is no authority for this requirement. It is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. If the rights of the Crown have been openly usurped it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice.”

    15. This decision of the Privy Council has been referred to by the Supreme Court in the above referred case of P. Lakshmi Reddy (AIR 1957 SC 314) and has been approved. While talking of the legal requirement of adverse possession, the Supreme Court in this case has no doubt referred to the knowledge of the person against whom the adverse title is asserted for the purpose of constituting the ouster, but these observations do not mean that this knowledge should be actual. This would be clear from the following observations made by the Supreme Court in context with its observations as regards knowledge. The necessity of the knowledge does not, says the Supreme Court, “necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other”.

    “There are cases” proceeds the Supreme Court “which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title”. The Supreme Courts has further observed in this case that “whether that line of cases is right or wrong need not be considered, but it would be sufficient to notice that the Privy Council in N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, AIR 1919 PC 44 at p. 47 quotes, apparently with the approval, a pass age from Culley v. Doe d. Taylerson, (1840) 3 Per and Dav 539 which indicates that such a situation may well lead to an inference of ouster if other circumstances concur.” These observations of the Supreme Court, therefore, made it clear that in order to prove ouster it is not an invariable requirement of law that actual knowledge of the ouster should be conveyed to the co-owner who is ousted.

    16. This question has been pointedly considered by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim, reported in AIR 1942 Mad 622. In this Madras case, the question arose whether the possession of a mortgagee becomes adverse to the other members of the family from the moment of his entry into possession or from the date of the ouster to the knowledge of other members of the family. It appears that there were divergent views on this question taken by different Judges of the Madras High Court and, therefore, the following question was referred to a Full Bench of that Court:—

    “Where some co-owners usufructuarily mortgage specific items of property held by the member of a Mohomedan family and the mortgagee enters into possession of the mortgaged items under his mortgagee deed, is a suit to recover the share therein by other members of the same family barred by Article 144, Limitation Act, at the end of 12 years of such possession or does adverse possession begin as against the other members only from the date of ouster to their knowledge?”

    17. The opinion of the Full Bench was expressed by Leach, C.J of that High Court who after considering a number of authorities on the subject, observed that for establishing ouster it was sufficient that the possession was overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time was running ought, if he exercised due vigilance, to be aware of what was happening. These observations were based on the above referred Privy Council case of Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal (AIR 1934 PC 23). Following are the pertinent observations of the Court in that case in disposing of the reference:—

    “When one of several co-shares lets into possession a stranger who proceeds to cultivate the land for his own benefit the other co-sharers must, unless they deliberately close their eyes, know of what is going on, but if they are so regardless of their own interests they must take the consequences.”

    18. In view of these observations the Full Bench answered the first part of the question in the affirmative and the latter part in the negative. Practically the same view is taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bhavrao v. Rakhmin, reported in (1899) ILR 23 Bom 137.

    19. In the foregoing portion of this judgement we have preferred to the view taken by the Punjab High Court in Ganda Singh v. Ram Narain (AIR 1959 Punj 147) (FB) (supra) wherein they have referred to the necessity of knowledge to the ousted co-owner about the assertion of hostile title. A Division Bench of Punjab High Court has considered these observations in Mst. Bhago v. Deep Chand, reported in AIR 1964 Punj 187. Dua, J. speaking for the Court has considered the question about the necessity of the accrual of knowledge on the part of the ousted co-owner and has observed as under with regard to the above referred observations of that Court in that Full Bench Decision given in Ganda Singh's case (at p. 192 of AIR 1964 Punj):—

    “May be that reference to knowledge of the possession on the part of the legal claimants has been somewhat loosely or unprecisely stated and what was really meant was that the legal claimants should by due diligence be able to know of the open hostile claim and not that their knowledge must positively be proved. The true ratio of the Full Bench is of course binding on the Bench and must be followed. It is, however, unnecessary in this case to pursue this aspect, for, on either hypothesis this appeal deserves to prevail.” While discussing the question of adverse possession this Division Bench of Punjab High Court has made the following observations which are very pertinent to the contention which is under our consideration (at p. 191) :

    “………and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possession actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.”

    (Emphasis supplied by us).

    20. The same view is taken in the Nagpur case of Muraduddin v. Mt. Umraobi, reported in AIR 1933 Nag 27 wherein on the death of a Mohammadan, his sons partitioned the properly and entered into the possession of the land inherited from the father to the exclusion of the female heirs. Contention was raised that the female heir, who filed the suit, did not know of her exclusion from her share and that the presumption was that the possession by the sons of the deceased was on behalf of all the co-owners. The Court held that even if the plaintiff did not know of her exclusion, it is quite sufficient that assertion of title by the sons at the time of partition was quite open and hence the presumption above referred to was sufficiently rebutted. The Court further observed that it is sufficient if adverse possession is adequate, continuous and exclusive, that the true owner must be vigilant and that it does not prevent time from running if the true owner could have obtained but did not actually obtain, knowledge of the adverse possession.

    21. Thus on consideration of the case law on the subject we do not find ourselves in a position to accept the contention raised by Mrs. Malhotra on behalf of the appellant that the appellant should have actually known that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had asserted their hostile title. Considering the facts of the case we find that before the mutating was changed in the year 1930, it was not changed secretly or in a clandestine manner. The learned single Judge has rightly observed in his judgement that it is in the evidence of (sic) the appellant's name from the revenue record as co-sharer in respect of the suit land, there wan a proclamation in the village (sic). The issuance of this proclamation, and the nature of the enquiry which is recorded at the time of the change in mutation in the year 1930, carry sufficient evidence to show that the assertion of hostile title was not secret, but was quite open. Therefore, if the appellant was vigilant enough to visit her village she could have always known that the predecessors of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, were asserting a title hostile to her. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to say that the assertion of the hostile title by the respondents was secret, and if that be so, even though the predecessors of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were co-owners, they can be said to have ousted the appellant from the year 1930 onwards. The facts, which were not disputed and which are enumerated by the learned single Judge in his judgement, show that right from the year 1930 up to the year 1963 the appellant has not claimed any share in the produce from the disputed land. She is not proved to have paid any land revenue with regard to this land, and she has not received a single farthing from the respondents as her share from the produce of the land. This long period of non-participation in the profits of the land would be a circumstance which would go to establish adverse possession as held in the Bombay case of Gangadhar v. Parashram, reported in (1905) ILR 29 Bom 300 where it is observed that sole possession by one of the tenants in common continuously for a long period without any claim or demand by any person claiming under the other tenants in common, is evidence from which an actual ouster of the other tenant in common may be presumed. In fact, this was the view taken in the English decision in Culley v. Doe d. Taylerson, (1840) 3 Per and Dav 539, to which the Supreme Court has made reference in P. Lakshmi Reddy's case (AIR 1957 SC 314) (supra).

    22. Mrs. Malhotra referred to decisions given by the Punjab High Court for showing that an ex parte change in the mutation entries without the knowledge of the ousted co-owner would not constitute any evidence of ouster. For this proposition she has mainly put reliance upon Kirori Mal v. Man Bai, reported in 62 Pun LR 499 : (AIR 1960 Punj 485) and Mst. Bui v. Gurdip Singh, reported in (1976) 78 Pun LR 461. It appears by reference to these decisions that the earlier view taken by Lahore High Court in Amar Singh v. Shiv Datt Kaur, reported in AIR 1937 Lah 890 to the effect that changed entry in mutation is itself evidence of ouster, is rejected. However, we find by reference to these Punjab decisions, upon which reliance is placed, that the High Court of Punjab has taken the view that if change in mutation is obtained in clandestine or surreptitious manner, or by practicing fraud, it would not amount to an ouster or an assertion of open hostile title. We find that this principle, even if accepted, would have no application to the facts of the present case, because, the recorded evidence shows that the respondents and their predecessors in title have made the assertion of their hostile title quite openly, and have not played any fraud because it is an admitted fact that for more than 30 years before the institution of the suit whereabouts of the plaintiff were not known.

    23. We find that the contention of the appellant, that the deletion of the name of the appellant from the revenue record on the ground that she was not known for more than seven years cannot amount to an assertion of hostile title, is rightly rejected by the learned single Judge because even if the name of the appellant was deleted from the revenue record on the ground that she was not heard of for more than seven years, the fact remains that the predecessors in title of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had in fact asserted their hostile title. The grounds on which the hostile title is asserted are not relevant because what it relevant is the fact that the hostile title was actually asserted, and the said assertion was made publicly and openly.

    24. Under the circumstances, we find that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the suit suffers from the bar of limitation.

    25. This appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed with costs.

    26. Appeal dismissed.

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    Smt. Samundra Devi v. Chand Singh, And Others
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