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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs filed a suit on 10-8-1948 against Jhamru and the State of Himachal Pradesh (successor-in-interest to the former State of Madhan) for a declaration that an earlier order dated 29-6-1945 (which had conferred non-occupancy rights in 14 bighas on Jhamru) was illegal and for a perpetual injunction restraining Jhamru from taking possession. The suit related to a specified portion of charand land.

Plaintiffs' oral evidence concluded on 11-12-1950, and the matter was adjourned to 29-12-1950 for the plaintiffs to file documentary evidence and for defendants to produce oral evidence. The case was not taken up on 29-12-1950. The first subsequent entry on the record after 11-12-1950 is 18-1-1951, which records the parties as absent and adjourns the case to 29-1-1951. On 29-1-1951 the parties were again recorded absent and the case was adjourned to 31-1-1951. On 31-1-1951, with the parties again absent, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit under Order 9, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The plaintiffs filed a revision petition in this High Court on 29-3-1951, supported by an affidavit stating they had been present on 29-12-1950 but the case was not called that day, that they had not been informed of any subsequent dates (18-1-1951, 29-1-1951, 31-1-1951), and that they first learned of the dismissal on 10-3-1951 when their attorney ascertained the position. The trial Court record (order-sheet entry of 18-1-1951) indicates the office had mistakenly fixed 29-1-1951 as a date.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge was justified in dismissing the suit under Order 9, Rule 3 CPC when the plaintiffs had not been given notice of the subsequent dates on which the matter was called and the dismissal occurred.
  2. Whether the High Court should exercise its revisional jurisdiction (or alternatively powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution) to set aside the dismissal, given that alternative remedies (an application under R.4, an appeal, or a fresh suit) were relied upon by the respondents.
  3. What period of limitation (Article 163 v. Article 181 of the Limitation Act) governs an application to set aside a dismissal purportedly made under Order 9, Rule 3 CPC, where it is contended that the case was not summoned in the presence of the parties.
  4. Whether the existence of other remedies (appeal, application to set aside, fresh suit) bars the High Court from exercising revisional jurisdiction in the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Petitioners') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs were present on 29-12-1950 but the case was not called; they were not informed of any subsequent dates (18-1-1951, 29-1-1951, 31-1-1951) on which the case was later listed.
  • They first learned of the dismissal on 10-3-1951, and promptly filed the revision on 29-3-1951 upon discovering the dismissal.
  • The record itself shows that the office had mistakenly fixed 29-1-1951 (order-sheet entry of 18-1-1951), corroborating that no proper notice had been given for the later dates and that the dismissal under O.9, R.3 CPC was therefore unjustified.

Defendants' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The High Court should not grant relief in revision because other remedies were available to the plaintiffs: (a) an application to set aside the dismissal (provided by R.4 of the Order), (b) an appeal, and (c) a fresh suit.
  • It was argued that because no date had been fixed in the presence of the parties for 18-1-1951 or subsequent dates, the dismissal on 31-1-1951 could not properly be characterized as under Order 9, Rule 3 CPC; consequently, the limitation for an application to set aside would be governed by Article 181 (three years) rather than Article 163 (30 days), citing Mt. Zainab Bibi v. Behari Lal.
  • The respondents relied on authorities (Sher Ali v. Jagmohan Ram and Leoh Moses v. Solomon Judah Meyer) which, according to their reading, restrict the High Court from exercising revisional jurisdiction where an appeal is available to the aggrieved party.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mt. Zainab Bibi v. Behari Lal, A.I.R. (22) 1935 Pesh 186 Authority for the proposition that where no date was fixed in the presence of the parties an order of dismissal might not be one under O.9, R.3 CPC, and that Article 181 (three years) of the Limitation Act may apply to an application to set aside such an order. Cited by respondents to argue that an application to set aside the dismissal could still be made within three years under Article 181; the Court noted this authority but observed that because the order purports to have been passed under O.9, R.3 the apparent remedy (R.4) was time-barred by Article 163 in the facts of this case.
Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad, 18 All 163 Establishes that where an alternative remedy is doubtful the High Court may interfere in revision. Relied upon to support the exercise of revisional jurisdiction here because the alternative remedy (application under R.4 or fresh suit) was uncertain or time-barred in practice.
Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath, 7 Bom 341 Illustrates that revisional jurisdiction may be exercised where alternative remedies (e.g., a separate suit) would not be equally prompt or certain and would impose additional expense on the aggrieved party. Applied to justify the Court's discretion to entertain the revision because a fresh suit would delay resolution, increase expense, and might be uncertain (witnesses could be influenced, etc.).
Sher Ali v. Jagmohan Ram, A.I.R. (18) 1931 All 333 Ratio that where a remedy by way of appeal is available, the aggrieved party should not invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Cited by respondents; the Court distinguished it on the facts, noting that an appeal was not available against an order of dismissal under O.9, R.3 CPC in the present case.
Leoh Moses v. Solomon Judah Meyer, A.I.R. (13) 1926 Bom 139 Similar principle to the Allahabad ruling: availability of appeal precludes revisional remedy. Cited by respondents; Court found it inapplicable here because no appeal lay against an O.9, R.3 dismissal.
Nanak Chand v. Ahmed Din, A.I.R. (17) 1930 Lah 440 Case where the High Court interfered using inherent/S.151 powers because the period of limitation for a fresh suit had expired. Cited by respondents; Court observed that the Lahore case did not assist the respondents on the particular facts of this matter.
Abdullah v. Salaru, 18 All 4 Authority that where a subordinate Court has signally failed to do its duty and the petitioner has not been at fault, the High Court can direct the subordinate Court to perform its duty and complete the case according to law. Invoked to support exercise of the High Court's supervisory powers (analogous to Article 227), authorizing the setting aside of the dismissal and direction that the subordinate Court re-admit and proceed with the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Fact-finding: the record showed the plaintiffs' oral evidence ended on 11-12-1950 and the matter was adjourned to 29-12-1950 for documentary evidence; the case was not taken up on that date. The first subsequent entry was 18-1-1951 recording absence of parties and noting that the office had mistakenly fixed 29-1-1951. Thereafter the matter was adjourned to 29-1-1951 and then to 31-1-1951, on which date the trial Court dismissed the suit under O.9, R.3 CPC. The plaintiffs' affidavit that they had not been informed of the later dates and first learned of the dismissal on 10-3-1951 was not controverted and the Court treated these facts as incontrovertible.
  2. Application of procedural law on remedies and limitation: the Court observed that an order of dismissal under O.9, R.3 CPC is not a decree within S.2(2) of the CPC and therefore is not appealable. An application to set aside such a dismissal is provided by R.4; the period of limitation for such an application would normally be 30 days under Article 163 of the Limitation Act. That 30-day period had expired by the time the plaintiffs learned of the dismissal (they learned on 10-3-1951 and the dismissal occurred on 31-1-1951), so the apparent remedy under R.4 was time-barred.
  3. Consideration of respondents' submission on Article 181: respondents relied on Mt. Zainab Bibi to contend Article 181 (three years) might apply if the order could not properly be said to have been passed under O.9, R.3 because no date had been fixed in the presence of the parties. The Court acknowledged this authority but noted that since the order purported to have been passed under O.9, R.3 the plaintiffs could not be expected to rely on that technical line of authority rather than pursue revision when the remedy under R.4 was apparently time-barred.
  4. Discretion under revisional jurisdiction: the Court emphasized that paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 (analogous to Section 115 CPC for present purposes) does not automatically bar revision when other remedies (other than appeal) are available; whether to exercise revision should be decided on the facts of each case. The Court relied on authorities (including Ghulam Shabbir and Shiva Nathaji) to hold that where alternative remedies are doubtful, uncertain, slow or would impose considerable expense, the High Court may exercise its revisional jurisdiction. In this case a fresh suit would be slow (the original had already lasted over two-and-a-half years), uncertain (risk of witnesses being influenced) and expensive.
  5. Powers of superintendence under Article 227: even if there were doubt as to the propriety of interference in revision, the Court held it could set aside the order under Article 227 of the Constitution, describing these supervisory powers as broader in the present respect than earlier provisions (citing historical analogues). The Court relied on Abdullah v. Salaru to show that where a subordinate Court has signally failed to do its duty and the petitioner has not been at fault, the High Court may direct the subordinate Court to complete the case according to law.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: the combination of undisputed facts showing lack of notice, the apparent time-bar of the ordinary remedy under R.4, and the availability of supervisory jurisdiction justified setting aside the dismissal and directing the trial Court to re-admit and proceed from the stage as of 11-12-1950.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision allowed; the order of dismissal dated 31-1-1951 is set aside.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court (as expressly stated in the opinion):

  • The trial Court is directed to re-admit the suit under its original number in the Register of Civil Suits and to proceed with the case, after giving due notice to the parties, from the stage at which the case stood on 11-12-1950.
  • No order as to costs of this revision was made by the Court in view of the circumstances in which the dismissal was passed.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the trial Court on 17-9-1951.

Broader implications discussed by the Court (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The High Court may properly exercise revisional jurisdiction even where other remedies (excluding appeal) exist, if the alternative remedies are doubtful, time-barred in practice, would be unduly slow, uncertain or would impose extra expense on the aggrieved party.
  • Separately, the High Court possesses broad supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution to set aside orders of subordinate Courts which manifestly fail to perform their duty, and to direct subordinate Courts to proceed according to law; such powers provide an independent basis for relief in appropriate cases.

The opinion contains the final short endorsement: "Revision allowed."

    Mani Ram v. Jhamru

    1. This is a plaintiffs' application in revision against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Theog dated 31-1-1951, purporting to dismiss their suit under Order 9, Rule 3 of the CPC, for non-appearance of parties. The suit related to 14 bighas out of 74 bighas and 14 biswas of charand land situate within the former State of Madhan. By an order dated 29-6-1945 the said State conferred non-occupancy rights in the said 14 bighas on Jhamru defendant. The present suit was filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners on 10-8-1948 against Jhamru and the State of Himaehal Pradesh as successor-in-interest of the Madhan State for a declaration that the order in question was illegal and for a perpetual injunction to restrain Jhamru from taking possession on the land in pursuance of the order. The suit was contested by both the defendants.

    2. The plaintiffs' oral evidence was concluded on 11-12-1950 and on that date the suit was adjourned to 29-12-1950 for plaintiffs to file their documentary evidence and for the defendants to produce their oral evidence. The case was however not taken up on 29-12-1950. There is no order of that date on the record. It was taken up after 11-12-1950 for the first time on 18-1-1951 when, it is recorded, the parties were absent, and the case was adjourned to 29-1-1951. On the latter date again the parties were absent and the case was adjourned to 31-1-1951, on which date, on the parties being again found absent, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit under O. 9, R. 3 of the CPC.

    3. The plaintiffs filed the present revision against the said order dated 31-1-1951 on 29-3-1951 together with an affidavit that they were present in Court on 29-12-1950 but the case was not called on for hearing, that they were never informed that the case was to be taken up on 29-1-1951 or on 31-1-1951, and that it was only on 10-3-1951 that, the plaintiffs' attorney, who had gone to ascertain what had happened in the case, came to know for the first time that the suit had been dismissed on 31-1-1951. These facts were not controverted and are in fact incontrovertible. The order of the trial Court dated 18-1-1951 in the order-sheet is to the effect that the office had by mistake fixed 29-1-1951 as the date, and therefore the case be adjourned to that date. There is nothing to show that 29-1-1951 had ever before 18-1-1951 been fixed as a date in this case. On the contrary, as already seen, it was 29-12-1950 to which date the case had been adjourned on 11-12-1950, but on that date the case was not taken up at all. Naturally therefore the parties were absent on all the three subsequent dates 18-1-1951, 29-1-1951 and 31-1-1951, of none of which they had any intimation. The trial Court was therefore wholly unjustified in dismissing the suit on the last mentioned date under O. 9, R. 3 of the CPC.

    4. Although the above facts are not controverted, it was argued on behalf of the defendants-respondents that this Court should not grant any relief to the plaintiffs-petitioners in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction since there were other remedies open to them. The other remedies referred to were an application to set the dismissal aside, an appeal and a fresh suit. Before proceeding further it may be stated here that although under Cl. (3) of paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts), Order, 1948, Section 115 of the CPC is not applicable to Himaehal Pradesh, the provisions of Cl. (1)(a) of that paragraph, under which this revision has been filed, is, except for the omission of the word illegally from Cl. (c) of S. 115, mutatis mutandis the same as the latter section. That being so, the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the parties in connection with the applicability of that section of the Code of Civil Procedure would be equally relevant in the present case.

    5. Now, there is no doubt that no appeal lay against an order of dismissal under O. 9, R. 3, since an order under that provision is not a decree within S. 2(2) of the Code. As regards an application to set aside the order of dismissal, such an application is provided by R. 4 of the said Order, and the period of limitation prescribed for such an application is under Article 163 of the Limitation Act 30 days from the data of the dismissal. This period had, however, already expired by 10-3-1951 on which date the plaintiffs came to know for the first time of the order of dismissal. It was however argued on behalf of the respondents that as no date had been fixed in the presence of the parties for 18-1-1951 or the subsequent dates it could not be said within O. 9, R. 3 of the CPC, that the suit was called on for hearing on 31-1-1951, and that therefore the order of dismissal passed on that date could not be one under that provision, so that the proper Article of the Limitation Act applicable to an application to set aside the order of dismissal was 181 and not 163. And in support of this contention the ruling reported as Mt. ‘Zainab Bibi v. Behari Lal’, A.I.R (22) 1935 Pesh 186, was cited. It was urged therefore that the remedy to have the order of dismissal set aside by an application was, and in fact even now is, open to the petitioners. It must however be noted that as the order in question purports to have been passed under O. 9, R. 3 of the CPC, the apparent remedy under R. 4 was by 10-3-1951 time barred. It may be that had the petitioner's lawyer gone deeper into the question, he would have come across the ruling cited on behalf of the respondents showing that he had in fact three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act for filing an application to set the order of dismissal aside, but it would be too much to expect that he should have filed an application on that authority rather than come up in revision to this Court. He could not possibly be certain that the said authority would not but be followed, and where the other remedy is doubtful the High Court would interfere in revision. ‘Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad’, 18 All 163.

    6. As regards relief by way of suit, there is no doubt that a fresh suit was not time-barred by the time that the present application in revision was filed inasmuch as the six years period of limitation for such a suit under Article 120 expired on 29-6-1951. But under Section 115 of the CPC, or paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, the only remedy which, if still open, has been specifically laid down as barring revision is the remedy of appeal. That being so, where there is any remedy other than appeal open to a party, the question whether revisional powers should or should not be exercised should be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. One such instance is, that of the Allahabad ruling just cited where the remedy by a separate suit was doubtful. Another circumstance which is taken into consideration in favour of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, even though another remedy by way of suit be available, is that the alternative remedy by suit would not be equally prompt or certain and would put the aggrieved party to additional expense. ‘Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath,’ 7 Bom 341. In the present case the plaintiffs' suit, which was filed after the statutory two months' notice under Section 80 of the CPC, had already lasted over two years 5½ months before it was dismissed on 31-1-1951. Remedy by another suit could not therefore have been ??? Nor could it have been certain because it is possible that some of the witnesses whom he had produced might have been won over by the opposite side in the meanwhile, a feature by no means uncommon. And there is no doubt that the production of oral evidence all over again and the paying of court-fee and other expenses would have cut the petitioner to additional cost. In these circumstances, I would exercise my discretion in favour of giving relief to the petitioners under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court even though a separate remedy by suit may have been open to them when they filed the present petition.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondents cited the following rulings before me: ‘Sher Ali v. Jagmohan Ram, A.I.R (18) 1931 All 333; ‘Leoh Moses v. Solomon Judah Meyer,’ A.I.R (13) 1926 Bom 139 and ‘Nanak Chand v. Ahmed Din,’ A.I.R (17) 1930 Lah 440. The ratio decidendi of the Allahabad and Bombay rulings was that because remedy by way of an appeal was open to the aggrieved party he was not entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the present case the remedy by way of appeal was not open to the petitioners. As regards the Lahore case, it does not help the respondents since the High Court interfered under S. 151 of the Code on the ground that period of limitation for a fresh suit had expired.

    8. Even if there be any doubt as to the propriety of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, I have no doubt that the order in question can be set aside by this Court under the much wider powers of superintendence over subordinate Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. These powers, correspond more to those laid down under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 115, than those under Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, since the limitation placed upon the exercise of powers of superintendence by sub-s. (2) of S. 224 of the 1935 Act did not find place in the 1915 Act and are absent from the aforesaid Article of the Constitution of India. In exercise of similar powers under S. 15 of the Statute 24 & 25 Vic, Cap. 104 it was held by the Allahabad High Court in ‘Abdullah v. Salaru,’ 18 All 4, that where a subordinate Court had signally failed to do its duty, and there had been no patent neglect on the part of the petitioner, it was competent for the High Court, on an application for revision, to direct the subordinate Court to do its duty and complete the case according to law. In the present case also the subordinate Judge has signally failed to do his duty in that he has arbitrarily dismissed the suit for default taken place, and though no default had in fact taken place, and there has also not been any patent neglect on the part of the petitioners in that they filed the present application in revision on 29-3-1951 after having come to know of the order of dismissal on 10-3-1951. This is therefore in any case, a fit case in which this Court should set aside the order in question in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The plaintiffs' application in revision is allowed, the order of dismissal of suit dated 31-1-1951 is set aside and the trial Court is directed to re-admit the suit under its original number in the Register of Civil Suits and proceed with the case, after giving due notice to the parties, from the stage at which the case was on 11-12-1950. In view of the circumstances in which the order in question was passed. I make no order as to the costs of this revision. The parties are hereby directed to appear before the trial Court on 17-9-1951.

    V.B.B

    9. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Mani Ram v. Jhamru
    (Aug 21, 1951)