Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
================================================================
DAKSHIN GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY
LTD. THROUGH MANAGING DIRECTOR....Applicant(s)
Versus
AMARDEEP ASSOCIATION
,NAVSARI, & 2....Respondent(s)
===========================================================
Appearance:
MS
LILU K BHAYA, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MRS
SANGEETA N PAHWA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent No. 1
MRS
KRINA CALLA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent No.2.
================================================================
CORAM:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE VIJAY MANOHAR SAHAI
and
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE S.G.SHAH
Date : 08/02/2013
CAV JUDGEMNT
(PER : HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE S.G.SHAH)
We
have heard Ms.Lilu Bhaya, learned counsel for the applicant on the
delay condonation application, Mrs.Sangeeta Pahwa, learned counsel
appearing for opponent No.1 and Mrs.Krina Calla, learned A.G.P for
opponent No.2 at length on 28.1.2013.
Rule.
Learned advocate Mrs.Sangeeta
Pahwa waives service of rule for opponent No.1 and Mrs.Krina Calla,
learned A.G.P. waives service of rule for opponent No.2.
Before
coming to the present application, it would be appropriate to
recollect the details of litigations reaching upto the present Civil
Application for condontation of delay in filing the Letters Patent
Appeal against the order passed by learned Single Judge in Special
Civil Application No.21284 of 2006. Special Civil Application
No.21284 of 2006 was preferred by one M/s.Amardeep Association in
the month of October 2006, claiming appropriate writ and directions
against the Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. and to grant permission
for provisional
power connection in respect of lands and properties covered by
Survey Nos.336/1
(336, 336/P and 336/3 Hissa No.1) (C.S.No.1714 Tika No.36) and
Vejalpore Survey Nos.311/P, 310/1, 310/2, 310/5, 310/7, 307/1,
308/1, 301/A/2 and 301/B forthwith. Though the facts, details and
issues either before the learned Single Judge in such Special
Civil Application or before us in Letters Patent Appeal may not be
much relevant for consideration of application for condonation of
delay, since the learned advocate for the opponent has argued in
detail and referred several factual details, we are obliged to deal
with all such factual details.
From
the record, it becomes clear that all such lands were originally
owned by Navsari Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. and when it becomes sick
industrial company in terms of SICA, a reference was made to BIFR in
the year 1990 when BIFR sanctioned a rehabilitation scheme in the
year 1991 and revised it in the year 1996. During the process of
such rehabilitation scheme, present opponent has purchased the land
and applied for electricity connection in view of the directions
issued by the BIFR in its scheme, which was sanctioned under the
provisions of Section 18 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act. The
sum and substance of the Special Civil Application is to the effect
that opponent herein is entitled to the power connection from the
applicant as a new owner and seeking fresh power connection. Whereas
applicant has passed an order on 20.09.2005 that in view of the
arrears of electricity from the old owner of such premises, no new
power connection can be
given. Thereby the basic issue between the ligitants herein is
relating to the old dues of
predecessor in title from new owner for release of new electricity
connection for the same premises.
Before
proceeding further with the facts and details of this case, it would
be appropriate to recollect here that such issue was referred to the
larger Bench of this Court in the case of Apurva Chemicals &
Ors. in Special Civil Application No.2582 of 2012. The order and
judgment dated 3.12.2012 in such Special Civil Application has been
challenged before the Hon ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave
to Appeal (Civil) No.37871 of 2012 by the present applicant being
Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. wherein by an order dated
11.12.2012, while issuing notice, the Apex Court has stayed the
impugned order of this Court, which otherwise confirms that old dues
of predecessor cannot be recovered from new owner for release of new
electric connection for the same premises. Therefore, atleast until
such SLP is decided by the Hon ble Apex Court, the issue regarding
recovery of old dues of the predecessor in title for the same
premises from new owner for release of new electric connection for
the same premises remains sub-judice and authority lower than the
Apex Court may not take any final decision on such issue.
The same principle will apply to the electricity companies, more
particularly, when they are semi-Government companies or companies
owned and managed by the State Authority. It is also relevant to
recollect here that, in fact, after the impugned order of Special
Civil Application in the Letters Patent Appeal before us, a
condition No.4.1.11 has been incorporated in The Electricity Supply
Code, 2005, which allows the electricity company to refuse the new
electric connection in the same premises where there is old dues of
consumption of electricity for the electric connection already
provided to the same premises. In the present case, all above issues
are involved and, therefore, they are recollected so as to deal with
the contentions of both the parties in this application for
condonation of delay of 865 days in filing the appeal against the
order dated 14.6.2010 in Special Civil Application No.21284 of 2006.
By such judgment and order dated 14.6.2010, the learned Single Judge
has directed the applicant electricity company to grant
electricity connection to the opponent herein without insisting for
the payment of previous owner s dues observing that the
electricity company can recover the outstanding electricity dues
from the previous owner in accordance with law and in accordance
with the
provisions contained in the revised sanctioned Scheme. Though it is
not disclosed, learned Single Judge must be referring to the Scheme
approved under the proceedings before the BIFR.
As already noticed, BIFR has directed the electricity company to
grant electricity connection to the new owner without asking for
dues of the old owner. The record shows that after such order,
applicant - electricity company has granted some connections.
However, it seems that thereafter company has decided to take
necessary steps and stopped to grant new connection. Therefore,
respondent herein has preferred Misc.Civil Application Nos.1464 of
2012 as well as 3178 of 2012 claiming Contempt of Court by the
applicant electricity company and practically for directions for
execution of order and judgment dated 14.6.2012 in original Special
Civil Application. In both such Misc. Civil Applications
respectively on 24.6.2010 and 10.12.2012, some directions were
granted by this Court in favour of the opponent herein. Probably,
this has resulted into filing of present Letters Patent Appeal
against the order dated 14.6.2010.
Learned
advocate Ms.Lilu Bhaya for the applicant has submitted that though
they have released electricity connection between 30.12.2010 till
1.4.2012, in view of amendment
in Clause No.4.1.11 of The Electricity Supply Code working effect
from 20.8.2010, they have decided not to accept the fresh
application for electricity connection and in such cases they have
not entertained such application of present
opponent considering the fact that the dues of old owner of the
premises, namely, M/s.Navsari Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd., which
was then known as Morarji Desai Mills was to the tune of
approximately Rs.22 Crores and, therefore, in view of amendment in
The Electricity Supply Code, it would be difficult for the
electricity company to provide fresh electricity connection without
recovering dues for the same premises. It is further submitted that
at this juncture in view of the order dated 24.7.2012 passed in
Misc.Civil Application No.1464 of 2012, it has become necessary for
the applicant to challenge the order in Special Civil Application.
It is further submitted that there is some delay due to
administrative contingency in the office and administration of the
electricity company and after getting legal opinion, they have
decided to file such appeal and because of such reasons, there is
delay of 865 days. The applicant is also relying upon few judgments
of the Hon ble Apex Court as pleaded in the application itself,
which will be dealt with hereinafter. It
is also submitted that opponent-original petitioner has prayed for
connection for the land and properties, which were not owned by them
on the date of filing of the original Special Civil Application.
The
opponent being original petitioner has contest such request to
condone the delay of 865 days by filing a detailed Affidavit in
reply on 7.1.2013. The points raised by the learned advocate for the
opponent, as pleaded in such reply and argued before the Court can
be summarised as under:-
7.1. There
is no cause of action for filing Letters Patent Appeal.
7.2. No
cause, much less sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay.
7.3. There
is no misrepresentation as argued by the petitioner.
7.4. Condition
No.4.1.11 does not come in picture.
7.5. No
cause is shown for delay from August 2010 when above condition was
incorporated till November 2012 when appeal was filed.
7.6. Non-compliance
of impugned order.
7.7. There
is a conscious decision not to challenge the impugned order.
7.8. There
is suppression of material fact by the applicant and that whether
above decision regarding not to file an appeal would be material
fact for condonation of delay.
7.9. There
is no change in law or no other reason to challenge the judgment,
after taking conscious decision.
Learned
advocate Ms.Pahwa has also relied upon several citations in support
of above issues, which shall be dealt with hereinafter.
The
learned advocate for the opponent has relied upon several factual
details from the record of original Special Civil Application. All
such averments on factual details from pleadings may be summarised
as under.
9.1 The
applicant has not explained the delay from 14.6.2010 till 21.9.2012
as pleaded in affidavit in reply.
9.2 It
is stated that there is no prima-facie case in favour of the
applicant and to substantiate such argument, the opponent has
reproduced paragraph 27 of the impugned order dated 14.6.2010 in
paragraph 10 of affidavit in reply wherein the learned Single Judge
of this Court has observed that BIFR has directed the respondent
company through the State Government to grant power connection to
the petitioner without insisting for the payment of previous owner s
dues and that directions issued by the BIFR are binding on the
respondent company and so on.
9.3 Letter
dated 27.10.2010 by the Company Secretary of the applicant company
to its Superintending Engineer is relied upon submitting that
opinion of Company Secretary was not followed at the relevant time.
9.4 Letter
dated 2.11.2010 of Executive Engineer of the applicant addressed to
the opponent to show that they have reason to know about the
correspondence by Company Secretary to the Officer of the applicant.
9.5 Letter
dated 20.5.2004 by the Sales Committee of the Navsari Cotton &
Silk Mills, Navsari addressed to the opponent conveying permission
granted by the BIFR with reference to property in question, more
particularly Survey Nos. of land, which is purchased by the
opponent.
9.6 Judgment
and order dated 14.6.2010 being impugned judgment to confirm the
total area of the land as being observed by the learned Single
Judge.
9.7 Final
order and direction by the impugned judgment dated 14.6.2010, which
confirms that electricity connection is to be granted as prayed for
without insisting for the payment of previous owner s dues.
From
the above listed submissions, so far as reference to some letters
and correspondences are concerned, it is clear that the Court cannot
rely upon opinion of anybody while deciding any matter on its own
merits and, therefore, the controversy regarding contents of letter,
knowledge of such communication to opponent and possession of such
letters with the opponent as objected by the applicant are not
required to be dealt with in the present application, which is only
for condonation of delay, more particularly when condonation of
delay would rest solely upon the cause for delay and not on the
merits or opinion of the case on hand.
So
far as other submissions are concerned, though they are dealt with
herein at appropriate place, it is made clear that in general all
such factual details are not to be relied upon for consideration of
condonation of delay, for the simple reason that if any decision is
taken on such merits by the learned single Judge, and observation on
such facts would unnecessarily disturb the decision, when such
judgment is impugned in present Letters Patent Appeal. In other
words, determination relating the facts may be done only if the
parties are given proper opportunity to argue the matter fully on
merits, touching all aspects. However, when opponent has read out
and referred the final direction in the impugned judgment, it would
be sufficient to recollect such order wherein though it is
categorically stated that the respondent electricity company is
directed to grant electricity connection to the petitioner as prayed
for and then added that it should be without insisting for payment
of the previous owner s dues and that electricity company may
recover such dues from the previous owner in accordance with law and
in accordance with the provisions contained in the revised
sanctioned scheme. Therefore, it becomes clear that electricity
company is entitled to recover the amount in accordance with law and
when a decision by the High Court that electricity company cannot
recover the previous dues from the new owner is stayed by the
Hon ble Apex Court, there is reason for the applicant company to
challenge such order by appropriate proceedings. At the same time,
it would be beneficial to refer the prayers in Special Civil
Application itself. When in the impugned order, it is stated that
as prayed for , it makes it clear that there is difference in
what is prayed for and what is granted and at least to that extent,
the applicant has sufficient cause of action to prefer appeal
against the impugned order.
So
far as present application is concerned, it is solely restricted to
condonation of delay in filing Letters Patent Appeal is concerned,
irrespective of facts, details and merits of the main case as well
as Letters Patent Appeal. Therefore, practically it would be futile
exercise to reproduce the averments and arguments by both the
parties so far as it is concerning factual details of the parties,
litigations between them and further details relating to property in
question.
However,
to decide the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to
consider that whether there is sufficient and reasonable cause for
condonation of delay in filing any litigation beyond the prescribed
period of limitation.
There
are catena of judgments, more particularly when sufficient cause
and reasonable ground are not defined under the law, that in
general, the dispute shall be resolved on its own merits rather than
technicalities and that, therefore, sufficient cause and
reasonable ground for condonation of delay cannot be defined
in any narrow manner and thereby there cannot be straitjacket
formula that what is sufficient cause and what is reasonable
ground for condonation of delay, it goes without saying that
sufficient cause and reasonable ground may be different
from case to case and though particular cause or ground may not
sufficient and reasonable to condone the delay in a particular case,
similar ground or cause may be sufficient and reasonable enough to
condone the delay in any other given case, if on judicial scrutiny
of matter, it is so found by the competent Court to condone such
delay. Therefore, without influenced by decision cited during the
argument, we have to examine the cause of action for filing the
Letters Patent Appeal and cause for delay in filing such Letters
Patent Appeal.
The
applicant has categorically submitted that they have acted as per
the decisions of the Court, but when condition No.4.1.11 has been
incorporated in The Electricity Supply Code and that when the Apex
Court has granted stay against the judgment of this Court whereby
issue regarding recovery of dues from new owner has been sub-judice
and that when the present opponents are hard pressing the applicant
under different contempt petitions and that when due amount is
approximately Rs.22 Crores, they have to take a decision that order
of the learned Single Judge is required to be challenged by filing
Letters Patent Appeal and, therefore, there is sufficient cause in
filing the Letters Patent Appeal, and for all above reasons,
including the administrative delay on their part, they are praying
to condone the delay in filing such Letters Patent Appeal.
Whereas
since opponent has raised different issues, it would be appropriate
to deal with them. So far as issue No.1 is concerned, we are
satisfied that because of the development, both in statute as well
as in judicial process, whereby there is an amendment in The
Electricity Supply Code by incorporating particular condition and
because the issue becomes sub-judice, in view of the Apex Court s
order dated 11.12.2012, practically cause of action for filing the
Letters Patent Appeal has arisen only thereafter. Once we came to
the conclusion that the cause for filing Letters Patent Appeal has
arisen, because of some development after the impugned order,
naturally, the same would be sufficient cause for condoning the
delay. Therefore, when it is clear that though otherwise the
applicant has complied with the impugned judgment and order passed
by the learned Single Judge, when it has been necessary for the
applicant, because of the new development in form of new rule and
order of the Hon ble Supreme Court, there is sufficient cause of
action in filing Letters Patent Appeal at present, and for the same
reasons, there is sufficient cause for them in filing such Letters
Patent Appeal with application to condone delay in preferring
Letters Patent Appeal.
So
far as issue regarding misrepresentation of certain facts is
concerned, since we are not dealing with the main issue regarding
right of electricity company to recover the dues or liability of the
new owner to pay the dues of old owner, we do not wish to discuss
and determine this issue at this juncture since it would
unnecessarily hamper the right of both the parties to argue in
better manner and details while dealing with the main issue in
appropriate proceeding, if delay is not condoned or in the Letters
Patent Appeal itself. For the same reasons, issue regarding
conscious decision and whether it is material for filing an appeal
or to condone the delay in filing the appeal need not required to be
discussed or determined at this stage.
However,
it would be appropriate to observe that learned advocate for the
applicant has raised his objection regarding disclosure of certain
facts that certain documents being communication by and between
their Officers that how such communication has been procured by the
opponent. Against which it is the case of the opponent that such
documents were obtained through Right to Information Act and that
atleast in some of the communication, applicant itself has conveyed
some fact to them. However, for the reasons stated herein above, it
would appropriate not to discuss or determine any issue on such
point, which may otherwise prejudice the final decision on such
points in appropriate proceedings, considering the fact that at
present we are simply dealing with the application for condonation
of delay and we should restrain ourselves for decision on
sufficient cause and reasonable ground for delay and
nothing more than that.
So
far as the issue regarding applicability of condition No.4.1.11 of
the Electricity Supply Code is concerned, the opponent has submitted
that such condition does not come in picture at all because in
present case, applicant has to comply with the directions of the
BIFR since BIFR has directed them to grant power connection without
insisting for the payment of dues of previous owners. We are of the
opinion that this is also one of the major issue to be decided on
its own merits.
Therefore,
we are of the opinion that there is cause of action to the applicant
to prefer such Letters Patent Appeal, which arises not only from the
date of impugned judgment, but also from the date when the Hon ble
Apex Court has taken cognizance of the similar issue in SLP (Civil)
No.37871 of 2012. We are of clear opinion that while dealing with
the application for condonation of delay, the Court has not to enter
into the minute facts, details and controversy of the main issue,
which includes misrepresentation of facts by any litigant and
applicability of amended condition of The Electricity Supply Code.
So far as the explanation of delay from August 2010 till November
2012 and conscious decision whether material for filing an appeal
are concerned, it would merge into the reasons for sufficient
cause to condone the delay, inasmuch as if there is sufficient
cause for delay, then decision making process and length of
delay is immaterial.
So
far as submission regarding non-compliance of impugned order is
concerned, we do not agree with such submission inasmuch as if the
appellant has to first comply with the directions in the impugned
order, then the appeal becomes infructuous even before its filing
and, therefore, such concept is misconceived on the part of the
opponent.
Before
determining the issue relating to sufficient cause finally, it is
necessary to deal with several decisions cited by both the parties.
Learned
advocate for the opponent Mrs.Sangeeta Pahwa has relied upon
following decisions to substantiate her submission that delay should
not be condoned in such cases.
23.1 (2010)2
SCC 114 Dalipsingh Vs.State of UP & Ors. - wherein the
Hon ble Apex Court has dealt with practice and procedure with
reference to abuse of process stating that new creed of dishonest
litigants noticed, which is to be deprecated strongly with denial of
any relief to such persons. The Apex Court has held that costs should
be imposed if party approaching the Court is guilty of suppressing
facts and misleading the Court. It is further held that such litigant
is not entitled to be heard on merits and cannot invoke the
extraordinary/discretionary jurisdiction under Constitution. Such
principle can be invoked based upon the facts and circumstances of
particular case and, therefore, unless there is a clear determination
to that extent, such judgment does not help the opponent in present
application for consideration of cause of delay.
23.2 (2012)8
SCC 524 - Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory wherein the
Apex Court has held that if there is no sufficient cause, inordinate
delay would amount to substituting the period of limitation
prescribed by statute. Therefore, outcome of such judgment is simple
that for condonation of delay there must be sufficient cause, thus
it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned even if there is
sufficient cause.
23.3 (2012)5
SCC 157 Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai
wherien the Apex Court has dealt with Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and more particularly expression sufficient
cause . It is clarified and discussed with reference to object of
Limitation Act and extent of leniency to be shown in public interest
in condonation of delay by State machinery. Though High Court s
order
to condone the delay was set-aside by the Apex Court, it was held
that expression sufficient cause should be construed liberally
on facts without any hard and fast rules. It is further stated that
substantive right of parties should not be ignored because of delay,
but a distinction must be made between the delay of few days and
inordinate delay causing prejudice to the other side and that no
premium can be given to total lethargy or utter negligence. It is
further stated that condonation of delay cannot be held as a matter
of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the
ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. In this
reported case, there was delay of seven years and, therefore, the
Apex Court has observed as such and refused to condone the delay,
more particularly when explanation for such delay was prima-facie
found as concocted and causing prejudice to private appellant when
the issue was pertaining to demolition. It is further observed that
explanation regarding advocate s transfer has no bearing on the
issue and that explanation offered was silent about the events and
persons involved and credible causes for such delay. Therefore also,
though in this reported judgment, delay has not been condoned, it
cannot be the rule of law that delay cannot be condoned even if
sufficient cause
is shown, because in the present case, condonation of delay was
practically refused because of the particular facts on record
delay of seven years with absence of proper explanation and
concocted explanation for condonation of delay. Therefore, unless
there is such reason in the case on hand, such decision cannot be
applied to every cases blindly without verifying that whether cause
for delay is sufficient or not.
23.4 (2012)3
SCC 563 Post Master General & Ors. Vs.Living Media India
Ltd. & Ors.
- wherein also the Apex Court has dealt with sufficient cause
with reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Apex
Court has held that if there is non-explanation of sufficient cause,
and if there is absence of diligence by Department in prosecuting
matter, inspite of another opportunity of filing better
affidavit being granted, it was held that condonation of delay is
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. Therefore, again this decision is based upon
the particular facts and circumstances on record before the Apex
Court wherein the Apex Court has found that there is negligence on
the part of the Government and there is non-explanation of
sufficient cause. Therefore, only because of such judgment, it
cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned in all cases even if
sufficient
cause is proved.
23.5 (2010)8
SCC 685 Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Others
wherein the Apex Court has again dealt with express sufficient
cause . But, it is categorically stated that sufficient cause
implies presence of legal and adequate reasons and there cannot be
straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases without
reference to the particular facts and circumstances of a given case.
Therefore, it is to be decided by the Court whether or not a cause
is sufficient and whether it could have been avoided by the party by
exercise of due care and attention. Therefore, only because of
denial of condonation of delay in few cases would not amount to a
straitjacket principle of law that delay cannot be condoned
irrespective of sufficient case shown.
23.6 (2010)5
SCC 459 Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation & Anr.
- wherein though the Supreme Court has directed probe to be
conducted against defaulting officials of respondent Corporation for
fixing accountability while denying to condone the delay, the fact
remains that in the given case before the Apex Court, there was
false statement made to explain the delay and when litigant did not
approached the Court with clean
hands, the Apex Court had no option, but to take serious view of the
matter. However, while defining the term sufficient cause , the
Apex Court has categorically observed and held that Courts bestowed
with power to condone delay, if sufficient cause is shown and that
term sufficient cause elastic enough to enable the Courts to
apply the law in a manner which subserves ends of justice and that
there cannot be hard and fast rule laid down for condonation of
delay and that liberal approach in condoning the delay of short
duration with stricter approach in case of inordinate delay is
required. It is further stated that certain amount of latitude not
impermissible with regard to the State because State represents
collective cause of the community and decisions are taken by the
Officers/agencies i.e. more than one person. Therefore, even in the
case cited by the opponent, the Apex Court has categorically stated
in paragraph 15 that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in
dealing with the application for condonation of delay.
23.7 (2008)17
SCC 448 Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) Vs.Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project & Anr. - the Apex Court has refused to condone
the delay mainly because of the reason that the Court was of the
opinion that there was fraud on Court by public authority when false
plea was taken with incorrect statement made in application seeking
condonation of delay itself and, therefore, it was held that it is
sufficient to reject such application without any further inquiry as
to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient
cause to condone the delay or not. Therefore, unless there is a proof
or pleading regarding fraud committed with the Court proceeding only
because of such judgment, it cannot be held that delay cannot be
condoned in any case.
23.8 (1997)7
SCC 556 P.K. Ramachandran Vs.State of Kerala & Anr. -
wherein the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay because there
was no explanation much less reasonable or satisfactory explanation
offered by the State for condonation of delay in application for the
purpose. Though it was seriously opposed, the same was allowed by the
High Court without taking into consideration of all the aspects
touching to such subject. However, only for such citation, it cannot
be held that delay cannot be condoned even if there is sufficient
cause.
23.9 2012(7)
SCALE 230 B.Madhuri Goud Vs.B.Damodar Reddy the Apex
Court has refused to condone the delay of almost four years to
set-aside the ex-parte decree since the ground pleaded for condoning
delay was that the documents were misplaced by the office of the
advocate and inadvertently tagged with the record of another appeal,
but the affidavit of concerned advocate was not filed on record.
Therefore, in such case, when cause was not supported by affidavit,
Apex Court has decided not to condone the delay. Hence, in absence of
such proof, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned even if
sufficient cause is pleaded and proved on record.
The
sum and substance of all above decisions cited by the opponent No.1
makes it clear that there cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule
either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and
that every case is to be decided considering the facts and
circumstances of that case only. The only requirement for
condonation of delay is that whether there is sufficient cause
for the litigant not to initiate the litigation in prescribed time
of limitation. In all the cases cited above, there is either
inordinate delay, which was never explained or there was
misrepresentation or fraud and, therefore, the Apex Court has held
that in such cases, delay cannot be condoned. However, it cannot be
ignored that in almost all such judgments, the Apex Court has
categorically observed and held that if sufficient cause is shown,
delay can be condoned and that term sufficient cause elastic
enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a manner which
subserves ends of justice and that there cannot be hard and fast
rule laid down for condonation of delay.
As
against that, if we look into the judgments cited by the applicant,
it becomes clear that generally Courts should be reluctant to shut
out a consideration of the case on merits on the grounds of
limitation or any other similar technicality (AIR 2012 SC 640 -
Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of Bihar); if there is delay in filing
petition, due to opinion of the advocate on record and the Solicitor
General etc., such delay deserves to be condoned (AIR 2011 SC 428
Delhi Development Authority Vs.Bhola Nath Sharma); there is
a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellant and, therefore,
the Court should decide the matter on merit by giving the expression
sufficient cause a pragmatic justice-oriented approach (AIR
2011 SC 977 Union of India Vs.Giani); the meaning of the
word sufficient is adequate or enough , inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended and, therefore, word
sufficient embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to
exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in
the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of
universal application (AIR 2011 SC 1150 Parimal Vs.Veena);
if case file has to be routed from various departments before
decision to file appeal, it is sufficient cause for condonation of
delay (AIR 2010 SC 1445 State of J & K Vs.Mohmad Maqbool
Sofi); while deciding application for condonation of delay,
Court cannot go into the merits of the case, if averments made in
the application is sufficient to condone the delay, there is no
hesitation to condone such delay (AIR 2009 SC 1927 State of
Jharkhand Vs.Ashok Kumar Chokhani); the expression sufficient
cause must receive liberal construction to advance substantial
justice even condoning delay of more than 6500 when question of law
involved (AIR 2009 SC 2577 State of Karnataka Vs.Y.Moideen
Kunhi); and what counts is not length of delay, but sufficiency
of cause and that what constitutes sufficient cause cannot be
laid down by hard and fast rules [AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 695
State (NCT of Delhi) Vs.Ahmed Jaan]; delay of more than six
years can also be condoned to avoid miscarriage of justice (AIR
1984 SC 1744 O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) by 3
Judges bench of Apex Court).
Moreover,
atleast in AIR 2008 SC 1688 Sinik Security Vs.Sheel Bai, AIR
2009 SC 2170 D.D. Vaishnav Vs.State of M.P. and AIR 2009 SC
(Supp.) 195 Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara
Vs.Labour Court, Bhilwara, the Apex Court has condoned
inordinate delay (769 days, 589 days and 178 days respectively) even
by imposing some costs upon the applicant.
In
AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag &
Anr. Vs. Mst.Katiji & Ors., the Apex Court has held as under
-
The legislature
has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51
of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the
Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters
on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by
the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply
the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice
that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of
Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has
been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in
this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated
down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
[1
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under
any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if
the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.
]
1. Ordinarily a
litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal
late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned
the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's
delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial
justice and technical considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for
the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non- deliberate delay.
5. There is no
presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or
on account of culpable negligence, or on account of
malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to
delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be
grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it
is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a
justice- oriented approach from this perspective, there
was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of
the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant.
The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is
no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State'
is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact
experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file
pushing, and passing- on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any
event, the State which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression
"sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to
be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end
in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits
If
we scrutinize all above referred citations, it becomes clear that in
the citations referred by the applicant and discussed in paragraph
21 herein above, the delay was not condoned mainly for the reason
that either there is forged statement by the applicant or the cause
for delay was shown as loss of paper by the advocate or the main
dispute is falling under Special Legislature like Rent Control or
Arbitration or Consumer Dispute. Though in some cases, dispute falls
within General Law, the second aspect for non-condoning the delay is
actual delay in number of days, which is more than 1000 days in 5
cases, out of total 8 cases referred by the opponent and discussed
in paragraph 21 above. Unless there is a similar situation i.e.
unless the case in hand falls within a special enactment or there is
inordinate delay beyond couple of years, none of such referred and
cited judgment confirms that delay cannot be condoned even if
sufficient cause is shown, more particularly because of the reason
that all such judgments are by the Division Bench only and in none
of such judgments, any of the citations, which are relied upon and
cited by the applicant and prior to the above referred judgments,
were ever overruled or distinguished or even referred and not
followed in any of the case, which is referred by the opponent. As
against that, if we scrutinize the judgments cited by the applicant
and referred in paragraph 25 to 27, it becomes clear that atleast
those judgments are referred amongst different judgments within them
so as to decide that the delay can be condoned if sufficient cause
is shown. Whereas atleast decision in O.P.Kathpalia Vs.Lakhmir Singh
(Dead) & Ors. (supra) is by the three Judges bench of the Apex
Court wherein delay of more than 6 years was condoned observing that
otherwise it would result into miscarriage of justice. Therefore,
when there is a judgment by the bench of three Judges of the Apex
Court that to avoid miscarriage of justice, delay of even 6 years
can be condoned and when the judgments referred and cited in
paragraphs 25 to 27 are yet not overruled or distinguished in any of
the later judgment by the Bench of three Judges , only
because the Apex Court has not condoned the delay in some of the
cited cases, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned in all
cases after such judgments even if there is sufficient cause to
condone the delay. Thus, in general, if there is sufficient
reason to condoned the delay, irrespective of the cited cases, delay
can be condoned.
In
view of the above facts detailed and discussion, it has been clear
that the applicant has a cause of action to file the Letters Patent
Appeal in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, more
particularly development in law after the impugned judgment and,
therefore, the reasons shown by the appellant for condonation of
delay are good enough and sufficient. It appeals to this Court to
condone such delay considering the overall aspect of the matter,
which includes the public interest in as much as applicant has to
recover Rs.22 Crores. Further, so as to avoid multiplicity of
litigation in view of the fact that the same issue has been pending
before the Hon ble Apex Court and, therefore, it is sub-judice.
Therefore, if impugned order is confirmed by denying to condone the
delay, there would be either multiplicity of litigation or there
would be differential treatment because of different judgments.
Hence, to avoid such a situation, when the original petitioners are
filing repeated applications for contempt, in our view there is no
option for the applicant company to prefer such Letters Patent
Appeal and for all such reasons, there is sufficient cause to
condone the delay. Thus, in our view, the statement in the
application for condonation of delay and in rejoinder affidavit, do
constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay.
For
the foregoing reasons, the application deserves to be allowed as
prayed for. The delay caused in filing the Letters Patent Appeal
deserves to be condoned.
Rule
is made absolute.
(V.M.SAHAI, J.)
(S.G.SHAH, J.)
(binoy)
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