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  • provisions contained in Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the B.P.M.C. Act")
  • Section 466(1) read with Section 147 made provision
  • provisions of the B.P.M.C. Act
  • Section 466(1)(A)(f)
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  • provisions contained in Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the B.P.M.C. Act")
  • Section 466(1) read with Section 147 made provision
  • provisions of the B.P.M.C. Act
  • Section 466(1)(A)(f)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Municipal Corporation of City of Surat v. Transporters / Indian Oil Corporation

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, Municipal Corporation of City of Surat ("the Corporation"), appealed against a common judgment delivered by a learned single Judge in Special Civil Application Nos. 8482, 6859, 6835 and 7631 of 1990 on 1-2-1996.

The original petitioners (now respondents in the appeals), except Indian Oil Corporation (I.O.C.), were transporters engaged in carrying I.O.C.'s products by tanker through the limits of the Corporation. The Corporation levied octroi but, to facilitate transporters and simplify procedure for export cargo, the Commissioner purportedly used powers under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (B.P.M.C. Act) and Standing Orders made under Section 466(1) read with Section 147 to impose a "supervision" or transit fee instead of direct octroi payment at entry/exit points.

The Corporation initially charged modest supervision charges (Rs. 2, later Rs. 5, Rs. 10, Rs. 20), and then increased the charge to Rs. 100 per truck with effect from 1 August 1990. Transporters challenged the imposition/collection of these fees in the Special Civil Applications noted above. The learned single Judge disposed of the petitions while leaving some questions open; the Corporation has pursued these appeals.

Relevant documentary material on record included: an agreement dated 7 June 1988 (Annexure-C) providing for Rs. 10 per truck, correspondence between the I.O.C. and the Corporation (including a letter of 5 December 1989 proposing Rs. 20), a 13 August 1990 letter from the Corporation notifying an increase to Rs. 100 per truck with effect from 16 August 1990, and some later correspondence and deposit transactions (including references to amounts paid by I.O.C.). Interim orders had been passed in the special applications, notably a direction that collection of fees be "subject to the result of this petition."

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Corporation is entitled, under the B.P.M.C. Act and Standing Orders framed under Section 466(1), to levy supervision (transit) charges as fees for services rendered to transporters.
  2. Whether the Corporation validly collected the increased supervision fee of Rs. 100 per truck from 1 August 1990 (i.e., whether state sanction or other required authority existed for that rate).
  3. Whether the transporters (petitioners) have locus standi to challenge the recovery when receipts were issued in the name of I.O.C. and the Corporation contends collection was under an agreement with I.O.C.
  4. Whether amounts collected in excess of what the Standing Orders authorize (if any) must be refunded, and if so, to whom (transporters or I.O.C.).
  5. The effect and scope of the agreement(s) between I.O.C. and the Corporation (notably the 7 June 1988 agreement) and whether any alleged implied consent by I.O.C. validates later increases.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant-Corporation's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioners (transporters) lack locus standi because they did not themselves pay the supervision charges; receipts were issued in favour of the I.O.C., and the I.O.C. paid the amounts under an agreement with the Corporation.
  • The Corporation is entitled, under the B.P.M.C. Act and the Standing Orders made under Section 466(1) (specifically Schedule-I and related provisions), to collect supervision charges and has done so lawfully.
  • Reference to Section 466(1)(A)(f) was relied on as authority to frame Standing Orders determining "the supervision ... and the fees payable by persons so conveying the goods." The Corporation relied on the Supreme Court decision in Municipal Corporation of the City of Baroda v. Babubhai Himatlal to support the validity of Standing Orders and the Commissioner's authority.
  • There was an agreement between I.O.C. and the Corporation by which I.O.C. agreed to pay fees (Corporation asserted implied consent by I.O.C. to the Rs. 100 rate based on correspondence and deposits), so refunds were not justified.
  • The Corporation also submitted that where facilities are provided under Standing Orders, the exchequer should not suffer and parties using the services must pay.

Petitioners' / Transporters' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioners alleged illegal recovery of large amounts (claimed monthly totals such as Rs. 30,000–40,000) which, if continued, would threaten their business since the levy was not accounted for in transport contracts with I.O.C.
  • In Special Civil Application No. 7631 of 1990 (ground (h)), the petitioner specifically sought relief against the Corporation for the alleged illegal recoveries and for refunds.

Indian Oil Corporation's (I.O.C.) Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • I.O.C. contended that contractual relations and obligations between it and the transporters should not be adjudicated by the Court in these proceedings; transactions between petitioners and I.O.C. were governed by independent agreements.
  • I.O.C. stated that the petitioners' claim might constitute a separate cause of action against I.O.C., and that enforcement of any contractual obligation between I.O.C. and the Corporation should not be the subject of these petitions.
  • I.O.C. did not place the agreement relied upon by the Corporation (as between I.O.C. and the Corporation) on the record for the Court to examine fully.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of the City of Baroda v. Babubhai Himatlal, AIR 1989 SC 2091 (1990(1) GLR 432 (SC)) Validity of the Commissioner's authority under Section 466 to frame Standing Orders; Standing Orders framed in accordance with procedure; State Government sanction to Standing Orders in that case. The court relied on this decision to observe that the Commissioner has authority under Section 466 and that Standing Orders can validly authorize collection of supervision fees, subject to the sanctional requirement (i.e., the Baroda case's validity turned on sanction by the State Government).
Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors., 1982 (1) SCR 519 Distinction between fees and taxes; definition/explanation of "fees" as payment for a privilege or service; discussion of the quid pro quo element in relation to fees. The court cited this authority to explain the concept of "fees" (payments for privileges or services) and to accept that strict quid pro quo is not always an essential element of a fee, supporting the view that supervision charges may be charged as fees for services rendered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in several analytical steps, constrained to the materials and arguments presented:

  1. The court accepted the legal proposition established by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Baroda that a Commissioner has authority under Section 466 to make Standing Orders and that such Standing Orders may authorize collection of supervision fees; also noting that the Baroda decision turned in part on the existence of State Government sanction to the Standing Orders in that case.
  2. The court observed that the Corporation is entitled in principle to levy supervision charges by way of fees under the Standing Orders as a charge for services rendered (citing the conceptual distinction between fees and taxes as discussed in Southern Pharmaceuticals).
  3. The court distinguished between entitlement in principle and the specific rates/collection history in this case. It found that the agreement produced on record (7 June 1988) authorized a charge of Rs. 10 per truck and was effective for one year (per Clause 11 of that agreement). Subsequent increases (notably to Rs. 100 from 1 August 1990) lacked a demonstrated sanction by the State Government authorising that higher rate.
  4. The court noted deficiencies in the record: I.O.C. had not placed the agreement authorising later increases before the Court; the petitioners did not produce specific evidence of amounts that they individually paid; and the Corporation did not produce a Standing Order authorizing collection at Rs. 100 per truck when requested.
  5. Regarding locus standi, the court found that although the Corporation contended sums were paid by I.O.C. under an agreement (and receipts were in I.O.C.'s name), transporters who had in fact paid could have a remedy to recover those amounts. However, in the absence of specific evidence showing what individual transporters paid, the court could not direct refunds.
  6. The court emphasized that the Corporation could not collect amounts beyond what Standing Orders authorize, or do so under the pretext of an agreement unless such authorisation had been permitted under Standing Orders duly approved and sanctioned by the competent authority (the State Government). Collections in excess of the Standing Orders' limits were treated as without legal authority.
  7. Procedurally, the court noted the interim order in the Special Civil Applications that collections would be "subject to the result of this petition," and that there had been no direction to deposit collections in a separate account.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeals were allowed to the extent indicated in the opinion. The court held that the Corporation is entitled to collect supervision (transit) charges only to the extent permissible under the Standing Orders properly framed and sanctioned. Collections in excess of what the Standing Orders authorize (notably the Rs. 100 per truck increase instituted without shown State sanction) were characterised as recovered without legal authority. Because petitioners produced no specific evidence of amounts they personally paid, the court did not order refunds but observed that transporters who can show they paid excess amounts may be entitled to recover them.

Implications:

  • The Corporation may lawfully collect supervision charges only within the limits and procedure established by the Standing Orders and, where required, with sanction by the State Government (as made clear by the Baroda authority).
  • Amounts collected in excess of authorized limits (or without proper sanction) are recoverable in principle, but recovery will depend on claimants proving they personally paid the excess sums; in absence of such evidence the Court will not direct refunds.
  • If a transporter paid the excess amount, the appropriate initial step is to produce relevant evidence before the Corporation; if the I.O.C. paid amounts, that will affect the right of transporters to claim refunds. In case of disputes as to facts or contractual matters, the petitioners were advised to establish their rights by filing proper suits as necessary.
  • The court did not make any broader new precedent beyond applying existing authorities; the decision resolves the appeals on the facts and legal record before it and makes no order as to costs.

Procedurally, the rule issued in the Civil Applications filed in the appeals was discharged in consequence of the hearing and the appeals were allowed to the extent explained.

    Municipal Corporation Of The City Of Surat v. B.M Transport And Others

    1. Appellant-Municipal Corporation of City of Surat (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Corporation") has preferred these appeals against the common judgment delivered by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application Nos. 8482, 6859, 6835 and 7631 of 1990 on 1-2-1996.

    2. The original petitioners who are respondents in these appeals except the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter to be referred to as "the I.O.C.") were transporters and were engaged in transporting the products of I.O.C. through their tankers. While transporting the products of the I.O.C., drivers of the tankers were required to pass through the limits of the Corporation and the Corporation was thus entitled to levy the octroi. In the case of export of the same material, the Corporation was duty-bound to refund the amount. However, to make the procedure easy and to facilitate the transporters, it seems that the Commissioner of the Corporation exercised powers under the provisions contained in Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the B.P.M.C. Act") and under the Standing Orders framed under Section 466(1) read with Section 147 made provision for supervision charges to be collected from the transporters for carrying the goods through the limits of the Corporation under the supervision of the staff of the Corporation without paying octroi. It appears that initially, the Corporation was charging Rs. 2/- and the rate was increased thereafter to Rs. 5/-, then it was increased to Rs. 10/-, then to Rs. 20/- and then the rate was increased to Rs. 100/- with effect from 1st August, 1990. This action of the Corporation of charging these fees was the subject-matter before the learned single Judge.

    3. On behalf of the respondent Corporation, it was contended that the petitioners have no locus to file petitions as the petitioners have not paid anything to the Corporation, but in fact, the amount is paid by the I.O.C.. It was further contended on behalf of the Corporation that no evidence was produced along with the affidavit by any of the petitioners indicating that the amount was paid by the transporters, but in fact, receipts issued by the Corporation were in favour of the I.O.C., and therefore, according to Mr. Prashant Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, the petitioners had no right to file the petitions. Mr. Desai further submitted that at the most, the party aggrieved could be said to be the I.O.C.. It was contended by the Corporation before the learned single Judge that since I.O.C. had agreed to pay fees in view of services rendered the Corporation had collected the fees.

    4. It was further contended that the Corporation under the provisions of the B.P.M.C. Act read with the Rules and Standing Orders is entitled to collect the fees. Mr. Desai for this purpose, placed before us the relevant Standing Orders. He invited our attention to Section 466(1)(A)(f) which reads as under :

    "466(1) The Commissioner may make Standing Orders consistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules and by-laws in respect of the following matters namely :

    (A) (a) xxxxx

    (f) determining the supervision under which, the routes by which and the time within which goods 'intended for immediate exportation shall be conveyed out of the city and the fees payable by persons so conveying the goods;"

    So far as the Standing Order is concerned, in Schedule-I supervision fee is prescribed. Reading the Schedule, it clearly appears that the Corporation is entitled to recover the supervision charges as mentioned in the Schedule-I. It is required to be noted at this stage that the supervision charges have been enhanced from time to time and the Corporation is entitled to recover the amount of supervision charges as per the Standing Order. Mr. Desai invited our attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of me Municipal Corporation of the City of Baroda v. Babubhai Himatlal, AIR 1989 SC 2091 : 1990(1) GLR 432 (SC). After examining the provisions contained in the B.P.M.C. Act and the Standing Order, the Apex Court in Para 10 held as under :

    10. It is thus clear that so far as the authority of the Commissioner under Sec. 466 of the Act is concerned and the manner in which the Standing Orders . are framed, it is clear that the Commissioner had the authority and the Standing Orders have been framed in accordance with procedure prescribed under Section 466, and therefore, on that count the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained.

    The Apex Court also considered the reasons for charging fees. The Apex Court also pointed in Para 11 as under.

    "... By this Standing Order, the Corporation has attempted to make it convenient to the transporter not to involve in the payment of octroi duty at the entry and after satisfying the authorities at the exit end claim the refund of the octroi paid, thereby the Corporation intended to help the transporter in saving time and also in payment of the octroi at one end and later on claiming a refund..."

    The Apex Court also pointed in the aforesaid case as under.

    "As regards this aspect of the matter, the learned Judges of the High Court came to the conclusion that there was no quid pro quo established which could justify the levy of this fees as fees for the services rendered in the interest of the transporter. In Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur and Ors., v. State of Kerala and Ors., 1982 (1) SCR 519 this Court after considering the various decisions distinguished fees from tax in these words :

    "'Fees' are the amounts paid for a privilege, and are not an obligation, but the payment is voluntary. Fees are distinguished from taxes in that the chief purpose of a tax is to raise funds, for the support of the Government or for a public purpose, while a fee may be charged for the privilege or benefit conferred or service rendered or to meet the expenses connected therewith. Thus, fees are nothing but payment for some special privilege granted or service rendered."

    As regards the principle of quid pro quo rule in the same judgment, it was observed as under :

    That is because the Constitution did not contemplate it to be an essential element of a fee that it shouid be credited to a separate fund and not to the consolidated fund. It is also increasingly realised that the element of quid pro quo stricto sensu is not always a sine qua non of a fee. It is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax.

    Thus, considering the scheme, the Apex Court held that the Corporation is entitled to levy supervision charges by way of fees, and therefore, in our opinion, the views expressed by the learned single Judge that the Corporation is not entitled to recover the amount cannot be accepted. However, the question is whether the Corporation is entitled to collect the same at Re. 1/-. Mr. Prashant Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation submitted that the Standing Orders permit the Corporation to charge the fees by an agreement entered into between the I.O.C. and the Corporation and as per the said agreement, the I.O.C. was paying the sum of Re. 1/-. It was contended by the petitioners in ground (h) in Special Civil Application No. 7631 of 1990 as under :

    "(h) The petitioner further submits that as mentioned herebefore, the petitioner firm is required to pay to the Corporation every month, an amount of Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 40,000/- which the respondent-Corporation has been illegally recovering as mentioned herebefore. That if this recovery continues, it may oblige the petitioner to stop his business as the incidence of the said recovery was not taken into account while making contract of transport with Indian Oil Corporation, that otherwise also the petitioner cannot be made to bear the burden of a levy which is totally illegal and unjustifiable."

    In reply to this, on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, it has been specifically averred in reply by deponent "Babubhai K. Mehta, Octroi Inspector as under :

    "15. With reference to Para III(10) of the petition, 1 say that no amount is recovered from the Association or its members by the Corporation and the amount is recovered from Indian Oil Corporation Limited as per the agreement. It is also not correct to say that an amount aggregating to about Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 30,000/- per day is being recovered by the respondent-Corporation as alleged."

    So far as the I.O.C. is concerned, the I.O.C. has not taken care to produce on record the agreement entered into between the I.O.C, and the transporter. However, it is relevant to refer to relevant part of Para 18 of the affidavit on behalf of the I.O.C. dated 30th January, 1996. The same reads as under :

    "Question of contractual obligation and its enforcement as between the I.O.C. and the petitioner should not be gone into by the Hon'ble Court. In fact, the transaction between the petitioner and I.O.C. are governed by an independent agreement executed by them and terms and conditions of the said agreement are binding on the parties."

    It is contended further by the I.O.C. that the relief claimed by the petitioner constitutes separate cause action against the I.O.C., and therefore, the same should not be granted by this Court. Reading the contents of the petition, it is very clear that the petitioners were claiming the amount through I.O.C. or from the Corporation. The petitioner has produced on record Xerox copy of the receipt issued by the Corporation. Reading the same, it appears that it is issued in favour of the I.O.C. it is the say of the Corporation that the transporters were working as agents of the I.O.C. and whatever amount was paid was paid by and on behalf of the I.O.C. under the agreement, and therefore, according to the Corporation, as I.O.C. has not claimed any amount, the transporter cannot make a claim by filing writ petition against the Municipal Corporation.

    5. What is required to be considered in this case is that the agreement which is produced on record indicates that the Corporation can charge Rs. 10/- per truck. The agreement dated 7th June, 1988 is produced on record at Annexure -C. This agreement was in operation upto 1989 in view of Clause 11 of the said Agreement. In view of specific Clause mentioned in the agreement and condition No. 11, the agreement was binding between the parties i.e. the I.O.C. and the Corporation for a period of one year from 7th June, 1988. Mr. Desai invited our attention to the letter dated 5th December, 1989 written by the I.O.C. to the Corporation wherein it was agreed by the I.O.C. that the facilities may be continued as proposed by the Corporation as per the Rules on payment of Rs. 20/- by way of supervision charges. This letter is silent about the period during which these facilities should be provided by the Corporation. There is a letter addressed by the Corporation on 13-8-1990 conveying the information to the I.O.C. that vide resolution passed by the Corporation on 4-8-1998, the amount has been increased and fixed at Rs. 100/- per truck. It was further made clear that change will take place on 16th August, 1990 and thus from this date, the Corporation intended that it would collect an amount of Rs. 100/- per truck. For this purpose, we requested Mr. Desai to place before us the relevant Standing Order authorizing the Octroi Inspector to collect Rs. 100/- by way of fees. It was stated before us that the amount has been increased subsequently i.e. by resolution dated 16th December, 1994 and the amount had increased to Rs. 75/-. Mr. Desai, however, tried to suggest that there is implied consent on the part of the I.O.C. which can be seen from the letters dated 5th September, 1992, 15th September, 1992 and 8th October, 1992. Mr. Desai submitted that it was known to the I.O.C. that the amount of Rs. 100/- per truck is to be paid. Not only that, but even amount of deposit was also increased to Rs. 4.00 lacs which they have paid by cheque under letter dated 8-10-1992. Thus, the I.O.C. has impliedly agreed to pay Rs. 100/- per truck. Mr. Desai therefore, submitted that there is no question of refund of the amount. He further submitted that as per the Standing Orders if the facilities are provided to the party, then the exchequer should not suffer and the parties must pay the amount for the facilities provided to it.

    6. It is difficult for us to agree with the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation as there is no sanction from the State Government to recover this amount at the rate of Rs. 100/- per truck. We are of the opinion that the fees can be charged in accordance with the Standing Orders, and therefore, the excess amount recovered can be said to be recovered without any power. It can be said that it was recovered without legal authority.

    7. It is required to be noted that the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of City of Baroda (supra) upheld the validity of the Standing Order authorizing the Corporation to charge the supervision fee which in the present case is transit fee for the benefit of the person using the services rendered by the Corporation because the sanction was granted by the State Government to the said Standing Orders. Before the learned single Judge, it was specifically pleaded by the Corporation that the amount was recovered or levied under an agreement. It is in view of this agreement, the learned single Judge, without going into the question of validity of the provisions of the B.P.M.C. Act and the bye-laws made thereunder, disposed of the petitions by leaving the question open. As pointed out earlier, the Apex Court has upheld the validity of the provisions contained in the Standing Orders, and therefore, the Corporation is entitled to collect the fees in accordance with the Standing Orders.

    8. The Corporation has come out with a case that the amount was recovered under an agreement. We find that after 1990 the amount by way of supervision charges has been collected in excess of the limit prescribed in the Standing Orders and for subsequent period, there is no concluded agreement between the I.O.C. and the Corporation. The agreement is for a period of one year only as indicated earlier. Thereafter, we find no reference as to on what date, it was extended. Merely because the amount towards the deposit is paid, it would not indicate that the I.O.C. also agreed to the amount to be paid for supervision charges at the rate of Rs. 100/-. What Mr. Desai has contended is diat the I.O.C. never raised any dispute, and therefore, this Court should not examine the aspect and should not decide the dispute between the Corporation and the I.O.C.. In our opinion, I.O.C. has not disputed the facts pleaded before the Court by the Corporation, and therefore, it would not be just and proper for this Court to decide that issue. We find that the Corporation could not collect fees under the pretext of agreement unless and until such authorisation is permitted under the Standing Order duly approved and sanctioned by the Competent Authority i.e. the State Government. In the present case, I.O.C. has not claimed for refund or preferred petition. So far as the cases of the petitioners are concerned, we are of the view that if amount is paid by individual transporter, then he may be entitled to recover the amount. Before the Court, there is no specific evidence as to what amount has been paid. Therefore, in absence of any material, the Court cannot pass order directing the Corporation to refund the amount to the petitioners. It would be appropriate for the petitioners to produce relevant evidence before the Corporation, pointing out that they have paid particular amount in excess to the Standing Orders, If the I.O.C. has paid the amount, then there is no question for the Corporation to examine the same and if the Corporation is satisfied that the petitioners have paid the amount, then the Corporation will have to refund the amount. However, in case of dispute, it will be for the petitioners to establish their rights by filing proper suit before the Court. We are of the opinion that the Corporation was entitled to collect the supervision charges to the extent permissible under the Standing Orders. It is required to be noted that we have called for original papers from the Registry of all the Special Civil Applications. There is reference to an order dated 23-10-1990. The order dated 23-10-1990 passed in Special Civil Application No. 7631 of 1990 reads as under :

    "Mr. J. G. Shah, learned Advocate, for the petitioner seeks time for considering as to whether resp. No. 3-Indian Oil Corporation should be transposed as petitioner1 No. 2 in the petition particularly when it was pointed out that transport Company would not have locus standi in the matter and if at all petitioner has any grievance against not paying up the amount by the Indian Oil Corporation, it will have remedy against Indian Oil Corporation. In case, the Indian Oil Corporation does not want to be joined as petitioner No. 2, petitioner will be at liberty to argue the matter on the point of locus standi. In that view of time is granted. S.O. to 5-11-1990."

    Except in the aforesaid Special Civil Application, there is no such order dated 23-10-1990 in rest of the matters. The interim order dated 1-7-1991 passed in all the aforesaid Special Civil Applications reads as under :

    "Rule returnable on 16-9-1991. By way of interim relief, it is directed that the collection of the fees by the respondent No. 1 will be subject to the result of this petition. Mr. G. N. Desai waives service on behalf of respondent No. 1."

    Thus, it is clear that there was no direction to deposit the amount in separate Bank account, but only direction was that the collection of supervision charges will be subject to the result of the petition. With these observations, the appeals are required to be allowed. It is also made clear that we have not examined any aspect prior to 1990 as the same is not the subject-matter with regard to collection of supervision charges. The appeals are allowed accordingly to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.

    9. As the above appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent, rule issued in the Civil Applications filed in the aforesaid appeals is required to be discharged.

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    Municipal Corporation Of The City Of Surat v. B.M Transport And Others
    (Jan 10, 2002)