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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by M. Panchal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Deceased Vinodbhai Mangaldas Patel originally filed Claim Petition M.A.G.P. No. 86 of 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 11 (Aux.), Ahmedabad under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking Rs. 15 lakhs for injuries sustained in a motor-vehicle accident on December 28, 1987 allegedly caused by the negligent driving of an S.T. bus by opponent No. 5. The claimant died on November 11, 1989 during the pendency of the claim. Opponents Nos. 1 to 4 (purporting to be heirs and legal representatives of the deceased) filed application Exh. 14 on September 4, 1990 seeking impleadment as heirs and legal representatives and condonation of delay for being brought on record, alleging the death resulted from the injuries and explaining delay in filing because they were awaiting post-mortem/cause of death reports. The Tribunal heard the parties and, by order dated February 4, 1992, allowed Exh. 14 and permitted the opponents to be brought on record. The petitioner (Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation) challenged that order by filing the present revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court heard submissions and delivered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether on the death of the injured claimant the claim petition filed by him abates or whether the right to sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives.
  2. Whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in permitting heirs/legal representatives to be brought on record in the pending claim petition filed by the deceased claimant.
  3. Whether the Tribunal was required to have a separate formal application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before condoning delay in bringing the heirs/legal representatives on record and setting aside abatement.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Applicant's) Arguments

  • With the death of the original claimant who sued in his personal capacity, the cause of action died and did not survive to his heirs; consequently, the proceedings should have abated.
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act excludes the survival of actions for certain personal injuries (e.g., defamation, assault, or other personal injuries not causing death), and because the original proceedings claimed compensation for personal injuries that had not resulted in death at the time of filing, the right to sue did not survive.
  • Relying on the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, the petitioner contended that personal actions die with the person and therefore the application Exh. 14 should have been dismissed.
  • The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone delay or set aside abatement because the opponents did not file a separate application specifically for condonation of delay; thus the impugned order should be set aside.

Opponents Nos. 1 to 4 (Heirs/Legal Representatives) — Arguments Presented in Exh. 14

  • They sought impleadment as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimant, averring that the deceased died on November 11, 1989 due to injuries sustained in the vehicular accident.
  • They explained delay in applying to be impleaded on account of awaiting the post-mortem/cause of death report and stated that until they were informed that the post-mortem report would not be made available, they could not file the application; they also claimed to have been informed that for impleadment it was not necessary to have the report and that they were informed that death was due to the accident injuries.
  • They claimed mental shock from the claimant's death and prayed that any delay in seeking impleadment and condoning of delay be excused; the prayer for condonation of delay was included in Exh. 14 itself.
  • They sought only to be brought on record as heirs and legal representatives so that the existing petition might continue rather than filing a fresh petition, and to pursue such reliefs as might be appropriate at trial (including proving death was due to the injuries so as to claim compensation under relevant provisions, or otherwise survival-claims under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Official Liquidator of Supreme Bank Ltd v. P.A. Tendolkar Criticism and historical origin of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona; described as an invention of English common lawyers and linked to the quasi-criminal character of trespass actions. Used to show the maxim's doubtful origins and that it has been criticised; supports the view that the maxim is not an absolute rule and may be limited in application.
M. Veerappa v. Elelyn Sequeria Consideration of Section 306 of the Succession Act and Order 22 Rule 3 CPC; holds that legal representatives may continue proceedings instituted earlier by a deceased plaintiff if the right to sue survives. Relied upon to establish that legal representatives stand on par with executors/administrators and that the maxim does not apply where injury affected the estate; supports survival of certain causes of action.
Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. T.G. Nair Quoted passage (via M. Veerappa) concerning the ability of legal representatives to continue proceedings and the interplay of Section 306 and procedural rules. Quoted with approval in M. Veerappa and used to support the proposition that legal representatives can be impleaded to continue proceedings where rights to sue survive.
Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury The maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' has limited application; it operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing death, and where relief after death would be nugatory. Used to illustrate the limited scope of the maxim and to support the proposition that many actions (e.g., claims affecting estate or account actions) do survive and are not caught by the maxim.
Hazari v. Neki (Dead) Explained scope of Section 306 of the Succession Act (1925), observing that some personal actions (other than those expressly excluded) survive and that the section qualifies the maxim. Applied to show that Section 306 saves some personal actions from the operation of the maxim and that causes of action qua property and some personal actions devolve on legal heirs/representatives.
Shri Rameshwar Manjhi (Deed.) Through his son Shri Lakhiram v. Management of Sangramgarh Colliery and Ors Examined the scope of the maxim in the context of industrial disputes; held that the reference does not abate on the workman's death and heirs/representatives can pursue monetary reliefs even if reinstatement is impossible. Relied upon to demonstrate that the maxim has been considerably abrogated by judicial pronouncements and that statutory-created rights (e.g., under Industrial Disputes Act) may survive to heirs for monetary relief — supporting the conclusion that causes of action which affect estate survive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-by-step legal analysis grounded in (a) the common-law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona and its historical application, (b) the statutory landscape in India beginning with the Legal Representatives' Act (Act XII of 1855) and later enactments culminating in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act (1925), and (c) relevant Supreme Court precedents interpreting the maxim and Section 306.

1. The Court recognized the common-law rule that personal actions traditionally died with the person and recited judicial criticism of that maxim (citing Official Liquidator v. Tendolkar).

2. The Court reviewed legislative responses in India: the Legal Representatives' Act (1855) and later statutes, and reproduced the material portion of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which provides that all demands and rights to prosecute or defend existing at the time of death survive to executors/administrators except causes of action expressly excluded (defamation, assault, or other personal injuries not causing death).

3. The Court then examined controlling Supreme Court authority (notably M. Veerappa and related cases), which held that Order 22 Rule 3 CPC and Section 306 operate to allow legal representatives to continue proceedings instituted by a deceased plaintiff where the right to sue survives. The Court emphasized the principle that the maxim is inapplicable where the injury affected the deceased's estate or where the relief sought is not strictly personal in a manner that would be nugatory after death.

4. Relying on Hazari v. Neki, Girja Nandini Devi and Shri Rameshwar Manjhi, the Court observed that judicial pronouncements have limited the scope of the maxim and that causes of action which result in tangible loss to the estate (such as medical expenses, loss of income from injury until death, miscellaneous expenses incurred because of the injury) survive to heirs and representatives under Section 306.

5. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that opponents Nos. 1 to 4 sought only impleadment as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased who had filed the original claim seeking damages. If at trial they established that death was caused by the injuries, they could recover compensation accordingly; if they did not prove causation of death, they would still be entitled to compensation for claims that survive to heirs under Section 306 (e.g., expenses and loss to estate attributable to the injuries).

6. On the procedural point concerning condonation of delay, the Court explained that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not mandate that a formal separate written application for condonation must be filed before delay can be excused; it is open to the Tribunal to condone delay if sufficient cause is shown. In this case Exh. 14 itself contained a prayer and reasons for condonation, and the Tribunal found sufficient cause to condone the delay. The Court rejected the petitioner's technical objection that a separate condonation application was mandatory.

7. For these reasons the Court concluded that the Tribunal had not acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in allowing the heirs to be brought on record, and that the impugned order did not warrant interference in revision under Section 115 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision application fails and the impugned order of the Tribunal allowing opponents Nos. 1 to 4 to be brought on record as heirs and legal representatives is upheld.

Immediate consequences and implications:

  • The Tribunal order dated February 4, 1992 permitting the heirs/legal representatives (opponents Nos. 1 to 4) to be brought on record stands; there is no interference by this Court with that order.
  • Opponents Nos. 1 to 4 may pursue the pending claim on the existing record: if they prove that death resulted from the injuries, they may recover compensation accordingly; if they do not, they may still recover those heads of damage that survive to the heirs under Section 306 (medical expenses, expenses consequent on injury, loss of income from date of injury until death, etc.), as explained by the Court.
  • The Court ruled that a separate formal application for condonation of delay is not a sine qua non; where sufficient cause is shown in the application presented (as in Exh. 14), the Tribunal may condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • No jurisdictional error was found in the Tribunal's exercise of discretion; the revision under Section 115 CPC is dismissed. The Rule is discharged with no order as to costs and an earlier ad-interim relief is vacated.

Broader precedent: The opinion applies and relies on established statutory provisions and Supreme Court decisions to conclude that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has limited scope and that rights to sue which affect the estate survive under Section 306. The opinion does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond the application of the cited authorities.

    Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Amishkumar Vinodbhai And Ors.

    M. Panchal, J.

    1. Whether on the death of injured claimant, claim petition filed by him abates or right to sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives, is the question which arises for consideration in this revision application.

    Deceased Vinodbhai Mangaldas Patel filed a Claim Petition being M.A.G.P. No. 86 of 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 11 (Aux.), Ahmedabad under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939. claiming compensation against the applicant, i.e., Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Ltd., and opponent No. 5, i.e., Shri Laljibhai Keshavbhai Chaudhari, who was driving the offending bus belonging to the applicant. In the said application, Vinodbhai Patel claimed compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs on account of personal injuries sustained by him as a result of vehicular accident which took place on December 28, 1987 due to rash and negligent driving of S.T. bus by the opponent No. 5.

    2. During the pendency of the claim petition, the original claimant Shri Vinodbhai expired on November 11, 1989. Thereupon opponents Nos. 1 to 4 herein submitted an application Exh. 14 praying that they be impleaded in the claim proceedings before the Tribunal in their capacity as heirs and legal representatives of the original claimant. In the said application Exh. 14, the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 averred that the deceased expired on November 11, 1989 due to the injuries sustained by him in the vehicular accident. It was mentioned in the said application that though the deceased expired on November 11, 1989 and post-mortem was performed at V.S. Hospital on November 12, 1989, they were awaiting the report from the authorities indicating the cause of death and, therefore, the application could not be filed in time. It was further stated in the said application that, till the date of filing of the application, the post-mortem report was not received by them and that two days before the date of filing of the application they were informed that the report would not be made available to them. It was also claimed by them that they were given to understand that for the purpose of being impleaded as heirs and legal representatives, it was not necessary to have the report indicating cause of death the deceased and on being informed that the death of the deceased was caused because of the injuries sustained in the accident, they were presenting the application for bringing them on the record of the claim petition as heirs and legal representatives of the original claimant. After pointing out the fact that they suffered mental shock due to the tragic death of the deceased claimant, they prayed that the delay, if any, in bringing them on the record of the case as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimant be condoned. The said application was presented on September 4, 1990. By passing an order on November 15, 1990, the learned Judge fixed the application for hearing and reply. The application was contested by the applicant.

    3. The Tribunal heard both the parties and has granted the application vide order dated February 4, 1992, giving rise to the present revision application which is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, with the death of the original claimant who was suing in his personal capacity the applicant and the opponent No. 5 for compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident, the cause of action did not survive and as the cause of action died with the claimant, the application Exh. 14 submitted by the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 ought to have been dismissed by the Tribunal.

    Elaborating the said argument further, it was contended that Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act in terms provides that, all demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute for any action or special proceedings in favour or against person at the time of his death survive to and against executors or administrators except cause of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the parties, and as right to sue for personal injuries sustained by the deceased claimant did not survive, the revision application deserves to be allowed by this Court. It was pleaded that the original proceedings were the proceedings claiming compensation for personal injuries sustained by the deceased which had not resulted into his death and. therefore, the right to sue would not survive in favour of the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 so as to entitle them to continue the proceedings initiated by the original claimant and in view of the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. Lastly, it was claimed that as no separate application for condonation of delay was filed by the opponent Nos. 1 to 4, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to condone the delay caused in filing the application for bringing the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 on the record of the case or to set aside the abatement and, therefore, also, the impugned order should be set aside and the revision application should be allowed.

    In view of the submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant, the point which arises for determination is whether right to sue survives to opponent Nos. 1 to 4 on death of Vinodbhai Patel who had filed petition claiming compensation for personal injuries sustained by him in the vehicular accident?

    5. The common law maxim is actio personalis moritur cum persona - a personal right of action dies with the person. At common law, if an injury were done either to the person or property of another, for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom, the wrong was done. As regards all actions essentially based on tort, the principle was inflexibly applied. It is not known when this principle came into being, for its genesis is hidden in the mists of antiquity. From time to time, it had been severely animadverted on by Judges for it is neither based upon justice nor common sense. In Official Liquidator of Supreme Bank Ltd v. P.A. Tendolkar , the Supreme Court pointed out that the maxim was "an invention of English common lawyers" and observed: "It seemed to have resulted from the strong quasi-criminal character of the action for trespass." The maxim, with its extension, was criticised by Winfield and found to be pregnant with a good deal of more mischief than was ever born of it.

    6. The first legislation in India on this subject was enacted in 1855. In that year, an Act was passed called the Legal Representatives' Act, being Act XII of 1855. It was assumed by the Legislature that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona applied in India, for the Preamble to the Act says:

    "Whereas it is expedient to enable exercutors, administrators or representatives in certain cases to sue and be sued in respect of certain wrongs which, according to the present law, do not survive to or against such executors, administrators or representatives"
    . The Act then proceeds to provide for actions by the representative of a deceased person, and actions against the representative of a deceased person.

    7. Under the Act XII of 1855 an action may be maintained by the executors, administrators or representatives of a deceased person for any wrong committed in the lifetime of the deceased which has occasioned pecuniary loss to the estate of such person and for no other wrong committed within one year before his death.

    8. Then came the Indian Succession Act, 1855. and the Probate and Administration Act, 1881. Both these Acts contained a section which is now reproduced as Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. 1925. The material portion of that section is as follows:

    All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party....

    9. Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, and such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the deceased person; and in every such action, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whose benefit such action shall be brought.

    10. Section 306 as well as the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in M. Veerappa v. Elelyn Sequeria, . The Supreme Court has quoted with approval a passage occurring in Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. T.G. Nair, and held that,

    "though Section 306 speaks only of executors and administrators, Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets out the right of legal representatives to continue the proceedings instituted earlier by a deceased plaintiff if the right to sue survives, the Courts have taken the view that the legal representatives stand on par with executors and administrators regarding their right to seek impleadment in order to complete the suit."
    In the said case, the Supreme Court pointed out that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is inapplicable in those cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his estate or has caused an accretion to the estate of the wrongdoer or where the cause of action arises out of breach of contract. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court of India, it becomes evident that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona would not apply to the cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his estate and to that extent, right to sue survives.

    11. The Supreme Court in a different context while considering the question of survival of a claim for rendition of accounts, after the death of the party against whom the claim was made, in Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury observed as under:

    The maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' - a personal action dies with the person - has limited application. It operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory.

    12. In Hazari v. Neki (Dead), : while dealing with the question of devolution of the right of pre-emption on the legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff, the Supreme Court explained the scope of Section 306 of the Succession Act, 1925 and observed that this section expresses a qualification of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona to the extent that amongst causes of action which survive are included some actions of a personal nature, that is to say, personal actions other than those expressely excluded by the section itself. From these observations, it is evident that the provisions of the said section not only provide that causes qua property would devolve on the legal heirs of the deceased-plaintiff but also saves some of the actions of personal nature except those expressely excluded therein.

    13. The scope of the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" has been examined by the Supreme Court in case of Shri Rameshwar Manjhi (Deed.) Through his son Shri Lakhiram v. Management of Sangramgarh Collery and Ors. considering the question whether an industrial dispute survives when the workman concerned dies during its pendency. The Supreme Court has held that "The maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona though part of English Common Law has been subjected to criticism even in England. It has been dubbed as as unjust maxim, obscure in its origin, inaccurate in its expression and uncertain in its application. It has often caused grave injustice." After holding that the applicability of the said maxim depends upon the reliefs claimed and the facts of each case, it has been held that on the death of the workman, even when the reference is of an individual dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal loes not become functus officio or the reference does not abate merely because, pending adjudication the workman concerned dies and it is open to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased workman to have the matter agitated and decided. The Supreme Court has ruled that in the event of the death of the workman during the pendency of the proceedings, the relief of reinstatement cannot be granted but there may be a claim for back wages or for monetary relief in any other form and the said cause of action created in favour of the workman under the provisions of the Act should be in normal circumstances survive to his heirs.

    13.1 Since the aim of award of damages is to compensate the person wronged, there is no reason why measure of damages pertaining to estate should be in any way affected or limited by the death of the original victim of the accident. In my view, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is considerabley abrogated by the judicial pronouncements. The scope of the provisions of Section 306 of the Succession Act and the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona " appears to be well settled and the claim of damages on account of loss to the estate of the injured would not abate on his death. The claim regarding loss caused to the estate would include several items such as medical expenses, miscellaneous expenses, actual loss of income from the date of injuries till the death of the injured etc. But for the injuries sustained, the injured would not have been required to incur the said expenses nor would have suffered actual loss of income. Therefore, even after the death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right 10 sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives.

    14. Coming to the facts of the case, this Court finds that the case of the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 is that the deceased Vinodbhai Patel died due to the injuries suffered by him in the accident. They could have filed a substantive claim petition for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 following the death of the injured victim. However, since the injured victim had already filed a claim petition for compensation for injury before his death, the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 are seeking to be brought on the record of the case instead of filing separate claim petition. If, at the trial, they succeed in proving that the death of the deceased was due to the injury sustained by him in the accident, they will get the compensation accordingly. If they fail to do so, they will get compensation for such claims as survie to the heirs and legal representatives under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. What is sought to be done by the impugned order is to permit the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 to be brought on record as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased climant and nothing more than that. In my view, therefore, it cannot be said that any jurisdictional error is committed by the Tribunal in permitting the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 be brought on record of M.A.C.P. No. 86 of 1988 as right to sue survives to them on the death of the original claimant Vinodbhai Patel.

    15. So also, the submission that because a separate application, for condonation of delay in filing application for bringing the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 on the record of the case as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimant and setting abatement, was not filed, the impugned order deserves to be set aside has no substance. In my view, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not of warant an interpretation that an application in writing must be filed before the relief under the said section can be granted. The filing of a formal application for excusing delay is not sine qua non for the exercise of power under the said section and it is always open to the Tribunal to condone the delay if the person concerned is able to convince it that there were justifiable grounds for the delay in presenting the appeal or application. In this case, prayer for condonation of delay is made in application Exh. 14 itself and as held by the Tribunal, sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay caused in filing the application for bringing the heirs and legal representatives on record and setting aside the abatement. It was not incumbent upon the opponent Nos. 1 to 4 to file a separate application for condonation of delay caused in filing the application for bringing them on record and setting aside abatement. In my view, such a technical plea should not have been raised by the applicant, i.e., Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, which a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

    16. In view of the above discussion, it cannot be said that the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. No ground is made out by the petitioner for interfering with the impugned order in the present revision application which is instituted under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision application, therefore, fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad-interim relief granted earlier is hereby vacated.

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    Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Amishkumar Vinodbhai And Ors.
    (Mar 24, 1994)