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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and under Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Code. 3. Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876
  • Bombay Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act 1912 belong Bombay Act No. XI of 1912. Under Sub-section (9)
  • Article 14 of the Limitation Act and under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act
  • Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act and Section 37(3) of the Code.
  • provisions of Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Code. Section 11 of this Act
  • provisions of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act.
  • Article 14. Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code.
  • Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act.
  • 1912 Section 37 was amended and Sub-sections (2)
  • Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code
  • Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act
  • Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 37
  • provisions of Section 37(2) of the Code
  • Section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code
  • Article 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Sub-section (1) or subsection (2)
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 37
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 37.
  • provisions of Section 37(3).
  • Section 37(2) of the Code
  • Section 203 of the Code
  • Section 12 of the Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and under Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Code. 3. Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876
  • Bombay Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act 1912 belong Bombay Act No. XI of 1912. Under Sub-section (9)
  • Article 14 of the Limitation Act and under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act
  • Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act and Section 37(3) of the Code.
  • provisions of Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Code. Section 11 of this Act
  • provisions of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act.
  • Article 14. Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code.
  • Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act.
  • 1912 Section 37 was amended and Sub-sections (2)
  • Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code
  • Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act
  • Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
  • provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 37
  • provisions of Section 37(2) of the Code
  • Section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code
  • Article 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Sub-section (1) or subsection (2)
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 37
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 37.
  • provisions of Section 37(3).
  • Section 37(2) of the Code
  • Section 203 of the Code
  • Section 12 of the Code
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — M. Shelat, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for a declaration of ownership of certain land and for a perpetual injunction restraining the State of Bombay from interfering with his possession. Substantively the suit sought to set aside an order passed by the Mamlatdar which was subsequently confirmed by superior revenue authorities.

Procedurally, the plaintiff first appealed the Mamlatdar's order to the Prant Officer, who dismissed the appeal on 27 March 1952, thereby confirming the Mamlatdar's order. The plaintiff then filed an appeal before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal; the Tribunal rejected the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have appealed to the Collector before approaching the Tribunal. The plaintiff instituted the present civil suit on 22 June 1953. The Trial Court and the learned Assistant Judge dismissed the suit. Mr. Shah appeared for the plaintiff in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by the period of limitation under Article 14 of the Limitation Act and the special bar in Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.
  2. Whether, under Section 37(3), the relevant date for limitation is the date of the order of the final appellate authority (Revenue Tribunal) or an earlier valid appellate order (Prant Officer) when a purported appeal to the Tribunal is invalid.
  3. Whether Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the suit because the plaintiff did not exhaust statutory appeals available within the period of limitation.
  4. Whether the Mamlatdar's order was ultra vires (i.e., without jurisdiction), in which case the plaintiff could sue directly without exhausting appeals (and Section 11 would not apply).
  5. Whether the notice issued by the Mamlatdar (Ex. 8) misled the plaintiff into not pursuing the proper appeals, thereby preventing the State from relying on the bar under Section 11.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — Mr. Shah

  • The suit was in time: it was filed on 22 June 1953, which Mr. Shah contended was within one year from 28 April 1952 (the date he identified as the Tribunal's order dismissing the appeal).
  • Article 14 of the Limitation Act (one-year period) should govern; the plaintiff relied on case law (Malikajeppa) suggesting Article 14 does not apply to ultra vires orders.
  • The notice (Ex. 8) served by the Mamlatdar offered an alternative to sue in a civil court within one year without filing appeals, which was contrary to Section 11 and which allegedly misled the plaintiff into not following the correct appeal route (i.e., resulted in the plaintiff approaching the Tribunal directly).
  • The Mamlatdar lacked competence under Section 37(2) to pass the order in question; alternatively, the delegation (notification) conferred only restricted powers (limited to steps for removal of encroachment) and did not authorize the full inquiry-and-decision power under Section 37(2), making the Mamlatdar's order ultra vires.

Respondent's (State / Revenue Authorities) Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The suit is time-barred under Article 14 of the Limitation Act and, more importantly, under Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code because the one-year period runs from the date of the final appellate order but, where there is no valid appeal to the final authority, from the date of the valid last appellate order (here the Prant Officer's order of 27 March 1952).
  • Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the suit because the plaintiff did not exhaust the statutory appeals available within the prescribed time, and the plaintiff did not plead that the Mamlatdar's order was ultra vires.
  • The Mamlatdar's order was not ultra vires: powers under Section 37(2) had been validly delegated to Mamlatdars by Notification No. G.R.D. 3237/45 (29 October 1948), and such delegation covers the inquiry and decision functions necessary to pass the impugned order.
  • The notice (Ex. 8) did not mislead the plaintiff; the plaintiff actually appealed to the Prant Officer and thereafter improperly to the Revenue Tribunal, thereby causing delay and resulting in the suit becoming time-barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganesh Shesho Deshpande v. The Secretary of State for India, 22 Bom.L.R. 212 Held that a plaintiff challenging the legality of a revenue order must file suit within one year from the date of the order; aligns Article 14 and Section 11 principles. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the present suit was barred by Article 14 and Section 11, reinforcing that statutory limitation periods must be respected.
Malikajeppa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, I.L.R. 36 Bombay 325 Held that Article 14 applies only to orders passed by a Government officer in his official capacity; ultra vires orders are not covered by Article 14. The plaintiff relied on this case, but the court distinguished it on the ground that Section 37 was amended in 1912 (adding subsections (2) and (3)), and subsection (2) contemplates inquiry and decision by the Collector (and by delegation), so Malikajeppa did not apply to the facts of the present case.
Secretary of State v. Husenabu Daudhai, 33 Bom. L.R. 361 Held that where a notice misleads parties about the appellate route, the Government cannot rely on the bar under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The court distinguished this authority on its facts, finding that the notice in the present case (Ex. 8) did not mislead the plaintiff and therefore the Government could rely on Section 11; the Husenabu Daudhai ruling was not applicable here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds from statutory texts and the sequence of appeals actually taken by the plaintiff:

  1. Limitation framework: The court identifies Article 14 of the Limitation Act (one-year period for setting aside certain orders) and Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code as the governing provisions. Section 37(3) is treated as a special statute prescribing the limitation period for suits that seek to set aside orders made under Section 37, and it states that suits brought after one year from the relevant order (or from the final appellate authority's order if appeals have been filed) must be dismissed.
  2. Determination of the relevant "date of order": The court analyses the appeal route under Sections 203 and 204 of the Code (Mamlatdar → Prant Officer → Collector → Revenue Tribunal). The plaintiff appealed to the Prant Officer and then directly to the Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal rejected the appeal because the plaintiff should have appealed to the Collector first; consequently, there was no valid appeal to the Tribunal within the meaning of the Code.
  3. As there was no valid appeal to the final appellate authority, the Prant Officer's dismissal of the appeal (dated 27 March 1952) constituted the final order for the purposes of limitation. The suit filed on 22 June 1953 was more than one year after that date and therefore time-barred under Section 37(3).
  4. Section 11 analysis: Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars civil suits against Government for acts or omissions of Revenue Officers unless the plaintiff proves that all appeals allowed by law and possible within the limitation period were presented. The court notes that orders passed under the Land Revenue Code by a Mamlatdar are within the scope of "act or omission of any Revenue Officer" for Section 11 purposes.
  5. Ultra vires exception considered: Section 11 does not apply where the revenue order is ultra vires or invalid; in such cases the order is a nullity and a suit may be brought without exhausting appeals. The court observed that the plaintiff did not plead that the Mamlatdar's order was ultra vires either in the Trial Court or the first appellate court; therefore the plaintiff could not rely on that contention for the first time in this second appeal. Independently, the court also found on the merits that the Mamlatdar had been delegated powers under Section 37(2) by Notification No. G.R.D. 3237/45 (29 October 1948), and that the order was not ultra vires.
  6. Notice (Ex. 8) and alleged misleading: The Mamlatdar's notice offered two alternatives (appeal within 60 days to the Prant Officer and thereafter to superior officers, or sue in a Civil Court within one year without filing appeals). Mr. Shah argued that the second alternative contradicted Section 11 and misled the plaintiff. The court rejected this contention: the plaintiff in fact appealed first to the Prant Officer and then to the Tribunal, and the notice was not held to have misled the plaintiff in a way that would prevent the Government from invoking Section 11.
  7. Delegation and scope: The court interpreted the delegation to Mamlatdars as encompassing the procedural steps required by Section 37(2), including the holding of formal inquiries and passing of orders deciding claims (such steps are integral to removal of encroachment and other powers envisaged by the notification). Accordingly, the Mamlatdar's order was validly made under delegated power and not ultra vires.
  8. Precedent application: The court relied on Ganesh Shesho Deshpande to support the limitation bar and distinguished Malikajeppa on the ground of legislative amendment (addition of subsections (2) and (3) to Section 37 in 1912) which changed the legal landscape relied upon by Malikajeppa.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the plaintiff's suit is time-barred and dismissed under Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act.

Implications and immediate effect:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's civil suit is not maintainable and is barred by limitation and procedural bar; the court affirmed that the Prant Officer's order of 27 March 1952 was the operative final order for limitation purposes because there was no valid appeal to the Revenue Tribunal.
  • The court found the Mamlatdar's order to be within jurisdiction by reason of an express delegation of powers (Notification No. G.R.D. 3237/45) under Section 37(2), and therefore the ultra vires exception to Section 11 did not apply.
  • The opinion distinguishes prior authorities relied upon by the appellant where facts or legislative context differed; the court applied existing statutory rules and precedent to the present facts rather than announcing any new principle of law. The judgment, as presented, does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond its application to the facts before the court.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text of that opinion.

    Rukmanibai W/O. Kasturdas Dharamdas v. The State Of Gujarat

    M. Shelat, J.

    1. His Lordship after narrating the facts proceeded. Mr. Shah who appears for the plaintiff has challenged the order of dismissal of the plaintiff's suit by the Trial Court and the learned Assistant Judge. His first contention was that the finding by the Courts below that the suit was barred both under Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and under Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was erroneous and was not justified in law. He submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiff was in fact in time as it was filed on the 22nd of June 1953 i.e. within one year from the 28th April 1952 that being the date of the order of dismissal of the plaintiffs appeal by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal which is the final appellate authority That contention in my view cannot be sustained.

    2. The suit in substance was to set aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar and subsequently confirmed by the superior revenue authorities. Though in the plaint it was said that the suit was for a declaration that the land in question was of the plaintiffs ownership and there was a prayer for a perpetual injunction restraining the State of Bombay from interfering was his possession that declaration was sought on the footing that the order passed by the Mamlatdar and subsequently consumed by the other revenue authorities was illegal and should be set aside. Article 14 of the Limitation Act would, therefore seem to apply. Under that Article the period of Limitation prescribed is one year from the date of the order sought to be set side. If Article 14 of the Limitation Act were to apply then the question would be, which is the order from the date of which the limitation for one year is to commence under Article 14. Section 37(3) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which is a special statute laying down the period of limitation in respect of such orders provides that any suit instituted in any Civil Court after the expiration of one year from the date of any order passed under Sub-section (1) or subsection (2) or if one or more appeals have been filed against such order within the period of limitation then from the date of any order passed by the final appellate authority as determined according to Section 204 shall be dismissed if the suit is brought to set aside such an order or if the relief claimed is inconsistent with such an order provided that in the case of an order under sub-section (2) the plaintiff has had due notice of such order. It is therefore immaterial whether the plaintiff in the suit has claimed declaration as regards his ownership of the land in question or whether the suit is for setting aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar. So long as the relief claimed in the suit is in consistent with the order passed by the Mamlatdar Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code would apply and therefore the period prescribed by this sub-section viz. one year from the date of the order of the final appellate authority must apply to such a suit. If therefore a suit is instituted in a Civil Court after the expiry of one year from the date of the order of such final appellate authority such a suit is liable to be dismissed under provisions of Section 37(3). It is not disputed that the final appellate authority as contemplated in Section 37(3) is the Revenue Tribunal. Under Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code an appeal from an order of a Mamlatdar first lies to the Prant Officer and thereafter to the Collector and then to the Revenue Tribunal. As I have stated the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Prant Officer and having failed there he straightway filed an appeal before the Revenue Tribunal who rejected the same on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have preferred an appeal before the Collector before he launched his appeal before the Revenue Tribunal. Since no appeal can lie to the Tribunal directly from the order of a Prant Officer there was no valid appeal before the Revenue Tribunal within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. It was therefore rightly rejected by the Tribunal. That being the position and there being no valid appeal against the order of the Prant Officer the final order was the one passed by the Prant Officer dismissing the Plaintiffs appeal and confirming the order passed by the Mamlatdar. That was dated the 27th of March 1952. The present suit having been instituted on the 22 of June 1953 it was undoubtedly filed after more than a year from the date of the order of the Prant Officer and therefore it was time barred under Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Code.

    3. Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 provides that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit against Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer unless the plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suit he had presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force as within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such a suit it was possible to present. It has been held on more than one occasion that the words "act or omission of any Revenue Officer" would include an order passed by the Mamlatdar or any other Revenue Officer under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. Section 11 of this Act enjoins that all appeals that could be filed before the superior officers or tribunals within the limitation prescribed for the suit must be filed and if they are not filed the suit would be barred. Of course if the order of the Revenue Officer is ultra vires or invalid a plaintiff is not bound to appeal under Section 203 of the Code and it would be open to him to bring a suit directly without filing any appeal. That is because such an order is a nullity and cannot give rise to any right whatsoever even a right of an appeal and therefore Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act would not apply in case of such an order. 3Jut then all incorrect orders are not necessarily ultra vires or invalid and in such case Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act would apply. There can be no doubt that the order passed by the Mamlatdar in the present case has been passed under the provisions of Section 37(2) of the Code and though it was pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaint that the land in question belonged to him it was never his case either in the Trial Court or in the first appellate Court that the order passed by the Mamlatdar was ultra vires or invalid. Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act therefore must apply to the present case.

    4. Under Section 11 the plaintiff must exhaust all appeals available to him within the period prescribed therein before he can take recourse to a civil suit to challenge an order passed by the Revenue-Officer. The question as to the construction of Section 11 arose in Ganesh Shesho Deshpande v. The Secretary of State for India 22 Bom.L.R. 212, where Macleod C.J. and Heaton J. held that if the plaintiff wished to have a decision of the court upon the legality or illegality of an order of forfeiture passed by the Collector he was bound to put his plaint on the file within one year of the date of the order. In that case certain land belonging to the plaintiff was forfeited by an order dated May 6 1911 after which he applied first to the Collector and then to the Commissioner to set aside the order. Eventually he filed a suit on Oct. 14 1915 for a declaration that the proceedings held by the Revenue authorities in respect of forfeiture were illegal and ultra vires. It was held that since the suit was filed after the expiry of one year from the date of the order both under Article 14 of the Limitation Act and under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act the suit was barred. It is thus clear that the present suit was barred by virtue of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act and Section 37(3) of the Code.

    5. Mr. Shah for the appellant however relied upon Malikajeppa v. Secretary of State for Indian Council I.L.R. 36 Bombay 325 where it was held that Article 14 of the Limitation Act would only apply to orders passed by a Government officer in his official capacity, and that article did not apply to orders which are ultra vires of the officer passing them. There it was held that when a Revenue Officer passes an order under Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which reference to land which is prima facie the property of an individual who has been in peaceful possession thereof and not of Government he is not dealing with that land in his official capacity but is acting ultra vires. Sub-section (1) of Section 37 in clear terms provides that a Collector has the power to dispose of lands which are declared thereunder the property of the Government subject of course, to the orders of the Commissioner and the general rules sanctioned by Government and subject always to the right of way and all other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. The power of the Collector under Sub-section (1) of Section 37 being limited to such lands and property only an order passed by the Collector under Section 57(1) in respect of properties which do not fall under the subsection but which are of the ownership of private individuals cannot be an order passed under that sub-section nor can it be said to be an order passed by the Collector in his official capacity. His power to dispose of such lands being limited only to such lands or properties declared by that sub-section to be belonging to Government an order passed by him in respect of properties belonging to the private individuals would consequently be an order outside the scope of Sub-section (1) of Section 37 and therefore ultra vires of him. But the decision in the case of Malikajeppa v. Secretary of State for India in Council was given in November 1911. In 1912 Section 37 was amended and Sub-sections (2) and (3) were added by the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act 1912 belong Bombay Act No. XI of 1912. Under Sub-section (9) it is provided that where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by or on behalf of Government it shall be lawful for the Collector or a Survey Officer after a formal inquiry of which due notice has been given to pass an order deciding the claim. Thus whereas Sub-section (1) of Section 37 confers power upon the Collector subject to certain restrictions thereunder provided to dispose of lands which are declared to be the lands belonging to Government thereunder Sub-section (2) confers upon the Collector an additional power to pass an order deciding a claim where property or a right therein or over it is claimed either by Government or by any person as against Government. The words pass an order deciding the claim themselves contemplate an adjudication by the Collector of a dispute in regard to land in respect of which either Government makes a claim or an individual person makes such a claim. Sub-section (2) therefore enjoins upon the Collector to hold a formal inquiry of which due notice has to be given to the person concerned and thereafter to pass an order deciding the claim. The very provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 37 thus contemplate an inquiry in respect of land over which either Government makes a claim or a private individual makes such a claim. The decision in I.L.R. 36 Bombay 325 would have no application to the facts of the present suit. It cannot therefore be said that the order in question was passed without jurisdiction or was in any sense ultra vires.

    6. After the Mamlatdar passed his order he issued a notice to the plaintiff Ex. 8 dated the 2nd of March 1951 wherein it was stated that if the plaintiff was aggrieved by the order made by him he had two alternatives (1) to file an appeal within 60 days from the date of the order before the Prant Officer and thereafter to the officer superior to the Prant Officer or (2) he could file a suit in a Civil Court within one year from the date of the order without filing any appeal against it notwithstanding the provisions of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. It was contended by Mr. Shah that the second alternative suggested in this case was contrary to the express provisions of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act inviting the plaintiff to file straightway a suit in a Civil Court without having recourse to appeals provided for under that section and that the suggestion in that alternative was such that it was likely to mislead and did in fact mislead the plaintiff resulting in the plaintiff not having filed an appeal before the Collector and going directly before the Revenue Tribunal. Such an alternative was also contrary to the provisions of Sections 203 and 204 of the Land Revenue Code under which by virtue of Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act the plaintiff would have to file an appeal first before the Prant Officer then before the Collector and thereafter before the Revenue Tribunal. So far as the first alternative suggested in the notice is concerned Mr. Shah could not take any exception. As regards the second alternative also it cannot be rightly said that it had in any way misled the plaintiff though the alternative suggested to the plaintiff was that he could straightway life a civil suit without filing any appeals. The plaintiff had in fact filed an appeal first before the Prant Officer and thereafter before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal. It cannot therefore be said that the notice (Ex. 8) in any manner had misled the plaintiff as suggested by Mr. Shah.

    7. Mr. Shah relied upon the decision in the Secretary of State v. Husenabu Daudhai 33 Bom. L.R. 361 where it was held that on the facts before the court and having regard to the terms of the notice in that case Government was not entitled to rely upon the bar under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The facts there were that the City Survey Officer at Dahod decided that a certain plot of land belonged to Government and not to the plaintiffs and communicated that decision to the plaintiffs by a notice one of the clauses of which ran as follows:

    If any person desires to appeal against the above-mentioned order he should appeal in the prescribed manner to the Collector within 60 days from the date of the said order.

    8. Within the period so prescribed plaintiffs appealed against the order but the appeal was dismissed by the District Deputy Collector. Without presenting any further appeal the plaintiffs filed a suit to obtain a declaration against Government that the land was of their ownership. It was objected that the suit was barred under Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The High Court held that in view of the fact that the City Survey Officer not having been a direct subordinate of the Collector an appeal would lie to the Collector under notification No. 14447 of Nov. 29 1927 and that it did not appear that any further appeal to the Commissioner was necessary to be filed and further that having regard to the terms of the notice in the case. Government was not entitled to rely on the bar under Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. Relying upon certain unreported judgments of the High Court it was observed that such a notice having misled the parties in not filing the appeal against the order the Government was not entitled to rely upon the provisions of section 11 as bar to the plaintiffs suit. The facts in this case were different from the ones before me. As an I have pointed out the notice cannot be said to be one which misled the plaintiff. The observations therefore in 33 Bom. L.R. 361 that the Government was not entitled to rely upon the bar under Section 11 cannot apply in this case. Contrary to the advice contained in the notice the plaintiff after filing an appeal before the Prant Officer straightway lodged an appeal before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal without having recourse first to appeal before the Collector. By adoption of these proceedings much time was wasted and the cause of action which the plaintiff had against the State of Bombay was allowed to be time-barred under Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code. In my, view therefore, there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Shah that the notice had in way misled the plaintiff or that Government therefore was not entitled to rely upon Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. Mr. Shah next sought to argue that the power to pass an order deciding a claim under Section 37(2) was conferred by the legislature upon the Mamlatdar had no competence to pass the order in question under subsection (2) of section 37 Consequently the order passed by the Mamlatdar was ultra vires and illegal and could be challenged by the plaintiff in a court of law without Section 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act applying and without the plaintiff having had recourse to the appeals referred to is that section. The allegation that the Mamlatdar had no power under Section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code to decide the claim by or on behalf of Government or by the plaintiff was not taken in the plaint nor was such contention raised either in the Trial Court or before the learned Assistant Judge. It would not therefore be proper to allow Mr. Shah to raise such a contention for the first time in second appeal denying thereby the opportunity to the other side to give an answer or an explanation. But the difficulty In the way of that contention is that Section 12 of the Code expressly provides that the duties and powers of a Mamlatdar shall be such as may be expressly imposed or conferred upon him by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force or as may be imposed upon or delegated to him by the Collector under the general or special orders of the State Government. By Notification No. G.R.D. 3237/45 of October 29 1948 powers under Section 37(2) of the Code have been delegated to the Mamlatdars. Therefore there is no validity in the contention that the order passed by the Mamlatdar in this case was either without jurisdiction or ultra vires.

    9. But then Mr. Shah contended that the powers so conferred are only with regard to the Mamlatdar taking steps for removal of encroachment on Government lands. He argued that that meant that there was no delegation of power to the Mamlatdar under Section 37(2) to hold an inquiry and to pass an order deciding the claim. In my view there is no force in this contention also. When the notification delegates powers under Section 37(2) to the Mamlatdar to take steps for removal of encroachment on Government lands the steps contemplated under the notification and which the Mamlatdar is to take are steps to be taken in accordance with Sub-section (2) of Section 37. If any steps under this notification are to be taken for the purpose of removing an encroachment on lands belonging to Government those steps must be taken in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 37 one of the steps for removal of such an encroachment being to pass an order whereby the Mamlatdar would have to decide the claim made either by Government or an individual. Such a claim cannot be decided by the Mamlatdar without following the procedure laid down in that sub-section. A proceeding contemplated by the sub-section is the passing of an order deciding claim after a formal inquiry. Therefore when the notification uses the words "to take steps for removal of encroachment on Government land those words must mean and include the passing of an order on a claim after an inquiry as stated in Sub-section (2). It is difficult to make any substantial distinction between the powers of the Mamlatdar to pass an order deciding a claim after a formal inquiry and the power delegated to him under the notification dated the 29th of October 1948 to take steps for removal of encroachment on Government lands. It is thus not possible to sustain the contention that the delegation of power under the notification was a restricted one or that therefore the order passed by the Mamlatdar was ultra vires or beyond the scope of Section 37(2) of the Code.

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    Rukmanibai W/O. Kasturdas Dharamdas v. The State Of Gujarat
    (Aug 17, 1960)