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  • Rule 27(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1965,
  • rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Rule 27(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1965,
  • rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was employed as an Accountant under the Director of Supply and Transport, Government of Mizoram. By order dated 10.1.1974 he was placed under suspension pending departmental proceedings for continuous unauthorised absence. A memorandum dated 2.3.1974 proposed an enquiry under rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, alleging absence from duty from 20.6.1973 to 9.1.1974. The appellant submitted a written defence which the disciplinary authority did not accept and an enquiry officer was appointed on 17.8.1974. The enquiry officer's report (31.7.1975) found that the appellant suffered from a lung disease (medical certificate dated 11.12.1974), concluded misconduct had occurred but recommended leniency (stoppage of three annual increments).

Contrary to the enquiry officer's recommendation, the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellant by order dated 20.10.1975. The appellant filed representations in 1975 and 1977 which were not disposed of; he then filed Civil Rule No. 342/78. A Division Bench on 8.11.1983 directed appellate authorities to consider his appeals after hearing. The appellate authority rejected his appeal and communicated rejection on 1.10.1985. The appellant filed Civil Rule No. 1107/87 (13/90) in 1987; the learned Single Judge dismissed it by judgment dated 23.1.1996 on grounds of delay and inability to grant effective relief. The appellant appealed that decision to the Division Bench which produced the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary authority's dismissal of the appellant was sustainable in law when the enquiry officer found the appellant suffered from a lung disease and recommended leniency.
  2. Whether the appellate authority complied with its obligation under Rule 27(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, to examine whether the disciplinary findings were warranted by evidence.
  3. Whether the High Court (Single Judge) erred in refusing to disturb the disciplinary and appellate orders on the ground of delay in filing the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented through Mr. G. Raju)

  • The enquiry report clearly established that the appellant suffered from tuberculosis (TB) and recommended leniency (stoppage of three annual increments), so the disciplinary authority could not have validly found the absence to be wilful.
  • The appellate order rejecting the appellant's appeal did not state reasons for the rejection.
  • Because the appellant lived in a remote part of Assam after dismissal, he could not immediately approach the Court; therefore, a delay of about two years in filing the writ petition should not have been fatal.
  • The appellant relied on Article 220 of the Constitution (as referenced in submissions) to explain difficulties in immediate recourse to court. [As presented in the opinion]

Respondent's Arguments (as presented through Mr. T. Vaiphei)

  • Relied on State of Punjab & others v. Surinder Kumar & Co. & others ((1997) 9 SCC 66) for the proposition that in a writ petition the High Court cannot go into mala fides and record any finding.
  • Relied on P.N. Subramanyam Reddy v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation & others ((1992) 1 SCC 63) — factual authority invoked to support the respondent's position (as recited in the opinion).
  • Relied on the Division Bench decision in ASEB v. Surya Kanta Roy ((1994) 1 GLR 383) for the proposition that an appellate court will not interfere with the discretion of the court of first instance except where that discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled principles.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab and others v. Surinder Kumar & Co. and others, (1997) 9 SCC 66 Proposition relied on by respondent that in a writ petition the High Court cannot go into mala fides and record any finding. The court noted the precedent was cited by the respondent but held that the decision was rendered on its own facts and did not apply to the present case; the court therefore did not follow it as a bar to interference here.
P.N. Subramanyam Reddy v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others, (1992) 1 SCC 63 Cited by respondent as authority concerning appellate intervention in administrative/disciplinary matters (factual authority in respondent's submissions). The court observed that the decision was cited by the respondent but concluded the facts of that case differ from the present matter and that the precedent did not preclude interference in the present case.
ASEB v. Surya Kanta Roy, (1994) 1 GLR 383 (Division Bench of this Court) Proposition that a Writ Appellate Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the court of first instance except where discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or ignored settled principles. The court accepted the principle but applied it to hold that where a Single Judge ignores settled principles (as the Division Bench said the Single Judge did here), the appellate court can interfere. The precedent supported appellate interference on those grounds.
State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 Principle that the High Court under Article 226 is not a court of appeal over departmental enquiry findings but may interfere where authorities' conclusions are arbitrary, influenced by irrelevant considerations, or disabled from reaching a fair decision. The court relied on this Supreme Court precedent as the governing principle to justify interference: since the enquiry officer accepted evidence of disease and recommended leniency but the disciplinary and appellate authorities ignored that evidence and reached a conclusion described as wholly arbitrary and capricious, interference was warranted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the evidence and the sequence of administrative decisions as recorded in the enquiry report and subsequent orders:

  1. The enquiry officer's report (31.7.1975) accepted that the appellant was suffering from a lung disease (supported by a medical certificate dated 11.12.1974), noted applications for leave on medical grounds and prior granted leave, and concluded that while misconduct was proved, leniency was warranted (recommendation: stoppage of three annual increments).
  2. Despite that report, the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellant by order dated 20.10.1975. The Division Bench characterized this as a conclusion inconsistent with the enquiry officer's acceptance of medical evidence and the recommendation for leniency.
  3. The appellate authority, which was obliged under Rule 27(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, to consider whether findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by evidence, did not, on the materials before the court, appear to have considered the enquiry evidence (the court found the appellate order lacked engagement with that evidence).
  4. The court applied the Supreme Court's test in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao: although a High Court is not a court of appeal over departmental enquiries, it may interfere where the authority's conclusion is arbitrary or where the authority failed to consider relevant evidence or allowed extraneous considerations to influence its decision. The Division Bench found the disciplinary authority's finding of wilful absence to be so wholly arbitrary and capricious in light of the enquiry officer's findings that interference was warranted.
  5. The court considered respondent authorities' reliance on precedents (e.g., State of Punjab, P.N. Subramanyam Reddy) that limit interference by writ courts, but determined those decisions were factually distinguishable and did not prevent intervention here where the administrative findings were inconsistent with the enquiry evidence.
  6. The court acknowledged delay: the appellate order was communicated on 1.10.1985 and the writ was filed in 1987, nearly two years later. Because of that delay, the court declined to award back wages for the period the appellant remained out of service.
  7. Balancing the equities and applying the legal standards, the court decided to set aside the Single Judge's judgment (which had refused relief on delay grounds), quash the disciplinary order of dismissal and the appellate rejection of the appeal, and direct that the appellant be treated as having been in service for purposes of pensionary and other terminal benefits for the period of dismissal. The court also ordered no costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and QUASHED both the disciplinary order of dismissal dated 20.10.1975 and the appellate order rejecting the appellant's appeal.

Consequences and specific directions given by the court:

  • The appellant shall be treated as having been in service for the period he remained out of service on account of the dismissal order and shall be granted all pensionary and other terminal benefits consequent upon such treatment.
  • The court declined to award back wages for the period of dismissal because of the approximately two-year delay in filing the writ petition after communication of the appellate order.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

The opinion does not indicate that the court intended to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities (it decided the matter on the facts and on established principles such as those in Sree Rama Rao). The decision's practical effect is limited to granting relief to the appellant and directing pensionary and terminal benefits; no broader doctrinal change was announced in the opinion.

    Dulal Chandra Sarma v. State Of Mizoram And Ors.

    1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 23.1.1996 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No 13/90 filed by the appellant.

    2. The facts briefly are that the appellant was working as Accountant under the Director of Supply and Transport, Government of Mizoram. By order dated 10.1.1974, the Director of Supply and Transport, Government of Mizoram placed the appellant under suspension pending drawal of departmental proceeding against him for continuous unauthorised absence from duty. The said disciplinary authority issued a memorandum dated 2.3.1974 wherein it was mentioned that the disciplinary authority proposed to hold an enquiry under rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Along with the said memorandum, article of charge was annexed wherein it was alleged that the appellant while functioning as Accountant during the period from 10.1.1970 to 9.1.1974 was absent from duty without any authority from 20.6.1973 to 9.1.1974. By the said memorandum, the appellant was directed to submit his written statement in defence. The appellant submitted his written statement but the same was not accepted by the said disciplinary authority. Instead by order dated 17.8.1974, the said disciplinary authority appointed Shri T. Gohain, the Accounts Officer, as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charge framed against the "appellant. The said Enquiry Officer held the enquiry and submitted the report dated 31.7.1975. In the report the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the appellant was suffering from the disease of lungs as indicated in the medical certificate dated 11.12.1974. However, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that the appellant had committed misconduct but was liable to be dealt with leniently. The relevant portion of the said enquiry report is extracted hereinbelow :

    "The charge against Shri Dulal Chandra Sharmah, Accountant was that the was absent from duties from 30.6.1973 till 9.1.1974.

    On 29.6.1973 he sent an application for one month's leave on medical ground with effect from 20.6.1973 (vide 41 of File No ZANV. 1 / 73). The leave application was not supported by any medical certificate and therefore he was directed to furnish a certificate, (vide letter at Sl. 43c of File ZANV. 1/73). He again applied for an extension of leave for a further period of one month vide his application at 42c of file No ZANV. 1/73.

    The leave account at page 6 of the Register of earned leave shows that the said Dulal Sharmah was granted 86 days leave with effect from 5.12.1972 to 28.2.1973 on the ground of his illness.

    In his written statement at SI. 14c (file No ZANV. 4/73) he submitted that he was infected by some disease of lungs, requiring him to remain in isolated ward at the Durtlang Hospital for treatment of Pulmonary kocks.

    He submitted bills of his medical treatment which was returned to him for obtaining countersignature of the Civil Surgeon.

    That the said Shri Dulal Sharmah was suffering from a disease of the lungs is indicated in the medical certificate furnished on 11.12.1974 (which may be seen at Sl. 18c of file ZANZ. 4/ 73).

    By not responding to the office directives till 9.1.74 constitutes an offence under the CCSfCCA) Rules, 1965.

    But considering the delicate nature of the case, the case deserved to be dealt leniently.

    I have consulted the Revised Leave Rules, 1971. There are provisions for special treatment of patients suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis or plerisisy of tuberculosis origin.

    For the charges brought against Shri Dulal Sharmah stoppage of 3 (three) annual increments may be considered sufficient.".

    The disciplinary authority instead of imposing punishment of stoppage of three annual increments as indicated in the report of the Enquiry Officer, above, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service by order dated 20.10.1975. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal from service dated 20.10.1975, the appellant filed a representation dated 12.11.1975 before the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Department of Supply and Transport and another representation dated 9.7.1977 before the Chief Secretary to the Government of Mizoram. When aforesaid representations were not disposed of by the aforesaid authorities, the appellant filed Civil Rule No. 342/78 before this Court and the said Civil Rule was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 8.11.1983 with a direction to appellate authorities to consider the appeals filed by the appellant on 12.11.1975 and 9.7.1977 after giving due opportunities of hearing to the appellant. Pursuant to the said direction of this Court, the appellate authority rejected the appeal of the appellant and the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Department of Supply and Transport, communicated the said order of rejection to the appellant on 1.10.85. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Civil Rule No 1107/87 (13/90) before this Court but by the impugned judgment dated 23.1.1996 the learned Single Judge held that while the order of appellate authority was passed on 1.10.1985, the appellant had filed the Civil Rule in the year 1987 and at such belated stage no effective relief can be granted. Aggrieved by the said judgement dated 23.1.1996 of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

    3. Mr. G. Raju, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that it would be clear from the Enquiry Report that in fact the appellant was suffering from TB and for this reason, the Enquiry Officer has recommended to the authorities to deal with the case of the appellant leniently and to impose punishment of stoppage of three annual increments. He submitted that in view of clear evidence before the Enquiry Officer that the appellant was suffering from TB, the disciplinary authority could not have come to a finding that the absence of the appellant from duties was totally without any cause and that the alleged misconduct on the part of the appellant was wilful. Mr. Raju further submitted that the order of the appellate authority also does not disclose the reason for which the appeal of the appellant was rejected. Mr. Raju further submitted that after dismissal from service, the appellant was staying in a remote place of the Stale of Assam and, therefore, he could not possibly approach the Court immediately by filing a writ petition under Article 220 of the Constitution and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the delay of about 2 years in filing the writ petition should not have weighed with the learned Single Judge for dismissing the writ petition.

    4. In reply to the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Raju, Mr. T. Vaiphei, learned Additional Advocate General, Mizoram, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Surinder Kumar & Co. and others, (1997) 9 SCC 66, for the proposition that in a writ petition, the High Court cannot go into the question of mala fides and record any finding. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in P.N. Subrainanyam Reddy v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others (1992) 1 SCC 63, in which a Division Bench of the High Court after setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge held that the appellant in that case was not entitled to pay scale of Rs. 700 - Rs.1200 which the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation had granted to Assistant Director Printing (Technical), but the Supreme Court set aside the Judgment of the Division Bench and directed that the appellant in that case should be placed in the scale of Rs. 700 - 1200 with effect from 10th August, 1975 and his pay should be revised accordingly Mr. Vaiphei also cited the decision of the Division Bench in ASEB v. Surya Kanta Roy, (1994) 1 GLR 383, for the proposition that in Writ Appeal the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perverse or where the court has ignored the settled principles of law.

    5. In the case of Assam State Electricity Board (supra) cited by Mr. Vaiphei, learned Additional Advocate General, Mizoram, the Division Bench of this Court has made it clear that where the learned Single Judge had ignored the settle principles of law, the appellate Court can interfere with the judgment in a writ appeal. In the present case it will be patently clear from the findings of the Enquiry Officer quoted above that the appellant had been submitting applications from time to time for leave on medical ground and the appellant was also granted leave for some period. The aforesaid enquiry report also made it clear that the defence of the appellant against the charge of unauthorised absence from duty with effect from 30.6.1973 till 9.1.1974 was that he was infected by some disease requiring him to be admitted in Durtlang Hospital for treatment of Pulmonary kocks and that a medical certificate dated 11.12.1974 certifying that the appellant had been suffering from disease of lungs was also furnished. This is, therefore, not a case where the appellant had wilfully not reported for duty contrary to directives of the superior authorities and remained absent and yet the disciplinary by impugned order dated 20.10.1975 has held that the appellant had acted in gross disobedience and was guilty of wilful absence from duty and has dismissed him from service.

    6. In State of Andra Pradesh and others v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant and where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence, but the High Court may interfere where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. In the present case as discussed above, there was clear evidence that the appellant was suffering from disease of lungs and on the basis of such evidence, the Enquiry Officer had come to a clear conclusion that the appellant was in fact suffering from disease of lungs during the period in which he was alleged to have been absent from duty. If this be the evidence clearly accepted by the Enquiry Officer, we fail to appreciate as to why the disciplinary authorities came to the conclusion that the appellant had remained absent from duty wilfully and disobeyed the directions of the superior authorities. As per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Andra Pradcsh and others (supra) this is a fit case in which the learned Single Judge should have interfered with the findings of the disciplinary authority holding the appellant guilty of charge of wilful absence from duty as the said findings of the disciplinary authority on the face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such finding on the basis of the evidence before the Enquiry Officer. Further, it clearly appears from the order of the appellate authority that the appellate authority has not considered the aforesaid evidence in the enquiry. The appeal under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, is not an empty formality and Rule 27(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, casts an obligation on the appellate authority to consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by evidence and the said obligation laid down by Rule 27 was disregarded by the appellate authority. The decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others (supra) and P.N. Subramanyan Reddy (supra) cited by Mr. Veiphei were rendered on the facts of those cases and do not apply to the facts of the present case. The present case is not (sic) one where the learned Single Judge has not exercised the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution though such jurisdiction should have been exercised as per settled principles of law.

    7. This is not to say that the appellant should not suffer some disability on account of the fact that there was delay in filing (lie writ petition. The appellate order was passed in October, 1985 and was duly communicated to the appellant but the appellant has approach this Court almost 2 years after in the year 1987. For this reason we are not inclined to grant any back wages to the appellant for the period he remained out of service due to the impugned order of dismissal.

    8. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and allow the writ appeal and quash the impugned order of dismissal as well as the appellate order rejecting the appear of the appellant. The appellant has attained the age of superannuation and would have retired from service had he been in service and in view of this judgment he shall be granted his all pensionery and other terminal benefits by treating him to be in service for the period he remained out of service on account of order of dismissal from service. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.

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    Dulal Chandra Sarma v. State Of Mizoram And Ors.
    (Feb 18, 2002)