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  • Section 154 or section 155 or section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 264,
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961,. for short the Act,
  • sub-section (1) or subsection (2) or sub-section (4)
  • sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139
  • re-assessment6. Sub-section (40) of section 2
  • section 139(8) and 217 of the I.T Act, 1961
  • section 144. Assessment under section 143
  • section 148. Sub-section (1) of section 148
  • subsection (1) or sub-section (2),
  • section 139(8) and section 217
  • section 143 or section 144.7.
  • provisions of Section 139(8)
  • Section 139(8), section 217
  • supplied)4. Sub section (8)
  • assessment.8. Section 147
  • Amendment Act of 1984.
  • T.L.A Act, 1984,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 154 or section 155 or section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 264,
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961,. for short the Act,
  • sub-section (1) or subsection (2) or sub-section (4)
  • sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139
  • re-assessment6. Sub-section (40) of section 2
  • section 139(8) and 217 of the I.T Act, 1961
  • section 144. Assessment under section 143
  • section 148. Sub-section (1) of section 148
  • subsection (1) or sub-section (2),
  • section 139(8) and section 217
  • section 143 or section 144.7.
  • provisions of Section 139(8)
  • Section 139(8), section 217
  • supplied)4. Sub section (8)
  • assessment.8. Section 147
  • Amendment Act of 1984.
  • T.L.A Act, 1984,
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Reference under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (U.L. Bhat, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellate Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court at the instance of the Revenue: whether the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that interest under Section 139(8) and Section 217 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not chargeable where the first assessment was made under Section 143(3) read with Section 147.

The assessee was a registered firm for assessment year 1978-79. The assessee did not submit a return under Section 139(1). No notice under Section 139(2) was issued by the Income-tax Officer. Later, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 alleging escaped income for assessment year 1978-79 due to failure to make a return. On receipt of that notice, the assessee furnished a return and account books. The Income-tax Officer passed an assessment order dated 6.9.1982 assessing total income at Rs. 1,14,770 and levying income tax and interest under Sections 139 and 217(1A).

The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), arguing (inter alia) that the assessment made pursuant to Section 148 (i.e., under Section 147) was not a "regular assessment" as defined in Section 2(40) and hence interest under Sections 139(8) and 271(1A) could not be levied. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld this contention. The Tribunal also upheld the assessee's contention in a subsequent appeal by the Revenue, prompting this reference/revision to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the interest under Section 139(8) and Section 217 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not chargeable where the first assessment was made under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue (Appellant) — Contentions as recorded

  • The Revenue contended (in seeking the reference) that interest under Section 139(8) and Section 217 should be chargeable even where the assessment proceeded under Section 147 (with the first assessment being under Section 143(3) read with Section 147).
  • At the Bar, Revenue's counsel submitted that the expression "regular assessment" in Sections 139(8) and 217 should not be limited to the definition in Section 2(40) but should be taken in its ordinary sense; that is, the context of those provisions requires a broader meaning.
  • Revenue's counsel also drew attention to the Explanation 2 (substituted by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1984) which provides that where an assessment is made for the first time under Section 147, that assessment shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of Section 139(8) (arguing its relevance to the dispute).

Assessee (Respondent) — Contentions as recorded

  • The assessee argued that the escaped-assessment made pursuant to notice under Section 148 (i.e., assessment under Section 147) was not a "regular assessment" as defined in Section 2(40) of the Act and as contemplated in Sections 139(8) and 271(1A), and therefore interest contemplated by those provisions could not be levied.
  • The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted this contention and set aside the levy of interest; the Tribunal also upheld the assessee's contention on further appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Charles D'Souza v. C.I.T., 147 I.T.R. 694 (Karnataka High Court) Held that assessment under Section 147 (after notice under Section 148) does not fall within "regular assessment" as defined and so Section 139(8) does not apply. The Court referred to and followed this decision as agreeing with the view that Section 139(8) does not apply to assessments under Section 147.
Decisions of High Courts of Kerala, Patna, Allahabad, Orissa, Punjab & Haryana and Calcutta (collectively referenced) These courts had taken views consistent with the proposition that Section 139(8) does not apply to assessments under Section 147. The Court noted that the Karnataka judgment followed these views and treated them as supporting the Court's conclusion.
C.I.T. v. Padma Timber Depot, 169 I.T.R. 645 (A.P.) Followed the view that Section 139(8) is not attracted by assessments made under Section 147. The Court cited it as a later decision consistent with the view adopted.
Prakash Lal Khandelwal v. ITO, 180 I.T.R. 604 (Patna) Held consistently that Section 139(8) does not apply to assessments made under Section 147. Cited as a later decision aligning with the Court's position.
C.I.T. v. United Machinery and Appliances, 200 I.T.R. 569 (Calcutta) Supported the view that assessments under Section 147 are not "regular assessments" for the purposes of Section 139(8). Cited by the Court as another later decision following the same view.
P.A. Abdul Muthalif Rowther v. I.T.O., 102 I.T.R. 694 (Kerala) Took a view differing from the earlier Kerala decision (Gates Foam) on whether Section 139(8) applies to assessments under Section 147. The Court expressly refused to agree with the contrary view taken in this later Kerala decision and noted it did not refer to the earlier Kerala decision (Gates Foam).
Gates Foam & Rubber Co. v. C.I.T., 90 I.T.R. 422 (Kerala) Earlier Kerala decision which the Court treated as consistent with the view that Section 139(8) does not apply to Section 147 assessments. The Court relied on the earlier decision as part of the line of decisions supporting its conclusion and noted that the later Kerala decision did not refer to this earlier authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise statutory and textual approach:

  1. The Court examined the text of Section 139(8) (as it stood at the relevant time) which imposes interest at 12% per annum on tax payable "on the total income as determined on regular assessment" where returns are not furnished or are furnished after the specified date. The Court reproduced the provision and its explanations, including the definition of "specified date" and Explanation 2 (later substituted).
  2. The Court noted the statutory definitions: Section 2 defines "assessment" to include "re-assessment"; and Section 2(40) defines "regular assessment" as an assessment made under Section 143 or Section 144.
  3. By reference to these definitions, the Court concluded that "regular assessment" is confined to assessments under Section 143 or Section 144. Assessment under Section 143 presupposes a return filed under Section 139. Section 144 covers best judgment assessments in certain situations.
  4. The Court then examined Section 147 and related provisions. Section 147 deals with escaped income in specified circumstances and contemplates assessment or reassessment under that provision, subject to Sections 148 to 153. Section 148 requires a notice calling for a return, and provides that the provisions of the Act, "so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under Section 139."
  5. The Court found that this statutory direction (that provisions apply "so far as may be") indicates that the mechanism of Section 139/143 is adopted only to the extent applicable after a Section 148 notice; it does not convert a Section 147 assessment into an assessment under Section 143 or into a "regular assessment" as defined in Section 2(40).
  6. The Court rejected Revenue's argument that the expression "regular assessment" in Sections 139(8) and 217 should be given an ordinary (broader) meaning rather than the defined meaning in Section 2(40). The Court emphasized that the Legislature deliberately distinguished between "assessment" and "regular assessment" by definition and that there is nothing in the context of Sections 139(8) and 217 to displace the statutory definition.
  7. The Court concluded that proceedings initiated under Section 147 and terminating in assessment or reassessment are not "regular assessment" for the purposes of Section 139(8) (and similarly for Section 217); therefore, the provisions of Section 139(8) cannot apply to such assessments.
  8. The Court addressed the Amendment (Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1984) which substituted Explanation 2 to Section 139(8) (effective from 1.4.85) providing that where an assessment is made for the first time under Section 147, that assessment shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of that subsection. The Court observed that the substitution was intended to widen the scope of "regular assessment" by bringing first-time Section 147 assessments within its ambit. The Court characterized the substitution as amendatory (not clarificatory) and therefore not having retrospective effect to apply to periods prior to 1.4.85.
  9. The Court surveyed relevant case law (Karnataka decision and other High Court decisions) and found a line of authority supporting its conclusion; it expressly disagreed with a later Kerala decision that reached a contrary result.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue: it held that proceedings initiated under Section 147 (and culminating in assessment following notice under Section 148) are not "regular assessment" as defined in Section 2(40) and, accordingly, the provisions of Section 139(8) (and Section 217) do not apply to such assessments for the period before the substitution of Explanation 2 effective 1.4.85.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Tribunal was justified in holding that interest under Section 139(8) and Section 217 was not chargeable in the assessee's case (assessment under Section 147 arising from notice under Section 148). The decision was therefore in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
  • The Court directed that a copy of its judgment and order be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under the Registrar's signature and seal. The Court made no order as to costs.

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court observed that the Amendment Act of 1984 (effective 1.4.85) substituted an Explanation that expressly treats a first assessment under Section 147 as a "regular assessment" for the purposes of Section 139(8). The Court considered that substitution amendatory and not retrospective, and therefore it does not affect assessments made prior to 1.4.85.
  • The opinion did not purport to create a new rule of statutory construction beyond applying the statutory definitions and cited precedents; it relied on existing High Court decisions reaching the same conclusion and disagreed with the later contrary Kerala decision.

This summary is limited to and based exclusively upon the contents of the provided opinion.

    Commissioner Of Income Tax, N.E Region, Shillong v. M/S. Triple Crown Agencies .

    U.L Bhat, C.J:— The following question has been referred by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961,. for short “the Act”, at the instance of the Revenue.

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the interest under section 139(8) and 217 of the I.T Act, 1961 is not chargeable where the first assessment was made u/s 143(3) of the I.T Act, 1961 read with section 147 of the I.T Act, 1961 ?”

    2. The assessee is a registered firm. Assessment year is 1978-79. The assessee did not submit return as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. The Income-tax officer did not issue notice to the assessee under sub-section (2) of Section 139 of the Act. Long after the end of the previous year relevant to the assessment 3 year, Income-tax Officer issued notice to the assessee under Section 148 of the Act averring that income charageable to tax escaped assessment for the assessment year 1978-79 by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return. On receipt of the notice the assessee submitted raturn and also his account books. The Income-tax Officer finally passed assessment order dated 6.9.1982 assessing total income at Rs. 1,14,770/- and levying income tax as also interest under Sections 139 and 217(1A) of the Act. The assessee; filed an appeal against this order before the C.I.T (Appeals) raising various contention including the escaped assessment having been made in pursuance to notice under Section 148, it was not a regular assessment as defined in Section 2(40) of the Act and contemplated in Sections 139(8) and 271(1A) of the Act and hence interest contemplated in these provisions cannot be levied. C.I.T upheld this con???ention. The Tribunal also upheld the contention in a further appeal by the Revenue. Hence this revision. We will refer to sub-section (8) of Section 139 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.

    “139(8)(a) Where the return under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) or sub-section (4) for an assessment year is furnished after the specified date, or is not furnished, then whether or not the Income-tax Officer has extended the date for furnishing the return under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), the assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at twelve percent per annum, reckoned from the day immediately following the specified date to the date of the furnishing of the return or, where no return has-been furnished, the date of completion of the assessment under section 144, on the amount of the tax payable on the total income as determined on regular assessment, as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid, and any tax deducted at source:

    Provided that the Income-tax Officer may, in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, reduce or waive the interest payable by any assessee under this sub-section.

    Explanation I —For the purposes of this sub-section, “specified date”, in relation to a return for an assessment year, means,—

    (a) in the case of every assessee whose total income, or the total income of any person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act, includes any income from business or profession, the date of the expiry of four mont???s from the end of the previous year or where there is more than one previous year, from the end of the previous year which expired last before the commencement of the assessment year, or the 30th day of June of the assessment year, whichever is later;

    (b) in the case of every other assessee, the 30th day of the assessment year.

    Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this sub-section, where the assessee is a registered firm or an unregistered ???irm which has been assessed under clause (b) of section 183, the tax payable on the total income shall be the amount of tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm.

    (b) Where as a result of an order under Section 154 or section 155 or section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 264, the amount of tax on which interest was payable under this sub-section has been reduced, the interest shall be reduced accordingly, and the excess interest paid, if any, shall be refunded.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    3. We may also notice the following Explanation 2 substituted by T.L.A Act, 1984, with effect from 1.4.85

    “Explanation 2—Where, in relation to an assessment year, as assessment is made for the first time under section 147, the assess ment so made shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of this sub-section.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    4. Sub section (8) deals with cases where return under sub-sections. (1) or (2) or (4) was not furnished at all or furnished after the specified date. In such cases liability to pay simple interest at 12% per annum would arise for the period referred to in the sub-section Interest is payable on the amount of tax payable on the “total income as determined on regular assessment”, as reduced by the advance tax if any, paid, and any tax deducted at source.

    5. The expression “assessment” and regular “assessment” are defined in the Act. Sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Act defines assessment as “including re-assessment”

    6. Sub-section (40) of section 2 defines “regular assessment” as follows:

    “Regular assessment means the assessment made under section 143 or section 144.”

    7. Going by this definition, “regular assessment” would comprehend within its scope only assessment under 143 or under section 144. Assessment under section 143 can be made only in cases where return has been made under section 139. Cases of failure to make return as required by notice under section 139(2) or to make return or revised return under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139 and certain other cases are covered by section 144 which empowers the Income-tax Officer to make best judgment assessment.

    8. Section 147 deals with cases of escaped income on acount of any of the circumstances referred to therein. It takes in cases of income escaping assessment on account of failure to make return under section 139 or to disclose truly or fully all material facts or in consequence of information in possession of the Income-tax Officer. The assessment or re-assessment under section 147 contemplates assessment being made under that provision, subject to section 148 to 153. Before making assessment or re-assessment or recomputation under section 147, notice has to be issued to the assessee as required under section 148. Sub-section (1) of section 148 requires notice to be issued requiring the person concerned to furnish a return of his income.

    Sub-section (1) further states:

    “The provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139.”

    9. A reading of the provisions in sections 139, 143, and 148 of the Act would makes it clear that the assessment or re assessment contemplated under section 147 is quite different in nature and content from assessment under section 143. Assessment or re-assessment under section 147 can be mane only after issue of a notice under section 148. The provision in section 148 declaring that as far as may be the provisions of the Act shall apply as if the return under section 139 is a device adopted to indicate the procedure to be followed after issue of the notice under section 148. The procedure contemplated in Section 143 is required to be followed, as far as may be. This cannot lead to the inference that assessment or reassessment under section 147 is assessment under Section 143 or that it is regular assessment as defined in Section 2(40) of the Act. That being so, proceeding initiated under section 147 and terminating in assessment or re-assessment is not “regular assessment” as contemplated in Section 139(8) of the Act and to such a case, the provisions of Section 139(8) cannot apply. The same is the position regarding section 217 of the Act.

    10. The definition section 2 commences with the words “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.” It is suggested at the Bar that the context of Sections 139(8) and 217 demand that the expression “regular assessment” occurring therein should not be ascribed the meaning given to in Section 2(40) and must be taken in its ordinary sense. We are unable to find any difference between the ordinary meaning of “assessment” and “regular assessment.” The differentiation is brought about by the Legislature and that too deliberately. There are various provisions which use the expression “assessment” or “re-assessment.” There are some provisions such as Section 139(8), section 217 which use the expression “regular assessment.” There is nothing in the context of these provision which detracts from the application of the definition in Section 2(40) There can be no doubt that the expression has been used in these provisions in the sense in which it has been defined in section 2(40) of the Act and the logical consequence would be to hold that expression “regular assessment” in section 139(8) and section 217 would not attract assessment initiated under section 147 of the Act.

    11. We may refer in this connection to a judgment of the Karnataka High Court delivered by K. Jagannatha Shetty J., as he then was and S.R Rajasekhara Murthy J. in Charles D' Souza v. C.I.T, 147 I.T.R 694. The judgment followed the views of High Courts of Kerala, Patna, Allahabad, Orissa, Punjab & Haryana and Calcutta which is in accordance with the view we have taken. The same view was followed in later decisions, namely, C.I.T v. Padma Timber Depot, 169 ITR. 645 (A.P), Prakash Lal Khandelwal v. ITO, 180 I.T.R 604 (Patna) and C.I.T v. United Machinery and Appliances, 200 ITR 569 (Calcutta). A later decision of Kerala High Court in P.A Abdul Muthalif Rowther v. I.T.O, 102 I.T.R 694 takes a view different from the view taken by an earlier decision of the same High Court in Gates Foam & Rubber Co. v. C.I.T, 90 I.T.O 422 but without referring to the earlier decision. We are unable to agree with the view taken in P.A Abdul Muthalif Rowther'??? case for the rea sons already indicated by us. Learned counsel for Revenue has drawn our attention to the substituted Explanation 2 to subsection (8) of Section 139, according, to which an assessment made for the first time under section 147 shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of Section 139(8). This Explanation has been substituted with effect from 1.4.85 by the Amendment Act of 1984. The attempt made by the Explanation is to widen the scope of the expression “regular assessment” used in sub section (8) by bringing in within its ambit assessment made for the first time under section 147. This amendment has been apparently incorporated in view of the decisions of various High Courts referred to in the decision of the Karnataka High Court. We do not under stand the provision to be of a clarificatory nature; it is cleary amenddatory in nature and cannot have retrospective effect so as to apply to any period prior to 1.4.85

    12. We, therefore, answer the question in the affi???mative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Send a copy of this judgment and order under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court to the Appellate Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Commissioner Of Income Tax, N.E Region, Shillong v. M/S. Triple Crown Agencies .
    (Jun 23, 1993)