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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 144 A INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 147 read with Section 143(3) of Income
  • sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section
  • provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a)
  • sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148
  • Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 250/143(3) of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 143(2) and (3) of Income Tax Act.
  • Section 271(1)(e) of Income Tax Act.4.
  • Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act
  • section 148 read with section 147(a).
  • Sections 147/148 of Income Tax Act
  • SECTION 147 INCOME TAX ACT
  • SECTION 250 INCOME TAX ACT
  • SECTION 143 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 147/148 of Income Tax Act,
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 142(1) or Section 148
  • sub-section (2) of section 148.
  • Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989,
  • FINANCE ACT 2012
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 144 A INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 147 read with Section 143(3) of Income
  • sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section
  • provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a)
  • sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148
  • Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 250/143(3) of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 143(2) and (3) of Income Tax Act.
  • Section 271(1)(e) of Income Tax Act.4.
  • Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act
  • section 148 read with section 147(a).
  • Sections 147/148 of Income Tax Act
  • SECTION 147 INCOME TAX ACT
  • SECTION 250 INCOME TAX ACT
  • SECTION 143 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 147/148 of Income Tax Act,
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 142(1) or Section 148
  • sub-section (2) of section 148.
  • Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989,
  • FINANCE ACT 2012
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal by the assessee challenged the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's (ITAT) order dated 27.05.2013 in ITA No. 2141/Del/2012 and sought quashing of a re-assessment order made under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act for assessment year (AY) 2003-2004.

Relevant chronology and procedural posture (as set out in the opinion):

  • The assessee filed its return for AY 2003-2004 on 02.12.2003 declaring income of Rs. 1,17,24,580; the return was processed under Section 143(1).
  • The case was selected for scrutiny under Section 143(2); an assessment was completed at Rs. 1,32,03,670 after certain additions, and later revised to Rs. 1,17,24,580 by an order under Section 250/143(3) dated 21.09.2007.
  • The assessment was re-opened under Section 147, and a notice under Section 148 was issued on 22.03.2010. During re-assessment the Assessing Officer (AO) concluded that the assessee had adopted an incorrect turnover for claiming deduction under Section 80HHE, resulting in an excess claim of Rs. 46,65,749; the AO recalculated taxable income at Rs. 1,63,90,329 and applied interest under Sections 234B and 234D, and initiated penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(e).
  • The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] set aside the re-assessment order, finding the re-opening to be based on an impermissible "change of opinion" and noting the re-opening occurred after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year; CIT(A) referred to the decision in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited (320 ITR 561 (SC)).
  • The ITAT allowed the Revenue's appeal against CIT(A), holding that CIT(A) had not given the AO an opportunity to respond in the first appeal and had not made specific findings about failure by the assessee to make return or to disclose fully and truly material facts; ITAT set aside the CIT(A) order and remanded the matter to CIT(A) for re-adjudication after giving opportunity to both parties.
  • The assessee filed an application under Section 254(2) before the ITAT on 08.11.2013 seeking rectification of the ITAT order of 27.05.2013; that application was pending before the ITAT at the time of this opinion.
  • The High Court proceeded to consider the matter, framed the legal question whether the re-opening under Section 147 after completion of assessment under Section 143(3) and issuance of notice under Section 148 was an impermissible "change of opinion", and ultimately concluded that the re-opening was impermissible, set aside the ITAT order and restored the CIT(A) order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the re-opening of the assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, after completion of assessment proceedings under Section 143(3) and issuance of notice under Section 148 on 22.03.2010, was a re-opening motivated by a "change of opinion" and therefore impermissible in law?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Assessee) — Main Points as Appearing in the Opinion

  • The assessee contended that there was no material showing failure on its part to make full and true disclosure of material facts necessary for assessment.
  • The assessee maintained that the re-opening was based on the same material that had already been scrutinized and thus amounted to a "change of opinion" by the Assessing Officer — an impermissible ground for re-opening.
  • The assessee filed an application under Section 254(2) before the ITAT seeking rectification of the ITAT order and reiterating that no material supported a finding of failure to disclose; that application was pending before the ITAT.

Revenue / Assessing Officer — Main Points as Appearing in the Opinion

  • The Assessing Officer recorded reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment because, on "going through the records", it appeared that the turnover adopted for computing deduction under Section 80HHE (Rs. 1,63,58,001) was incorrect when compared to the Profit & Loss account (total turnover shown much higher), resulting in an excess claim of deduction.
  • The Revenue relied on Honda Siel Power Products Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 340 ITR 53 (Delhi) to argue that mere production of books of account or other evidence is not necessarily sufficient disclosure under Explanation 1 to Section 147, i.e. production does not necessarily constitute disclosure.

CIT(A) — Main Points as Appearing in the Opinion

  • CIT(A) concluded that the reassessment was actuated by a "change of opinion" of the AO and therefore impermissible, particularly because the re-opening occurred after the expiry of four years prescribed by the first proviso to Section 147.
  • CIT(A) relied, inter alia, on the dictum in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited (320 ITR 561 (SC)).

ITAT — Main Points as Appearing in the Opinion

  • The ITAT held that CIT(A) failed to call the Assessing Officer to assist at the hearing and had not made specific findings after investigating whether there had been failure by the assessee to make return under Section 139 or to comply with notices under Sections 142(1) or 148, or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts.
  • On that basis ITAT set aside CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to CIT(A) for re-adjudication after giving both parties appropriate opportunity to be heard.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited, 320 ITR 561 (SC) (also cited as CIT v. Kelvinator (2002) 256 ITR 1 (Del) (Full Bench) and later affirmed (2010) 2 SCC 723) That post-1 April 1989, Section 147 confers wider power to re-open if the AO has "reason to believe" income has escaped assessment, but "reason to believe" requires schematic interpretation and must be supported by "tangible material" so as to prevent re-opening based on mere "change of opinion". Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. The High Court relied on and cited the Kelvinator line of authority to underline that "reasons to believe" post-amendment require tangible material and that mere change of opinion cannot justify re-opening; CIT(A) had relied on Kelvinator in setting aside the reassessment.
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd., (2007) 291 ITR 500 (SC) Explained that after the 1989 substitution of Section 147, only the first condition (reason to believe that income escaped assessment) is sufficient for jurisdiction, except where the proviso applies (when both conditions apply). The case distinguished main provision from proviso. The High Court invoked Rajesh Jhaveri to explain the statutory framework post amendment: existence of "reason to believe" suffices for jurisdiction unless the proviso applies; the court used the explanation to interpret scope of Section 147.
Jindal Photo Films Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax, (1998) 234 ITR 170 That if a notice under Section 148 is issued without the jurisdictional foundation under Section 147 (i.e., absence of material), the notice and subsequent proceedings are without jurisdiction and can be struck down; judicial review will not test sufficiency where there is material, but will intervene where material is absent. The High Court cited Jindal Photo Films for the proposition that absence of material equates to absence of jurisdiction for re-opening; applied in concluding that the AO lacked fresh material and thus jurisdiction was absent.
Haryana Acrylic Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax IV, (2009) 308 ITR 38 One of the cases interpreting the expression "reasons to believe" in Section 147. The High Court referenced this decision among several authorities that have interpreted "reasons to believe" to show judicial treatment of the concept; used to support the interpretive framework requiring tangible material.
Honda Siel Power Products Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, (2012) 340 ITR 53 (Delhi) Held that mere production of books of account or other evidence may not be sufficient disclosure under Explanation 1 to Section 147; the court in that case found omission or failure on part of assessee attracting the proviso to Section 147. The Revenue relied on Honda Siel. The High Court distinguished Honda Siel on its facts, noting that Honda Siel involved a finding of omission/failure by the assessee, whereas in the present case the AO had no fresh material and had relied on the same material previously scrutinized.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from a careful exposition of the statutory assessment regime and the special scheme for re-opening assessments:

  1. Statutory framework: The court set out the relevant statutory provisions (Sections 139, 142, 143, 144 and especially Section 147 with its provisos and explanations). It explained that assessments ordinarily conclude on an order under Section 143(3) or Section 144, but Section 147 provides the mechanism to deal with income escaping assessment subject to Sections 148–153 and specific provisos.
  2. Effect of the 1989 amendment: The court described how the 1989 amendment to Section 147 changed the law so that for most cases only the existence of a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment is required to confer jurisdiction to re-open, but emphasized that the proviso (the four-year bar and its exception) remains applicable where an assessment under Section 143(3) or Section 147 has been made.
  3. Meaning of "reason to believe": The court relied on precedent (notably Kelvinator and Rajesh Jhaveri) for the proposition that "reason to believe" must be supported by "tangible material" and that the concept should be given a schematic interpretation to prevent arbitrary re-openings based on mere "change of opinion." Reasons must have a live link to the formation of belief.
  4. Proviso and limitation: The court explained that once four years have elapsed after an assessment under Section 143(3), re-opening is ordinarily barred unless the re-opening is justified by failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts — in which case the bar is lifted. The court stressed that the law does not allow re-opening simply because the assessing authority failed to gather material in the original proceeding; the exception is for the assessee's default.
  5. Examination of the AO's satisfaction note and re-assessment order: The court analyzed the AO's reasons recorded for re-opening (which stated the AO had, "after going through the records", discovered an incorrect turnover used for claim under Section 80HHE). The court observed that the satisfaction note did not specify which records were reviewed, what new material had come to light, or how any failure by the assessee to disclose had occurred. The AO effectively drew inferences from the same material that had been available in the original scrutiny assessment.
  6. Application of legal tests: Applying the legal standards drawn from the precedents, the court found that the AO did not point to any fresh or tangible material that gave rise to a reason to believe; the satisfaction note was too vague. Because the earlier assessment had been completed under Section 143(3) and the re-opening took place after four years, the first proviso to Section 147 applied and the AO needed material showing failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly. No such material was shown.
  7. Distinguishing Revenue's authority: The court considered Honda Siel (2012) relied upon by the Revenue, but found its factual matrix distinguishable because Honda Siel involved a finding of omission/failure on the part of the assessee which made the proviso applicable; the present case lacked such a finding or supporting material.
  8. Conclusion on jurisdiction: The court concluded the re-opening was based on an impermissible change of opinion and that the AO's proceedings under Sections 147/148 suffered from jurisdictional error because they lacked the requisite foundation of tangible material and, where relevant, a showing of failure by the assessee to disclose.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The re-opening of the assessment under Section 147/148 for AY 2003-2004 was impermissible as it amounted to a "change of opinion" and therefore suffered from jurisdictional error; the ITAT order is set aside and the CIT(A) order dated 15.12.2012 is restored.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated or reasonably confined to the text of the opinion):

  • The remand order passed by the ITAT is set aside and the CIT(A) decision (which had set aside the reassessment) is restored, resulting in closure of the reassessment proceedings for AY 2003-2004 in respect of the appellant assessee.
  • The court treated the re-opening as a jurisdictional error and held that the proceedings taken in consequence of the re-opening could not be sustained.
  • The opinion does not elaborate broader doctrinal or prospective changes beyond applying established precedents; accordingly, the immediate effect is confined to the parties (the reassessment is quashed and the CIT(A) order is restored).

Note: This summary is compiled exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences that are not present in that opinion.

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    Donaldson India Filters Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Dcit, Circle 10(1)

    Mr. Justice R.K Gauba

    1. This appeal by the assessee seeks to assail the order dated 27.05.2013 passed by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in appeal registered as ITA No. 2141.Del/2012 and for quashing of the re-assessment order passed by the respondent (the assessing authority) under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act. By the impugned order, the ITAT set aside the order passed by the Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] on 15.02.2012 whereby the assessment order made on 02.12.2010 by Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax Circle 10(1), New Delhi for the assessment year (AY) 2003-2004 assessing the income at Rs. 1,63,90,330/- having the effect of tax liability in the sum of Rs. 23,83,380/- under Section 147 read with Section 143(3) of Income Tax was set aside.

    2. The assessment order dated 21.12.2010 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax Circle 10(1), New Delhi shows that the assessee had filed return of income for the assessment year 2003-2004 on 02.12.2003 declaring an income of Rs. 1,17,24,580/-. The return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was issued and later the assessment was completed at Rs. 1,32,03,670/- after making certain additions in the returned income of the assessee company. Subsequently, the income was revised at Rs. 1,17,24,580/- by order under Section 250/143(3) of the Income Tax Act dated 21.09.2007

    3. The case was re-opened under Section 147 of Income Tax Act leading to notice under Section 148 of Income Tax Act being issued on 22.03.2010 which action was resisted by the assessee through a response. In the course of re-assessment proceedings, the assessee was called upon to furnish details of Income Tax Return/bank account/profit and loss account/tax audit report etc. vide letter dated 14.10.2010 The assessing authority found in the reassessment proceedings that the assessee, while calculating deduction under Section 80HHE, had adopted incorrect turnover which had resulted in excess claim under the said provision of law to the tune of Rs. 46,65,749/-. The Assessing Officer proceeded to re-calculate the deduction and restricted it to 50%, that is to say Rs. 6,41,070/-. On that basis, the revised taxable income was calculated at Rs. 1,63,90,329/- on which interest under Sections 234-B and 234-D was also applied, simultaneously withdrawing proportionately the interest allowed under Section 244-A. The Assessing Officer directed penalty proceedings to be initiated separately under Section 271(1)(e) of Income Tax Act.

    4. The CIT(A) in appeal by the assessee, however, found the reassessment order to have been actuated by “change of opinion” of the Assessing Officer which is not permissible in law, also for the reason the case had been re-opened after expiry of four years prescribed in the proviso to Section 147 of the Income Tax Act. In reaching such conclusions, the first appellate authority, inter alia, referred to dictum in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited 320 ITR 561 (SC).

    5. The ITAT in the appeal by the Revenue, however, found that the first appellate authority had failed to give an opportunity to the AO for responding to the objections of the assessee in the first appeal and had also not given any specific finding after investigating the fact as to whether there had been failure on the part of the assessee to make the return under Section 139 or in response to notice under Section 142(1) or Section 148 or for that matter as to whether there had been a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment of this case.

    6. The ITAT, thus, set aside the order of CIT(A) and restored the matter to the said forum for re-adjudication after giving appropriate and reasonable opportunity to both parties.

    7. The pleadings and the submissions made in the course of hearing indicate that the appellant assessee on 08.11.2013 has moved an application before the ITAT invoking Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act seeking rectification of the order dated 27.05.2013 reiterating its position about there being no material showing failure on its part to make full and true disclosure and questioning the grounds on which the assessing authority had re-opened the case. The said application is pending consideration before the ITAT.

    8. The CIT(A) exercises the jurisdiction of the first appellate authority following the procedure prescribed under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act. It is clear from Section 250(2) that at the hearing of such appeal both sides, i.e the assessee and also the Assessing Officer, have a right to be heard, either in person or by a representative. A perusal of the order of CIT(A) in this case clearly shows that the Assessing Officer was never called upon by the said authority to assist at the hearing before the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

    9. Technically speaking, the ground on which the matter has been remanded by the ITAT to CIT (A) cannot be questioned. Ordinarily, in such fact situation, this court would not interfere. But, having heard both sides, we find merit in the view taken by CIT (A) on the validity of the satisfaction on the basis of which the case of assessment for the assessment year in question was re-opened in the matter at hand. Since it is a jurisdictional error, we proceed to set out hereinafter the reasons why the remand order passed by the ITAT should be set aside and the matter of re-assessment for assessment year 2003-2004 in respect of the appellant assessee be closed.

    10. In the facts and circumstances, the following question of law arises:-

    “Whether the re-opening of the assessment under Section 147 of Income Tax Act, after completion of the assessment proceedings on 21.03.2006 under Section 143(3), leading to the notice under Section 148 of Income Tax Act issued on 22.03.2010 was for the reason of “change of opinion” and, therefore, impermissible in law?”

    11. The procedure for assessment is prescribed in Section 143 of the Income Tax Act. Every person liable to pay income tax is required by the law (Section 139) to submit return of income. There is a provision for inquiry before assessment (Section 142), for which purposes the assessing authority is required to issue a notice for submission of return or production of specified account or document or furnishing of information, as may be deemed necessary.

    12. The assessment is made under Section 143(1) on the return submitted under Section 139, or material furnished in response to notice under Section 142.

    13. The assessing authority is vested with power to subject a case to be taken for scrutiny under Section 143(2) and (3) of Income Tax Act. Generally, if he considers it necessary or expedient to do so, to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has underpaid the tax in any manner and, particularly, in cases where he has reasons to believe that any claim of loss, exemption, deduction, allowance or relief made in the return is inadmissible. For cases taken up under the “scrutiny” clause, the Assessing Officer is required to issue a notice calling for such information and documents as are considered necessary.

    14. In cases of failure to make the return under Section 139, or in compliance with the notice under Section 142, or the notice under Section 143(2) on the part of the assessee, the AO is vested with the jurisdiction to make best judgment assessment (Section 144) of the total income or loss accruing to, or incurred by, the assessee and for determining the sum payable as income tax thereupon, after taking into account the relevant material “gathered” by such authority subject, however, to the requirement of giving to the assessee an opportunity of being heard.

    15. Ordinarily, the assessment procedure stands concluded upon the assessment order being passed either under Section 143 or Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. But, the legislation provides for dealing with the cases of income escaping assessment and for such purposes the procedure is stipulated in Section 147 of Income Tax Act which, as amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989, brought in force with effect from 01.04.1989 (as is relevant for purposes), reads as under:

    “147. Income escaping assessment.- If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year):

    Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year:

    Provided further that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income, other than the income involving matters which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment.

    Provided also that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income, other than the income involving matters which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment.

    Explanation 1.—Production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso.

    Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely:—

    (a) where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax;

    (b) where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the Assessing Officer that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return;

    (ba) where the assessee has failed to furnish a report in respect of any international transaction which he was so required under section 92E;

    (c) where an assessment has been made, but—

    (i) income chargeable to tax has been underassessed; or

    (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or

    (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act; or

    (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed.

    (d) where a person is found to have any asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India.

    Explanation 3.—For the purpose of assessment or reassessment under this section, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped assessment, and such issue comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue have not been included in the reasons recorded under sub-section (2) of section 148.

    Explanation 4.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of this section, as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, shall also be applicable for any assessment year beginning on or before the 1st day of April, 2012.” (emphasis supplied)

    16. The Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (2007) 291 ITR 500 explained the law in the following words:-

    “The scope and effect of section 147 as substituted with effect from April 1, 1989, as also sections 148 to 152 are substantially different from the provisions as they stood prior to such substitution. Under the old provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a) and (b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past assessment years could be assessed or reassessed. To confer jurisdiction under section 147(a) two conditions were required to be satisfied: firstly the Assessing Officer must have been reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment, and secondly he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Assessing Officer could have jurisdiction to issue notice under section 148 read with section 147(a). But under the substituted section 147 existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to re-open the assessment. It is, however, to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147. The case at hand is covered by the main provision and not the proviso. (emphasis supplied)”

    17. The expression “reasons to believe” appearing in Section 147 of the Income Tax Act has been a subject matter of interpretation in a number of cases decided by this court including in Haryana Acrylic Manufacturing Company v. The Commissioner of Income-tax IV (2009) 308 ITR 38, Jindal Photo Films Ltd v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax. (1998) 234 ITR 170 and CIT v. Kelvinator (2002) 256 ITR 1 (Del) (Full Bench).

    18. In Jindal Photo Films Ltd v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax. (supra), this court observed as under:-

    “It is also equally well settled that if a notice under section 148 has been issued without the jurisdictional foundation under section 147 being available to the Assessing Officer, the notice and the subsequent proceedings will be without jurisdiction, liable to be struck down in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this court. If ‘reason to believe’ be available, the writ court will not, exercise its power of judicial review to go into the sufficiency or adequacy of the material available. However, the present one is not a case of testing the sufficiency of material available. It is a case of absence of material and hence the absence of jurisdiction in the Assessing Officer to initiate the proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act.”

    19. The view taken by the Full Bench of this court in CIT v. Kelvinator was affirmed by Supreme Court of India in civil appeal vide judgment reported as (2010) 2 SCC 723. The observations of the Supreme Court in the said case (after noting the legislative changes) appearing in Para No. 6 of the report, to the following effect are germane to the issue raised here:-

    “On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989, re-opening could be done under above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1 April, 1989], they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to re-open the assessment. Therefore, post-1 April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe”, failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to re-open. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1 April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief.” (emphasis supplied)

    20. The first proviso to Section 147 quoted earlier makes it abundantly clear that no action thereunder is ordinarily permissible in cases where assessment for the relevant assessment year has already been made under Section 143(3), after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. But, it is clear that this limitation would apply only if there has been a scrutiny assessment and not otherwise. There is, however, an exception available even to the four year rule wherein such re-opening of the assessment proceedings is permitted if any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessee “to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary” for assessment for the assessment year in question. Noticeably, the re-opening of the assessment after expiry of four years is permitted only if there has been a default on the part of the assessee to disclose. To put it conversely, the law does not provide for re-opening of the assessment, through the route of Section 147 Income Tax Act, if any income has escaped assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessing authority to gather necessary information within the prescribed period or to make proper inquiry or subject the available material to proper scrutiny.

    21. Thus, it emerges that generally the assessing authority is vested by the amended law in Section 147 to re-assess (re-compute etc.) if he has reasons to believe that income has escaped assessment but this he can do only within four year period. On elapse of such period, the matter must attain finality. Yet, if the Assessing Officer also finds material giving rise to reasons to believe that the escapement was due to default of assessee to truly disclose, the bar of limitation would get lifted.

    22. Undoubtedly, explanation - 1 to Section 147 indicates that mere production of account books or other evidence before the Assessing Officer would not necessarily amount to disclosure of the material information by the assessee. But then, the explanation clarifies the said general refrain by the words “not necessarily”. Therefore, the burden is equally placed on the Assessing Officer to exercise due diligence in examining the record (account books or evidence) produced before him in the light of declarations made in the return or responses (to the notices, questionnaire etc.). As has been noted above, the sine quo non for action under Section 147 (to deal with escapement of income) is gathering or availability of some “tangible material” requiring the matter to be re-opened.

    23. The impugned order passed by the ITAT quotes the reasons recorded by the assessing authority for re-opening the assessment under Sections 147/148 of Income Tax Act as under:-

    “The assessment was completed and order u/s 143(3) of the Act was passed on 30. 11.2005 After going through the records, it is revealed that the calculation of deduction admissible u/s 80HHE of the IT Act, the assessee adopted the total turnover of the business as Rs. 1,63,58,001/- whereas the P & L account shows that the total turnover as Rs. 14,54,12,662/- (Sales gross + Services). Adoption of incorrect total turnover resulted in excess allowance of deduction u/s 80HHE to the tune of Rs. 42,17,556/- entailing short levy of tax of Rs. 21,27,313/-.

    Therefore, I have reason to believe that the income of the assessee has escaped the assessment as per the section 147 of the IT Act.

    Issued Notice u/s 148.

    The approval of Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-IV, has been obtained on 19.02.2010”

    24. It is clear from bare reading of the aforementioned satisfaction note recorded by the assessing authority for re-opening the assessment five years after the assessment had been completed under Section 143(3) (on 30.11.2005) that the only indication set out as to the grounds which had triggered such action is through the words “after going through the records”. The assessing authority would not elaborate as to which records had been adverted to and what was the event which had occurred that had impelled such perusal of the records for a fresh view to be taken. Noticeably, the Assessing Officer while recording his satisfaction by note dated 19.03.2010 that a case had been made out for the income to be re-assessed would not attribute any act of commission or omission on the part of the assessee so as to constitute a failure to discuss fully and truly of the material facts. Indeed, the assessing authority expressed that reasons to believe existed that a part of the income had escaped assessment. But, it would not clarify even remotely as to how the said failure had occurred.

    25. A relevant part of the re-assessment order that came to be eventually passed by the assessing authority on 21.12.2010 needs to be extracted. It reads as under:-

    “The reply filed by the assessee company has been considered, however, no found to tenable. In the absence of any substantiating submissions filed by the assessee company it is presumed that it has nothing to say in the matter. On going through the P&L A/c submitted by the Assessee it appears that Net Sales was of Rs. 10,89,05,293/= and after adding back services and others total turnover comes to RS. 13,16,12,262/= whereas on perusal of the Annexure-2 regarding deduction under chapter VI-A the assessee in computation of deduction under section 80HHE the total turnover claimed was RS. 1,63,58,001/=. Thus details relating to the claim by the exporter computer software for deduction under section 80HHE of the I.T Act, shows that as per Form No. 10CCAF the total turnover of the assessee company for the year under consideration has been taken at Rs. 1,63,58,001/- instead of Rs. 13,54,12,662/- (Sales Gross + Services).

    In view of the above, it is quite evident that the assessee company, while computing the deduction u/s 80HHE has adopted incorrect turnover which has resulted excess claim of deduction U/s 80HHE to the tune of Rs. 46,65,749/-…”

    26. The Revenue has placed reliance on Honda Siel Power Products Limited v. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 340 ITR 53 (Delhi) to argue that mere production of books of account or other evidence was not sufficient in view of explanation - 1 to Section 147 noted earlier. In our considered view, the factual matrix of Honda Siel Power Products Limited (supra) is distinguishable. The court had found on that occasion omission or failure on the part of the assessee which attracted initiation of action under Section 147(1) on account of the first proviso thereto coming into play.

    27. The order passed by the assessing authority extracted above unmistakably shows that even at that stage it had no fresh material available to it so as to exercise the jurisdiction available under Sections 147/148 of Income Tax Act. It was, thus, taking a fresh call on the subject of assessment of income (i.e re-assessment), drawing conclusions and inferences from the same very material that had been scrutinized in the original assessment proceedings. The case at hand is concededly not covered by other exceptions as indicated by second and third proviso or explanation to Section 147 quoted earlier.

    28. The re-opening of the assessment in the case at hand through notice under Section 148 of Income Tax Act issued on 22.03.2010 fails to pass the muster on both the tests. The satisfaction note does not disclose the foundation of “reasons to believe” as it vaguely refers to the perusal of “the records” without specifying the fresh “tangible material” that had come to light giving rise to a need for such action. Since the assessment had earlier been concluded under Section 143(3) by order dated 21.09.2007, the restrictions on the exercise of the power of re-assessment as contained in the first proviso to Section 147 would inhibit further action in absence of material showing default by the assessee to fully or truly disclose.

    29. In the above facts and circumstances, we concur with the view taken by the CIT(A) that it is a case of impermissible change of opinion. The order whereby the proceedings have been re-opened for assessment under Section 147/148 of Income Tax Act, thus, is found to suffer from jurisdictional error. Consequently, the proceedings taken out in its wake cannot sustain.

    30. We, thus, answer the question of law formulated as above in affirmative against the Revenue.

    31. Consequently, the order of ITAT is set aside and the order passed by CIT(A) on 15.12.2012 is restored.

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