G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)
1. The Appellant is aggrieved by an order dated 20.02.2013 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge whereby although he was acquitted for
the main offence, that is, under Section 307 IPC but he was convicted for
the offence punishable under Section 174-A IPC as he was declared a
proclaimed offender during the trial of the Sessions Case No.186/2010
which was instituted on 15.05.2009.
2. There is twofold contention raised on behalf of the Appellant. The firstly,
that the process under Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the
Code) was ordered to be issued against the Appellant by an order dated
15.02.2010 passed by the learned ASJ; the process was actually issued by
the clerical staff on 02.03.2010 and actual publication was carried out by
the process server on 08.03.2010 whereby the Appellant was required to
appear before the Court on 27.03.2010. It is urged that as per Section 82
of the Code a period of at least 30 days is required to be given to a person
against whom a proclamation has been issued (since the date of
publication) to appear in the Court. Since in this case a period of just 19
days was given, the proclamation itself was illegal.
3. Second, that Section 174-A IPC was inserted by way of amendment by
the Act of 25 of 2005 and became enforceable w.e.f. 23.06.2006. It is
urged that the offence is triable by the Magistrate of First Class. Yet, in
the instant case no challan/report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was
submitted before the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, ('MM')
rather the learned ASJ herself tried the Appellant for the offence
punishable under Section 174-A as well in the case under Section 307/34
IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act. It is urged that infact on Appellant's
arrest in connected case he himself applied for issuance of the production
warrant on 01.10.2012 but instead of acting on his request, a production
warrant was issued at the request of the IO who effected his arrest under
Section 41 (1) (c) of the Code. It is thus urged that the trial by the learned
ASJ is illegal.
4. It may be noted that the Appellant was arrested or had surrendered in the
connected case on 03.09.2012, that is, more than two years after the
publication of the proclamation under section 82 of the code. It is not the
Appellant's case that he put in an appearance before the Court concerned
within 30 days or that he was incapacitated to appear before the Court
immediately after 30 days of the date of publication of the proclamation.
Thus, even if in pursuance of order dated 15.02.2010 for issuing
proclamation against the Appellant, the proclamation was really
published on 08.03.2010, the fact that he was required to appear on or
before 27th March losses significance. In order to show his bonafide and
escape prosecution under Section 174-A IPC he could have appeared
within 30 days of the publication. I am supported in this view by a
judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Munnawar Hasan v.
State of NCT of Delhi, Crl.Rev. P. No.44/2013 decided on 30.04.2013.
5. I have before me the Trial Court record. Admittedly, the Appellant had
surrendered in some other case on 03.09.2012; a request for interrogation
and arrest of the Appellant was made by Head Constable Vijay Dutt to
the learned ASJ on 03.10.2012 which permission was granted to him.
The Appellant was consequently arrested under Section 41(1)(c) Cr.P.C.
as he had been declared as a proclaimed offender. Thus, filing of the
kalandra under Section 41(1)(c) was not a report under Section 173
Cr.P.C. prepared by the officer in charge of the Police Station. Thus, on
the basis of the earlier said Kalandra under Section 41(1)(c) Cr.P.C. the
Appellant could not have been tried for the offence punishable under
Section 174-A IPC. All the more, it was only a 'MM' who was entitled
to take cognizance and to try the offence under Section 174-A IPC. On
the other hand, the Appellant was tried by the learned ASJ alongwith
main case under Section 307/34 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act. The
procedure adopted by the learned ASJ was totally illegal. A common
judgment was passed by the learned ASJ whereby he was acquitted of the
charges under Section 307/34 IPC and 25/27/54/59 of the Arms Act but
was convicted under Section 174-A IPC.
6. Since the trial was illegal the impugned judgment convicting the
Appellant under Section 174-A IPC is hereby set aside. However, this
order shall be without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to file a
report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against the Appellant before the learned
'MM' and to have a trial in accordance with law.
7. The Appeal stands disposed of in above terms.
(G.P. MITTAL)
JUDGE
MAY 23, 2013
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