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citation codes
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  • Section 29 of the old Act, Section 34 of the said Code r/w Section 41 of the old Act and Section 3 of the Interest Act
  • provisions of Section 31(7) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the New Act)
  • Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Contract Act)
  • Sections 30 & 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred
  • SECTION 73 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 31(7)(b) of the New Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 29 of the old Act, Section 34 of the said Code r/w Section 41 of the old Act and Section 3 of the Interest Act
  • provisions of Section 31(7) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the New Act)
  • Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Contract Act)
  • Sections 30 & 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred
  • SECTION 73 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 31(7)(b) of the New Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Limited (IFFCO) floated a tender for construction of 'B' type residential quarters at its Aonla plant. Duggal Construction (India) Ltd. (Duggal) submitted a bid and was awarded contract No. 117 on 8.4.1985 for construction of 257 quarters (contract value Rs. 4,26,80,000) and subsequently contract No. 117-A on 25.5.1985 for 128 quarters (of about the same value). The Letter of Intent dated 8.4.1985 fixed an 18-month completion period and provided for liquidated damages at 0.5% of contract price per week of delay subject to a maximum of 5% of the contract price.

Both contracts were delayed (16 months and 12 months respectively). Disputes as to payments were referred to arbitration before two arbitrators, who framed issues regarding breach of contract and entitlement to damages. By award dated 6.6.1997 the arbitrators awarded Duggal a net sum of Rs. 1,30,23,790 (after set-off), interest @ 18% p.a. on awarded sums (which amounted to Rs. 1,87,20,000 for the pre-award period), and further post-award interest on the total. IFFCO filed objections under sections 30 & 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Old Act) (registered as Suit No. 1412-A/1997).

The learned single Judge (impugned order dated 25.4.2001) allowed only one objection: disallowing escalation awarded beyond the contractual 5% ceiling, treating that ceiling as applicable even for the spillover/post-original-period. The remainder of the award was made rule of the court. Cross-appeals were thereafter filed; the present opinion addresses those appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrators were entitled to award compound interest (interest on the interest component) in the absence of a contractual provision permitting compound interest.
  2. Whether the rate of interest fixed by the arbitrators—18% per annum—was excessive for the post-award period and, if so, whether a lower rate should be applied.
  3. Whether the contractual ceiling of 5% on escalation (liquidated damages / escalation clauses) barred Duggal from claiming escalation or damages for labour and material cost increases for the spillover period during which delay was attributable to IFFCO (i.e., whether the arbitrators could award escalation beyond the 5% ceiling as compensation under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872).

Arguments of the Parties

IFFCO's Arguments

  • Challenged the arbitrators' award on several grounds under the Old Act, principally that the arbitrators exceeded jurisdiction by awarding escalation beyond the 5% contractual ceiling.
  • Contended that the award of interest at 18% p.a. throughout was excessive; specifically challenged the grant of compound interest (interest on interest), arguing that compound interest is not permissible absent a contractual provision.
  • Maintained that interest on interest (i.e., compound interest) and the interest rate post-award were not sustainable.

Duggal's Arguments

  • Contended that the arbitrators' calculation of labour and material escalation followed the contract formulae and government notifications; only the 5% ceiling prevented recovery of the full calculated amount.
  • Argued that escalation awarded for the spillover period (statutory increases in labour rates and material costs after the stipulated contract period) represented damages for losses caused by IFFCO's breach and were recoverable under Section 73 of the Contract Act; therefore the 5% ceiling applicable during the contract period should not bar compensation for extra costs caused by owner-attributable delay.
  • Maintained that where the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is plausible, courts should not interfere; relied on precedents to support non-interference with the arbitrators' view and to argue that embargoes on escalation should not extend beyond the original period if delay was caused by the employer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora & Company, (2010) 3 SCC 690 Arbitral awards cannot grant interest on interest (compound interest) for pre-award or post-award periods unless contract provides for it; construction of Section 31(7)(b) of the New Act that "sum directed to be paid" refers to substantive claims (principal) not interest on that principal. Used to conclude that arbitrators could not have awarded compound interest in the present case in absence of contractual provision; applied to set aside post-award interest on the interest component of the award.
Pt. Munshi Ram and Associates (P) Ltd. v. DDA, (2011) 163 PLR 20 Authority of an arbitrator to grant compound interest exists only under contract; both Old Act and New Act interpretations do not permit arbitrator to award compound interest absent contractual provision; courts retain power to deny compound interest if contrary to public policy. Relied upon to reinforce that compound interest cannot be awarded where contract is silent; supported setting aside of compound interest in this case.
State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co., (2005) 11 SCC 197 Guidance on appropriate rate of interest — recognizes changing interest regimes and allows courts to moderate rates where necessary. Guided the court to reduce post-award interest rate from 18% to 12% per annum for the period after the award until payment, on the principal amount only.
K.N. Sathyapalan (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of Kerala, (2007) 13 SCC 43 Where one party's failure to fulfill contractual obligations directly affects execution, the arbitrator may compensate the other party for extra costs incurred (reliance on Section 73 of the Contract Act). Applied as the most apposite authority for allowing recovery of extra escalation/damages for the spillover period attributable to IFFCO; used to sustain the arbitrators' award of escalation beyond the 5% ceiling as compensation for owner-caused delay.
Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 2911 Where contract provided for no escalation during contract pendency, the embargo should not be carried beyond the completion period if delay is due to employer; arbitrator's award in such circumstances should not be interfered with. Relied upon by Duggal and considered by this Court to support the proposition that embargo on escalation need not extend to periods of delay caused by the owner; used to support non-interference with the arbitrators' award.
New India Civil Erectors (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, AIR 1997 SC 980 Where parties have expressly stipulated that price is firm and not subject to escalation until completion, contractor is not entitled to escalation for work completed after expiry of contract period. Relied upon by IFFCO to argue against post-period escalation; considered by the Court but not found to overturn the arbitrators' fact-based finding that excess costs were caused by IFFCO and thus recoverable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the three principal contentions in turn and applied the relevant legal principles and precedents identified in the record.

1. Compound interest (interest on interest):

  • The Court noted the award included both principal and interest accrued from the date of reference to the date of award, and also granted post-award interest at 18% p.a. on the total including the interest component.
  • Relying on State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora and the Division Bench decision in Pt. Munshi Ram & Associates, the Court held that an arbitral tribunal cannot award compound interest (interest on interest) unless the contract expressly permits such an award; statutory provisions interpreted by higher courts do not, by themselves, authorize compound interest.
  • Because the contract in the present case contained no specific provision for compound interest, the Court set aside the award to the extent it granted post-award interest on the component of interest (i.e., interest on the Rs. 1,87,20,000 interest component). The Court limited post-award interest to operate only on the principal awarded amount.

2. Rate of post-award interest:

  • The Court accepted that a higher interest regime existed during the earlier period of the dispute and that awarding 18% p.a. up to the date of the award (6.6.1997) was not objectionable.
  • However, recognizing that interest regimes declined after that period and guided by State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction, the Court held that 18% p.a. for the post-award period would be excessive.
  • Accordingly, the Court substituted post-award interest at 12% p.a. (simple interest) to be payable on the principal amount awarded (and not on the interest component) from the date of the award until payment.

3. Escalation for labour and material during spillover period (5% ceiling issue):

  • The single Judge had disallowed escalation beyond the contract ceiling of 5%, holding that the ceiling applied to the entire period during which the contract subsisted (including spillover), and treated the arbitrators' contrary conclusion as wrong.
  • On review, the Court examined the contract clauses: clause 1 (contract price and escalation formula in NIT), clause 2 (18-month period and liquidated damages at 0.5% per week subject to maximum 5% for delay in completion), and clause 3.0 of the first schedule (limiting escalation of all items together to 5% of contract value, after setting out formulas for labour and material components).
  • The Court emphasized two principles: (a) an arbitrator is a judge chosen by the parties and courts should not interfere where the arbitrator's interpretation of contract clauses is plausible; and (b) the arbitrators applied the contract-prescribed formulae for escalation (not an ad hoc formula). The Court recognized that the pivotal question was whether the ceiling of 5% applied even to compensation for extra costs where delay was caused by the owner.
  • Relying on K.N. Sathyapalan and similar authorities, the Court held that where delay is attributable to the owner, the arbitrator may compensate the contractor for extra costs under Section 73 of the Contract Act; the absence of a specific contractual prohibition against claiming compensation in such circumstances meant the arbitrators' conclusion was plausible and sustainable.
  • Therefore, the Court concluded that the single Judge erred in interfering with the arbitrators' award on this point, and it reinstated the arbitrators' award insofar as escalation/damages for the owner-attributable spillover period were concerned.

Overall analytical approach: The Court applied authoritative Supreme Court precedent to procedural and substantive questions arising from the award. Where precedent limited arbitrators' powers (compound interest), the Court followed it and modified the award accordingly. Where the arbitrators had applied contract formulae and reached a plausible interpretation on fact-sensitive issues (attribution of delay and resultant damages), the Court declined to substitute its view and sustained the award.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeals are allowed in part and the arbitral award dated 6.6.1997 is modified as follows:

  • Compound interest: The award of post-award interest on the interest component (i.e., interest on the Rs. 1,87,20,000 quantified as interest from date of reference to date of award) is set aside. Post-award interest shall not be payable on that interest component.
  • Post-award interest rate: Post-award interest shall be payable at 12% per annum (simple interest) on the principal awarded amount of Rs. 1,30,23,790 (and not on the interest component) from the date of the award until payment. The 18% p.a. awarded up to the date of the award remains unchallenged for that pre-award period.
  • Escalation/damages for spillover period: The arbitral finding that Duggal was entitled to escalation/compensation for the period of delay attributable to IFFCO (calculated per contractual formulae) is sustained; the single Judge's interference limiting recovery to the 5% ceiling was set aside.
  • The award is otherwise sustained; the award stands modified only to the extent noted above. The appeals were allowed to the aforesaid extent, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications: The direct consequences are (i) Duggal remains entitled to the award amount subject to the modification that post-award interest will be calculated only on the principal (Rs. 1,30,23,790), and at a reduced rate of 12% p.a. simple interest for the post-award period; (ii) the arbitrators' award of escalation/damages for periods of delay attributable to the employer (IFFCO) is reinstated and not limited by the 5% contractual ceiling for the spillover period. The Court applied existing Supreme Court precedents to limit compound interest and to moderate post-award interest; it did not purport to lay down any novel principle beyond those precedents.

This summary is restricted to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

    Indian Farmers Fertiliser Co-Operative Ltd. v. Duggal Constructions (India) Ltd. .

    Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.:— Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Limited (for short ‘IFFCO’) floated a tender for construction of ‘B’ Type residential quarters for its township at its Fertilizer Plant in Aonla (District Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh). Duggal Construction (India) Ltd. (for short ‘Duggal’) submitted its bid for the same and vide letter dated 8.4.1985, contract No. 117 was allotted to Duggal for construction of 257 quarters for contract value of Rs. 4,26,80,000.00. In response to the very same tender another contract No. 117-A for construction of 128 quarters was awarded to Duggal vide letter dated 25.5.1985 of about the same value.

    2. The contract was to be completed within a period of 18 months as per clause 2 of Letter of Intent (for short ‘LoI’) dated 8.4.1985 Any delay was to attract liquidated damages. The relevant clause 2 reads as under:

    “The entire job has to be completed within a period of 18 (eighteen) months from the date of acceptance this Letter of Intent. Any delay in completion of job will attract liquidated damages at the rate of per cent (half per cent) of the contract price (as defined under clause 1 of the letter) for each week of delay or part thereof, subject to a maximum of 5 per cent of the contract price.”

    The contracts were delayed by sixteen (16) months and twelve (12) months respectively.

    3. The contract between the parties provided for reference of disputes to arbitration and since disputes arose about the payments to be made by IFFCO to Duggal, the same were referred to two learned arbitrators Mr. Justice M.S Gujral (Retd.) and Air Commodore Mr. B.S Gathwala (Retd.). The arbitrators framed two issues qua the disputes as under:

    “a. Whether breach of contract has been committed, if so by which party and to what extent?

    b. Which party is entitled to damages from the other party and to what extent?”

    The arbitrators published their award on 6.6.1997 holding that Duggal was entitled to Rs. 1,31,22,353.00 from IFFCO while IFFCO was entitled to Rs. 98,654,00 from Duggal and, thus, a net award in favour of Duggal for Rs. 1,30,23,790.00 was made. Duggal was also held entitled to interest @ 18 per cent per annum on the aforesaid amount which itself amounted to Rs. 1,87,20,000.00. Thus, the total amount awarded under the award to Duggal was Rs. 3,17,43,790. Needless to say that this interest was calculated from the date of entering upon reference till date of award and further interest was also awarded from the date of award till date of payment on the sum of Rs. 3,17,43,790.00.

    4. IFFCO filed objections under sections 30 & 33 of the arbitration act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Old Act’), which was registered as Suit No. 1412-A/1997. The principal grievance IFFCO was that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction by awarding escalation over and above the ceiling limit of 5 per cent prescribed under the contract with a further grievance against rate of 18 per cent per annum interest. The rate of interest of 18 per cent per annum was also stated to be disputed apart from the fact that interest on interest component under the award amounted to granting compound interest which was not permissible.

    5. The learned single Judge in terms of impugned order dated 25.4.2001 has allowed only one objection, i.e, award of escalation which was stated to be under the garb of damages as according to the learned single Judge such amount could not have exceeded the maximum ceiling limit of 5 per cent of the contract value. Thus, the ceiling limit which was to prevail during the period of contract was held applicable also for the spillover period. The remaining part of the award was made rule of the court.

    6. We are, thus, faced with a set of cross-appeals arising from the impugned order.

    7. Learned counsel for IFFCO sought to urge the following aspects in his appeal:

    Grant of compound interest:

    8. The award contains both the principal amount and the interest component from the date of reference till date of award. For the post award period, interest had been granted @ 18 per cent per annum. Thus, learned senior counsel for IFFCO assailed the grant of compound interest, i.e, interest on the interest element.

    9. The aforesaid issue, to our mind, is no more res integra in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. S.L Arora & Company, (2010) 3 SCC 690. While construing the provisions of Section 31(7) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘New Act’) it has been held that the expression “sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award” in Section 31(7)(b) of the New Act refers to the award of sums of substantive claims, i.e, the principal amount awarded and not the interest awarded on that principal amount. An arbitral tribunal has been held not to award interest on interest or compound interest for pre-award or post award period unless there is a provision, in the contract providing so.

    10. In Pt. Munshi Ram and Associates (P) Ltd. v. DDA, (2011) 163 PLR 20, a Division Bench of this Court examined various judgements on this issue while coming to the following conclusion:

    “20. We are unequivocally of the view that the authority of an arbitrator to grant compound interest can only be under a contract as the applicable statutes, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, permitting grant of interest by an arbitrator being Section 29 of the old Act, Section 34 of the said Code r/w Section 41 of the old Act and Section 3 of the Interest Act do not permit specifically the grant of such compound interest. The position is thus same in respect of the authority to grant compound interest under the new Act and the old Act. We also make it clear that even where there is such a provision in the contract, the authority of the Court is not taken away not to grant such compound interest if it is in conflict with or in violation of the public policy of India as observed in para 18.3 of State of Haryana v. S.L Arora & Co. case (supra). As for the facts of the present case are concerned, as already noticed, there is no contract for compound interest and thus compound interest cannot be awarded.”

    11. In the facts of the present case it is not disputed by learned counsel for Duggal that there is no specific term of the contract providing for compound interest. Thus, to the extent that for the post award period interest has been allowed @ 18 per cent per annum even on the component of interest contained in the award of Rs. 1,87,20,000.00 is not sustainable. We accordingly set aside the award of this compound interest, i.e, interest post award on the component of interest forming a part of the award.

    Rate of interest being excessive:

    12. Learned senior counsel for IFFCO contended that grant of interest @ 18 per cent per annum throughout is excessive. In this behalf, we may notice that there was undoubtedly an interest regime of higher interest for the earlier period of the dispute and, thus, to the extent interest has been awarded @ 18 per cent per annum till the date of the award, i.e, 6.6.1997 cannot be faulted. It is also a matter of common knowledge that the regime of interest declined post that period and we do find that the award of interest @ 18 per cent per annum post the period of the award would be excessive. We are guided by the observations qua the issue of rate of interest by the Supreme Court's judgement in State Of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co., (2005) 11 SCC 197. We are, thus, inclined to grant interest @ 12 per cent per annum on the principal amount awarded under the award for the period post the date of the award till payment instead of 18 per cent per annum.

    Award of Loss & Profit Damages on account of increase in overheads:

    13. The third aspect urged by learned senior for IFFCO before us pertained to the award of sum of Rs. 18,16,000.00 in contract No. 117 and Rs. 7,18,000.00 in contract No. 117-A on the aforesaid account. We asked learned senior counsel to explain as to where this aspect has been discussed in the impugned order by the learned single Judge. Learned counsel has failed to point out any such discussion. Learned counsel did seek to contend that as per his instructions the said aspect was urged before the learned single Judge. We, however, are not inclined to examine this plea on account of the fact that there is no such discussion in the impugned order nor did IFFCO at any stage move the learned single Judge by filing an appropriate application claiming that some aspects which they had urged had escaped the attention of the learned single Judge resulting in non-adjudication thereof. We also asked learned counsel to point out as to whether in the grounds of appeal this aspect has been raised, i.e, that something had been urged over which there is no pronouncement. Learned counsel fairly conceded that such a plea had not been taken though there is a mention that the amount ought not to have been awarded.

    14. We, thus, find no merit in this plea.

    15. The aforesaid are, thus, the only three aspects raised by learned counsel for IFFCO qua FAO(OS) No. 294/2001.

    Limiting labour & material costs escalation to 5% for spillover period:

    16. This brings us to the appeal of Duggal, i.e, FAO(OS) No. 374/2001, where Duggal is aggrieved by the interference of the learned single Judge with the impugned award qua the restriction arising from the ceiling of 5 per cent of contract value even for the period post the original period within which the contract had to be executed.

    17. To appreciate the plea, we would first like to turn to the reasoning of the learned single Judge in this behalf. The discussion is from page 8 onwards. The learned single Judge took note of clause 1 of the letter of award dated 8.4.1985 which prescribed the contract price and stipulated that price was subject to escalation as per escalation formula stipulated in the NIT. Clause 2 prescribed the period of contract as eighteen (18) months with a provision for liquidated damages at half () per cent of contract price for each week of delay or part thereof subject to maximum of 5 per cent of the contract price. Article 38 provided for all prices to be fixed for the duration of the contract without escalation unless stated otherwise in the first schedule. Clause 3.0 of the first schedule to the contract provided for escalation for material procured by the contractor to be limited to a maximum ceiling of 5 per cent of the contract value.

    18. The learned single Judge thereafter proceeded to discuss the findings of the arbitrators qua the claim in respect of labour and material escalation for spill over period. IFFCO had pleaded the limit of 5 per cent while Duggal pleaded that the claim for escalation was, in fact, a claim for damages for loss suffered by them because of breach of obligations on the part of IFFCO which had caused the delay in execution of the contract. The arbitrators found that there was no specific clause prohibiting Duggal from claiming compensation in a situation where a contract could not be performed within the stipulated period due to the fault of IFFCO and in such a situation Duggal was held entitled to escalation cost for performing the contract during the expended period.

    19. The learned single Judge, however, did not agree with the interpretation of the clauses by the arbitral tribunal as the letter dated 8.4.1985 fixed the contract price subject to escalation formula. The extent of damages that Duggal could claim was, thus, held subject to 5 per cent of the contract price as per clause 2. The duration of contract was held to imply the period during which the contract subsists and since the work went on beyond the originally stipulated date of the contract, the duration of contract was held to include the entire period during which the contract subsisted which was beyond the originally stipulated period of contract for completion of work.

    20. The learned single Judge did not agree with the finding that the arbitral tribunal had power to award damages which could not have been granted under the heading of escalation. The objection of IFFCO was, thus, held to be wrongly decided by the arbitral tribunal as the terms of the contract were held to construe only one interpretation and not two plausible ones.

    21. Learned counsel for Duggal invited our attention to claim No. 2 for Rs. 32,40,929.40 on account of labour escalation by reason of statutory increases and claim No. 4 for escalation in materials for Rs. 3,38,181.38. He emphasized that the formula for labour component applied was as per the contract and the labour rates were taken from the Government notifications. It was, thus, pleaded that there was really no dispute about the methodology of calculation but the dispute arose on account of ceiling of 5 per cent of the contract value. The claim, thus, arose especially on account of statutory increases in labour rates that occurred after the stipulated period of contract imposing additional financial burden on Duggal. Since the blame for delay lay on IFFCO, Duggal claimed that they were entitled to the full amount.

    22. Similarly in so far as the escalation in the cost of material is concerned the formula as per contract was applied and, once again, the ceiling limit came in the way.

    23. Learned counsel for Duggal emphasized that clause 3.0 limit the escalation in cost of labour and material to the extent of 5 per cent of the value of the contract could not be a bar to Duggal claiming estimated expenditure as a component of compensation of damages under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “the Contract Act”) for such part of the extended or spillover period as the delay was occasioned by the breaches on the part of IFFCO. The work had got delayed as much as 16 months and 11 months under the contract and the arbitral tribunal on consideration of the evidence and material on record held that IFFCO was responsible for having caused the delay to the extent of eight (8) months in relation of each of the two contracts while the remaining delays were occasioned over which neither party had any control. Thus, the excess expenditures incurred on account of spillover were liable to be reimbursed to Duggal.

    24. The first aspect of the submission flows from the plea that the interpretation of the terms of the contract by the arbitral tribunal ought not to be interfered with unless such interpretation was absurd or contrary to law. As long as the view taken by the arbitral tribunal is plausible, though perhaps not the only correct view, the Court could not interfere or substitute its own opinion. We may notice that, in fact, this plea has been recorded by the learned single Judge but he came to the conclusion that the only view plausible was the one which he had taken. The escalation had further been calculated as per the accepted formula given in the contract.

    25. Learned counsel for Duggal referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in K.N Sathyapalan (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of Kerala, (2007) 13 SCC 43. One of the questions which arose for consideration was a claim arising out of the failure of the opposite party to fulfill its obligations directly affecting the execution of the work by the claimant party. The claimant party was held entitled to the claim towards extra cost incurred by him as per Section 73 of the Contract Act. The arbitrator was held vested with the authority to compensate the second claim for extra cost incurred as a result of failure of the first party to live up to its obligations. In the facts of the case the contractor had been prevented by unforeseen circumstances from completing the work within the stipulated period of eleven (11) months which delay could have been prevented had the State Government stepped in to prevent the law & order situation which had been created at the work site. There were other reasons also on account of which the work could not proceed and compensation was awarded.

    26. Learned counsel for Duggal relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Limited., AIR 2008 SC 2911, where the terms of the contract provided for no escalation during the pendency of the contract. It was held that the embargo would not be carried beyond the period for completion of the contract and in case the arbitrator awarded the amount, the court would not sit in appeal over the decision.

    27. On the other hand learned senior counsel for IFFCO has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in New India Civil Erectors (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, AIR 1997 SC 980, to advance the proposition that where there is an expressed stipulation between the parties as to the price being firm and not subject to any escalation till completion of work, the contractor was not entitled to escalation for work completed after expiry of period of contract.

    28. We have examined the aforesaid controversy. The first thing we would like to notice is that the arbitrator is a judge chosen by the parties and the undisputed legal position that the interpretation of clauses of contract made by the arbitrators must prevail even if there are two plausible views. Of course, if the arbitrator acts contrary to the terms of the contract or finds an absurd interpretation or an interpretation contrary to any law, the Court, is not without jurisdiction to interfere with the same. It is in the context of this principle that the interpretation of the clause as made by the arbitral tribunal will have to be considered.

    29. The other equally important aspect is that the escalation towards the labour and material cost has been made as per the formula stipulated in the contract and not something devised by the arbitrators themselves. The only issue, thus, is whether the ceiling of 5 per cent of the contract value which was applicable during the period of contract would also apply to the spillover period even if the contractor is not to blame. The undisputed position is that what the arbitrators have awarded is for the spillover period to the extent that the blame lay at the door of IFFCO. Now turning to the clauses of the contract, clause 1 states contract price and restricts the escalation as per escalation formula stipulated in the NIT. The period of contract is 18 months and the contractor is to suffer liquidated damages @ (half) per cent of the contract price for each week of delay or part thereof subject to a maximum of 5 per cent of the contract price. This is apparent from the wording of clause-2 because such liquidated damages are subject to a maximum of 5 per cent of the contract price is provided for “any delay in completion of the job”. The job had to be completed by Duggal/contractor. Clause 3.0 of the first schedule provided for escalation of all items together will be limited to a maximum ceiling limit of 5 per cent of the contract value. This was after the clause of escalation for labour component and escalation for material procured by the contractor giving the relevant formulas.

    30. On a conspectus of the clauses we are of the considered view that the finding of the arbitral tribunal cannot be faulted nor was any interference called for by the learned single Judge on this aspect. The arbitral tribunal was right in concluding that there was nothing prohibiting Duggal/contractor from claiming compensation in such a situation where the contract could not be performed within the stipulated period due to the fault of IFFCO. The conclusion arrived at by the arbitrators in following terms is unexceptionable:

    “In our case there is no specific clause which prohibits the contractor from claiming compensation in a situation where the contract could not be performed within the stipulated period due to the fault of the owner. In our opinion in such a situation the contractor is entitled to escalation cost for performing the contract during the extended period. The relevant clause in this contract is only an enabling clause to allow the contractor to claim escalation during the contract period though that is limited to 5% of the contract period, but there is no prohibition that if the owner has caused delay and has thereby created a situation where the contractor had to incur extra heavy expenditure, he could not claim the same, as damages.”

    31. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge that this interpretation of the terms of the contract was either de hors the contract or that the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge could be the only correct conclusion. We find that the conclusion of the arbitral tribunal is not only plausible but we agree with the said conclusion.

    32. The learned single Judge seems to have been persuaded to take a different view from the arbitrators on account of the meaning of duration, i.e, the duration of the contract stood extended beyond the original term. The question is not whether the duration stood extended but as to who is to blame for the extended period for which the duration of the contract became longer. The arbitral tribunal has given a finding that on account of various faults on the part of IFFCO there was a delay attributable to it and it is for this period that the amount has been awarded on the principles of Section 73 of the Contract Act. Such period has been specified as eight (8) months out of the total period of delay under the two contracts. In so far as the legal position in this behalf is concerned, of the various judgements referred to aforesaid, the most apposite to our mind is the judgement of the Supreme Court in K.N Sathyapalan (Dead) By LRs. Case (supra). It has been clearly held that the parties would be bound by the terms agreed upon in the contract but in the event of one of the parties to the contract is unable to fulfill its obligations under the contract which has a direct bearing on the work to be executed by the other party, the arbitrator is vested with the authority to compensate the second party for the extra costs incurred by him as a result of the failure of the first party to live up to its obligations. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. The arbitrators in their wisdom, thus, for the period of delay attributable to IFFCO (which finding cannot be really disputed being a finding of fact on appreciation of evidence) have calculated the compensation payable under Section 73 of the Contract Act and on the basis of the same formula as was agreed to in the contract for calculation for the escalation during the period of the contract albeit with the ceiling of 5 per cent.

    33. We are, thus, of the view that no interference was called for in the award by the learned single Judge on this account and, thus, to that extent the impugned order is set aside and the award sustained.

    Conclusion:

    34. As a result of the findings which we have arrived at aforesaid Duggal is entitled to the amount as per the award dated 6.6.1997 except to the extent that for the post award period, the interest would not be payable on the interest component of the award. Thus, interest would be payable post award only on Rs. 1,30,23,790.00 and not on the interest component in the award from date of reference till date of award which was quantified at Rs. 1,87,20,000.00. Further the interest post the award would be @ 12 per cent per annum (simple interest) instead of 18 per cent per annum.

    35. The award stands modified to that extent.

    36. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

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    Indian Farmers Fertiliser Co-Operative Ltd. v. Duggal Constructions (India) Ltd. .
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