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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Sections 138/132/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 240 Cr.P.C Both these provisions
  • ARTICLE 20 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision of Section 223 Cr.P.C,
  • section 223 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 251 Cr.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Sections 138/132/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 240 Cr.P.C Both these provisions
  • ARTICLE 20 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision of Section 223 Cr.P.C,
  • section 223 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 251 Cr.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two petitions challenging an order dated 2nd June, 2003, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, concerning the mode of trial in a complaint case filed under Sections 138/132/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The case involved ten accused persons, all directors or officers of a company accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque. The impugned order allowed the trial to be split, proceeding against three accused who had appeared, while simultaneously continuing efforts to procure the presence of the remaining accused. The petitions contest the legality of splitting the trial in this manner.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether in a complaint case or a case filed on police report, the Court can split the trial by proceeding simultaneously against accused persons who have appeared and those whose presence is still being procured.
  2. Whether such splitting of trial violates Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C), which mandates joint trial of persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction.
  3. Whether requiring accused persons to disclose their defence at the stage of notice of offence violates Article 20 of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the procedural provisions distinguishing summons cases and warrant cases under Sections 251 and 240 of the Cr.P.C. It clarified that in summons cases, the accused is required to be informed of the particulars of the offence and asked whether they plead guilty or have a defence to make, which includes disclosure of defence if not pleading guilty. This does not violate Article 20 of the Constitution, as the accused is entitled to state their defence at this stage.

The court then examined Section 223 Cr.P.C., which mandates that persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction must be charged and tried together. The court found that all accused in the instant case were charged with offences arising from the same transaction and therefore must be tried jointly.

Splitting the trial by proceeding against some accused who had appeared while continuing to procure the presence of others was held to be impermissible. Such splitting would cause intermittent trial proceedings, complicate evidence recording, and potentially require recalling witnesses, thus prejudicing the fairness and efficiency of the trial. The court noted that if the trial court was concerned about delay, it could have issued coercive processes or declared absconding accused as proclaimed offenders under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C.

Accordingly, the court set aside the impugned order splitting the trial and directed that all accused be served notice simultaneously under Section 251 Cr.P.C. and tried together in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed and the impugned order splitting the trial is set aside.

The court directed the trial to proceed by serving notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. on all accused persons and trying them jointly. This decision ensures compliance with statutory provisions mandating joint trial of accused persons involved in the same transaction and preserves the procedural fairness and integrity of the trial. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the established legal principles governing joint trials and procedural safeguards under the Cr.P.C.

    Jitender Narottam Das Mehrotra & Ors Petitioners v. State & Ors S

    J.D Kapoor, J.:— Both the above petition Nos. Crl. M (M) 3168/2003 and Crl. M (M) 3171/2003 stand disposed of by the following common order as not only the parties are common, but the question of law and facts involved therein are identical.

    2. Short question involved for determination is whether in a complaint case or for that purpose in a case filed on the police report, Court can split the trial in respect of those accused persons who are appearing before the Court and simultaneously continue the proceedings against those whose presence is still being procured through some process or the other. In other words can the court create multiple stages in one trial.

    3. Impugned, order dated 2nd June, 2003 passed by Sh. S.N Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi has been challenged as to the mode of trial adopted by the learned ASJ, as out of as many as ten accused persons, notice of offence was given to three of them and after they entered into the plea of not guilty, the learned Additional Sessions Judge fixed the case for complainant's evidence against these persons and at the same time listed the matter for the appearance of the remaining accused including the petitioner.

    4. Impugned order has been assailed on the following premises:—

    (i) That it is against the provision of Section 223 Cr.P.C, according to which persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of same transaction are to be charged and tried together;

    (ii) It is violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of India in as much as petitioners were forced by the Court to disclose their defence which they did by way of written defence and thereby the court not only provided an opportunity to the complainant to modify or adjust their case by filling up the lacuna but also compelled the accused to be witness against him which is prohibited by Article 20.

    (iii) It is for the complainant or the prosecution to prove the case against the accused and not for the accused persons to first come out with their defence.

    5. Procedure for stating substance of accusation to the accused in a sum mons case is laid down in Section 251 Cr.P.C whereas the procedure for framing charge in a warrant case is provided in Section 240 Cr.P.C Both these provisions need to be reproduced to discern the distinction between the pro cedures in a summons case and a warrant case. Section 251 Cr.P.C is as under:—

    “252. Substance of accusation to be stated.

    When in a summonscase the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge.”

    6. Section 240 provides as under:

    “240. Framing of charge.

    (1) If, upon such consideration examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

    (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

    7. Bare perusal of these provisions shows that after stating the particulars of the offence in a summons case the court shall first ask him whether he pleads guilty and in case the accused does not, he shall then be asked what defence he has to make. It is only in a warrant case where the charge is framed that the accused is asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. Expression “claims to be tried” impliedly means that the accused pleads not guilty and therefore claims to be tried. In that case the Magistrate cannot ask the accuse to what defence he has to make. This distinction is because of summon cases being ordinarily triable summarily and not by way of a full dress trial required in a warrant case.

    8. To say that the accused or the petitioners were only required to enter into plea of not guilty and could not have been asked to make their defence, is not correct. Again to say that disclosure of defence by the accused in reply to the statement of particulars of offence is violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of India is difficult to accept as under Section 251 Cr.P.C itself the accused is required to state his defence in case he does not plead guilty. As a consequence, the contention that the accused cannot be allowed to first come out with his defence looses its force. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that it is incumbent upon prosecution to first prove its case beyond doubt.

    9. However, as regards the contention that the Additional Sessions Judge vide impugned order could not split up the trial by serving notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C on some of the accused persons and simultaneously continue the proceedings for appearance of the remaining accused answer is provided in section 223 of Cr. P.C It provides as under:—

    “223. What persons may be charged jointly.

    The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely:—

    (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction;

    (b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence;

    (c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months;

    (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction;

    (e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named offence;

    (f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence;

    (g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to counterfeit coin and person ac cused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such of fence; and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges:

    Provided that where a number of person-are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall, within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together.”

    10. It is apparent that Section 223 prescribes that the persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of same transaction are to be charged and tried together. So much so Section 223 even requires the Court to frame the charge and try even those persons who are accused of more than one offence of the same kind or different offences committed in the course of same transaction.

    11. In the instant case, a complaint was filed under Sections 138/132/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on account of the dishonour of the cheque issued by the Company of which the petitioner and co-accused happen to be Chairman, Managing Director and Directors. As many as ten persons were arrayed as accused. As is apparent, all of them were accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction. Cheque was issued on behalf of the Company whereas all the Directors including the Chairman and Managing Director were accused of having committed the offence on account of their being incharge of and responsible for the affairs of the Company at the relevant time. In such a circumstance, there was no other option open to the learned Trial Court than to try all of them together.

    12. As in the warrant case charges are framed against all the accused persons together, similarly in a summons case also notice containing particulars of the offence has to be given to all the accused persons together, as it is not permissible to create multiple stages of proceedings in one trial.

    13. Splitting of trial against some of the accused and simultaneously continue with the proceedings of procuring the presence of remaining accused is neither legally permissible nor congenial to the trial as it has to be intermit-tently subjected to fits and starts and the possibility of de novo trial, if even one of the accused appears at the fag end cannot be ruled out.

    14. It is not understandable as to how the evidence of the complainant will be recorded simultaneously with the proceedings for procuring the presence of the remaining accused persons. If at one stage or the other one or two of them appear, it will be incumbent upon the learned Trial Court to serve notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C and again recall the witnesses who have already been examined, for fresh examination in their presence. No witness can be allowed to be examined in the absence of accused until and unless he is declared proclaimed offender.

    15. If the Trial Court was chary of expeditious trial it could have expedited the proceedings by issuing coercive process and declare those persons whose presence was difficult to procure as Proclaimed Offenders as per provisions of 82 and 83 Cr.P.C

    16. In view of the foregoing reasons the petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2002 whereby the trial was split up is set aside as it suffers from inherent infirmity and illegality. Learned ASJ is directed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of law by way of serving notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C upon all the accused persons and try them together.

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    Comments

    Jitender Narottam Das Mehrotra & Ors Petitioners v. State & Ors S
    (Aug 5, 2003)