Pradeep Nandrajog, J.:— By the present order, C.M(M.) No. 394/94 and C.M(M.) No. 395/94 are disposed of CM(M) has been filed by M/s Tata Chemicals Ltd. challenging the impugned order dated 10.6.1994 passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks whereby he had allowed application No. 421889-B dated 14.5.1984 filed by respondent No. 2 in both the petitions and had disallowed the objections Nos. DEL-7732, DEL-7733 and DEL-7734.
2. In C.M(M.) No. 395/94, the same order has been challenged by M/s. Tata Sons Ltd. Petitioners of both the petitions claim to be the Proprietors/licence users of the trade mark “TATA” alleged to be the trademark of internationally known business house operating under the group “THE HOUSE OF TATAS”. It is averred that the word “TATA” is associated with the petitioners and the House of TATAS. Manufacturing activities of the House of TATAS touches almost every aspect of day to day life from edible products to household products, automobile and computers. The trade mark/name TATA is the household word and is exclusively associated in the minds of the public with THE HOUSE OF TATAS.
3. The group companies of the House of TATAS are over 50, out of which, about seven are overseas companies. For the period ending 31.3.1994, the group companies had an annual turnover of approximately Rs. 16,000/- crores.
4. An application was filed by Shri Madan Lal, partner of Ms. Ashoka Industries, a partnership firm having two partners, namely, Shri Madan Lal and Shri Ashok Kumar. The applicant was a promoter of the company M/s Tata Pressure Cooker Manufacturing Company the proprietary rights over the mark TATA, which the applicant stated was being used by him, were assigned to M/s Tata Pressure Cooker Manufacturing Company. As per the application filed, user was claimed since 1.9.1981 in respect of pressure cookers. The application for registration was filed on 14.5.1984 Opposition was filed by the petitioner in the present petition as well as petitioner in C.M(M.) No. 395/94. Both the oppositions were dismissed by order dated 10.6.1994
5. Shri Praveen Anand, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that each of the three counts, on which the opposition has been rejected, are non-sustainable. I shall deal with the three counts as they appear from the impugned order.
6. Firstly, examining the objections, learned Registrar of Trade Marks held that the applicants have successfully submitted evidence of user and reputation in respect of pressure cookers sold by them since 1981 onwards. Therefore, the mark applied for qualifies for registration.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that TATA was not the surname of Madan Lal or his alleged partner Ashok Kumar. How these persons picked up the word TATA as their trade mark/name remained a mystery. The House of TATA, submitted the counsel, was in existence since the 19th Century founded by late Sir Jamshed Ji Tata and the mark “TATA” is a household name in India. He contended that the applicant picked the mark “TATA” by trespassing upon the mark of the petitioner. He stated that it was not a case of honest concurrent user. Counsel relied upon the observations in the Judgment reported as 63 RPC 171, as approved by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment reported as AIR 1990 Delhi 19. The observations of Romar, J., as approved by this Court, are as under:
“In my judgment, the circumstances which attain the adoption of a trade mark in the first instance are of considerable importance when one comes to consider whether the use of that mark is or has not been a common user. If the user in its inception was tainting it would be difficult in most cases to purify it subsequently.”
8. Counsel thus argued, that user by the applicant since 1981 had to be ignored as it was not an honest user and the taint could not be purified by continuous user.
9. The applicant, in reply to the opposition, failed to disclose as to how it struck upon it to adopt the mark TATA as its trade mark/name. In the year 1981, the House of TATAS had indeed become a household name and various products under the mark ‘TATA’ were available in every nook and corner of this country. I, therefore, find merit in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner pertaining to the first ground on which the respondent No. 1 has relied to knock the opposition filed by the petitioner.
10. The second and third ground on which the respondent No. 1 has based its finding are equally non-sustainable. Dealing with the opposition that no mark, the use of which, would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, should be registered and that the mark applied for was a colourable imitation of the mark of the petitioner, the respondent held that though voluminous evidence had been filed by the petitioner, same had to be ignored as in the pleadings, it was not pleaded by the objector that TATA was a registered trade mark of the objector and hence no amount of evidence could be looked into.
11. I have gone through pleadings the facts of opposition. The pleadings clearly disclose that the objector pleaded that TATA was its trade mark. In the grounds of opposition, in ground (1) it was stated that the trade mark and name TATA is a household expression.
12. In ground No. 6, it was stated that in consideration of reputation, accrued to the trade mark TATA the use of an identical trade mark would cause confusion and deception. The word in any case was likely to cause confusion and deception. Thus, the rejection of the evidence of the objector on the ground that there was no pleading, is contrary to the record of respondent No. 1 and finding to this effect is perverse and is required to be quashed.
13. I may also note that the petitioner had filed a suit bearing No. 2104/92 against respondent No. 2 wherein this Court had restrained in from selling or offering for sale the pressure cookers under the trade mark TATA This aspect has been completely overlooked by the Registrar of Trade Marks.
14. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 10.6.1994 is set aside. Since there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent, there shall be no order as to costs.