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Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Arun Khosla, with Ms. Manisha Singh, Advocates for the Petitioners.
  • Mr. Sanjay Gupta, Ms. Varsha & Mr. D.R Thadani, Advocate for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Mukul Mudgal, J.
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Arun Khosla, with Ms. Manisha Singh, Advocates for the Petitioners.
  • Mr. Sanjay Gupta, Ms. Varsha & Mr. D.R Thadani, Advocate for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Mukul Mudgal, J.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Mukul Mudgal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs comprise plaintiff No. 1 (the wife of defendant No. 1) and plaintiffs 2 and 3 (their children). Defendant No. 1 is the husband; defendants 2 and 3 are his parents; defendant No. 6 is his brother; defendant No. 4 is his uncle; defendant No. 5 is his aunt; defendant No. 8 is his cousin.

Plaintiff No. 1 alleged that she lived with defendant No. 1 at the matrimonial home at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi for about eight years, but, due to matrimonial disharmony, she left that home along with plaintiffs 2 and 3 and took shelter in her parents' house on 13 August 1999. She seeks a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the plaintiffs' ingress and egress to the matrimonial home (specifically the suite shown blue in the site plan).

Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement denying the plaintiffs' case, pleading that the remedy, if any, is by proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (restitution of conjugal rights), and invoking Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act as a bar. Defendant No. 1 also alleged that plaintiff No. 1 made scandalous and defamatory remarks in the plaint and that the plaintiff's conduct disentitles her to interim relief. Other defendants (Nos. 2–8) pleaded that plaintiff No. 1 left the house voluntarily.

The court issued notices and took up the suit on multiple dates in early 2000. Defendant No. 1 was not residing at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road at the time of the interim application; he had shifted to his sister's house (said to be at 141, Sunder Nagar), a fact that the court treated as significant in relation to the application for interim relief.

An interlocutory application (IA No. 4241 of 2000) was filed by defendant No. 2 under Order VI Rules 2 and 16 read with Section 151 CPC seeking deletion/striking down of various averments (paras 5–21) of the plaint as false, scandalous and defamatory. The court considered and disposed of that application by striking out paragraph 5(a) of the plaint and directing the filing of an amended plaint within one week.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff (the wife) can obtain an interim injunction to secure ingress and egress to the portion of the house treated as her matrimonial home, pending final determination of rights in the property.
  2. Whether the husband's act of shifting his residence (to his married sister's house) can defeat or frustrate the wife's interim rights to access the matrimonial home.
  3. Whether the availability of remedies under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (restitution of conjugal rights) bars the present suit for injunction seeking access to the matrimonial home.
  4. Whether plaintiff No. 1's maintainability arguments concerning her status as natural guardian of the children are sustainable in the light of existing Supreme Court authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Plaintiff No. 1 lived with defendant No. 1 at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road (the blue-marked suite) for about eight years; she left with the children because of matrimonial disharmony on 13 August 1999 and has been denied access since.
  • She seeks access only to the specific suite marked blue (the portion she previously occupied with defendant No. 1 and the children), not a claim to the entire bungalow.
  • It was suggested that defendant No. 1's departure from the matrimonial home coincided with filing of the suit and service-of-notice efforts, implying the move was designed to frustrate her claim.
  • Plaintiff relied on certain English authorities (including Garasz v. Garazz and other All E.R. authorities) and the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 to support the proposition that a wife has rights of occupation/entry to a matrimonial home; she argued that women in India deserve at least comparable protection given their social status.
  • Plaintiff relied on Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (JT 1999 (1) SC 524) to counter the objection that she is not the natural guardian of the minor children; the court accepted this reliance and held the suit cannot be dismissed on that ground.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendant No. 1 contended the plaint is founded on false premises and that the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy, if any, is under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (restitution of conjugal rights). He also invoked Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act to challenge the suit's maintainability.
  • Defendant No. 1 pointed to scandalous and defamatory averments in the plaint and submitted that the plaintiff's conduct disentitles her to interim relief.
  • Defendant No. 1 asserted that he had left the parents' house and was not the owner of the bungalow; he had shifted to his sister's house, so the relief sought would be infructuous.
  • Defendants 2–8 argued plaintiff No. 1 left voluntarily and was not forced out; they relied on Saroj Rani (1984 (4) SCC 90) and Mahua Biswas (1998 (2) SCC 359) to contend that the claim effectively seeks conjugal rights covered by Section 9 and therefore the suit cannot lie. They also emphasized that the premises belong to defendants 2 and 4 (and defendant No. 1 has no property right), and relied on Sardar Sudhir/Sandhu Singh (60 (1995) DLT 638) to assert that a daughter-in-law has no right to a father-in-law's property.
  • They submitted that plaintiff No. 1 had not attempted to return from 13 August 1999 till 25 January 2000, that there was no balance of convenience in her favour, and that no irreparable loss would be suffered because she was residing with well-to-do parents.
  • Defendants also sought deletion of certain pleadings (paras 5–21) as scandalous and irrelevant (IA No. 4241/2000).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saroj Rani Smt v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, 1984 (4) SCC 90 Held that the concept of conjugal rights is wide and includes the enjoyment of living together. Defendants relied on it to argue the present suit effectively seeks restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9; the court held the law in Saroj Rani could not be applied to the present case at this stage.
Smt. Mahua Biswas v. Swagata Biswas, 1998 (2) SCC 359 Authority for the proposition that matrimonial disputes should be taken to matrimonial courts. Relied upon by defendants to challenge maintainability; the court held that Mahua Biswas (and Saroj Rani) did not apply to the peculiar facts of this case at the interlocutory stage.
Sardar Sandhu/Sudhir Singh v. Narinder Kaur, 60 (1995) DLT 638 Holds that permissive user by a daughter-in-law does not convert possession into a legal right and that the legal obligation to provide residence is that of the husband rather than the husband's father. Defendants relied on it to contend the daughter-in-law had no property right; the court observed the case also supports the proposition that a wife is entitled to seek residence from her husband and used that part to support a legal obligation on the husband to provide a residence.
Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, JT 1999 (1) SC 524 Holds that the mother can be a natural guardian of minor children even though the father is alive. Plaintiff relied on this authority to meet an objection about her status as natural guardian; the court accepted this reliance and held the suit could not be dismissed on that ground.
Garasz v. Garazz, 1969 (3) All E.R. 822 and other All E.R. authorities (1952 (1) All E.R. 1307; 1955 (1) All E.R. 445; 1953 (1) All E.R. 556) and Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 (England) English authorities and statute recognizing wife's rights of occupation/entry to a matrimonial home; Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 provides certain protections to a wife in occupation and procedures for entry where not in occupation. Plaintiff relied on these English authorities to support a right of occupation/entry. The court noted these authorities but held that due to the particular facts (notably the husband not being in occupation) the English principle did not need to be invoked at this interlocutory stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, constrained to adjudicate the interim application without prejudging the final determination of rights in the property:

  1. Factual foundation: It was undisputed that plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 had lived together at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road for about eight years and that, until plaintiff No. 1's departure (13 August 1999), the blue-marked portion of the bungalow was treated as the matrimonial home.
  2. Primary interlocutory question: Whether a wife can obtain interim relief (an injunction for ingress and egress) to the matrimonial home when the husband has shifted his residence elsewhere in an apparent attempt to make enforcement of such relief impracticable.
  3. The court emphasized it was not determining ultimate title or the final rights over the joint family property (that determination was reserved for the final hearing), but rather was concerned with whether interim rights of the wife could be defeated by the husband's conduct in shifting residence.
  4. The timing and circumstances of the husband's departure from the matrimonial home were material to the analysis: the court observed the coincidence of the husband's shifting residence around the time of suit filing and service, and noted that defendant No. 1 had not clearly stated the date of shifting in his written statement.
  5. On the question of competing legal routes, the court analysed the reliance on Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the decisions cited by defendants (Saroj Rani and Mahua Biswas). It concluded that the present suit is not a suit for restitution of conjugal rights per se but seeks access to the matrimonial house; accordingly, the availability of Section 9 proceedings did not bar the present suit at this stage.
  6. The court examined relevant authorities: while English authorities and the Matrimonial Homes Act were relied upon by the plaintiff, the judge held that invoking those principles was unnecessary at this interlocutory stage in view of the particular facts (in particular, the husband's non-occupation of the Jantar Mantar house).
  7. The court treated the DLT authority (Sardar Sandhu Singh v. Narinder Kaur) as providing mixed guidance: although that decision supports the proposition that permissive user does not create a property right in a daughter-in-law, it nevertheless affirms the legal obligation of a husband to provide residence to his wife. The court relied on this aspect to conclude that the husband cannot evade his obligation by merely shifting his residence to a sister's house.
  8. Balancing practicability and the wife's immediate need: because the husband had created a situation in which the court could not presently grant the injunctive relief sought (by shifting residence), but the wife's need for access to a matrimonial home was imminent, the court determined a remedial interim measure was appropriate — namely, monetary provision enabling the wife to secure suitable alternative accommodation that would function as the matrimonial home.
  9. On the interlocutory application by defendant No. 2 (IA 4241/2000) seeking to strike out scandalous averments, the court examined the pleaded paragraph 5(a), found it prima facie scandalous and defamatory and unrelated to the relief claimed (ingress/egress), and ordered paragraph 5(a) to be struck out and the plaint to be amended within one week.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court directed that defendant No. 1 should pay Rs. 20,000 per month to plaintiff No. 1 with effect from 1 September 2000 so that she may rent a house for herself and her children which will serve as the matrimonial home of the parties. The court observed that the defendant would also be entitled to residence in such a house.

The court also held that the present suit is not barred at this stage by remedy under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act because the suit only seeks access to the matrimonial house and is not a suit for restitution of conjugal rights per se.

Concerning the interlocutory application IA 4241/2000, the court ordered paragraph 5(a) of the plaint struck out as scandalous and defamatory and directed plaintiff No. 1 to file an amended plaint within one week. IA 4241/2000 was disposed of accordingly.

Procedural disposition: The suit was to be listed for further proceedings before the Joint Registrar on 18 October 2000.

Implications: The direct effects on the parties are (a) payment of Rs. 20,000 per month by defendant No. 1 to plaintiff No. 1 from 1 September 2000 for securing alternate accommodation that will serve as the matrimonial home, (b) striking out of paragraph 5(a) of the plaint and requirement to file an amended plaint within one week, and (c) continued prosecution of the suit with a hearing listing on 18 October 2000. The opinion does not purport to set a new binding precedent; it resolves the interim issues in the factual matrix before the court and reserves final determination of property and title rights for the final hearing.

End of summary based exclusively on the opinion text provided.

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    Anu Seth & Others v. Rohit Narain Seth & Ors

    Mukul Mudgal, J.— The plaintiff No. 1 is the wife of defendant No. 1 and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are their children. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the parents, and defendant No. 6 is the brother, defendant No. 4 is the uncle, defendant No. 5 is the aunt, defendant No. 8 is the cousin of defendant No. 1. It is the plaintiffs case that plaintiff No. 1 was married to defendant No. 1 and stayed in the matrimonial home at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi for 8 years. The plaintiff No. 1 has further averred in the plaint that owing to matrimonial disharmony, she left the matrimonial home alongwith plaintiffs 2 and 3 and took shelter in her parents house on 13th August 1999. The plaintiff No. 1 has furher stated that she is being denied the access to the matrimonial house by the defendants and consequently seeks a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the ingress and egress of the plaintiffs to her matrimonial home i.e at 6A, Jantar Mantar, New Delhi. The plaintiff No. 1 has further pleaded that she is seeking access only to the suite marked blue in the site plan in which she was residing with plaintiffs 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1 and this portion of the HUF bungalow at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road was earmarked for their family i.e the plaintiff and defendant No. 1.

    2. The suit has been resisted by defendant No. 1 by pleading that the plaint is founded on false premises. The plaintiffs relief, if any, is to file proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. Further reliance has been placed on the bar contemplated in Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. The defendant No. 1 has referred to the plaint where the plaintiff has made several scandalous and defamatory remarks. The defendant No. 1 further submits that the conduct of the plaintiff No. 1 disentitles her to any interim relief. However, the main plea raised by the defendant No. 1 is that the plaintiff No. 1 made the stay of the defendant No. 1 so unbearable that the defendant No. 1 left the house of his parents and is no more residing there and is in any event not the owner of the bungalow in respect of which the injunction is being sought. It is further stated that he has shifted to his sister's house at 141, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and therefore, the relief for in-fructuous is infectious in any event.

    The plea taken on behalf of defendants 2 to 8 is that the plaintiff No. 1 was not forced to leave the house and she left the same on her own accord.

    3. Learned counsel for defendants 2 to 8 has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saroj Rani Smt v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, 1984 (4) SCC 90 to contend that the concept of conjugal rights is wide and includes enjoyment of living together. It is, therefore, pleaded that the plea which seeks the injunction in the present suit clearly falls within the meaning of conjugal rights covered by Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and no suit as framed can lie. The learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment reported as Smt. Mahua Biswas v. Swagata Biswas, 1998 (2) SCC 359 (at page 361) to contend that matrimonial disputes should be taken to matrimonial courts. The learned counsel has reiied upon the certain pleadings of the plaint wherein scandalous and defamatory remarks have been pleaded against the husband, defendant No. 1, and the other defendants. For deletion of these remarks, the defendants have filed a separate application IA No. 3128 of 2000, which is being dealt with separately. It has further been pleaded that the plaintiff No. 1 does not want to come and live in the house but wants only the right of free ingress, egrees and use of the premises and the motive behind the relief claimed in the suit is to harass the defendants by having the right of ingress and egress and to use the premises so as to create further trouble for them as was done on 13th August 1999 by calling the police. It is further stated that no relief can be granted against the defendants as the premises in question belongs to defendants 2 and 4 and defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff No. 1 have no right whatsoever in the said bungalow. In this regard reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Sardar Sudhir Singh v. Narinder kaur, 1995 (6) DLT 638 to contend that the daughter-in-law has no right to the property of her father-in-law. It is further stated that defendant No. 1 is not living in the suit premises at Jantar Mantar Road any more and the relief sought for cannot be granted and the said bungalow is not her matrimonial home. It is therefore stated that since the permanent injunction claimed cannot be granted, the question of a temporary injunction being granted cannot arise. It has further been stated that the plaintiff No. 1 left the house on 13th August 1999 and did not attempt to come back till 25th January 2000. It has also been stated that there is no balance of convenience in her favour as the plaintiff No. 1 is staying with her parents who are very well to do and who can conveniently support the plaintiffs. It is also denied that the irreparable loss will be suffered by the plaintiffs.

    The main dispute in the present application for interim relief is as to whether the plaintiff can seek a relief of an injunction to enable her to have access to what was her matrimonial home.

    4. It is not in dispute that prior to August 1999 the plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant No. 1 had resided in the suit premises as husband and wife for a period of about 8 years. Thus, till the date the plaintiff No. 1 left and/or was ousted from the said premises, the portion of the bungalow, shown blue in the site plan, was certainly her matrimonial home. The real question which now arises in the present case is that in case the plaintiff No. 1 seeks access to her matrimonial home which was a portion of the joint family property can she be denied such access by defendant No. 1 and other defendants on the ground that defendant No. 1 is no longer residing in the said house as the house in question belongs to defendants 2 and 4. The present situation is such that defendant No. I is not now residing in the house at Jantar Mantar Road. It has been vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the departure of defendant No. 1 from the said premises is occasioned by the filing of the suit and the knowledge of the issue of notice by this Court. However, in my view it is not necessary to determine this plea at this stage as the defendant No. 1 is in fact not residing at 6A, Jantar Mantar Road.

    5. The crucial question is as to whether the relief in respect of the matrimonial house available to the wife can be frustrated by the husband, defendant No. 1, by shifting his residence to his married sister's house to deny the plaintiff No. 1 the relief of ingress and egress to the matrimonial home.

    6. I am of the view that the plaintiffs' rights vis a vis what is said to be her matrimonial home in the Jantar Mantar House, averred by plaintiff No. 1 which according to defendant Nos. 2 and 4 is their house, will be determined at the final hearing of the suit. I am at present only concerned with the plea whether the rights of the wife can be frunstrated/defeated by the departure of the husband from what was the matrimonial home and she be given any interim relief pending the hearing of this suit.

    7. The defendant No. 1 after service of the notice upon him had, therefore, taken a plea that the relief, if any, which the plaintiff No. 1 could be entitled to cannot now be granted to her in view of the fact that defendant No. 1 has left what was the erstwhile place of residence and has started staying with his married sister. It is unusual for a brother to stay with her married sister, particularly in a Hindu Family. This court is, therefore, faced with a situation where a relief which the plaintiff could be granted on the Court being satisfied cannot now be granted in view of the action taken by defendant No. 1. It is the plea of the learned counsel for plaintiff No. 1 that defendant No. 1 was aware of this suit pending in this Court as is clear from the difficulty with which he could be served. It is not necessary to go into this question at this stage. However, it is clear that the time of the departure of the defendant No. 1 from his residence, 6A, Jantar Mantar Road, is rather significant and the coincidence of the shifting of the defendant No. 1 around the time the suit was filed cannot easily be explained. Even in the written statement the defendant No. 1 has not clearly stated the date of shifting. He has merely stated that since January this year he has been living with his sister.

    8. The suit was taken up first on 23rd February 2000 when notice was issued and on 8th March 2000 fresh notice was issued. On 6th April 2000, defendant No. 2 was present in person and accepted notice on his own behalf. The Court is, therefore, faced with the situation where even if the Court was convinced that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction the order sought for in this suit cannot at present be granted due to this action of shifting of residence by the defendant No. 1.

    9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the English Law as laid down in Garasz v. Garazz, 1969 (3) All.E.R 822, as well as the following judgments -1952 (1) All E.R 1307, 1955 (1) All E.R 445 and 1953 (1) All E.R 556. These judgments, according to him, upheld the wife's right to occupation of the matrimonial home. He has further relied upon Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 which gives an innocent wife in occupation a right not to be evicted except by order of the court and if not in occupation a right by the order of the court to enter into and occupy the house. Learned counsel further states that even in an emancipated society like England such rights are given to the wife. Therefore, women in India are entitled to greater protection in view of their social status. He has further stated the preliminary objection that the plaintiff No. 1 not being the natural guardian of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, the suit is not maintainable cannot survive in view of the judgment in Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, JT 1999 (1) SC 524. The above plea of the plaintiff No. 1 is correct and the suit cannot be dismissed in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which lays down that the mother too can be a natural guardian of minor children even though the father was alive.

    10. I am of the view that due to the peculiar facts of the present case in which the right of defendant No. 1 in the Jantar Mantar Court have not yet been determined, the occasion for invocation of the above principle of the English Law does not arise at the present stage particularly when the defendant No. 1 is no longer in occupation of the Jantar Mantar house, which the plaintiff claims is the matrimonial home.

    11. The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in Sardar Sandhu Singh and Others v. Narinder Kaur, 60 (1995) DLT 638, to contend that nature of a permissive user as a daughter-in-law after marriage would not make the possession of the daughter-in-law lawful. In the aforesaid case the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the father-in-law had only the moral duty and not legal duty to provide maintenance and support to the respondent, daughter-in-law. The Court held that the obligation to provide residence is that of her husband. Further it is significant that in the aforesaid judgment the Court held that the wife was entitled to seek and claim the residence from the husband. The relevant observations are in para 14 of the judgment, which reads as follows:—

    “14. The Trial Court acted with material irregularity in not noticing that in the instant case far from establishing a prima facie case, the respondent had not even pleaded or asserted any legal right. It was not the respondent's case that the property in suit is joint family or that there is a legal obligation on the petitioners to provide her residence. Such an obligation is that of her husband. The respondent is entitled to seek and claim residence from him. In the instant case a reasonable offer made for provision of separate residence to the respondent was spurned by her purely for exploiting the situation and extracting a huge sum of money from the petitioners/in laws. Respondent's conduct is such as disentitles her from the discretionary relief of injunction. The revision is, therefore, allowed and the injunction granted by the Appellate Court is vacated, however, the status quo order granted shall continue for a period of three months to enable the respondent to find alternate accommodation for herself.”

    In so far as this judgment is concerned while it may prima facie appear to be against the plaintiff it infact partly supports the case of the plaintiff No. 1 because this Court held that the wife was entitled to seek and claim residence from the husband. Relying upon the law laid down by the aforesaid judgment while the issue whether the plaintiff can claim residence in the Jantar Mantar Road house can be determined at the time of final hearing of the suit, there is a legal obligation on the part of the husband to provide a residence to plaintiff No. 1, the wife, by the husband, defendant No. 1. The need of the wife to have access to a matrimonial home is however imminent. This right is not covered by the restitution of conjugal rights available under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, particularly, in the peculiar facts of the present case. Accordingly the law laid down by the judgments in Saroj Rani and Mahua Biswas (supra) could not apply to the present case.

    I am, therefore, of the view that the rights of a wife cannot be defeated in this manner by the husband by shifting the residence to his married sister's houses. It is not in dispute that prior to plaintiff No. 1's leaving the matrimonial home in August 1999, the parties were residing at 6A. Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi and treated the portion of the house where they were staying as their matrimonial home. The defendant No. 1 cannot avoid his responsibility to provide a matrimonial home to the plaintiff No. 1 by shifting his residence. This stratagem and device of avoiding and evading marital responsibility cannot be countenanced by a Court. He is bound in law to provide a matrimonial home to the plaintiff No. 1. However, if he creates a situation by which such relief cannot be granted at present, I am clearly of the view that he should be directed to provide sufficient monetary to the plaintiff No. 1 so that she can rent a house for herself and her children which will be the matrimonial house of the couple. Of course the defendant No. 1 will also be entitled to residence in such a house. Considering the social and comfortable financial status of the defendants as well as the defendant No. 1 a comfortable house should be provided to the plaintiffs. In this view of the matter I am clearly of the view that defendant No. 1 should be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- per month to the plaintiff with effect from 1st September 2000 so that she can set up a matrimonial home for the parties.

    In so far as the plea of restitution of conjugal rights is concerned, I am of the view that the present suit is not for the restitution of conjugal rights per se but in fact merely seeks access to the matrimonial house. Consequently the plea as to the maintainability of this suit due to the availability of Section 9 proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act would not come to the aid of the defendant No. 1 at this stage of the suit.

    IA 4241/2000

    This is an application (IA No. 4241 of 2000) under Order VI Rules 2 and 16 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, filed on behalf of defendant No. 2 seeking the striking down of the averments contained in paragraphs 5 to 21 of the plaint. It is stated by defendant No. 2 that the averments in paras 5 to 21 are false, scandalous and defamatory and have no connection or relevance with the relief claimed and are also likely to cause prejudice and embarrassment to the defendants, particularly, the defendant No. 2.

    Order VI Rule 16 CPC relates to the striking out of amendment of pleading by the Court at any stage of the proceedings. The said provision reads as unden:—

    “VI(16). Striking out pleadings - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading -

    (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or

    (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit or

    (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

    Para 5(a) of the plaint reads as under:—

    5(a) That defendants No. 2 & 3, the parents-in-law of the plaintiff No. 1, had strained relations because of their respective philanderous ways and extra marital “relationships, as conveyed to the plaintiff No. 1 by defendant No. 1 and other members of the family.

    Needless to say that the parents-in-law of the plaintiff No. 1 were not on talking terms and lived in separate bed rooms at the said Bungalow, but bowing to the dictates of social expediency they did appear together in public on select occasions.

    Having gone through the above pleadings and the pleas of the applicant, I am of the view that the pleadings in paragraph 5(a) are prima facie, scandalous and defamatory. In the context of the relief claimed in the plaint i.e an injunction restraining the defendants from causing obstruction to the plaintiffs access to her matrimonial home, the above pleadings are entirely unnecessary and indeed scandalous and vexatious. The said pleadings, therefore, do not directly or indirectly relate to the relief claimed by the plaintiff.

    In view of the above the pleadings contained in paragraph 5(a) of the plaintiff are ordered to be struck off and the plaintiff No. 1 is directed to file the amended plaint within one week from today.

    Accordingly IA 4241/2000 stands disposed of.

    S. No. 387/2000

    List the suit for further proceedings before the Joint Registrar on 18th October 2000.

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    Comments

    Anu Seth & Others v. Rohit Narain Seth & Ors
    (Aug 10, 2000)