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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Devinder Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed a writ petition on 16.8.1996 seeking to set aside a demand notice dated 27.2.1996 and a communication dated 22.7.1996 issued by the U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, which threatened re-entry and forfeiture of the appellant's rights to run an industrial unit. The appellant stated that it was engaged in the manufacture of industrial explosives and that the company and the project were connected with arrangements made in the State of Uttar Pradesh. An agreement dated 17.12.1984 was executed for allotment of land in Jhansi (U.P.) on lease and licence basis. The appellant alleged it had paid the premium (market value) demanded, that the respondents failed to fix the yearly lease (Economic Rent) as required, and that Respondent No. 2 had not approved any Economic Rent. The respondents, however, claimed arrears totalling Rs. 84,81,022.83. The appellant received the impugned communications at its registered office in New Delhi and contended that, because of that service, the cause of action accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court (Delhi High Court).

On 21.1.1998 the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, observing that "the cause of action has substantially and materially arisen in the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, this Court will not entertain the writ petition." The appellant appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi High Court could entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when the impugned notices were received at the appellant's registered office in Delhi but the substantive transactions (allotment, agreement and land) and the dispute about arrears and re-entry related to land situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
  2. Whether mere service of the impugned notices at the appellant's registered office in Delhi constitutes an integral part of the cause of action such that the cause of action is said to arise, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Article 226(2).
  3. Whether the respondents had the legal authority under the agreement to recover the arrears and to re-enter the land (i.e., whether the demand and threat of re-entry were enforceable under the agreement and applicable law).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The two impugned communications (dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1996) were received at the appellant's registered office in New Delhi; service in Delhi made the cause of action arise, at least in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
  • Notice is part of the transaction and an integral part of the cause of action; infringement of the petitioner's right occurs upon service of the notice.
  • Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, a High Court may exercise its writ jurisdiction where the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its territories; therefore the appellant was entitled to approach this Court.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of specific legal arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents in the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basi, JT 1994 (5) S.C. 1 Authority relied upon by the Single Judge in declining to entertain the petition on territorial/causal-of-action grounds. The Single Judge relied on this decision in concluding that the cause of action substantially arose in Uttar Pradesh; the appellate court recorded that reliance.
Sector Twenty One Owners Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board & Ors., 65 (1997) D.L.T. 81 (D.B.) Authority relied upon by the Single Judge in declining jurisdiction on the ground that the cause of action arose in another State. The Single Judge placed reliance on this decision; the appellate court noted that reliance in explaining the Single Judge's conclusion.
K.S. Rashid & Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission, (1954) S.C.R. 738 Established that, prior to insertion of Clause 2 in Article 226, writs under Article 226 did not run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Cited to explain the historical position of territorial limits of High Court writ jurisdiction prior to the constitutional amendment that added Clause 2 (now Article 226(2)).
Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India & Another, AIR 1961 S.C. 532 Held that a High Court could not issue a writ under Article 226 unless the person/authority against whom the writ was sought was resident or located within its territorial jurisdiction (reflecting pre-amendment law). Referred to as part of the law prior to insertion of Clause 2 in Article 226, to explain why Clause 2 altered the position.
State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Another, AIR 1985 S.C. 1289 Held that mere service of a notice does not give rise to a cause of action in the place of service unless the service of the notice is an integral part of the cause of action; cause of action is a "bundle of facts". The court applied the principle from this decision to hold that mere receipt of the impugned communications at the appellant's registered office in Delhi was not an integral part of the cause of action; the cause of action related to arrears and re-entry on land situated in Uttar Pradesh.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook the following analytical steps based on the material in the opinion:

  1. Recounted the Single Judge's decision dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the cause of action had substantially and materially arisen in the State of Uttar Pradesh; the Single Judge had relied on precedents (including ONGC and Sector Twenty One) to support that approach.
  2. Revisited the constitutional framework: Article 226(1) confers writ powers on High Courts within their territories; Article 226(2) (inserted as Clause 1A by the 15th Amendment and later re-numbered by the 42nd Amendment) permits a High Court to exercise its writ power where the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its territories even if the person or authority against whom relief is sought is resident or located elsewhere.
  3. Considered earlier Supreme Court authorities (K.S. Rashid; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh) to explain the pre-amendment territorial limitation and how Clause 2 changed the position, thereby permitting relief in a High Court where the cause of action (wholly or in part) arises.
  4. Analyzed the character of the cause of action in this dispute: the core question was whether the respondents had the right to recover arrears (totaling Rs. 84,81,022.83) and whether they had power of re-entry under the agreement concerning land in Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh. The court viewed the cause of action as relating principally to enforcement of rights concerning land situated in Uttar Pradesh and to interpretation and enforcement of the agreement executed in Uttar Pradesh.
  5. Applied the principle in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties that mere service of a notice at a party's registered office in another State does not, by itself, give rise to a cause of action in that place unless service is an integral part of the cause of action. The court held that in the present case it was not necessary for the appellant to plead service of the notices as part of the cause of action, because the substantive dispute concerned arrears and re-entry on land in Uttar Pradesh.
  6. Concluded that the mere fact that the registered office of the appellant was in Delhi and that the impugned communications were received there did not make service in Delhi an integral part of the cause of action. Consequently, the appellant should have approached the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the land was situated (i.e., in Uttar Pradesh) rather than the Delhi High Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The court held that the cause of action — concerning the respondents' right to recover arrears and to re-enter land situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh — substantially and materially arose in Uttar Pradesh. The Delhi High Court will not entertain the writ petition on the facts of this case.
  • The direct consequence for the parties is that the appellant's challenge in the Delhi High Court fails; the appellant will need to seek redress, if any, from the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the land and the agreement are situated (i.e., the relevant High Court in Uttar Pradesh).
  • The decision applies established precedents (in particular State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties) and constitutional provisions concerning territorial scope of High Court writ jurisdiction; the court did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying those authorities to the facts. The opinion does not state that it has created new precedent; it applies existing principles to the present factual matrix.

Disposition in the opinion: "Dismissed."

    Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. And Another v. U.P State Industrial Development Corporation And Another.

    Devinder Gupta, J.— This appeal has been preferred against the order passed on 21.1.1998 by learned Single Judge dismissing the appellant's writ petition observing:—

    “It appears to me that the cause of action has substantially and materially arisen in the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, this Court will not entertain the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.”

    The appellant filed writ petition on 16.8.1996 praying that demand notice dated 27.2.1996 and communication dated 22.7.1996 issued by the U.P State Industrial Development Corporation threatening re-entry and forfeiting the rights of the petitioner to run industrial unit be set aside.

    The appellant claimed that it is engaged in manufacture of industrial explosives and the company was set up in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the assisted sector with the Pradesihya Industrial and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh Limited and Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation. It approached the State of Uttar Pradesh for allotment of land. Respondent No. 2 decided to transfer 50 acres of land on lease and license basis besides another 656 acres in Tehsil Jhansi (U.P). The appellant had proposed to respondent No. 2 to set up an industrial unit at Jhansi to manufacture industrial explosives. Agreement was entered into on 17.12.1984 It had complied with the terms by making deposit of the amount demanded but the respondents had not communicated or fixed yearly lease rent. It was alleged that on 22.7.1996 a registered letter was received intimating that the appellant had failed to make payment of the dues amounting to Rs. 84,81,022.83. According to the appellant, it had paid in full the premium called the market value and had also been representing that but for non fixation of the Economic Rent, the respondents had no authority and power to re-enter as respondent No. 2 has not given its approval to the Economic Rent, which cannot be fixed arbitrarily or on its own by respondent No. 1. It is alleged that the respondents were asked to fix Economic Rent as per agreement, which they had failed, therefore, respondent No. 1 had got no legal authority to re-enter in the manner as threatened in the notice. Consequently, aforementioned writ petition was filed in this Court alleging that the impugned notice dated 27.2.1996 and communication dated 22.7.1997 containing illegal and arbitrary demand of Rs. 84,81,022.83 and the threatening re-entry and forfeiting the rights of the petitioner to run the industrial unit was received by the petitioner at its registered office at New Delhi and as such the cause of action had accrued to the appellant within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    The learned Single Judge relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basi and others JT 1994 (5) S.C 1 and of this Court in Sector Twenty one Owners Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board & Ors. 65 (1997) D.L.T 81 (D.B) declined to entertain the petition holding that cause of action had substantially and materially arisen in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

    Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that notice was received in Delhi. Notice is a part of the whole of the transaction and is an integral part of the cause of action. Infringement of the petitioner's right is on service of notice. Therefore, in view the constitutional provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the appellant was within its right to have approached this Court for redressal of grievances as cause of action, if not wholly arose in part within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads:—

    “Power of High Courts to issue certain writs:—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.]

    (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

    (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without -

    (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

    (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard,

    makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date ori which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

    (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.”

    By the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963, Clause 1A was inserted in Article 226 of the Constitution. This clause was later on by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 re-numbered as Clause 2. Prior to insertion of clause 1A, which later on has been re-numbered as clause 2, it was held in K.S Rashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc. (1954) S.C.R 738 that the writs do not run beyond the territories in relation to which each High Court exercises jurisdiction. Accordingly, in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union Of India & Another AIR 1961 S.C.532, it was held that a High Court cannot issue a writ or order under Article 226 unless the person, authority or Government, against whom the writ is sought was resident or located within its territorial jurisdiction. Now by insertion of clause 2, in case cause of action arises wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court, it may issue a writ against a person or authority resident within the jurisdiction of another High Court. As a result of the insertion of clause 2, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be presented before any High Court in case: (a) the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the person or authority against whom relief is sought reside or is situate; and (b) the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action, in respect of which relief is sought under Article 226 of the Constitution has arisen wholly or in part.

    The claim of the appellant in the writ petition is that respondent No. 1 has no authority or power to re-enter as respondent No. 2 has not given its approval to the Economic Rent, which cannot be fixed arbitrarily or on its own by respondent No. 1. Its claim is also that the respondents were asked to fix Economic Rent as per the agreement but they failed to do so. It had paid in full the premium called “market value” but the amount, which the Collector, Jhansi later on intimated is a short fall of the market vaiue over and above the figure intimated in Covenant 3 of the agreement, which the respondents have no right to recover and as such the respondents have no legal authority to enter in the manner threatened through notice dated 27.2.1996 and in communication dated 22.7.1996 Demand as such is illegal and arbitrary. On these averments learned Single Judge observed that as the land in question is situate in the State of Uttar Pradesh; agreement dated 17.12.1984 in regard to allotment of land was executed in the State of Uttar Pradesh; order by virtue of which permission was accorded to set up industrial unit was also passed in the State of Uttar Pradesh, therefore, cause of action, if any, had mainly and substantially arisen in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

    In State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another AIR 1985 S.C 1289, it was held that mere service of notice does not give rise to cause of action unless the service of notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The issue, which had arisen therein was that whether the service of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 53 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 served on the company at its registered office at Calcutta by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur was an integral part of cause of action and was sufficient to vest the Calcutta High Court with the jurisdiction to entertain petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act for acquisition of certain lands belonging to the company, as required by Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur for public purpose. It was held that cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It was further held that mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondent upon their registered office at Calcutta could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of that notice was an integral part of the cause of action. Answer to the question that whether service of notice within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. Consequently, in the said case, it was held that Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as it was not necessary in the said case to plead service of notice and in case the company felt aggrieved by the acquisition of its land and wanted to challenge the validity of notification, it ought to have approached Rajasthan High Court.

    In the instant case also the question arising for determination is of right of the respondents to recover arrears, which have accumulated to the tune of Rs. 84,81,022.83. The question whether or not the respondents are within their rights to enforce its demand in terms of the agreement, which was executed within the State of Uttar Pradesh or whether under the terms thereof due to non payment of dues the respondents have or have not a power of re-entry are such for which neither it is nor it was necessary for the appellant to plead service of notice on them by the respondents. The mere fact that the registered office of the appellant is in Delhi where the two communications dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1996 were received, will not be an integral part of cause of action for such a petition. In case the appellant has felt aggrieved by the demand raised or that the same is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement or that the respondents do not have any right of re-entry, it will be for the appellant to approach that High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the land is situated or agreement was executed and not this Court. Learned Single Judge not on the same reasonings but on different reasonings on the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that cause of action substantially and materially had arisen within the State of Uttar Pradesh.

    We are of the view that mere service of notice on the appellant's registered office at Delhi will not be an integral part of the transaction or cause of action. In view of what was observed in view of what was observed in M/s. Swaika Properties (supra) answer to the question that whether service of notice is an integral part of cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to cause of action. Cause of action in this case is the right of the respondents to recover arrears and re-entry on the land situated within the territories of State of Uttar Pradesh.

    Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. And Another v. U.P State Industrial Development Corporation And Another.
    (Apr 1, 1999)