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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • K.N.R.Pillai
  • Mukul Rohatagi
  • Ravinder Sethi
  • A.Ahlawat
Judges
  • M Sarin
Acts
  • Himachal Pradesh State Handicrafts section
  • Central Government Health Scheme Rules.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • K.N.R.Pillai
  • Mukul Rohatagi
  • Ravinder Sethi
  • A.Ahlawat
Judges
  • M Sarin
Acts
  • Himachal Pradesh State Handicrafts section
  • Central Government Health Scheme Rules.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Order by Manmohan Sarin, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) filed the above batch of writ petitions challenging the judgment dated 23.4.1998 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). By that impugned judgment the CAT, following its decision in Dr. Sangeeta Narang & Others v. Delhi Administration (1988 (6) ATC 405), directed the petitioner (GNCTD) to pay the respondent doctors the same pay-scales and benefits (including Provident Fund, Medical Attendance, etc.) as were payable to regular Junior Medical Officers performing similar duties.

The CAT further directed that the respondents would be deemed to have continued in service until regular appointments were made in accordance with rules and instructions, and ordered the petitioner to consider relaxation of age to the extent of service rendered on ad hoc or contract basis if the respondents happened to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The CAT rejected the petitioner's plea that the contractual appointment letters alone governed the respondents' entitlements.

GNCTD's factual position (as stated in the writ petitions) is that appointments of doctors are made through the UPSC under the Central Government Health Scheme Rules, with the Ministry of Health and Family Planning as the controlling authority; the UPSC selection process is long-drawn and ongoing, and there are at any given time roughly 150 vacancies. To meet service needs, a few posts were filled on a contract basis in 1996–97; when those contractual appointments were ending, the respondents approached the CAT, resulting in the impugned order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in directing parity of pay and benefits for doctors appointed on a contractual basis, thereby going beyond the express terms of the contract of appointment.
  2. Whether respondent doctors appointed on a contract/ad hoc basis who perform duties similar to regular Junior Medical Officers are entitled to parity in emoluments and benefits (doctrine of "equal pay for equal work").
  3. Whether the distinction between "ad hoc" appointments and "appointments on contract" affects the respondents' entitlement to parity and other reliefs granted by the CAT.
  4. Whether the CAT's direction to consider relaxation of age for respondents (for purposes of UPSC selection) was permissible or violated constitutional provisions governing UPSC's selection functions (Article 320).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (GNCTD)

  • The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by purporting to alter or go beyond the express terms of the contract of appointment; appointments were purely contractual for limited periods and parties were bound by the contract terms.
  • Appointment letters expressly provided for consolidated payment only; respondents were not entitled to additional emoluments or regularization by virtue of contractual appointment.
  • Direction to pay wages at par with regular doctors would have far-reaching financial consequences, would undermine the utility of contract appointments, and would harm health services by discouraging contract hiring and leaving posts vacant.
  • Granting parity would amount to a back-door entry into regular service and could lead to inefficiency by inducting candidates rejected in regular recruitment.
  • Reliance on Sangeeta Narang's case was misplaced because it concerned ad hoc appointments, not purely contractual appointments.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The writ petitions were devoid of merit and the impugned CAT order should not be interfered with; the order remedied an injustice.
  • Respondents relied on precedent (A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen) to submit an additional reason for refusing interference: there had been no failure of justice and the CAT's order only sought to undo injustice.
  • Respondents emphasized that they possessed required qualifications, performed similar duties, were transferable, and that the applicable rules and regulations governed their service despite contractual origin.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Sangeeta Narang & Others v. Delhi Administration etc. (1988 (6) ATC 405) Circumstance in which temporary/ad hoc appointees performing required services are entitled to continuity/benefits and authorities cannot terminate them at will when services are needed. The CAT followed Sangeeta Narang; the court noted that the department's Special Leave Petition against that CAT judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court, and that the Government itself implemented that decision. The court treated the Sangeeta Narang decision as controlling and rejected attempts to distinguish it on ad hoc vs. contractual grounds.
Union of India v. A.K. Roy (AIR 1986 S.C. 737) That appointments which begin as contractual/ad hoc may acquire a status and be governed by applicable rules and regulations rather than solely by the original appointment letter. The court referred to A.K. Roy to support the proposition that contractual appointments can acquire status and be governed by rules, bolstering the view that respondents' services could be regulated by applicable rules rather than contractual terms alone.
Harbans Lal & Others v. State of Himachal Pradesh Doctrine of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" may not apply where the discrimination is between different establishments/managements; parity claims require comparison within the same establishment. The petitioner relied on this case, but the court found it inapplicable because here both respondent doctors and regular Junior Medical Officers are employed by the same employer (GNCTD) performing similar duties.
State of Haryana v. Jasmit Singh & Others Observation that applying "equal pay for equal work" is not always straightforward; differences in qualifications, selection processes, transferability, and terms can render comparison inappropriate. The court considered the case distinguishable because in the present matter the qualifications (MBBS), duties, transferability, and applicable rules were the same for contractual doctors and regular doctors.
Ghaziabad Development Authority & Others v. Shri Vikram Choudhury & Ors. Daily-wage employees cannot be equated with regular employees for pay parity when regular posts are not available; protections for daily wagers while work exists. The court held this authority inapplicable because, in the instant case, regular posts were admittedly available for the duties performed by the respondents.
U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. & Others v. B.K. Tiwari [JT 1987 (10) SC 25] Submission that terms of an appointment letter (including accepted pay scales) ought to be given effect to. The court found reliance on this decision misplaced and held that the petitioners could not draw support from it for denying parity to the respondents.
Union of India & Ors. v. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan Direction of tribunal to consult State PSC for regularisation where posts were required to be filled by the Union through UPSC was quashed as violating Article 320 of the Constitution. The court held reliance on this case misplaced in relation to the CAT's age-relaxation direction, because the present CAT direction was limited to treating service without break and considering age relaxation for UPSC candidacy, not directing regularisation or consultation with any other commission.
A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen Used to support refusal to interfere when there has been no failure of justice. The court accepted respondents' reliance on this authority as supporting an additional reason to refuse interference with the CAT order, noting that the impugned order sought to undo an injustice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through several inter-related strands of reasoning, applying precedent and factual findings from the record:

  1. Precedent and Government practice: The court observed that the CAT had followed Sangeeta Narang, and that the department's Special Leave Petition against Sangeeta Narang was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Government had itself implemented Sangeeta Narang by issuing a circular (dated 2.11.1988) in which the terms "ad hoc appointment" and "appointment on contract" were used interchangeably. On this basis the court concluded that attempting to distinguish Sangeeta Narang as an "ad hoc" case rather than a "contract" case was not persuasive.
  2. Status of contractual appointments: Relying on observations in Union of India v. A.K. Roy, the court noted that appointments originating as contractual can acquire a "status" and be governed by applicable rules and regulations rather than solely by the original appointment letter. This supported the view that respondents' entitlements could not be limited purely by the wording of their contract letters when the actual work and governing rules indicated otherwise.
  3. Applicability of "equal pay for equal work": The court examined the petitioner's authorities relied upon to deny parity. It explained why those authorities did not assist the petitioner: in the present case the respondents possessed the same qualification (MBBS), performed the same duties, were transferable within GNCTD institutions, and the same rules and regulations applied to their discharge of duties. Given these facts, the court found no justification for denying parity in emoluments and benefits and concluded that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" should apply.
  4. Distinguishing unfavorable authorities: For each decision cited by the petitioner (e.g., Harbans Lal; State of Haryana v. Jasmit Singh; Ghaziabad Development Authority; U.P. State Cement Corporation v. B.K. Tiwari; Union of India v. Harish Mahajan) the court explained why the cited principles were distinguishable or inapplicable on the facts before it (differences in establishment, qualifications, availability of regular posts, the precise relief directed by the tribunals, or the specific terms of appointment).
  5. On "back-door entry" and selection process concerns: The court rejected the petitioner's contention that parity would create a back-door entry into service. It emphasized that the CAT's relief was confined to parity in salary and emoluments and to considering age relaxation for the period of ad hoc/contract service when respondents were candidates before UPSC; the relief did not direct regularisation or bypass UPSC selection. The court also rejected the submission that respondents were mere rejects from regular selection, observing respondents possessed equivalent qualifications and had been employed after scrutiny/selection via public advertisement by the Government itself.
  6. Equity and fairness: The court emphasized that the petitions sought to deprive respondents of legitimate emoluments and that the respondents had taken up contractual work by force of circumstances; the Government had not alleged inferior performance by respondents. The court characterized the petitioners' stance as legally untenable, unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions filed by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi are dismissed. The CAT's directions — including parity of pay and benefits with regular Junior Medical Officers, deeming service to continue until regular appointments are made, and consideration of age relaxation for UPSC candidacy for the period of ad hoc/contract service — are upheld as to the issues raised in these petitions.

The petitions were dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000 for each petition.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondent doctors are entitled to parity in emoluments and benefits with regular Junior Medical Officers performing similar duties; their service is to be treated as without break until regular appointments are made; the competent authorities are to consider age relaxation for the period of ad hoc/contract service if respondents are candidates before the UPSC.
  • The court rejected arguments that granting parity would automatically regularize posts or create impermissible "back-door" entry; it confined relief to parity in pay/benefits and consideration of age relaxation for UPSC candidacy.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond application of existing precedent (e.g., Sangeeta Narang, A.K. Roy); the decision primarily applies those precedents to the facts before the court to uphold the CAT's order.

This summary is confined strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text of the judgment.

Show full summary ...

    Government Of National Capital Territory Of Delhi & Ors. v. Dr. Ranjana Amar & Ors.

    ORDER Manmohan Sarin, J.

    1. The above batch of writ petitions have been preferred by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. The challenge in the writ petitions is to the judgment dated 23.4.1998 of the Central Administrative Tribunal. By the impugned, judgment the Central Administrative Tribunal, following its decision in Dr. Sangeeta Narang & Others Vs. Delhi Administration etc. (1988 (6) ATC 405), directed the petitioner to pay to the respondent doctors the same pay-scales and other benefits like Provident Fund, Medical Attendance, etc. as payable to the regular Junior Medical Officers, performing similar duties. The Tribunal further held that the respondents would be deemed to have continued in service till regular appointments are made to the posts in accordance with rules and instructions. Direction was also issued to the petitioner to consider relaxation of age to the extent of service on ad hoc or contract basis, rendered by the respondents if they happen to be the candidates before the Union Public Service Commission for selection. Petitioner's plea that the appointment of the respondent doctors was purely on contract basis and was to be governed as per the emoluments and terms set out in the appointment letter was negatived.

    2. Petitioner's case is that appointment of doctors to various hospitals and dispensaries of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi are made through the Union Public Service Commission under the Central Government Health Scheme Rules. The Ministry of Health and Family Planning is the controlling authority. The selection by the Union Public Service Commission is a long drawn out and on-going process. Vacancies result either by retirement or creation of new posts. It is submitted that at any given point of time there are about 150 posts vacant.

    Petitioner submits that to relieve the pressure and strain on the health care services, a few posts were filled on contract basis in 1996-97. When the appointment of the respondents on contract basis was coming to an end, the respondents chose to move the Central Administrative Tribunal, resulting in the impugned judgment being passed.

    3. Petitioner assails the impugned judgment on the ground that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction as it had no authority to go beyond the terms of the contract of appointment. The appointment of the respondents was purely on contract basis for limited periods. Parties were to abide by the terms of the contract and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to carve out fresh terms. It was a specific term of the appointment letter that a consolidated amount was to be paid and no more. Respondents were also not entitled to lay any claim to regularization by virtue of the contractual appointment. The impugned judgment directing payment of wages at par with regular doctors, to respondent doctors appointed on contractual basis for limited period, has far reaching financial consequences. The Government would not be able to make appointments on contract basis and, consequently, the health care services would suffer as the posts would remain vacant. This, in brief, is the submission of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that implementation of the impugned judgment would tantamount to giving back door entry to doctors and it would breed inefficiency as rejected candidates would get inducted in services on regular appointment. Lastly, it is contended that reliance on Sangeeta Narang's case (supra) was misplaced as it was a case of ad hoc appointment and not purely that of a contractual appointment.

    4. Regarding petitioners' contention in respect of Sangeeta Narang's case, we may note that the Special Leave Petition filed by the department against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Sangeeta Narang's case has been dismissed by the Apex Court. The Government, in fact has itself implemented the decision in Sangeeta Narang's case and issue a circular letter/order dated 2.11.1988, which appears at page 48 of the paper book. In the said letter the terms, "ad hoc appointment" and "appointment on contract" have been used interchangeably. Even otherwise, the distinction sought to be made out between the contractual employment and ad hoc employment would not be of any consequence. Especially when the petitioners have themselves admitted that there are at any point of time about 150 vacancies, which remain to be filled. It is the petitioners' own case that the said posts remain vacant as regular appointments are made only by selection through the Union Public Service Commission, which is a time consuming process. We may also note that the appointments though originating in contract, acquire a "status" inasmuch as they are governed by applicable rules and regulations and not by original letter/order of appointment alone. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. A.K. Roy (AIR 1986 S.C. 737). The decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, as approved by the Apex Court, in Sangeeta Narang's case (supra) clearly holds that it is not open to the authorities to terminate the services of the temporary employees who may have been appointed for specified periods at any time of their own sweet will, when there is admittedly need for their services. The attempt to distinguish Sangeeta Narang's case on the ground that it is one dealing with ad hoc appointment and not a contractual one, is of no avail.

    We may note that the petitioner is declining to pay the same emoluments to the respondent doctors as they pay to the regular appointed doctors only because the appointments of respondent doctors are contractual appointments, which according to the petitioner have to be governed by terms of the contract for all purposes. It is not the petitioner's case that the respondent doctors are not discharging similar duties and functions.

    5. Let us now consider the authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of her contention that the respondents are not entitled to parity in emoluments with the doctors appointed on regular basis. Reliance by the petitioner is on certain decisions, where the principle of 'Equal Pay for Equal Work' has not been applied.

    i. Learned counsel for the petitioner first relied on Harbans Lal & Others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , wherein doctrine of 'Equal Pay for Equal Work' was held to be not applicable. Carpenters working in the "Wood Work Center" of Himachal Pradesh State Handicrafts section of the Corporation sought parity in wages with those working in the State Government on regular basis. It was not disputed that there were no regular employees working in the category of 'carpenters' on the establishment of the Corporation. The Corporation was, however, paying the minimum wages as applicable in construction industry to the concerned carpenters. The Court held that discrimination complained of must be within the same establishment owned by the same management. We do not see how any support can be drawn by the petitioner from this decision. Admittedly the respondents and the Junior Medical Officers appointed on regular basis, with whom parity is sought, are employed by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, performing similar duties in the hospitals and dispensaries of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi.

    ii. Reliance was next placed on State of Haryana Vs. Jasmit Singh & Others . Petitioners in this case were employed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar/Pump Operators on daily wages. They sought parity with those regularly employed by the State Government. The Apex Court noticed the case law in respect of the doctrine of "equal pay of equal work". It observed that the application of the doctrine was not always an easy task and there were inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations. The daily rate workers were not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers. Restrictions, etc. on age were not there for daily rated workers. The selection process was totally different. The daily wagers had no liability for transfer. The Court found that the daily rates workers could not be equated with regular employees and, hence, were not entitled to equal pay. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that qualifications required, viz. MBBS Degree, is same for both. The work performed is the same. Same Rules and regulations are applicable to the doctors employed on contract basis so far discharge of their duties is concerned. The cited case is, therefore, distinguishable and is of no avail to the petitioners.

    iii. Learned counsel next relied on Ghaziabad Development Authority & Others Vs. Shri Vikram Choudhury & Ors., to canvass that daily wage employees need not be paid at par with regular employees. The Apex Court in the said case held that as long as petitioner Authority had work and projects in hand, the services of daily wagers could not be terminated. It was only in case if work was not there that principle of 'last come first go' was to be applied. As long as there were no regular posts available, there was no question of payment of wages at per with the regular employees. In the instant case, admittedly, regular posts are available and, hence, the said authority is of no avail to the petitioners.

    iv. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. & Others Vs. B.K. Tiwari [JT 1987 (10) SC 25] to urge that the terms of the appointment letter ought to be given effect to. In the cited case respondent was offered appointment as a 'Manager, by a Public Corporation. The appointment letter specifically gave the pay scales after revision, which had been accepted. Reliance on the cited case is completely misplaced and the petitioners cannot draw any support from it.

    v. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on Union of India & Ors. Vs. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan while assailing the direction given in the impugned order regarding considering relaxation of age for the respondents if they happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission. The reliance on the said case is completely misplaced. In the cited case, the direction of the Tribunal was assailed and quashed since the posts of Directors in Central Government Health Scheme were required to be filled by the Union through the Union Public Service Commission. The direction to consider in consultation with the State Public Service Commission for regularisation was, therefore, found to be in violation of Article 320 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the only direction given is to treat the service of the petitioners as without break and to consider age relaxation for the period served in case the respondents happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission.

    6. It is also not disputed before us that the respondent doctors possess the required educational qualifications and the training for discharging duties as Junior Medical Officers. The nature of their duties are, admittedly, similar to the regularly appointed doctors. The respondents are also liable to serve in any of the dispensaries or hospitals of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and may be moved from one place to the other. In these circumstances, we find no justification for denying them parity in emoluments with the doctors in regular service. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" should be applicable. The respondents did not claim or seek from the Central Administrative Tribunal or before us, regularisation of their posts but are only seeking parity of emoluments and other benefits as applicable to medical officers appointed on regular basis.

    Learned counsel for the respondents have taken us through the terms of the appointment letter, the extensions given from time to time and the advertisement issued to demonstrate the transferability of the job and highlighting the other terms as well as the applicability of the rules and regulations. The advertisements issued inviting applications as well as the appointment letters issued and the extensions given clearly establish the requirement for these vacancies and jobs, which is even otherwise not disputed in the writ petitions. As a matter of fact, the learned government counsel conceded that posts are always available and such appointments are always required in order to properly run the public health services. The process of regular Selection is through the Union Public Service Commission and is cumbersome and long drawn out.

    7. We may also, at this stage, notice the contention of the government counsel that the relief granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal to the respondents amounts to back door entry into the service. The submission is not correct. The relief granted is confined to parity in salary and emoluments with those payable to the regular doctors. The directions issued to consider relaxation of age for the years of service rendered by the respondents on ad hoc or contract basis, if they happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission for selection, cannot be considered as directing regularization or making any back door entry.

    In order to somehow justify the unequal treatment to the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent doctors are rejects from the regular selection process and, therefore, they cannot claim equal treatment. This contention is totally misconceived and untenable. Respondent doctors also possess the same degree and qualifications as those employed on regular basis. Besides, the respondent doctors have also been admittedly employed on the basis of selection and scrutiny, though not through the Union Public Service Commission. It is the Government, which invited them to take up job through public advertisement and not vice versa. Lastly, it is not the case of the Government that these doctors are not discharging their duties efficiently or meritoriously and, therefore, they have to be paid less than what the doctors appointed on regular basis are paid.

    8. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, submitted that the writ petitions were completely devoid of merit. Relying on A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen he submitted that there was an additional reason to refuse interference with the impugned order since there has been no failure of justice. The impugned order only seeks to undo the injustice meted out to the respondents. We find merit in this submission.

    9. The present writ petition by the petitioner is aimed at depriving the respondents of their legitimate emoluments and dues. Rather, acting as a model employer, the Government is attempting to take unfair advantage of the situation prevalent in the country on account of large scale unemployment. It is not the case of the petitioner that the services rendered by the respondents are in any manner inferior to the services rendered by the regularly employed doctors. The respondent doctors took up employment on contractual basis for short term on account of force of circumstances and should not be made to suffer on this account. The stand taken by the petitioners apart from being legally untenable, is unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000/- for each petition.

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    Comments

    Government Of National Capital Territory Of Delhi & Ors. v. Dr. Ranjana Amar & Ors.
    (Sep 11, 1998)