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  • Indian Partnership Act
  • clause (b)(i) of rule 2
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Indian Partnership Act
  • clause (b)(i) of rule 2
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a registered partnership firm engaged in the manufacture and supply of tubelight chokes, fittings, and fixtures for over 28 years, filed a suit under Order XXXVII CPC. The suit arose from a credit arrangement made around 1993 with the defendant company, whereby the plaintiff supplied goods on credit with an agreed payment period of 45 days and an interest rate of 24% per annum on delayed payments. The plaintiff supplied goods from September 1993 to August 1995, but the defendant allegedly defaulted on payments, resulting in outstanding bills totaling Rs. 21,22,029. The defendant issued three cheques purportedly covering some bills, but all were dishonoured. The plaintiff claimed the principal amount plus interest, totaling Rs. 33,92,681.49. The defendant sought leave to defend the suit and condonation of delay in filing the affidavit, citing illness of counsel’s wife and sealing of factory premises by authorities in connection with unrelated wage recovery proceedings, which allegedly prevented access to records. The defendant denied the plaintiff’s claims and the agreed interest rate. The plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of the defendant’s cause for delay and denial of the claim.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit based on bills/invoices qualifies to be instituted under Order XXXVII CPC as a suit on a written contract.
  2. Whether the defendant has disclosed sufficient cause to justify condonation of delay in seeking leave to defend the suit.
  3. Whether the defendant is entitled to leave to defend the suit under the test laid down in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh (AIR 1958 SC 321).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The suit is not maintainable under Order XXXVII CPC as it is not based on the specified instruments under rules 2(a) & (b) of the Order.
  • Delay in filing the affidavit seeking leave to defend was due to the serious illness of the counsel’s wife.
  • Sealing of factory premises and consequent non-availability of records prevented the defendant from ascertaining the exact position of the plaintiff’s claim.
  • The defendant denies the entire claim, the validity of the bills, and the dishonoured cheques.
  • The defendant denies the agreement to pay interest at 24% per annum.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The suit is maintainable under Order XXXVII CPC as the bills constitute a written contract under clause (b)(i) of rule 2 of the Order.
  • The defendant has failed to disclose sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
  • The managing director of the defendant company is not competent to file the affidavit seeking leave to defend.
  • The defendant cannot deny the bills without furnishing particulars or valid reasons.
  • The rate of interest at 24% per annum is expressly incorporated in the bills and is binding on the defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s. Punjab Pen House v. M/s. Samrat Bicycle Ltd., AIR 1992 Delhi 1 Definition of a 'written contract' under clause (b)(i) of rule 2 of Order XXXVII CPC Confirmed that bills/invoices with agreed terms constitute a written contract, justifying suit under Order XXXVII CPC.
Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, AIR 1958 SC 321 Test for granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII CPC: whether the defence raises a real and plausible issue, not a sham Applied to assess if defendant’s affidavit disclosed a genuine defence justifying leave to contest the suit.
Kesevan v. South India Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 Madras 226 Purpose of Order XXXVII CPC to prevent frivolous defences and ensure speedy disposal in commercial disputes Referenced to underline the object of the Order and guide discretion in granting leave to defend.
Sundaram Chettiar v. Valli Ammal, AIR 1935 Madras 43 (F) Examination of the object and scope of summary procedure under Order XXXVII CPC Used to support the rationale behind the special procedure and discretion exercised by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined whether the suit was maintainable under Order XXXVII CPC. It relied on the precedent in M/s. Punjab Pen House (AIR 1992 Delhi 1) to hold that the bills and invoices constituted a written contract under clause (b)(i) of rule 2 of the Order, making the suit maintainable. The Court noted that the bills incorporated the terms of credit and interest, and that the plaintiff had produced original bills supporting the claim.

Regarding the condonation of delay in filing the affidavit seeking leave to defend, the Court took a lenient view and condoned the six-day delay caused by the illness of the defendant’s counsel’s wife.

On the crucial question of whether the defendant was entitled to leave to defend, the Court applied the test from Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh. The defendant’s plea that factory premises were sealed and records unavailable was scrutinized. The Court observed that the affidavit did not show any attempt to access the records after receiving summons. The denial of the plaintiff’s claim without records was deemed a dishonest attempt to evade liability. The Court found that even if the sealing were proved, it did not amount to a plausible defence, as the defendant had not demonstrated a real issue to be tried.

The Court rejected the defendant’s denial of the agreed interest rate, noting it was clearly incorporated in the original bills. Consequently, the defendant was not entitled to leave to defend the suit.

Holding and Implications

The Court declined leave to defend the suit and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was awarded recovery of Rs. 33,92,681.94 with costs and interest pendente lite and future at 12% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 21,22,029. The decision directly affects the parties by affirming the plaintiff’s claim and denying the defendant’s defence without setting any new precedent beyond the application of established principles under Order XXXVII CPC.

    Beacon Electronics v. Sylvania & Laxman Ltd

    K.S Gupta, J.— Plaintiff filed suit under the provision of Order XXXVII CPC, inter alia, alleging that it is a partnership firm duly registered under the Indian Partnership Act and Prashant Mendiratta, who signed and verified the plaint and instituted the suit, is one of the partners thereof. Plaintiff has been carrying business of manufacture and supply of tubelight chokes, fittings and fixtures for the last more than 28 years. On Ashok Aggarwal, managing director of the defendant-company, approaching the plaintiff in or around 1993, the plaintiff agreed to supply aforesaid goods to the defendant on credit basis for a specified period of 45 days. In case the payment was delayed, it was expressly agreed that interest @ 24% per annum will be paid by the defendant for the period of default in payment. Plaintiff supplied the aforesaid goods which were duly received by the defendant against bills/challans over a period from September 1993 to August 21, 1995. It is alleged that as the volume of business increased defendant started committing defaults in making the payment by the due dates. In para 10 details of the outstanding bills have been given as below:—

    Bill/Invoice No. Date Amount 2988 10.01.94 9,282.00 3048 18.03.94 2,375.00 100 16.09.94 3,300.00 114 30.09.94 48,720.00 115 30.09.94 45,240.00 116 30.09.94 34,680.00 125 24.10.94 69,890.00 130 28.10.94 58,828.00 133 29.10.94 28,600.00 150 24.11.94 17,846.00 151 24.11.94 35,492.00 162 23.12.94 27,144.00 163 23.12.94 73,834.00 164 26.12.94 16,224.00 165 26.12.94 66,192.00 166 26.12.94 24,024.00 175 07.01.95 19,546.00 187 19.01.95 45,240.00 192 22.01.95 39,090.00 193 23.01.95 45,240.00 196 24.01.95 41,390.00 197 25.01.95 1,20,819.00 87 23.08.94 11,172.00 99 16.09.94 3,696.00 104 05.09.95 90,480.00 134 20.09.95 19,546.00 135 20.09.95 45,240.00 136 20.09.95 27,144.00 137 20.09.95 18,096.00 154 05.10.95 92,220.00 34 13.06.95 95,129.00 38 17.06.95 44,990.00 39 17.06.95 27,144.00 41 20.06.95 27,144.00 44 23.06.95 11,497.00 45 23.06.95 19,546.00 49 26.06.95 45,240.00 50 27.06.95 4,599.00 53 03.07.95 3,619.00 55 13.07.95 1,29,570.00 62 24.07.95 52,119.00 63 24.07.95 52,119.00 70 30.07.95 39,090.00 79 05.08.95 57,486.00 80 06.08.95 19,546.00 82 08.08.95 72,384.00 86 12.08.95 1,03,147.00 95 21.08.95 1,37,070.00 Total 21,22,029.00

    Aforesaid bills amount to a written contract between the parties. It is further alleged that the defendant-company issued three cheques Nos. 629473 dt.8.11.95 for Rs. 56.412/-, 629474 dt.9.11.95 for Rs. 62,128/- and 314907 dt.22.11.95 for Rs. 48,720/-. By cheques Nos. 314907 & 629474 defendant purported to make full payments of bills No. 114, 130 & 100. By cheque No. 629473 it purported to make full payment of bill No. 115 and part payment of bill No. 80 for Rs. 29,170/-. On presentation all these three cheques were dishonoured by the Punjab National Bank, Tropical Building, New Delhi. In addition to the aforementioned amount of Rs. 21,22,029/-, a sum of Rs. 12,70,652/49P has been claimed towards interest @ 24% per annum from the due dates till November 15, 1996. Total amount whereof the recovery is sought by the plaintiff against the defendant is Rs. 33,92,681/49P including the interest.

    By filing the affidavit dated April 5, 1997 of Ashok Aggarwal, managing director of the company, defendant has sought the leave to defend the suit and condone the delay in seeking the leave to contest. In the affidavit it is averred that the defendant received the summons for judgment on March 19, 1997 and it was handed over to the counsel for taking appropriate action in the matter. Since the wife of the counsel became seriously ill the affidavit could not be filed within the statutory time. It is stated that office block, cost section, store room and basement of the defendant's factory situated at 68/1-3, Najafgarh Road, were sealed by the District Collection Officer, Tis Hazari, Delhi on August 26, 1996, in connection with the recovery of Rs. 65,94,868/50P allegedly due towards wages of the workers who are on illegal strike since April 1996.

    Against the said illegal recovery the defendant-company filed Civil Writ No. 3375/96 and in C.M.No 5883/96 a status quo order in respect of the recovery has been passed by this Court on September 3, 1996. Status quo order still continues to be in operation. It is stated that due to non-availability of the records because of sealing of the aforesaid portions of the defendant's factory it is unable to find out the exact position of the claim of the plaintiff. Defendant does not accept a single paise claim of the plaintiff as well as the bills on which the suit claim is based and the cheques which were dishonoured. It is denied that interest @ 24% per annum Was agreed to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.

    Alongwith the affidavit photostat copies of the order dated September 3, 1996, passed in Civil Writ No. 3375/96 and the sealing memo dated August 26, 1996, have been filed.

    In the reply it is alleged that the defendant has failed to disclose sufficient cause to justify the condonation of delay in filing the affidavit. Although it is not disputed that Ashok Aggarwal is the managing director of the defendant-company but it is denied that he is competent to file the affidavit seeking leave to defend the suit on behalf of the defendant. Defendant-company having duly received the goods and made endorsements in that behalf on the bills cannot now be permitted to outrightly deny the bills without furnishing the particulars thereof. Bald denial of the claim of the plaintiff made by the defendant is not tenable in law. It is further stated that rate of interest is expressly incorporated in the bills and the defendant cannot seek to avoid liability to pay interest at the agreed rate. Reply is supported by the affidavit of Prashant Mendiratta, one of the partners of the plaintiff-firm.

    At the outset it may be noticed that there is delay of about six days in filing the affidavit dated April 5, 1997. Delay in question is alleged to have occurred due to serious illness of the wife of the counsel whom summons for judgment was given for taking appropriate action. Taking a lenient view, delay in question is condoned.

    Submission advanced by the learned counsel of the defendant was that the present suit does not qualify for being brought under the provision of Order XXXVII CPC as it is not based on instrument(s) reference whereof is made in rules 2(a) & (b) of the said Order. On the contrary, relying on a decision of this Court in M/s. Punjab Pen House v. M/s. Samrat Bicycle Ltd., AIR 1992 Delhi 1, argument advanced by the learned counsel of the plaintiff was that the suit is based on bills which amount to a written contract between the parties within the meaning of clause (b)(i) of rule 2 of the aforesaid Order. In M/s. Punjab Pen House (supra) at page 3 of the report which is relevant, it was held thus:—

    “When the goods are supplied through a bill on certain terms and conditions duly agreed to between the parties, there is no escape from the conclusion that it amounts to a written contract between the parties. Therefore, I am of the view that the suit is covered by clause (2) sub-clause (b) of Order XXXVII of the Code according to which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated amount in money payable by the defendant with or without interest arising on a written contract.”

    In para 11 of the plaint it is pleaded that the bills referred to in para 10 of the plaint amount to a written contract between the parties. Plaintiff has placed on file the original bills/invoices referred to in said para 10 raised in the name of the defendant-company. These amongst others include the terms that interest @ 24% per annum will be charged if the bill is not paid within one month of the date of presentation; that no complaint regarding the bill and no reduction in rate(s) will be entertained if not made in writing within a week of the date of the bill and that the disputes between the parties are subject to Delhi jurisdiction. Thus, it cannot be said that it is a case simpliciter of supply of goods to the defendant without any written terms and conditions between the parties. Ratio in M/s. Punjab Pen House's case (supra), with which I fully agree applies to this case and the objection taken about the non-maintainability of the suit under the aforesaid Order CPC is repelied being without merit.

    This brings me to the crucial point whether the facts disclosed in the aforementioned affidavit of Ashok Aggarwal entitle the defendant for leave to contest the suit and if so, on what terms. Case of Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, AIR 1958 SC 321, is the basic decision on the provision contained in said Order XXXVII CPC. In para 10 of the report (at page 324) which is relevant, it was held thus:—

    “It is always undesirable, and indeed impossible, to lay down hard and fast rules in matters that affect discretion. But it is necessary to understand the reason for a special procedure of this kind in order that the discretion may be properly exercised. The object is explained in Kesevan v. South India Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 Madras 226 and is examined in greater detail in Sundaram Chettiar v. Valli Ammal, AIR 1935 Madras 43 (F), to which we have just referred. Taken by and large, the object is to see that the defendant does not unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prevent the plaintiff from obtaining an early decree by raising untenable and frivolous defences in a class of cases where speedy decisions are desirable in the interests of trade and commerce. In general, therefore, the test is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sense that, if the facts alleged by the defendant are established, there would be a good, or even a plausible, defence on those facts.”

    Needless to repeat that the plea raised in the affidavit of Ashok Aggarwal on behalf of the defendant-company is that office block, cost section, store room and the basement of the defendant's factory at 68/1-3, Najafgarh Road, were sealed on August 26, 1996 by the District Collection Officer, Tis Hazari, in connection with the recovery of Rs. 65,94,868/50P being the amount of the arrears of wages of the workers and because of non-availability pf the records defendant is unable to find out the exact position of the claim of the plaintiff. Simultaneously, defendant has not accepted a single paisa claim of the plaintiff or the bills on which the suit claim is based or the cheques which were dishonoured. Claim of the plaintiff could have been denied only on verification of the records maintained by the defendant-company. If the relevant record itself was not available due to the sealing of the factory premises, latter part of the defence denying the plaintiffs claim based on the bills is a dishonest attempt to evade the liability on the part of the defendant and it cannot be allowed leave to contest on that ground.

    Turning to the former part of the plea referred to above, aforesaid affidavit does not indicate that after the receipt of the summons any attempt whatsoever was made by the defendant to secure the records from the sealed factory premises. If the facts alleged by the defendant are duly proved they will afford a good or even a plausible answer to the plaintiff's claim, is the test laid down for grant of leave to defend by the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar's case (supra). Plea of inability to find out the exact position in regard to the suit claim due to non-availability of records clearly signifies that the defendant-company has no defence to make at this stage but appropriate defence will be taken by it as and when the records are made available. Such a plea even if proved by the defendant will not afford a good or even a plausible answer to the plaintiffs claim in the suit. Rate of interest being 24% per annum on delayed payments is noted in the original bills placed on the file. From the aforesaid discussion, it must follow that the defendant is not entitled to the leave prayed for.

    Consequently, leave to defend the suit is declined. Suit is decreed for recovery of Rs. 33,92,681/94P with costs and interest pendente lite and future on Rs. 21,22,029/- @ 12% per annum against the defendant-company.

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    Comments

    Beacon Electronics v. Sylvania & Laxman Ltd
    (Jan 8, 1998)