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Judgment Summary — K. Ramamoorthy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Arbitrator published the Award on 1 May 1992. There were ten separate claims presented by the Claimant before the Arbitrator. The Award records which claims were allowed in full or in part and which were rejected.

Summary of the ten claims and the Arbitrator's dispositions (as recorded in the opinion):

  • Claim 1: Claimant sought Rs. 39,000 for refund of a 3% rebate (running/final bills) and release of security deposit; Arbitrator allowed Rs. 35,637.87.
  • Claim 2: Rs. 2,000 claimed as refund of a penalty; Arbitrator allowed Rs. 2,000.
  • Claim 3: Rs. 40,000 for increase in wages under clause 10C; Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 4: Rs. 35,421.84 for road cutting; Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 5: Rs. 500 for testing of lead; Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 6: Rs. 2,482.15 for disinfection costs; Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 7: Rs. 20,000 for laying 6" pipes instead of 4" as per agreement; Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 8: Rs. 1,24,727.40 claimed for excessive recovery for different diameter pipes; Arbitrator awarded Rs. 1,24,727.40.
  • Claim 9: Rs. 25,000 for rate determination under Clause 12 (substitution of pipes); Arbitrator rejected this claim.
  • Claim 10: Pendente lite interest; Arbitrator awarded interest at 12% p.a. from 11 May 1989 to 1 May 1992 (date of award).

The Respondent (Delhi Development Authority, DDA) filed objections in IA No. 2690/94 principally contending that the claims were time-barred under Clause 25 of the Agreement because the claimant invoked arbitration beyond 90 days of intimation that the final bill was ready for payment.

The opinion records procedural timelines relevant to arbitration hearings and the dates on which the final bill was passed (30 September 1986), payment released (12 November 1986), and the claimant invoked arbitration (applied for appointment of an Arbitrator on 12 March 1987).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Claimant's claims were barred by Clause 25 of the Agreement for not being preferred within 90 days of receipt of intimation from the Engineer-in-charge that the bill was ready for payment.
  2. Whether the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by deciding matters that were not properly referred (for example, refund of rebate on extra/substituted items) or deciding matters that were non-arbitrable.
  3. Whether the Arbitrator erred in admitting or ignoring specific evidence (e.g., list of issues and Stores Division records) relevant to Claim No. 8 (excessive recovery on pipes).
  4. Whether pendente lite interest awarded by the Arbitrator at 12% p.a. from 11 May 1989 to 1 May 1992 was justified and whether the Arbitrator exercised discretion judicially in granting it.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant (as reflected in the Award)

  • The Claimant advanced ten distinct monetary claims arising under the contract (refunds, adjustments, additional costs, recoveries, interest) and sought relief via arbitration, with an application for appointment of an Arbitrator dated 12 March 1987.
  • The Claimant's procedural posture before the Arbitrator and the relief sought on each claim is recorded in the Award (see the list of claim dispositions above).

Respondent (DDA) — Objections in IA No. 2690/94

  • Main contention: Clause 25 required claim to be preferred within 90 days from receipt of intimation that the bill was ready for payment; the Claimant invoked arbitration after 12 March 1987, beyond the 90-day period.
  • Specific contentions detailed in the objection:
    • (a) Invocation of arbitration beyond 90 days; therefore claims barred by Clause 25 and the Arbitrator erred in holding otherwise.
    • (b) Under Claim No. 1, the Arbitrator ordered refund on rebate for extra/substituted items — a matter not referred to the Arbitrator — and thus the Arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction to that extent (Rs. 2,741.38 identified as improperly allowed).
    • (c) Under Claim No. 2, the refund of Rs. 2,000 was said to be non-arbitrable in terms of Clause 2 of the Agreement and the Arbitrator therefore misconducted the proceedings in awarding it.
    • (d) Under Claim No. 8, the Arbitrator failed to consider a list of issues and Stores Division records that were produced; the Arbitrator ignored important evidence and thus misconducted proceedings.
    • (e) Under Claim No. 10 (pendente lite interest), the Arbitrator should have exercised discretion judiciously in granting interest (relying on the principle in Government of Orrisa v. G.C. Roy); the grant should not have been given as a matter of course.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
DDA v. Sudhir Bros, 1995 32 DRJ 366 Proposition that when a particular matter is not arbitrable the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. The DDA relied on this authority; the court invoked the principle to support the proposition that, in light of Clause 25, the Arbitrator's award could not be sustained where the claims were held to be barred by limitation and thus not arbitrable.
Government of Orrisa v. G.C. Roy Principle that the grant of pendente lite interest by an Arbitrator should not be as a matter of course and the Arbitrator must exercise discretion judicially; the case set out relevant circumstances around arbitrator appointment and conduct of proceedings. Cited by the Respondent to challenge the Arbitrator's award of pendente lite interest; the opinion records the principle and the background facts relied on but the principal ground on which the court set aside the award was limitation/perversity rather than only the interest award.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first recounts the Arbitrator's reasoning on limitation: the Arbitrator quoted Clause 25 and held that the 90-day period runs from the date of receipt of intimation from the Engineer-in-charge that the bill is ready for payment. The Arbitrator found no documentary evidence that any such intimation was sent by the Respondent; therefore, in the Arbitrator's view, the limitation clock did not start and the claims were not time-barred. The Arbitrator further observed that the security deposit was released on 12 November 1986 by adjustment of the minus final bill and that this release was not the same as an intimation that the final bill was ready for payment.

The court then scrutinized the chronology of events: the final bill was passed on 30 September 1986; payment (by adjustment) and release of security deposit occurred on 12 November 1986; the Claimant applied for appointment of an Arbitrator on 12 March 1987. The court emphasized that Clause 25 required the claimant to make the claim within 90 days from the receipt of intimation that the bill was ready for payment.

On analysis, the court concluded that the Arbitrator's reasoning — that the release/adjustment of the minus final bill was not equivalent to an intimation and that therefore limitation had not begun to run — was "absolutely perversive." The court held that Clause 25 applied, and that by failing to prefer claims within the stipulated 90-day period the Contractor (Claimant) was deemed to have waived his claims against the DDA. Consequently, the court found the claims to be barred by time and concluded that the award must be set aside on that ground.

The court also noted the Respondent's reliance on the authority that arbitrators lack jurisdiction over matters that are non-arbitrable (DDA v. Sudhir Bros), and accepted that principle as relevant in determining the validity of the Arbitrator's award in light of Clause 25. While the Government of Orrisa v. G.C. Roy authority was referred to on the issue of the discretion to award pendente lite interest, the court's primary basis for setting aside the award was the application of Clause 25 and the conclusion that the Arbitrator's view on limitation was perverse.

Finally, the court records the practical effect: because the Contractor's claims were time-barred by Clause 25, the DDA stood discharged from contractual liabilities and the award was set aside. The opinion concludes with an order that there shall be no orders as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the Arbitrator's award on the ground that the Claimant's claims were time-barred under Clause 25 of the Agreement (the Arbitrator's contrary conclusion was held to be perverse). As a result, the DDA was discharged of the contractual liabilities adjudicated in the Award. The court also recorded that there shall be no orders as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Arbitrator's Award (published 1 May 1992) was set aside because the Claimant invoked arbitration beyond the 90-day period prescribed by Clause 25, and the court found the Arbitrator's reasoning on limitation to be perverse.
  • The opinion relies on the principle that matters which are effectively non-arbitrable (for example, because a contractual time-bar precludes arbitration of the claim) cannot be validly decided by an Arbitrator, and cites DDA v. Sudhir Bros in support.
  • No broader novel precedent was declared by the court in this opinion; the disposition turns on the application of the contractual Clause 25 to the facts and on recognized principles concerning arbitrator jurisdiction and the exercise of discretion in awarding interest. The opinion does not state that it creates a new rule beyond these applications.

Disposition summary: Award set aside; claims held barred by Clause 25; DDA discharged of liabilities; no order as to costs.

    Shri Ram Singh v. Delhi Development Authority .

    K. Ramamoorthy, J.:— The Arbitrator published the Award on 1.5.1992 In all there were 10 claims.

    2. The Claimant has claimed Rs. 39,000 towards refund of 3% rebate for monthly regular payment, timely finalisation of final bill and release of security deposit, as the Department did not fulfil the terms of the agreement. The Arbitrator has allowed the claim to the extent of Rs. 35,637.87. On Claim No. 2, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 2,000 towards refund of penalty imposed by the Respondent even though the delay in execution of work is attributed to the Respondent. The Arbitrator has allowed Rs. 2,000 towards refund of penalty.

    3. On claim No. 3, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 40,000 towards increase in wages of labour during the progress of work under clause 10C of the Agreement. This claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    4. On Claim No. 4, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 35,421.84 towards road cutting carried out for laying sewerage lines and initially amount paid and later on recovered by the Department without solid or convincing reason. This claim has also been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    5. On Claim No. 5, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 500 on account of amount incurred to carry out testing of lead through Sri Ram Testing Laboratory, but the amount not paid back by the Department. This claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    6. On Claim No. 6, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 2,482.15 towards carrying out disinfection of water lines and in the process bleaching powder etc. was used. This claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    7. On Claim No. 7, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 20,000 towards laying of 6″ dia Pipes instead of 4″ dispipes to be laid as per terms of the Agreement, this claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    8. On Claim No. 8, the Claimant has claimed Rs. 1,24,727.40 on account of excessive recovery made for the different dia pipes issued by the Department. The Arbitrator has awarded Rs. 1,24,727.40.

    9. On claim No. 9, the Claiment has claimed Rs. 25,000 on account of rates not determined under Clause 12 of the agreement for substitution of 150″ mm. dia pipe in place of 100 mm. dia pipes stipulate to be laid. This claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator.

    10. On Claim No. 10, the Claimant has claimed pendente lite interest. The Arbitrator has allowed interest @ 12% per annum, from 11.5.1989 i.e, the date on which he has entered on the reference into 1.5.1992 i.e, the date of award.

    11. The Respondent (DDA) in IA No. 2690/94 has filed objection. The main contention is that under Clause 25 of the agreement the Claimant should preferred the claim within 90 days of receiving the intimation from the eer in Charge that the bill is ready for payment.

    12. The point taken in the objection petitioner is as follows:

    “(a) One of the preliminary objections raised by the respondent before the learned Arbitrator was that all the claims were barred under clause 25 of the Agreement between the partis. The learned Arbitrator has dealtwith the said plea at page 2 of the award and has reproduced the relevant portion of the Clause 25 of the Agreement also. The payment of the final bill was released on 12th November, 1986 admittedly. Thus on the said date the petitioner had the intimation with regard to the final bill being ready for payment. As a matter of fact the release of the security deposit after adjusting the amount against the final bill, which was in minus was a step more than intimation that the final bill was ready for payment. The petitioner applied for the appointment of the Arbitrator/invoked the arbitration clause admittedly on 12th March, 1987. Thus the invocation of the arbitration clause beyond 90 days as prescribed in Clause 25 of the Agreement. The learned Arbitrator has completely overlooked these facts and found that the claims are not barred by time, there is an error apparent on the face of the award and the entire award is liable to be set aside and the claims of the Petitioner are bound to be barred by time.

    (b) Under Claim No. 1, the petitioner Claimed Rs. 39,000 towards the refund on rebate on account of running account bills, final bill and release of security. The learned Arbitrator has dealt with this part at pages 4 and 5 of the Award. In sub-para (2) of Claim No. 1 at page 4, the learned Arbitrator has dealt with the question of refund on rebate on account of extra and substituted items. This part of the claim was never referred to the learned Arbitrator nor any claim in this behalf was specifically preferred by the petitioner. The learned Arbitrator has ordered the refund of rebate on this account also. The learned Arbitrator has thus dealt with the matter, which was not referred to him and thus exceeded his jurisdiction in this behalf. Amount of Rs. 2,741.38 was deducted on account of rebate against extra and substituted items. Thus part to the award to this extent is, therefore, liable to be modified/set aside so far as it relates to the refund of rebate against extra/substituted items.

    (c) Under claims No. 2, the petitioner had claimed refund of Rs. 2,000 which was a levy under Clause 2 of the agreement between the parties. The learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself and the proceedings by awarding this amount in favour of the petitioner as the matter was not arbitrable in terms of Clause 2 of the Agreement The Hon'ble court held so in numerous cases in the decisions rendered in the year 1993.

    (d) Under claim No. 8, a sum of Rs. 1,24,727.40 was claimed by the petitioner as excess recovery on account of C.I pipes. The basis for the claim was that the recovery rate had been changed in the Agreement and according to the petitioner, his was without the knowledge. This was also on account of the fact that correction was made only in figures and not in words and the corrections did not bear the signature of the petitioner. In the hearing held on 25th June, 1991, the learned Arbitrator called for list of issue raised and the relevant period issued by the Stores Division of D.D.A and the same was produced for the consideration for the learned Arbitrator. However, the learned Arbitrator has not taken said list into consideration and has rather omitted to take the same into consideration. The rates are also justified by the totality of circumstances, if one makes a calculation of total amount of tendered cost. However, this aspect has also been overlooked by the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator has thus ignored and failed to take into consideration these two important pieces of evidence and has thus misconducted himself as also the proceedings. The award is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

    (e) Under claim No. 9, the petitioner had claimed pendente lite interest. The learned Arbitrator has awarded pendente lite interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 11th May, 1989 to 1st May, 1992 (the date of award). No doubt, the learned Arbitrator was competent to award pendente lite interest, but the grant of pendente lite interest should not have been as a matter of course. The learned Arbitrator ought to have exercised its discretion judiciously as held in the case of Government of Orrisa v. G.C Roy by the Hon'ble High Court. The salient features of this case are that the learned Arbitrator was appointed vide letter dated 25th May, 1988 of the Engineer Member of D.D.A The first Arbitrator appointed was Shri Om Prakash, who resigned as per his letter dated 23rd February, 1989 on the ground The Claimant was directed to submit the Statement of Facts vide letter No. F. 2(80)88.SE-Arbn.II/Arb./1129-30 dated 7th July, 1988, but the same has not been submitted by him uptil now. It seems that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his claim. I, therefore, resign as Arbitrator in respect of the above case. The relevant file in respect of the case is sent herewith”. Thereafter, Shri J.K Varshney was appointed vide letter dated 27th March, 1989 of the Engineer Member. The learned Arbitrator vide letter dated 11th May, 1989 called upon the parties to file Statement of Facts and Counter-Statement of Facts and Rejoinder with advance copies to each other. The learned Arbitrator has assumed that this is the date from which he entered upon the reference or the lists commenced. The statement of facts was filed by the petitioner on 24th April, 1990. Counter-statement of facts by the respondent was filed on 23rd July, 1990 and thereafter rejoinder by the petitioner was filed on 1st November, 1990. The first effective hearing was held on 23rd February, 1991 (first hearing was fixed for 28th December, 1990, but the notice did not reach the respondent) and thereafter 21st January, 1991 was the date of hearing which was adjourned due to the Respondent. Subsequently the following dates were fixed and the parties as indicated above attended the hearing.

    DATE OF HEARING PRESENCE OF THE REASONS PARTISE. FOR ADJOURNMENT 8.2.1991 None for the parties 23.2.1991 None for the parties 29.3.1991 This date was pre-poned by the learned Arbitrator to 27.3.1991 and on that date none of the par ties appeared 20.4.1991 Both the parties present 10.5.1991 Petitioner absent 29.5.1991 Petitioner absent 10.6.1991 Petitioner absent 12.6.1991 Petitioner absent 25.6.1991 Both the parties present 24.9.1991 Adjourned, on the request of the Respondent 8.10.1991 Petitioner absent 19.10.1991 Petitioner absent 25.11.1991 Adjourned because the Arbitrator was out of town 7.2.1992 Both the parties present 13.3.1992 Adjourned due to respondent 4.4.1992 Both the parties present

    13. What has happened in this case is the final bill of the claimant was passed on 30.9.1986 and the payment of the amount was released on 12.11.1986

    14. The Arbitrator having quoted the relevant portion of Clause 25 has rejected the contention of the DDA in the following terms:

    “It will be seen that the period of 90 days starts from the date of receipt of intimation from the Engineer-in-charge that the bill is ready for payment. The respondent was asked to show on what date he had sent the intimation to the claimant. He replied in the negative and could not produce any documentary evidence that any intimation was ever sent to the claimant. If there is no intimation, the clock of limitation does not tick. Thus, the claims are not barred by limitation.

    On 31.10.1986 (C-9), the claimant requested the respondent to release his security deposit. The final bill of the claimant was in the minus. The security deposit was released on 12.11.1986 by adjusting the minus final bill. Thus, the payment of minus final bill was not as a result of intimation from the respondent but by adjustment while released the security deposit.

    In the light of the above facts, I hold that the claim of claimant are not barred by limitation.”

    Under Clause 25 of the Agreement the claimant must make his claim within 90 days from the receipt of intimation from the Engineer-in-charge that the bill is ready for payment. Therefore, the fact that the claimant was informed in September, 1986 and on 31.10.1986 the claimant requested the DDA to release the security deposited because no amount was payable on the finalbill because all amounts apparently had been adjusted. What remained was the refund of the security deposited that has also done by the Delhi Development Authority on 12.11.1986 The claim was made by the claimant on 12.3.1987

    15. The Contractor applied by the appointment of an Arbitrator on 12.3.1987 is not in dispute. The reasoning given by the Arbitrator that the payment of minus bill was not as a result of the intimation from the Respondent but by way of adjustment of releasing the security amount is absolutely perversive, therefore, the provision in Clause 25 would apply and the Contractor is deemed to have waived his claims against the Delhi Development Authority and the claim is absolutely barred and the DDA stands discharged in respect of all the liabilities on the contract on the sole ground that the award made by the Arbitrator is set aside.

    16. Learned counsel Mr. V.K Sharma for the DDA has brought to my notice the judgment of this court reported in DDA v. Sudhir Bros. . 1995 32 DRJ 366., for the proposition when a particular matter is not arbitrable the Arbitrator would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. In the light of the specific provision under Clause 25 of the Agreement, the award at all cannot be sustained. There shall be no orders as to cost.

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    Comments

    Shri Ram Singh v. Delhi Development Authority .
    (Jan 3, 1996)