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  • provisions of section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 455 DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT
  • M.P Electricity Board (supra).14. Section 22(d)
  • section 26(6) of (he Act and clause 22(d)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 455 DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT
  • M.P Electricity Board (supra).14. Section 22(d)
  • section 26(6) of (he Act and clause 22(d)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Letters Patent Appeal (DESU v. Petitioner)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the judgment dated 31 March 1987 of a Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 2004 of 1983. The dispute arose after the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) raised a bill dated 1 November 1980 alleging defects in the consumer's electricity meter and claiming amounts for earlier consumption. The writ petition was brought by the consumer challenging (inter alia) the bill on grounds including limitation and non-compliance with section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 ("the Act"). The Single Judge allowed the writ petition (with costs), quashed the 1 November 1980 bill and made findings on limitation, the application of section 26(6) and the method of computing consumption where a meter is defective. DESU filed this Letters Patent Appeal. Cross-objections were filed by the respondent challenging, among other things, the Single Judge's finding that the three-year limitation period begins from the date the bill is submitted to the consumer. Several connected writ petitions were argued because they raised identical points.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a demand for electricity charges can be raised more than three years after the electricity was consumed (i.e., the point from which limitation runs).
  2. Whether a demand based on an alleged defective meter can be validly raised by DESU absent compliance with section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (which requires referral to an Electrical Inspector on application by either party).
  3. If a meter is defective, what is the proper basis for calculating consumption for the period in question (the applicability of clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply and whether comparison should be with prior corresponding months/years).
  4. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable in a dispute of this nature (i.e., is an alternate remedy before the Electrical Inspector exclusive?).
  5. When an amount becomes "due" for limitation purposes: at the moment electricity is consumed or only when liability is quantified and a bill issued?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (DESU's) Arguments — as presented by Mr. Ashwani Kumar

  • The writ petition was not maintainable because disputes under section 26(6) are to be referred to the Electrical Inspector who has technical expertise; such disputes are therefore not properly resolved by a petition under Article 226. Reliance was placed on the Gujarat High Court judgment in Quality Steels and Forgings Ltd. v. Gujarat Electricity Board, AIR 1988 Gujrat 121.
  • If the consumer is aggrieved by a bill, the consumer may raise the dispute before the Electrical Inspector under section 26(6); meanwhile, DESU may recover amounts based on clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply where the meter is defective.
  • The Single Judge erred in holding that a demand cannot be raised on account of a defective meter when the correctness of the meter is being adjudicated by the Electrical Inspector; such a holding would disrupt DESU's functioning given the large number of defective meters in Delhi.
  • The Conditions of Supply are contractual and binding; where a meter is defective the consumer is bound to pay on the basis prescribed in clause 22(d).

Respondent's / Writ Petitioners' Arguments — as presented by Mr. Thadani, Mr. S.P. Mittal and others

  • On a correct interpretation of section 24 of the Act, the amount becomes due the moment the electricity is consumed; limitation (three years) runs from consumption. Reliance was placed on New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637.
  • Bills are to be rendered monthly or bimonthly per clause 25 of the Conditions of Supply; if DESU fails to send bills within the period of limitation, it cannot later insist payment for earlier periods.
  • A bill based on a defective or burnt meter is not a valid bill and DESU is not entitled to recover sums based on such a bill; DESU's appropriate remedy is to refer the matter under section 26(6) to the Electrical Inspector, who may estimate supply for up to six months.
  • When a matter is pending before the Electrical Inspector, DESU should not send bills to the consumer based on the defective meter; DESU can instead install a pilot meter and charge on that basis until the Inspector decides. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., 1980 LAB I.C 583, and on Bombay High Court and other decisions (Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR 1985 Bombay 415).
  • Reference was made to the Allahabad High Court judgment in Kamala Shanker Upadhya v. State Electricity Board, U.P. AIR 1977 Allahabad 185, to support certain positions about meter disputes and remedies.

Other Connected Petitioners' Submissions

  • In connected matters counsel reiterated submissions that where a meter is found defective DESU should refer the meter to the Electrical Inspector, install a pilot meter during pendency, and charge only on the basis of the pilot meter until the Inspector's decision (relying on Bharat Barrel and related cases).
  • Counsel emphasized that under the proviso to section 26(4) the meter cannot be removed till the Inspector decides and DESU cannot charge amounts pending that decision (submission advanced with reference to relevant authorities mentioned above).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Quality Steels and Forgings Ltd. & another v. Gujarat Electricity Board & another, AIR 1988 Gujrat 121 Cited by appellant to argue that disputes under the Act should be referred to the Electrical Inspector and that writ jurisdiction may be inappropriate. Court noted the reliance but rejected the appellant's contention that the writ petition was not maintainable; the Court treated the precedent as an argument but relied on other authorities to hold the writ was maintainable in the circumstances.
New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637 Authority cited for the proposition that if recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation it cannot be insisted that the amount was payable. Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision in that case does not assist the respondent on the specific point of when an amount becomes due under the Indian Electricity Act; the Court therefore did not accept that case as controlling on the "when due" issue under the Act.
M.P.E.B. and others v. Smt. Basamibai, AIR 1988 SC 71 Authority that the Supreme Court has upheld High Court judgment in a writ petition pertaining to disputes about defective meters (supporting jurisdictional precedents). Court relied on this precedent to reject the appellant's maintainability objection and to indicate that writ petitions have been entertained in similar defective meter disputes.
Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & others, AIR 1985 Bombay 415 Cited by respondents to support the proposition that when a meter is defective certain limitations exist on recovering charges and that the Electrical Inspector's role and six‑month estimation are material. Court found its view—particularly about the six‑month limitation under section 26(6)—to be supported by this Bombay High Court decision.
Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., 1980 LAB I.C 583 (Full Bench, Karnataka High Court) Cited to support the submission that when a matter is pending before the Inspector, bills should not be sent to the consumer on the basis of a defective meter. Court acknowledged the reliance but applied the statutory scheme of section 26(6) and clause 22(d) to determine the permissible period for estimation (six months) and the conclusiveness of the register outside that period.
Kamala Shanker Upadhya v. State Electricity Board, U.P., AIR 1977 Allahabad 185 Cited concerning the maintainability of writs in disputes involving public authorities exercising statutory powers (Division Bench authority). Court referred to this decision to support its view that writ jurisdiction can be appropriate where a public authority's action under statutory powers is challenged and used this to reject the appellant's maintainability objection.
Major Zorawar Singh v. M.C.D. & Anr., 44 (1991) DLT 314 Cited by respondents as a local decision relevant to the issues of billing and recovery under municipal/electricity arrangements. Court noted reliance upon this Court's decision among other authorities while addressing respondent submissions; the reasoning adopted in the opinion was based primarily on statutory interpretation rather than any specific reliance on this single case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the parties' contentions and the statutory scheme of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 along with the Conditions of Supply (clause 22(d) and clause 25) and prior authorities. The analysis proceeded in these principal steps:

  1. Maintainability of the writ petition: The Court rejected DESU's argument that the writ petition was not maintainable because the point was not raised by DESU in the writ petition and because precedent shows that writs challenging actions of public bodies invested with statutory powers may be entertained. The Court cited Kamala Shanker Upadhya and M.P.E.B. v. Basamibai to support this view and accordingly refused to uphold the maintainability objection.
  2. Interpretation of section 26(6) of the Act and clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply: The Court read section 26(6) as permitting either party to apply to the Electrical Inspector to decide whether a meter is correct. If the Inspector holds the meter incorrect, he is to estimate the energy supplied during a period not exceeding six months, and direct payment accordingly. The Court emphasized that the Inspector's estimate is limited to six months and that the Inspector must follow principles of natural justice.
  3. Conclusiveness of the meter register and scope of recovery: The Court held that except where the Inspector finds the meter incorrect for a period (not exceeding six months), the register of the meter is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive proof of the quantity supplied. Thus DESU can only revise bills for the period which the Inspector determines the meter was incorrect (max six months immediately preceding referral); in other periods the register is final and no extra charges beyond entries can be demanded.
  4. Application of clause 22(d): Clause 22(d) prescribes that where an Undertaking's meter is defective consumption for the defective period be determined by reference to the average recorded for the previous three season months (or similar prior period for seasonal factories). The Court held clause 22(d) must be read in conjunction with section 26(6) and upheld the Single Judge's view that DESU may calculate consumption by reference to previous three corresponding months/years until the Inspector adjudicates.
  5. When an amount becomes "due": The Court rejected the respondent's contention (based on its reading of section 24) that the amount becomes due the moment electricity is consumed. The Court agreed with the Single Judge that although liability to pay arises on consumption, it becomes due and payable only when the liability is quantified and a bill is raised. The Court found the New Delhi Municipal Committee (Kalu Ram) decision inapposite to the specific question of when amounts become due under the Electricity Act.
  6. Synthesis and support in authorities: The Court observed that its formulation — limited six‑month estimation by the Inspector, conclusiveness of the register outside that period, and the requirement that DESU comply with section 26(6) when alleging a defective meter — finds support in the Bombay High Court decision in Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. and other cited authorities.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The Single Judge's order (which had allowed the writ petition, quashed the DESU bill dated 1 November 1980 and recorded the legal findings described above) stands.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Single Judge's findings are affirmed: where DESU alleges a meter is defective it must comply with section 26(6) of the Act (i.e., the matter is to be determined by the Electrical Inspector on application by either party), and any estimation by the Inspector of the amount supplied is limited to a period not exceeding six months.
  • Outside any period for which the Inspector finds the meter incorrect (up to six months), the meter register is conclusive in the absence of fraud and DESU cannot demand additional charges beyond entries warranted by the register.
  • Clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply (average of previous three season months or similar period) is an appropriate method for DESU to determine consumption for the defective period pending determination by the Inspector.
  • The Court held that the liability to pay arises on consumption but becomes due only when quantified by a bill; consequently, limitation (three years) runs from the date the bill is submitted (as reflected in the Single Judge's finding which the respondent had challenged in cross-objections).
  • The Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs, and the writ petitions are directed to be listed before a Single Judge for decision in the week commencing 7 February 1994.
  • No broad new legal principle beyond the statutory interpretation and application of existing authorities was announced; the decision leaves in place the statutory framework (section 26(6) and clause 22(d)) and confirms the limits of the Electrical Inspector's estimation power (six months) and the conclusiveness of meter registers outside that estimation period.

No other outcomes, remedies, or factual findings beyond those stated above are contained in the provided opinion.

    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi (Dhsu). v. Shri H.D Shourie..

    Sat Pal, J.— This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31st March, 1987 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2004 of 1983. Before the learned Single Judge the following contentions were urged on behalf of the petitioner:—

    1) No demand can be raised for a period which is more than three years after the consumption of the electricity.

    2) Since the provisions of section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) have not been complied with, the demand raised by Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (for short called ‘DESU’) vide bill dated 1st November, 1980 was liable to be quashed. 3) Assuming there can be a demand which is raised in case of a defective meter, then the basis of calculating the correct consumption of electricity during the period should be not with reference to the subsequent period but should be with reference to the period earlier than the period in question.

    2. Dealing with the above contentions the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment gave the following findings:—

    1) Even though the liability to pay may arise when the electricity is consumed by the petitioner, nevertheless it becomes due and payable only when the liability i quantified and a bill is raised. The DESU is, therefore, at liberty to send a bill for consumption of electricity even three years after the electricity has been consumed.

    2) Section 26(6) of the Act provides for the Electrical Inspector taking a decision on disputed question and in this the requirement of the inspector following the principle of natural justice is implicit. Further under section 26(6) of the Act, an estimate by the Electrical Inspector is not to be for a period in excess of six months. In the present case since the Electrical Inspector was never brought in the picture and DESU took a unilateral decision and the bill was for a period in excess of six months, the provisions of section 26(6) of the Act have been violated. In view of non-compliance of section 26(6) of the Act, the bill dated 1st November, 1980 is quashed. It is also held that DESU can raise a valid demand only by complying with the provisions of section 26(6) of the Act if it alleges that the meter was defective and not otherwise.

    3) In case of a defective meter the electricity charges should be calculated in terms of clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply. Say in case of a defective meter in the months of May to July 1973, the amount of electricity consumption will be calculated by having reference to the consumption in the previous three season months i.e for the same months for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972.

    3. For the reasons mentioned herein above the writ petition was allowed with costs, hence the present appeal has been filed by the DESU. It may be pointed out here that in the present case cross-objections have been filed on behalf of the respondent and in the cross-objections the finding of the learned Single Judge that the period of three years will start from the date the bill is submitted to the consumer, has been challenged. Besides, the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent, counsel for the writ petitioner in Civil Petition No. 1443 of 1988 and other connected writ petitions also addressed arguments since the points raised in the connected writ petitions were also identical to those raised in the present appeal.

    4. Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the writ petition itself was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Act. He submitted that under section 26(6) of the Act the disputes or difference between the licencee (DESU) and consumer are required to be referred to Electrical Inspector who has got technical knowledge. It is, therfore, not proper to entertain the dispute of this nature in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of Gujrat High Court in Quality Steels and Forgings Ltd. and another v. Gujrat Electricity Board and another, AIR 1988 Gujrat 121.

    5. The learned counsel further submitted that in case the consumer was aggrieved with the amount of the hill sent by DESU, he is at liberty to raise the dispute before the Electrical Inspector in terms of section 26(6) of the Act and pending adjudication of the matter before the Electrical Inspector the DESU will be entitled to recover the amount from such a consumer on the basis of clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that a demand cannot be raised on account of defective meter when the question of correctness of the meter being adjudicated upon by the Electrical Inspector. He submitted that in case the aforesaid finding of the learned Single Judge is upheld, it will create difficulties in the proper functioning of DESU as in the Union Territory of Delhi there were thousands of meters which keep becoming defective from time to time. He further submitted that the Conditions of Supply which are contractual in nature are binding on the consumer and in case a meter is found defective, the consumer is bound to pay the bill for the electricity consumed, on the basis mentioned in clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply.

    6. Mr. Thadani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that on a correct interpretation of section 63 24 of the Act, the amount becomes due the moment the electricity is consumed and under section 455 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act sum due to the Corporation on account of any charge cannot be recovered more than three years after it has become due. He, therefore, contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the electricity charges become due after the bill is sent and not earlier. The learned counsel also drew our attention to clause 25 of the Conditions of Supply and submitted that bills are required to be rendered to the consumer monthly and bimonthly and in case DESU fails to send the bills within the period of limitalion, it cannot insist that the amount was payable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637. He also refered to page 212 of Maxwell “Interpretation of Statutes, Twelth Edition”, wherein it is stated that a man canot take advantage of his own wrong.

    7. Learned counsel further submitted that a bill based on defective/burnt meter is not a valid bill and DESU is not entitled to recover any amount-in respect of such a bill. He submitted that the only remedy for DESU in such a case is to refer the matter under section 26(6) of the Act to the Electrical Inspector who will estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer during such time not exceeding six months. He further submitted that when the matter is pending before the Electrical Inspector, no bill can be sent to the consumer. In support of this submission the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of a Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in Regional Director, E.S.I Corporation v. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., 1980 LAB I.C 583, a judgment of Bombay High Court in Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, AIR 1985 Bombay 415 and a judgment of this Court in Major Zorawar Singh v. M.C.D & Anr. 44 (1991) DLT 314.

    8 Mr. S.P Mittal, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in a connected case, besides reiterating the submissions made by Mr. Thadani, submitted that a demand made from a consumer for any sum of money with respect to the alleged supply of energy is not a valid demand if the same is based on a defective meter. He further submitted that in case of a defective meter DESU can install a pilot meter till a correct meter is provided but cannot charge any money on the basis of a defective meter. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kamala Shanker Upadhya v. State Electricity Board, U.P.A1R 1977 Allahabad 185.

    9. Mr. Valmiki Mehta and Mr. Rana Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the petitioners in other connected cases submitted that in case a meter is found defective, DESU should refer the meter to the Electrical Inspector and during the pendency of reference, should install a pilot meter and DESU should charge the bill only on the basis of the pilot meter till the matter is decided by the Electrical Inspector. They also relied on the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Bharat Barrel Mfg. Co. Ltd., (supra).

    10. Mr. A.P.S Ahluwalia, the learned counsel for the petitioner in another connected case referred to section 26(6) of the Act and submitted that in terms of the said section, person aggrieved has to approach the Electrical Inspector. He further submitted that since in the present case DESU, being the aggrieved party, should approach the Electrical Inspector who shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer during such time not execcding six months. He also submitted that under proviso to section 26(4) of the Act, the meter cannot be removed till the matter is decided by the Inspector and till the matter is decided by the Electrical Inspector, DESU cannot charge any amount. In support of his submission he also placed reliance on the judgment of Bombay High Count in the case of Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra).

    11. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the writ petition itself was not maintainable as this point was not raised on behalf of the apellant in the writ petition. In this connection we may, however, refer to a Division Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Kamala Shanker Upadhya (supra) which was a case of similar nature like the present one and in that case it was held that normally in case of ordinary contractual liability the writ would not be appropriate remedy but where the action of a public authority invested with statutory power is challenged, the writ petition is maintainable. Here it will also be relevant to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in M.P.E.B and others v. Smt. Basamibai, AIR 1988 SC 71. In this case the Supreme Court has upheld the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rendered in a writ petition pertaining to a dispute of defective meter. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition is rejected.

    12. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant pertaining to the demand in respect of a defective meter when the quesion of correctness of the meter is being adjudicated upon by the Electrical Inspector, it will be relevant to refer to section 26(6) of (he Act and clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply which read as under:—

    “26.(6) Where any difference ordispute arises as to whether any meter referred to in sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has, in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be correct, such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspectors have been correct; but save as aforesaid, the register of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount of quantity:

    Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this sub-section, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days' notice of his inteution so to do.”

    “22. Meters & Meter Reading

    (d) If at any time the meter belonging to the Undertaking and installed at the consumer's premises is found defective, the same shall be replaced by Undertaking. For the period during which the meter remained defective, the consumption shall be determined as follows:—

    (i) Average recorded for the previous three Season months for all consumers including perennial factories except those as brought out under item (ii) below.

    (ii) For seasonal factories and licensees either average of previous three mouths as in (i) above or last year's consumption for a similar period whichever is considered suitable by the Undertaking.”

    13. The reading of section 26(6) of the Act shows that a dispute also whether any meler is or is not correct can be referred on an application made by either of the parties to the Electrical Inspector and it is for the Inspector to determine whether the meter is correct or not and in case the Inspector is of the opinion that the meter is not correct, he shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer during a period not exceeding six months and shall direct the consumer to pay the same. Once the dispute is referred under section 26(6) of the Act, DESU will be entitled to claim only the charges payable as per the register of meter and such further amount as may be held due for a period of six months by the Electrical Inspector and that would be the amount due for the purpose of section 24 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the bills could be revised only for the period during which according to the Electrical Inspector the meter was not correct subject to a maximum period of six months immediately preceding the reference. In all other respects, the register of meter is final and binding on the parties and no charges other than what is warranted by the entries can be demanded from the consumer. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the learned Single Judge that under section 26(6) of the Act, an estimate by the Electrical Inspector is not to be for a period in excess of six mouths and the Electrical Inspector will have to follow the principles of natural justice for taking a decison. Similarly, in case a consumer is aggrieved in respect of alleged defective meler and raises a dispute that more charges than were really due from him are be ing recovered on the basis of reading of defective meler, he also cannot dispute the corectness of the entries in the register of meter for any period beyond six months. The view we have taken also finds support from the judgment of Bombay High Court is the case of Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra). It is, however, made clear that the dispute whether a meter is correct or faulty would only comes under the provisions of section 26(6) of the Act and not the dispute regarding the tampering of meter in term of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M.P Electricity Board (supra).

    14. Section 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply will have to be read along with section 26(6) of the Act. In terms of the aforesaid section the electricity charges in case of a defective meter can be calculated by DESU with reference to the consumption in the previous three years for the same months till the dispute is adjudicated upon by the Electrical inspector. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter also.

    15. As regards the contention of the learned cousnel for the respondent that in terms of section 24 of the Act the amount becomes due the moment the electricity is consumed, we do not find any substance in this contention. On the contrary we find no infirmity in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the liability to pay may arise when the electricity is consumed by a consumer, nevertheless it becomes due and payable only when the liabilitiy is quantified and a bill is raised. We fully agree with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent.

    16. fn the case of NDMC (supra) which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent the Supreme Court has held that if the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation it cannot be insisted that the amount was payable.

    The judgment of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is of no assitance to the respondent as the Supreme Court was not concerned with the ploint as to when the amount becomes due and payable under the Indian Electricity Act.

    17. In view of the aforesaid reasons the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. We further direct that the writ petitions be now listed before a learned Single Judge for deciion in the week commencing 7th February, 1994. Chief Justice

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    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi (Dhsu). v. Shri H.D Shourie..
    (Dec 17, 1993)