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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner company supplied coal to the respondent company, procuring coal against payment from collieries on permits issued in the respondent’s favour and supplying that coal to the respondent. In 1983 the respondent ran into financial difficulties and the respondent's factory was closed. At the date of closure the petitioner claimed it was owed Rs. 1,94,487.70 and claimed interest at 22% per annum, amounting to Rs. 98,328.58 up to 31 March 1986.

The record includes correspondence in which the respondent repeatedly acknowledged the debt and promised payment: a letter of 2 March 1984 promising payment by the end of March 1984; a letter of 22 June 1984 offering a staged payment schedule (initial Rs. 20,000 on 30 June 1984 and Rs. 25,000 fortnightly), which was not honoured; subsequent letters from the petitioner (including 29 June 1985, 11 July 1985 and 30 July 1985) and acknowledgements from the respondent (including 2 July 1985 and 3 August 1985) confirming inability to pay immediately and promising payment once the mill reopened.

The petitioner offered to take back the coal in view of the respondent's closed operations; the respondent apparently accepted that offer on 2 July 1985, but when the petitioner attempted to remove the coal he was prevented by the Collector of Sehore and therefore could not take back the coal. A notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act was sent by the petitioner to the respondent on 29 August 1986. The respondent disputed the claim for the first time in a reply through its lawyer dated 24 September 1986.

Having failed to recover its dues, the petitioner filed the present petition for winding up on 16 February 1987. Subsequently the petitioner also instituted a civil suit (Suit No. 1357/88) in May 1988, said to be to prevent the claim becoming time-barred. The winding up petition was resisted on two principal grounds (described below) and was pending when the court heard the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's offer to take back the goods and the respondent's acceptance amounted to a novation or substitution of the original contract, thereby extinguishing the respondent's liability to pay for the goods.
  2. Whether the winding up petition was maintainable despite the petitioner having instituted a civil suit for recovery (i.e., whether the pendency of a civil suit by the creditor precludes continuation of winding up proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that the respondent owed Rs. 1,94,487.70 for coal supplied, with interest claimed at 22% per annum up to 31 March 1986 (Rs. 98,328.58).
  • The petitioner contended that it repeatedly sought payment by correspondence and that the respondent repeatedly acknowledged the debt and promised payment.
  • The petitioner offered to take back the coal when the respondent’s operations ceased; when it could not remove the coal due to the Collector of Sehore's refusal, the respondent nonetheless failed to pay.
  • Having been unable to recover its dues, the petitioner filed the winding up petition on 16 February 1987 and later filed a civil suit in May 1988 to protect limitation rights.

Respondent's Arguments

  • First, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s offer to take back the goods and the respondent's acceptance amounted to novation or substitution of the original contract, discharging any liability to pay for the goods thereafter.
  • Second, the respondent argued that the winding up petition was not maintainable because the petitioner had instituted a civil suit for the recovery of the amount, implying the winding up proceedings should not continue while the suit was pending.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Traders Bank Limited v. Kwick Travel Pvt. Ltd., 1988 (2) C.L.J. 56 Illustrates a situation where a suit had been filed earlier and during its pendency a winding up petition was filed; relied upon by respondent. The court held this authority did not assist the respondent because that case involved the suit being filed before the winding up petition; the present matter involved a winding up petition already filed and later a suit by the creditor.
Central Bank of India v. Sukhani Mining And Engineering Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Others, 1987 (47) Company Cases 1 (Patna High Court) Holds that there is no provision in the Companies Act ousting the jurisdiction of the court to continue and decide winding up proceedings merely because a creditor has filed a suit for realisation of his debt; winding up proceedings benefit all creditors and contributories and are not stayed automatically by a suit. The court endorsed this principle to reject the respondent's contention that the winding up petition must be stayed because the petitioner subsequently filed a civil suit; the court relied on this view to continue the winding up proceeding.
Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P) Ltd. v. A.C.K. Krishnaswami & Another, 1965 (35) Company Cases 456 (Supreme Court) States that if the debt is not disputed on some substantial ground the Court may decide the debt on the petition and make a winding up order; petitions presented to pressure payment or as an abuse may be dismissed. The court applied this principle to conclude that because the respondent repeatedly acknowledged the debt and promises to pay, the debt was not substantially disputed and could be decided on the petition.
V.K. Jain v. Richa Laboratories (P) Ltd., C.P. 159 of 1988 (court's prior decision) Held that if a creditor files a suit during the pendency of winding up proceedings to protect limitation, the winding up proceedings are not invalidated. The court cited its earlier holding to support the view that the petitioner's subsequent civil suit (filed to save the claim from limitation) did not render the winding up petition non-maintainable.
State Bank of India v. Hedde and Colay Limited, 1987 (62) Company Cases 239 Offered authority to similar effect (that filing a suit does not necessarily prevent continuation of winding up proceedings). The court treated this decision as corroborative authority supporting the proposition that a creditor’s suit will not automatically stay or invalidate winding up proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the two principal defences raised by the respondent and analysed them in light of the documentary record and relevant authorities.

On the novation/return-of-goods argument: The court found that the petitioner’s offer to take back the goods was a concession to the respondent. Even if that offer and the respondent’s acceptance were treated as a separate contract in substitution of the earlier one, that substituted obligation became incapable of performance or enforcement because public authorities (specifically the Collector of Sehore) prevented the petitioner from lifting the coal. The court noted that the respondent, when informed that the petitioner could not remove the coal, reverted to promises to pay once the factory reopened. The court also observed that this plea (that the offer to take back the goods extinguished liability) was not taken in reply to the notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act but was raised for the first time only in reply to the show cause notice, undermining its force. The court concluded that the respondent could not be taken to have been absolved of liability simply because the goods could not be returned.

On the contention that the winding up petition was not maintainable because a civil suit had been filed: The court distinguished the authority cited by the respondent (Traders Bank v. Kwick Travel) on the ground that in that case the suit had been filed earlier and the winding up petition was filed later, whereas in the present matter the winding up petition had already been filed when the creditor later instituted a suit to save the claim from limitation. The court relied on Patna High Court authority (Central Bank of India v. Sukhani Mining) that there is no provision in the Companies Act requiring a court to stay or cease winding up proceedings merely because a creditor has filed a suit. The court also relied on the Supreme Court principle (Amalgamated Commercial Traders) that where a debt is not disputed on substantial grounds, the court may decide the debt on the petition. The court found that the correspondence showed repeated acknowledgements of the debt and promises to pay, indicating the debt was not substantially disputed.

The court reinforced its view with reference to its own earlier decision (V.K. Jain v. Richa Laboratories) and to the State Bank of India v. Hedde and Colay Limited decision, both of which supported the proposition that a suit filed by a creditor during the pendency of winding up proceedings does not invalidate or require the stay of those proceedings when the suit is filed to protect limitation. Considering these authorities and the facts (including repeated acknowledgements by the respondent), the court concluded a prima facie case of the respondent’s inability to pay had been established.

Additionally, the court noted the respondent company had not been conducting business since 1985, its factory remained closed, and the officers of the respondent had no access to the factory premises—factors relevant to the question of inability to pay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court admitted the winding up petition and ordered that a citation be published in the daily newspapers “Statesman”, “Jansatta” and the “Delhi Gazette” for 27 September 1993. The court attached a condition to this order: if the respondent paid the amount due within nine weeks from the date of the order, the citation would not be published.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The winding up petition proceeds, and the respondent faces the prospect of statutory notices via publication unless it pays the outstanding amount within the specified nine-week period. Publication of the citation is stayed only on condition of full payment within that period.
  • On precedent and broader legal implications: The court applied established principles (as cited) to hold that a winding up petition need not be stayed merely because a creditor subsequently files a civil suit to save the claim from limitation, and that where a debt is not substantially disputed it can be decided in winding up proceedings. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts of this case.

    Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Coal) Sales Ltd. v. Acme Paper Ltd .

    J.K Mehra. J. (Oral):— This petition for winding up has been filed on the basis of the claims which the petitioner company has against the respondent company for the price of the goods sold and neither to it, the petitioner used to procure the cole against payment from the collieries on the permits issued in favour of the respondent company and supply that coal to the respondent. In the year 1983 the respondent company ran into thing financial difficulties and its factory was closed our the petitioner on the date of the closure of the factory had to recover from the Respondent a sum of Rs. 1,94,487,70 whereon the petitioner had claimed interest @ 22% per annum which till 31st March 1986 came to Rs. 98,328.58p. Before the closure of the factory the petitioner approached the respondent for the payment of its ues and as a consequence of certain telephonic discussions the respondent wrote to the petitioner on 2nd March 1984 reading as under:—

    “This refers to our Today's telephonic talk regarding payment of coal dues of about Rs. 2.30 lacs.

    First of all, we are extremely sorry for the delay in payment caused due to some unavoidable circumstances at our end resulting in blockage of funds. However, we appreciate your co-operation all along and assure you that we would be able to make payment of your dues by the end of March 84 or earlier if possible. Therefore, we request you to please bear with us for this period and oblige.”

    2. Subsequent thereto the respondent again wrote to the petitioner on 22nd June, 1984, a copy of the said letter is annexure ‘D’ to the petition offering to pay the outstanding amount of the petitioner amounting to Rs. 2.21 lacs plus interest, by paying Rs. 20,000/- initially on 30th June, 1984 and thereafter Rs. 25,000/- every fortnight. But no payment was made. This letter was followed by a letter from the petitioner of 29th June 1985 wherewith copies of the ledger account for the years 1983-1984 and 1984-1985 upto 21st June 1985 were sent to the respondent. The petitioner further offered in view of the respondent's closed operation to take back the coal. This offer of return of coal was apparently accepted by the respondent vide its letter of July 2, 1985. When the petitioner attempted to remove the coal he was not permitted to do so and this fact was duly communicated to the respondent vide petitioner's letter dated 11th July, 1985 wherein it is communicated that the Collector of Sehore did not allow lifting of the coal from the respondent's Mills Coal Yard. Thus the respondent neither paid for coal nor could return it to the petitioner. The petitioner again wrote on 30th July, 1985 calling upon the respondent to make the payment. This letter was duly acknowledged by the respondent vide its letter of 3rd August, 1985 wherein they once again expressed their helplessness and pointed out.” Once the mill Reopens and starts functioning, action will be taken to send you payment. Kindly bear with us till then Following this a notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act was sent by the petitione respondent on 29th August, 1986. No payment was made in response to the said notice in fact the respondent took a complete summersault and for the first time the claim in the petition was disputed in the reply to the notice vide letter of repondent's lawyer dated 24th September, 1986.

    3. Having thus failed to recover its dues the petitioner filed the present petition for winding up on 16th February, 1987. After the winding up petition had been filed in this Court which has been pending for quite some time, I am told that the petitioner has also instituted a civil suit being Suit No. 1357/88 tiled in May, 1988 with a view to save the claim getting time barred. The petition has been resisted mainly on two grounds, firstly, that making of the offer for the return of the goods and its acceptance by the respondent amounts to novation of the contract and that there is no liability to make payment for the goods thereafter; and secondly that the present petition is not maintainable because a civil suit has already been instituted for the recovery of the said amount.

    4. I have heard both counsel at length and find that the offer to take back the goods from the respondent was by way of a concession to the respondent which the respondent had accepted and even if it is assumed that it was a separate contract in substitution of the earlier one the same became incapable of performance/enforcement on account of the public authorities non-cooperation and inability of the respondent to return the goods. This position is impliedly accepted by the respondent as when the fact was brought to its notice by the petitioner and in reply whereto the respondent again requested the petitioner to bear with it and promised to pay once the factory starts functioning. Thus reverting to the earlier position. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this plea. In any event, no such plea was ever raised in reply to notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act. In fact this plea was for the first time taken in reply to the show cause notice only. The only plea and that too raised for the first time in reply to the notice, was that of abandonment of claim for money by the petitioner by virtue of his having made an offer to take back the goods without adverting to respondents assurances to pay even after its failure to return the goods. In other words the plea of the respondent appears to be that whether or not the goods can he returned, the respondent stood absolved of its liability to pay or return those goods. Such a situation cannot be accepted.

    5. The second plea raised in defence is that the petitioner has since filed a civil suit and the amount due to the petitioner is yet to be ascertained after proper trial of the suit and that the winding up petition cannot go on after the suit is instituted. Counsel for respondent/has cited in support of this contention an authority of this Court in the case of Traders Bank Limited v. Kwick Travel Pvt. Ltd. reported as 1988 (2) C.L.J 56. that case does not help the respondent. That was a case where the suit had been filed earlier and during the penency of the suit the petition for winding up was filed by the petitioner. In fact the Court itself had acknowledged as correct the views expressed in the case of Central Bank of India v. Sukhani Mining And Engineering Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Others reported as 1987 (47) Company Cases Page 1 wherein Patna High Court had come to the conclusion that the winding up petition which had already been filed would not be stayed merely because the creditor had filed a suit against the company. It was observed in that case as under:—

    There is no provision in the Act which ousts the jurisdiction of the Court in continuing and deciding the winding up proceeding in spite of the fact that there is a suit by creditor for the realisation of his debt. If the Legislature had intended that on account of the fact that a suit or proceeding has been filed in another Court, the court in seisin of the winding up application will stay the winding up proceeding on that ground alone, there would have been a provision to that effect in the Companies Act. However, there is no such provision because a winding up proceeding is not merely for the benefit of the petitioner but of all its shareholders, creditors or contributories, therefore, merely because a creditor has filed a suit against the company the winding up proceedings cannot be stayed.”

    5. The Learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the case of Amainamated Commercial Traders (P) Ltd. v. A.C.K Krishnaswami & Another reported as 1965 (35) Company Cases Page 456 where Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that:—

    “A petition precented ostensibly for a winding-up order; but really to exercise pressure will be dismissed, and under the circumstances, may be stigmatized as a scandalous abuse of the process of the Court. At one time, petitions founded on disputed debt were directed to stand over till the debt was established by action if however, there was no reason to believe that the debt, if established would not be paid, the petition was dismissed. The modern practice has been to dismiss such petitions. But, of course, if the debt is not disputed on some substantial ground, the Court may decide it on the petition and make the order.”

    6. In that judgment the Supreme Court clearly laid down that if the debt is not disputed on some substantial ground, the Court may decide it on the petition and pass order accordingly. That is the case here. The entire correspondence referred to above clearly shows that the amount payable to the petitioner was not once but repeatedly acknowledged as due and payable by the respondent and it was accompanied by promises to pay. I have already held in the case of V.K Jain… v. Richa Laboratories (P) Ltd.…. in C.P 159 of 1988 that if during the pendency of winding up proceedings a suit was filed by the creditor to avoid the institution of the suit getting barred by limitation the proceedings for winding up will not be invalidated. To the same effect was another judgment in the case of State Bank of India v. Hedde and Colay Limited. reported as 1987 (62) Company Cases 239.

    7. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that a prima facie case of the respondent's inability to pay its debt has been made out by the petitioner. Another factor which cannot be lost sight of while considering the petition for winding up proceedings is that the respondent company has not been doing any business ever since 1985. Its factory is lying closed and admittedly the officers of the respondent company have no access to the factory premises.

    8. In the light of the above discussion I admit the petition and order a citation to be published in daily “Statesman”, “Jansatta” and “Delhi Gazette” for 27th September, 1993. It will be a further condition of this order that if the amount is paid by the respondent within nine weeks from today the citation will not be published.

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    Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Coal) Sales Ltd. v. Acme Paper Ltd .
    (Apr 23, 1993)