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  • consideration.12. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • provisions of section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • sections 398A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.4.
  • section 437 (1) (ii) of the Code Criminal Procedure
  • section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • consideration.12. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • provisions of section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • sections 398A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.4.
  • section 437 (1) (ii) of the Code Criminal Procedure
  • section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Application for Cancellation of Bail (Anil Dev Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the petitioner-complainant under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondents.

The petitioner is the father of the deceased, Smt. Chhama Jain. Chhama was married to Suresh Jain on July 4, 1991. She died on April 5, 1992 of burn injuries while six months pregnant. The death occurred in her matrimonial home. On April 6, 1992 the petitioner lodged a report alleging that Chhama had been harassed by her mother-in-law (Sumitra) and sister-in-law (Savita) over dowry demands and that her husband Suresh had demanded money (Rs. 15,000) from her father; part of that amount (Rs. 5,000) was given and the balance was demanded subsequently.

The FIR was registered naming several accused, including the respondents, under sections 398A, 304B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. During investigation the statements of the parents and other relatives (notably the mother and sister of the deceased, and two other witnesses) were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., describing alleged harassment, beatings and dowry demands; it was also stated that Suresh's first wife had previously died of burn injuries.

Suresh (first respondent), Sumitra Jain (second respondent), Savita Jain and Tej Vir Jain were arrested. The Additional Sessions Judge granted bail to the first and second respondents on May 2, 1992. The present petition in the High Court seeks cancellation of bail granted to the respondents, particularly challenging the grant of bail to the first respondent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should cancel bail granted by the Sessions Court under section 439(2) Cr.P.C., having regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence and the character of the evidence.
  2. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge erred in granting bail to the respondents despite (a) allegations of dowry-related harassment and (b) the deceased's unnatural death in the matrimonial home within one year of marriage.
  3. What considerations legitimately guide a superior court in deciding an application for cancellation of bail (for example, gravity of offence, prima facie case, likelihood of tampering with evidence or of the accused absconding, and the applicability of sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Complainant (counsel: Mr. S.K. Sharma)

  • The deceased died of severe burn injuries (noted as 80% burns in the narration) within less than one year of marriage, while six months pregnant; she was found in or near the bathroom of her in-laws' house.
  • The first wife of Suresh also died of burn injuries; the same method was allegedly used, suggesting pattern and gravity.
  • Given the nature and gravity of the offence and the manner in which it was committed, the learned Additional Sessions Judge misdirected himself in granting bail to the respondents; cancellation of bail is warranted.

Respondents (counsel: Mr. K.B. Andley)

  • The Additional Sessions Judge correctly granted bail; there is no illegality in that order.
  • No specific allegations are made in the FIR against the respondents; the allegations are vague and do not justify incarceration.
  • Cancellation of bail should be confined to two recognized grounds: (i) the accused tampered or is likely to tamper with evidence; or (ii) there is reasonable apprehension the accused will flee justice. In absence of such grounds, bail cancellation is not warranted.
  • No allegation exists that the respondents have misused their liberty; therefore the application for cancellation should be rejected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Jaspal Singh Gill, AIR 1984 S.C. 1503 Courts granting bail in non-bailable offences should consider nature and seriousness of the offence, character of the evidence, peculiar circumstances of the accused, likelihood of accused not being present at trial, apprehension of tampering with witnesses, larger public/state interest, and similar considerations. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that prima facie gravity and character of evidence can justify interference with a bail order; it quoted the principle to demonstrate that assessing sufficiency of evidence at the bail stage may be premature but that a prima facie case may exist.
Bhagirath Singh v. State of Gujarat (1984) 1 SCC 284 High Court should not interfere with Sessions Court bail order when there is no reasonable apprehension of fleeing or tampering; emphasises caution in cancelling bail. The court considered this decision and observed that it does not lay down an inflexible rule preventing cancellation in all cases; rather it must be read with other authorities recognising gravity of offence as relevant.
Shri H. C. Gaur…Petitioner v. Shri Rakesh Vij & Another, 1990 (1) CC Cases 461 Nature and seriousness of the offence is a relevant consideration when cancelling bail; superior courts can examine propriety of bail orders granted by lower courts. The court cited this decision to reinforce that considerations beyond tampering/fleeing (specifically gravity of offence) can justify cancellation of bail.
State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 S.C. 253 Authority recognising that the gravity of the offence is relevant in bail/cancellation considerations. Referred to as one of the cases where higher courts set aside bail orders in view of the gravity of offences; used to support the proposition that cancellation may be appropriate in serious cases.
Bhagirath Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, 1984 Cr.L.J 160 Decision discussed in context of limits on cancelling bail; in the facts of that case the Supreme Court did not approve cancellation by the High Court. The court noted this decision but observed it did not lay down a general principle limiting cancellation; rather it was fact-specific and did not disregard the relevance of gravity in appropriate cases.
Gurcharan Singh & others v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 S.C. 179 At the bail stage in serious non-bailable offences the court should consider whether the evidence discloses a prima facie case to warrant detention; the test is whether a prima facie case is made out on statements and other materials. The court relied on this precedent to apply the "prima facie case" test and to justify that superior courts may cancel bail where the evidence prima facie warrants detention; it used the authority to criticize the Sessions Judge's approach.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411 The power to take back into custody a person enlarged on bail must be exercised with care and circumspection but can be exercised in appropriate cases. The court cited this case to acknowledge that while cancellation is a serious step, it is permissible in appropriate circumstances and must be exercised cautiously.
Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and another, AIR 1987 S.C. 1613 Bail may be cancelled where, having regard to facts and circumstances, there is gravity of offence, nature of evidence and likelihood of tampering with evidence; courts can set aside bail accordingly. The court invoked this decision as an example where the Supreme Court cancelled bail due to gravity of offence, available evidence and attempts/likelihood of tampering — analogous factors in the present matter.
Smt. Rajani Rani Kar & another v. Goli Pradhan & others, 1992 (3) Crimes 181 (Orissa High Court) If bail has been granted improperly or arbitrarily by a Sessions Court, the High Court can cancel it. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that the High Court can intervene where bail has been granted improperly or arbitrarily; the principle was applied to examine the propriety of the Sessions Judge's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a fact-sensitive analysis focusing on (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence, (b) the character and weight of the evidence gathered during investigation, and (c) the propriety of the Sessions Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail. The following points record the court's step-by-step reasoning as stated in the opinion:

  1. Preliminary legal framework: The court noted that section 439 of the Cr.P.C. confers concurrent powers on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant bail, and that section 439(2) permits the High Court to direct arrest and committal to custody of a person released on bail. Such power must be exercised with care and circumspection but can be exercised where justice demands.
  2. Standards in bail-cancellation: The court reiterated established considerations from precedent (including Jaspal Singh Gill, Gurcharan Singh, Shahzad Hasan Khan, Sanjay Gandhi and others) — including nature and seriousness of the offence, character of the evidence, peculiar circumstances of the accused, reasonable possibility of accused not being available for trial, apprehension of tampering with witnesses, and larger public interests — as relevant in deciding cancellation applications.
  3. Application to facts: The court examined the facts: (i) death within less than one year of marriage, (ii) death occurred in the matrimonial home, (iii) the deceased had extensive burns (noted as 80% in submissions) and was six months pregnant, (iv) statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. from parents and relatives alleging harassment, dowry demands, beatings and that Suresh's first wife also earlier died of burns. The court treated these facts as grave and significant.
  4. Relevance of Evidence Act: The court emphasised that in such dowry-death circumstances courts should give due weight to sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, while exercising jurisdiction — indicating that inferences against accused may be available where the statutory conditions are met.
  5. Assessment of Sessions Judge's order: The court found that the Additional Sessions Judge had misdirected himself by concluding there were no specific allegations against the respondents, even though statements of parents and relatives contained specific allegations of harassment and dowry demand-related conduct. The Additional Sessions Judge had also made remarks suggesting the accused had committed crime — observations the High Court found inappropriate at the bail stage.
  6. Discretion exercised by the High Court: Considering the gravity of allegations against the first respondent (the mother-in-law), the third-degree burns, the evidence on record (statements recorded under section 161), and the relevance of the Evidence Act presumptions, the High Court concluded that the case was not fit for grant of bail to the first respondent.
  7. Differential treatment of respondents: The court distinguished the second respondent on facts — noting that she was a young girl and deserved leniency; therefore, the High Court declined to interfere with the Sessions Judge's grant of bail to the second respondent.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The bail granted to the first respondent (mother-in-law) by the Additional Sessions Judge on May 2, 1992 is hereby CANCELLED.

The bail granted to the second respondent (younger woman) is not interfered with and therefore remains in force.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The first respondent loses the benefit of the bail previously granted and is to be taken back into custody pursuant to the cancellation order (the order cancels the grant of bail).
  • Second respondent: Her bail is maintained; the court exercised leniency in her favour on the facts before it.
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies and synthesises existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities on the circumstances in which a superior court may cancel bail granted by a court of sessions — it does not purport to announce a novel legal test. No broader novel precedent beyond faithful application of the cited authorities is claimed in the opinion; the decision's principal effect is the immediate cancellation of bail as applied to the first respondent in this case.

This summary is strictly limited to the content and assertions present in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Jayanti Prasad Goel. v. Smt. Sumitra Jain & Ors.

    Anil Dev Singh, J.— This is an application by the petitioner-complainant under section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for cancellation of bail of the respondents.

    2. The petitioner is the father of the deceased Smt. Chhama Jain. On July 4, 1991 marriage of Chhama Jain was solemnised with Suresh Jain. On April 5, 1992 Chhama Jain died of burn injuries. At the time of death, she was six month's pregnant. The incident took place in the matrimonial home of the deceased.

    3. On April 6, 1992 the petitioner Jayanti Prasad Goel, father of the deceased lodged a report about the incident. In the report it was, inter-alia, stated that after four months of marriage, when Chhama came to the paternal house, she told him that her sister-in-law, Savita & mother-in-law, Sumitra were harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry. After five and a half months of her departure to the in-law's house, Suresh husband of the deceased came to the house of the complainant and demanded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- but was given only Rs. 5000/- by the complainant, as the financial position of the latter was not good. Thereafter Suresh accompanied by deceased again visited the complainant and demanded the remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/-. Shri Jayanti Prasad not being in a position to pay, expressed his inability to fulfil the demand at that juncture. He however, assured Suresh that he would be paid Rs. 10,000/- in due course of time. Then on April 5, 1992 at about 9.30 p.m Jayanti Prasad heard from his nephew, Bharat Vir Goel, that Chhama had suffered burn injuries. According to the complainant the deceased was either burnt to death by her in laws on account of non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry or she committed suicide on being harassed and tortured by them. On the report of the petitioner, the FIR was registered against the accused persons including the respondents under sections 398A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

    4. During investigation, statement of Smt. Uma Wati, mother of the deceased was recorded. She also by and large repeated the same story as narrated by her husband Jayanti Prasad Goel. She stated that Suresh was a widower and his first wife also died of burn injuries. It is also specifically alleged by her that mother-in-law and sister-in-law used to harass the deceased for bringing insufficient dowry.

    5. Besides the statements of the parents of the deceased, statements of Laxmi Devi, Bahu Parkash and Champat Ram were also recorded by the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Laxmi, who is the sister of the deceased, Chhama was harassed and used to be given beatings by her in laws on account of dowry. Bahu Parkash, the husband of Laxmi, reiterated the statement given by his wife. Champat Ram, a relation of the complainant, stated that he was responsible for getting the deceased married to Suresh. According to him, Chhama told him about her plight by classifying the situation in which she was placed as “hell”. He also stated that the deceased told him that her in-laws used to beat her day and night. During investigation Suresh, the first respondent, Sumitra Jain, the second respondent, Savita Jain and Tej Vir Jain were arrested. First respondent and second respondent were granted bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on May 2, 1992. This application is for cancellation of their bail.

    6. Mr. S.K Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the complainant submitted that the deceased died of burn injuries within one year of her marriage. He invited my attention to the fact that the deceased had 80% burns on her body and according to him she was found lying in or near the bath room of the house of her in laws. Mr. Sharma further submitted that the first wife of Suresh also died of burn injuries. According to the learned counsel same method was used to finish off Chhama. Learned counsel contended that in view of the nature and gravity of the offence and the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, the learned Additional Sessions Judge mis-directed himself in granting bail to the respondents. On the other hand, Mr. K.B Andley, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that bail was rightly granted to the said respondents and there is no illegality attached to the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. He contended that no specific allegations have been made in the FIR against the respondents. Accorfding to him, the allegations are vague and do not warrant the incarceration of the respondents. Learned counsel canvassed that in view of the fact that there is no allegation against the respondents of having misused their liberty the application should be rejected.

    7. I have given my earnest consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is well settled that the Courts are not to explore the merits of the case in detail or to weigh the evidence in golden scales while considering the question of grant or refusal of bail. Court has to decide the question taking into consideration the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which may be peculiar to the accused, a reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, reasonable likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and larger interests of the State. In a grave matter pertaining to the alleged dowry death, the Court has to proceed with caution and prudence while considering the question of grant of bail. In the instant case, the deceased died within less than one year of her marriage and the death took place in the house of her in-laws. The hapless girl had burn injuries all over her body and was found in that condition in her matrimonial home. When death takes place of a bride in these circumstances, the Court should be mindful of the magnitude and seriousness of the offence and must give due weight to the provisions of sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

    8. According to the statements of the father and mother of the deceased, recorded by the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears that the first wife of Suresh Jain also died of burn injuries, that both the respondents used to harass the deceased in connection with dowry and that Chhama was not allowed to go to her parental home, when Jayanti Prasad came to fetch her. According to learned counsel for the complainant, Chhama was the second victim of the respondents as her father was not able to quench their insatable thirst for dowry and before setting her on fire she was kept hostage by them as the demand for dowry was not met by Jayanti Prasad.

    9. It is shocking that somebody so young as her should die of burn injuries, specially when she was six month's pregnant. According to the statements of the relatives of the deceased, recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Chhama was either burnt to death in connection with the demand of dowry or she committed suicide on being harassed and tortured by her in laws on the said account. Having regard to the seriousness of the allegations levelled against the respondents, the nature & the character of the evidence and the fact that unnatural death, with third degree burns, had taken place in the house of the respondents, it is to be seen whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge exercised his discretion properly in releasing the respondents on bail.

    10 Learend counsel for the respondent submitted that the bail once granted can be cancelled only on two grounds, namely; i) that the accused tampered with or is likely to tamper with evidence or ii) that there is reasonable apprehension that the accused will flee from justice and not remain available for trial.

    11. He further contended that rejection of bail, when bail is applied for is one thing and cancellation of bail already granted is quite another matter and stands on a different footing. Learned counsel also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Singh v. State of Gujrat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 in support of his submission that a High Court should not interfere with the order of a Court of Sessions granting bail to an accused when there is no reasonable apprehension of his fleeing from justice or tampering with evidence. These submissions of the learned counsel require consideration.

    12. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers concurrent powers on the High Court and the Court of Session for granting bail. The power however, has to be exercised in the light of the provisions of section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Besides, both the High Court and the Court of Session under section 439(2) have been conferred with power to direct any person, who has been released on bail, to be arrested and committed to custody. This power to commit a person to custody after being enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection as it involves the liberty of a person. But this does not mean that even in appropriate cases the power cannot be exercised. Rather the power must be exercised if the ends of justice demand exercise of the same. In a case where a Court of Session has granted bail, the State can straightaway move the High Court for cancellation of the bail without approaching the the Court of Session in this regard. This follows from the superior position of the High Court vis-a-vis the Court of Session. The exercise of power by the High Court under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be a strait jacket formula in regard to the considerations, which prevail with the High Court for cancellation of bail granted by a Court of Session.

    13. In The State v. Jaspal Singh Gill, AIR 1984 S.C 1503, the order of the High Court granting bail was set aside by the Supreme Court having regard to the gravity of the offence with which the accused was charged. While cancelling the bail of the accused granted by the High Court, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “On a consideration of the above three decisions, I am of the view that the Court before granting bail in cases involving non-bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced should take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State and similar other considerations.

    On going through the order passed by the High Court, I feel that its decision that the material collected by the prosecution and the evidence to be adduced at the trial would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction appears to be premature one in the circumstances of this case. Since the trial is yet to begin, I do not propose to say anything more at this stage test it should prejudice either the accused or the prosecution than observing that on a perusal of the complaint and the other material available in the case, it cannot reasonably be stated that the prosecution case against the respondent is such that it can be thrown out at the threshold. It appears that a prima facie case is made out against the respondent. The gravity of the offences is quite obvious.”

    14. In Shri H. C. Gaur…Petitioner v. Shri Rakesh Vij & Another…S 1990 (1) CC Cases 461, this Court while dealing with a similar proposition held as follows:—

    “The contention canvassed by Mr. Sood that unless there are such considerations as apprehension about accused not remaining available for trial, or his tampering with evidence or intimidating the witnesses: the Court should not entertain petition for cancellation of bail, particularly when moved by the complainant apparently out of vendetta, than as a matter of genuine grievance, cannot be wholly accepted for it has been held in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) that nature and seriousness of the offence is also one of the relevant considerations. There are other cases, namely, (1) State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 S.C 253, and (2) State v. Jaspal Singh Gill, AIR 1984 S.C 1503, where orders of the High Court granting bail to the accused were set aside, considering the gravity of the offence with which the accused therein were charged.

    The decision relied upon by Mr. Sood, reported as Bhagirath singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, 1984 Cr.L.J 160 with all respects, does not lay down any general principles as it is manifest that their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not approve the order passed by the High Court in cancelling bail, in view of the observations made in that order taking into consideration status of the victim of the incident, and such extraneous factors as place of incident being inside premises of a hospital and other allied circumstances. This judgment does not take note of the judgment in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) to the effect that in suitable cases, the superior Court can examine the propriety of an order of granting bail and interfere accordingly and that the nature and seriousness of the offence, as also other facts and circumstances of the case are relevant factors for consideration, nor that of the earlier decision in the case of Captain Jagjit Singh (supra).”

    15. Again in Gurcharan Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 S.C 179 the Supreme Court held as follows:—

    “The only question which the Sessions Judge was required to consider at that stage was whether there was prima facie case made out, as alleged, on the statements of the witnesses and on other materials. There appeared at least nothing at that stage against the statement of A.S.I Gopal Das who had made no earlier contradictory statement. “The taint of unreliability” could not be attached to his statement even for the reason given by the learned Sessions Judge. Whether his evidence will ultimately be held to be trustworthy will be an issue at the stage of trial. In considering the question of bail of an accused in a non-bailable offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, it is necessary for the court to consider whether the evidence discloses a prima facie case to warrant his detention in jail besides the other relevant factors referred to above.”

    16. At another place the Court observed that there cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail and the facts & circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail. In Bhagirath Singh (supra) the Supreme Court, with respect, cannot be said to have departed from the principle laid down in State v. Jaspal Singh Gill (supra). As pointed out in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra), the facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in matters of granting or cancelling bail, therefore no inflexible rule was intended to be laid down by the Supreme Court in of Bhagirath Singh (supra).

    17. Agai n in State (Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411, the Supreme Court observed that the power to take back in custody one who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. But at the same time it held that in an appropriate case such a power can be exercised.

    18. While so holding the Supreme Court noticed the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) and oberved as under:—

    “In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), while confirming the order of the High Court cancelling the bail of the accused, this Court observed that the only question which the court had to consider at that stage was whether “there was prima facie case made out, as alleged, on the statements of the witnesses and on other materials”, that “there was a likelihood of the appellants tampering with the prosecution witnesses”. It is by the application of this test that we have come to the conclusion that the respondent's bail ought to be cancelled.”

    19. In Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1613, the Supreme Court cancelled the bail of the accused, which was granted by the High Court, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the nature of the evidence available and the likelihood of the accused tampering with evidence. The Supreme Court in this regard observed as follows:—

    “Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the learned Judge committed serious error in recalling his order dated June 3, 1986 and enlarging the respondent on bail. The occurrence took place, in the broad day light, in a busy market place and there are a number of eye witnesses to support the case against the respondent who was named as an assailant in the First Information Report. Immediately after the occurrence he could not be traced (it was alleged that he had absconded) for more than a month, attempts were made on his behalf to tamper with evidence. In view of these facts and circumstances the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to bail if the seriousness of the matter was realised and ajudicious approach was made. We had accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and directed that respondent No. 1 Ishtiaq Hasan Khan shall be taken into custody forthwith and the trial shall proceed in accordance with law expeditiously.”

    20. There is no doubt that the liberty of the accused has to be safeguarded in accordance with law but while keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the collective interest of the community cannot be lost sight of so that the parties do not lose faith in the administration of justice and take law into their own hands to wreak vengenance by private retribution.

    21. The High Court while considering the question of cancellation of bail can also examine the propriety and legality of the order passed by the Court of Session.

    22. In Smt. Rajani Rani Kar & another v. Goli Pradhan & others 1992 (3) Crimes 181, Orissa High Court, held inter-alia, that if it is found that bail to the accused has been granted improperly and arbitrarily, the same can be cancelled by the High Court.

    23 Learned Additional Sessions Judge completely misdirected himself in thinking that there were no specific allegations against the respondents in regard to the role played by them. As already observed, there were specific allegations of harassment of the deceased at the hands of the respondents in connection with demand of dowry. These allegations are found in the statements of the father and mother of the deceased. It is strange that learned Addl. Sessions Judge at one stage thought that the crime has been committed by the accused persons including the respondents and yet exercised discretion in the favour of the respondents in granting bail to them. Following are the observations of the learned Additional Session Judge:—

    “It appears that the present petitioner being ladies are in judicial custody since 7.4.92 i.e about a month, is true that there is a loss of life qua a woman and further it is a fact that crime has been committed by the accused persons including the present.”

    24. These out-landish remarks are out of tune with his ultimate order granting bail to the respondents. To say the least, it was not proper on his part to state that the accused including the respondents had committed the crime. These are observations on merits which can only be recorded at the conclusion of the trial, if evidence placed in the matter warrants such observations to be made.

    25. Considering the nature and seriousness of the accusation appearing against the first respondent, the mother-in-law of the deceased, the gravity of the offence, the circumstances in which deceased was found with third degree burns at the house of her in-laws, the weight of sections 113a and 113b of evidence act and the propriety of the matter, I am of the opinion that it was not a fit case for grant of bail to her.

    26. Accordingly the bail granted to the first respondent by the order of Additional Sessions Judge dated May 2, 1992 is cancelled. The fact that the first respondent is a lady does not entitle her to demand bail under proviso to section 437 (1) (ii) of the Code Criminal Procedure as a matter of right. In a henious crime of the nature with which she is accused of, does not warrant extending the benefit of the said provision to her at this stage.

    27. As regards the second respondent, she being a young girl may not be treated at par with first respondent and deserves leniency. Therefore, order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge granting bail to her is not interfered with.

    28. Accordingly, the bail granted to the first respondent by order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated May 2, 1992 is hereby cancelled.

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    Jayanti Prasad Goel. v. Smt. Sumitra Jain & Ors.
    (Sep 10, 1993)