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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged Notifications issued by the Delhi Administration under Sections 4, 6 and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 6.3.1987 and 10.3.1987 and the validity of the consequent acquisition proceedings. The petitioners are owners of property No. 6, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi (measuring 5,592 sq. yards with about 47,000 sq. ft. built-up area) which is situated in a main commercial centre and was used commercially (previously by Bharat Bank and subsequently by the United States Information Service). Portions of the building had been requisitioned earlier under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (e.g., four flats on 27.9.1950 and remaining building on 13.3.1959) and remained occupied by officers of the Administration until that Act lapsed on 10.3.1987. On 6.3.1987 the Delhi Administration issued a Section 4 notification invoking Section 17(1) (urgency) stating the purpose as “residential use of government servants.” On 10.3.1987 a Section 6 notification was issued and a letter was sent to the Collector to take possession within 15 days. The Administration engaged in lease negotiations with the petitioners and its officers continued to occupy the premises for over 20 months. An Award by the Land Acquisition Collector fixed compensation at Rs. 77,11,230.60. The petitioners were willing to accept compensation but the Administration did not make payment nor tender the 80% interim payment mandated by subsection 3-A of Section 17. The petitioners filed the present writ petition and also moved for directions for interim payment and damages for illegal possession after 10.3.1987.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Notifications under Sections 4 and 17(1) were valid when they did not expressly state the urgency required by Section 17(1), thereby denying the owners the right to file objections under Section 5-A.
  2. Whether invoking Section 17(1) to acquire a commercially used, built-up property for the stated purpose of "residential use of government servants" constituted an abuse or mala fide exercise of power (i.e., a fraud on the powers vested in the Administration).
  3. Whether non-compliance with subsection 3-A of Section 17 (i.e., tendering 80% of the estimated compensation before taking possession) invalidated the possession and the Notifications.
  4. What reliefs and remedies are appropriate if the Notifications and award are found to be ultra vires or vitiated (including determination of damages and the appropriate forum/procedure for that determination).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Section 4 and Section 17 notifications did not expressly state any urgency for immediate possession; accordingly they are vitiated and denied the petitioners the right to file objections under Section 5-A.
  • The Administration could not lawfully acquire a commercial building for residential purposes; the acquisition here was a misuse of power and amounted to a fraud on the powers conferred by the Land Acquisition Act.
  • The Administration failed to tender the 80% payment required by subsection 3-A of Section 17 before taking possession and therefore acted illegally in taking or retaining possession after 10.3.1987.
  • The Administration's prolonged lease negotiations and occupation showed that there was no unforeseen urgency; rather the Administration acted to cover up its own delay and lethargy.

Delhi Administration's Arguments

  • The building was urgently required for the residence of its officers and the urgency justified invoking Section 17(1).
  • It was asserted that the building had been used for residential purposes for a long time and therefore was not merely a commercial property.
  • As to non-payment under subsection 3-A of Section 17, the Administration stated that steps had been taken to secure the necessary sanction for making the payment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yesho Nathu v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1980 Bombay 221) Urgency clause must be applied with considerable care and responsibility; urgency should be unforeseeable despite due care and cannot substitute for administrative laxity. The Court relied on this authority to stress that invoking Section 17(1) requires genuine unforeseeable urgency and cannot be used to remedy prior administrative delay; it supported the conclusion that the Administration acted without proper urgency here.
Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 1594) The Appropriate Authority must satisfy itself about urgency and must clearly spell out the urgency in the Section 17 notification; rights under Section 5-A should not be taken away casually. The Court applied this principle to hold that the present Notification failed to state any urgency and thus was vitiated; Dora Phalauli was treated as authority for striking down notifications lacking explicit urgency.
Dhani Ram & Ors. v. Union of India (1989 DLT Pg. 208) Applied the Dora Phalauli principle to quash notifications under Sections 4 and 17 where urgency was not expressly stated. The Court cited this Division Bench decision as a local precedent which quashed similar notifications for lack of expressed urgency and followed its reasoning here.
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1986 SC 872) Use of power for an alien purpose or for a purpose other than that stated in the order is mala fide; such use renders the act or order ultra vires and a fraud on the powers. The Court invoked this principle to characterise the Administration's conduct (acquiring a commercial, built-up property for residential use and invoking Section 17(1) without urgency) as mala fide and ultra vires, supporting quashing of the notifications and award.
Assam Sillimanita Limited v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1417) The Supreme Court appointed an Arbitrator for determining damages in case of unlawful termination of a lease; endorses arbitration as an appropriate forum for damage assessment in certain public law disputes. The Court relied on this decision to appoint an Arbitrator (Mr. T.V.R. Tatachari) to determine damages payable by the Delhi Administration instead of directing suit in civil court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter along the following lines, applying statutory requirements and the cited precedents strictly as they are stated in the opinion:

  1. Requirement to state urgency: Section 17(1) permits possession to be taken in cases of urgency, but established case law (Dora Phalauli and subsequent authority) requires the urgency to be clearly stated in the notification so as to justify denial of the owner’s right to file objections under Section 5-A. The impugned notification merely stated the purpose as “residential use of government servants” and contained no statement of urgency.
  2. Temporal circumstances undermine claimed urgency: The Administration already had officers occupying the premises and knew the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act was to lapse on 10.3.1987. Given that knowledge and the extended period of occupation and negotiation (over 20 months), the Court concluded there was sufficient time to make alternative arrangements; accordingly the urgency invoked was not unforeseeable and therefore did not meet the test in Yesho Nathu.
  3. Non-compliance with subsection 3-A of Section 17: The statutory provision required the Collector to tender 80% of the estimated compensation before taking possession. The Administration did not tender or pay that amount and offered only that sanction processes had been initiated. The Court treated this non-compliance as material and unlawful.
  4. Abuse of powers and fraud on powers: Relying on Express Newspapers, the Court held that using acquisition powers for a purpose other than the one stated (or for a collateral improper purpose) is mala fide and ultra vires. The Court found the Administration’s invocation of Section 17(1) without stated urgency, combined with attempting to acquire a commercially used built-up property for residential use and acting contrary to its established policy of generally not acquiring built-up areas, amounted to abuse and a fraud on powers.
  5. Relief and compensation mechanism: Because damages were claimed for the period of illegal possession since 10.3.1987 and substantial time had elapsed, the Court considered appointment of an Arbitrator appropriate (relying on Assam Sillimanita). The Arbitrator was to determine damages within specified timelines and without obligation to give reasons, with both parties contributing initial fees.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Notifications issued under Section 4 read with Section 17(1), Section 6, and the consequential Award were held to be ultra vires and were quashed and set aside.

Direct consequences and orders made by the Court:

  • The impugned Notifications under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and Section 6, and the Award, were quashed and set aside.
  • The Delhi Administration was directed to hand over vacant and peaceful physical possession of the entire building (including garages, warehouses, spaces below staircases and other open spaces) to the petitioners within one month from the date of the order.
  • The Administration was declared liable to pay damages to the petitioners for illegal possession from 10.3.1987 until payment.
  • An Arbitrator (Mr. T.V.R. Tatachari, former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court) was appointed to determine damages; he was to enter upon the reference within four weeks of communication and make an award within four months thereafter; the Arbitrator was not obliged to give reasons. Each party was ordered to pay Rs. 10,000 as an initial payment towards the Arbitrator's fees.
  • The writ petition was allowed and disposed of; rule made absolute with costs and counsel fee of Rs. 3,000 awarded.

Implications beyond the parties: The Court applied existing precedents to the facts and quashed the administrative action; the opinion does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond the application of the cited authorities.

    Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Of India & Ors. .

    S.B Wad, J.:— The petitioners have challenged in this petition the Notifications issued by the delhi administration udder sections 4, 6 & 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Acton 6.3.1987 and 10.3.1987 They have also challenged the validity of the entire land acquisition proceedings pursuant to the said Notifications:

    2. The petitioners own property No. 6, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. It measures 5592 sq yards with the built up area of about 47,000 sq. ft. The property is situated on the main Ansari Road at the intersection of Ansari Road with Masjid Ghat abutting the said two main roads Apart from the main buildings on the property, known as Gopal Krishna Bhavan and Radha Krishna Bhavan, there are several godowns, garages, out-houses and allied structures for the proper utilisation of the building. The property is in the main commercial centre of Delhi and was all along being used for commercial purpose, first by the Bharat Bank and then by the American Embassy for running the United States Information Service (USIS).

    3. On 27.9.1950 four flats out of the said building were acquisitioned by the Delhi Administration under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. On 13.3.1959 the remaining building alongwith the garages, warehouses and other structures was requisitioned by the DDA under the said Act The building continued under the requisition till the said Act lapsed on 10 3.1987 On 6.3.1987 the Delhi Administration issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act under Section 17(1) of the Act, invoking urgency provisions. The purpose for acquisition mentioned in Notification is “residential use of government servants.” On 10.3.1987 the Delhi Administration issued Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and issued a letter to the Collector to take possession of the property within 15 days. The Delhi Administration thereafter proposed to the petitioners that the building be given on lease and the negotiations continued. The respondents prolonged the negotiations for the lease, only promising that after the Lease Deed was entered into the possession would be handed over to the petitioners The Officers of Delhi Administration continued to stay in the buildings for over 20 months The Delhi Administration suddenly decided to proceed with the land acquisition proceedings after a period of 20 months. At that stage the petitioners filed the present writ petition

    4. While issuing the notice the Bench of this Court on 25.11.1988 directed that the possession of the building shall not be taken by the Delhi Administration under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act but she acquisition proceedings may go on. Thereafter the Award was rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector fixing Rs. 77,11,230.60 as compensation. The petitioners were ready to accept the compensation without prejudice to their claim for the release of the property and the writ petition, but the Delhi Administration did not make the payment. It also did not offer the payment of 80 percent of the proposed compensation under sub-section 3a of section 17. On 16 8.1990 the petitioners moved CM. 3916/90, claiming further directions for the payment of the said amount of compensation without prejudice to the petitioners claim and also prayed that they be paid damages for the illegal possession of the land by the Delhi Administration after the lapse of Registrationing and Acquisition Act on 10 3.1987

    5. The main submissions of the petitioners are that the Notification under Section 4 and under Section 17 did not expressly state the urgency of taking the possession and, therefore, stand vitiaied in law. The petitioners are illegally deprived of their right to raise objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also submitted that the Delhi Administration cannot, in law, acquire a commercial building for residential purpose. It is then submitted that the whole exercise of the acquisition of the building under the Land Acquisition Act is a fraud on the powers of the Delhi Administration under the Land Acqusition Act. In reply, the submission of the Delhi Administration is that the building was urgently needed for the residence of its officers. It is also submitted that the building was being used for residential purposes for a long time and it was not correct to say that the building was a commercial building. As for non-payment of amount under sub-section 3 of Section 17, it is stated that steps were have been for securing the sanction for the said amount.

    6. Section 17 provides for special powers in case of urgency. The Appropriate Government can direct the Collector to take the possession of the property after expiration of 15 days notice even though no Award is made in cases of urgency. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Yesho Nathu v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1980 Bombay 221) has held that while applying the urgency clause the State should, indeed, act with considerable care and responsibility. The urgency should be such as could not have been foreseen in spite of due care and attention. It was also held that application of urgency clause cannot be a substitute for the laxity on the part of the State Administration in expeditiously initiating acquisition proceedings. Nor can it be invoked to make up for the delay caused only because of the lethargy on the part of the administration.

    7. In Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 1594) the Supreme Court has held that the Appropriate Authority must satisfy itself about the urgency of taking immediate possession and also of taking away the right of the owner of the land for filing objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the urgency must be clearly spelt out in the Notification urder Section 17 of the Act. In the Notification before the Supreme Court it was not so stated. The Supreme Court held, “Right of a person having interest in the property to file an objection under Section 5-A of the Act should not be interfered with in such a casual or vacalier manner, as has been done in this case.” The Notification was struck down by the Supreme Court. Relying on the said decision of the Supreme Court the D.B of this Court in Dhani Ram & Ors… v. U.O.I…, 1989 DLT Pg. 208, has quashed the Notification under Sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as the urgency of taking possession was not expressly stated in the Notification and what was mentioned was only “Planned Development of Delhi.”

    8. In the Notification challenged before us the only thing that is stated is that the property was required for the “residential use of government servants.” There is not a whisper of what was the urgency to take immediate” possession and to deny the right of raising object on to the owner under Section 5-A of the Act. The Notification under sections 4 and 17(1) in the present case, therefore, stand vitiated for non-compliance of the requirement of mentioning urgency in the Notification itself. What is more objectionable is the fact that the building was already in occupation of the officers of Delhi Administration and the Administration knew that the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act was to lapse on 10.3.1987 Thus, they had sufficient time to make alternate arrangement for the residence of their officers and there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the provisions of Section 17(1). The provisions of Section 17(1) cannot be utilised to cover up the laxity or lethargy of the Administration to take appropriate steps in time for making available alternate accommodation for its officers.

    9. The Notification under Section 17(1) is also bad in law for noncompliance of the requirement of sub-section 3-A of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said Sub-Section mandates the Collector to tender payment of 80 percent of the compensation for the land, as estimated by him, before taking possession of the land. The Delhi Administration has no explanation for this non-compliance with the mandatory provisions except to say that the process of sanction was initiated by them.

    10. The counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that when the Administration knew that the Act was to lapse in March, 1987, not to take any steps for removing its officers to alternate accommodation but to clamp a Notification under Section 17(1) of the Act, without mentioning any urgency in the Notification, is a fraud on the powers. In this connection he has also referred to the averments in para 25 of the petition to the effect that the Adminstration for the lease of the property and the assurance of the Lt. Governor to release the property. These averments are not denied by the Delhi Administration in its counter-affidavit. We also agree with his submission that the acquisition of a commercial property in the highly commercial area of Delhi for residential purposes of the officers is also abuse of powers by the Delhi Administration, vested in them under the Land Acquisition Act and otherwise. The failure of Delhi Administration to offer the payment of 80 percent of the amount of compensation under sub-section 3-A of Section 17 appears to be an ill-advised act to deprive the petitioners of the benefit of the huge amount. In any case it is an act of great lethargy and dereliction causing serious prejudice to the petitioners. There is one more reason why the action of the Delhi Administration is in the nature of a fraud on the powers. In this case the Administration has acted contrary to its well-estabished and published policy of non-acquisition of built up areas. We are every day dealing with the notifications of the Delhi Administration wherein the government lands, lands of religious nature and lands covered by built up areas are exempted from acquisition. It is our experience that even the lands having, built up structures are initially mentioned in the Notification under Section 4, they are dropped from acquisition at the stage of the Award or released from acquisition by a separate order under Section 48 of the Act. No justification has been shown by the administration as to why the said well-established practise of not acquiring the built up land was given a go-by in this particular case.

    11. In Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 (at page 926) the Supreme Court has held that “use of a power for an alien purpose other than the for which the power is conferred is malafide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order.” Such actions would render the impugned act or order ultra vires and it would be a case of fraud on powers. Considering the totality of circumstances in this case, we have no hesitation in holding that the Notifications under Sections 4, 17(1) and 6 and the consequential Award are ultra vires and bad in law and should be quashed.

    12. The impugned Notifications under Section 4, read with Section 17(1) and Section 6 and the Award are hereby quashed and set aside. The Delhi Administration is directed to hand-over vacant and peaceful physical possession of the entire building, including garages, warehouses, spaces below the staircases and other open spaces, to the petitioners within one month from today. As we have held that the Notifications in question are illegal and bad in law, the possession of the petitioners property by the Delhi Administration through its officers is illegal and is in the nature of trespass on their property of The Delhi Administration is, therefore, liable to pay damages to the petitioners. The petitioners have submitted that the market value of the property as of today, is around Rs. 20 crores. It is also submitted that the rent charged for the enjoyment of a similar property in this commercial area is not less than Rs. 15 per sq. ft. The petitioners are entitled to damages from 10.3.1987 till the payment.

    13. In Assam Sillimanita Limited v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1417) the Supreme Court had appointed an Arbitrator for determining the damages in case of unlawful termination of a lease. Considering the fact that more than three years have elapsed since the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act has lapsed, it would be more just and appropriate that an Arbitrator is appointed in the present case to determine the damages payable by Delhi Administration instead of making the petitioners run to the Civil Court for that purpose. We appoint Mr. T.V.R Tatachari, former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, as an Arbitrator who will enter upon the reference within four weeks of the communication of this order to him. He may make the Award within a period of four months thereafter. The Arbitrator will not be obliged to give reasons for his conclusions. The parties will be at liberty to produce their valuers before the Arbitrator for the assessment of damages, if they so desire. The petitioners as well as the Delhi Administration will pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each to the Arbitrator as the initial payment towards his fees, A copy of this order he sent to the learned Arbitrator by the Registry.

    14. The writ petition is allowed and disposed of with the above terms. Rule is made absolute with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 3,000/-.

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    Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Of India & Ors. .
    (Feb 4, 1991)