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Judgment Summary — Mahinder Narain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a petition (initially described in the opinion as under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act) seeking enforcement of an agreement to sell dated 8‑10‑1989. The agreement concerned the sale of immovable property identified as Plot No. O‑11/41, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, and contained an arbitration clause providing that disputes "shall be referred to an Arbitrator appointed mutually ... and the award ... shall be final and binding".

At the admission hearing on 9‑8‑1990 the Court put a question to the petitioner's counsel (Mr. R.K. Makhija) whether, in view of Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act (which govern the grant of specific performance), it was permissible to refer a dispute that would ultimately seek specific performance of an agreement to arbitration. The opinion proceeds to analyse statutory provisions and authorities bearing on that question, and ultimately concludes that the petition (later referred to in the opinion as one under Section 26 of the Arbitration Act) is not maintainable and is rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a dispute which, if referred to an arbitrator, would require an award directing specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property can lawfully be referred to arbitration in view of Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
  2. Whether an arbitrator is permissible to grant an award directing specific performance of a contract for transfer of immovable property, or whether such relief is exclusively within the domain and discretion of courts as controlled by the Specific Relief Act and related statutes.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The petition sought enforcement of the agreement to sell and relied upon the arbitration clause to have disputes referred to arbitration.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. R.K. Makhija) contended that arbitration could be used and relied upon Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provides courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature) to support the view that civil disputes generally are amenable to adjudication and thus arbitration.
  • Counsel relied on case law, including a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in The Fertilizer Corporation of India v. Chemical Construction Corporation (1973 B.L.R. 335), and a Punjab High Court decision Laxmi Narain & Others v. Raghbir Singh & Others (AIR (43) 1956 Punjab 249), to support the proposition that disputes involving discretionary relief might be referred to arbitration (or at least had been treated in that manner in some authorities).
  • Counsel apparently contended (or implied) that the Privy Council dictum in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor applied only to criminal matters and not to the civil context of specific performance; the Court records this contention and rejects it.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific argument advanced on behalf of the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 When a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular way, it must be done in that manner and no other methods are permissible. The Court relied on this principle to hold that where the Specific Relief Act prescribes how specific performance may be granted, parties cannot circumvent that statutory regime by agreeing to have an arbitrator award specific performance.
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindh P, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 322 Referenced as one of the Supreme Court cases applying/approving the principle that statutory procedure must be followed. Noted by the Court as part of the line of authority where the Supreme Court has followed the Privy Council principle beyond criminal matters.
Ballabhdas Agarwala v. J.C. Chakravarty, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 576 Referenced as another Supreme Court decision approving the statutory‑method principle. Used to show the Supreme Court's endorsement of the proposition that statutory requirements must be complied with and cannot be bypassed.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358 Referenced among cases where the Supreme Court followed the principle limiting alternative methods where statute prescribes a particular procedure. Included to demonstrate the breadth of the Supreme Court's application of the principle to both criminal and non‑criminal contexts.
Gujarat Electricity Board v. Girdharilal Moti Lal and another, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 267 Referenced as part of the Supreme Court authority endorsing the principle. Cited to support the proposition that statutory procedure controls and alternative methods are forbidden when a statute prescribes a particular mode.
Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by LRs. v. Govind Joti Ghavare & Others Referenced among Supreme Court approvals of the principle stated in Nazir Ahmed. Listed by the Court as part of the series of authorities where the Supreme Court applied the statutory‑method rule.
Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 Identified as an earlier statement of the principle that when statute prescribes a manner it must be followed. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in 1975 (reported at 1975 Supreme Court 915) observed that the principle had been stated in Taylor v. Taylor earlier than the Privy Council judgment.
1975 Supreme Court 915 Referenced for the statement that the statutory‑method principle predates the Privy Council decision and was earlier stated in Taylor v. Taylor. Used by the Court to show that the principle has longstanding recognition in higher authority.
The Fertilizer Corporation of India v. Chemical Construction Corporation, 1973 B.L.R. 335 (Bombay) A Division Bench decision relied upon by petitioner’s counsel in support of civil disputes being determinable by court/other fora. The Court distinguished this authority: it was not shown that the Specific Relief Act was raised before that Bench and that case concerned whether an arbitrator could grant an injunction (a different issue) rather than whether an arbitrator may award specific performance.
Laxmi Narain & Others v. Raghbir Singh & Others, AIR (43) 1956 Punjab 249 Relied upon by petitioner’s counsel; involved post‑award objections where a High Court judge rejected contention that discretionary relief could not be referred to arbitration. The Court observed that in that decision the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the Nazir Ahmed case were not brought to the notice of the judge, and therefore it was not persuasive on the present question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the arbitration clause in the agreement to sell and framing the central question whether disputes which, if referred to arbitration, would seek specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property could lawfully be determined by an arbitrator.

The Court relied primarily on the statutory scheme governing specific performance in India: Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 10 makes grant of specific performance discretionary (with illustrative circumstances where it may be granted), and Section 20 emphasises that the court's discretion is to be exercised on sound judicial principles with specified instances where a court may properly refuse specific performance. The Court highlighted that specific performance in India is controlled by statute (the Specific Relief Act) rather than merely by common law or contractual agreement.

Applying the principle stated in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor (that when a statute requires something to be done in a particular way it must be done in that way), and noting that the Supreme Court has followed and applied that principle in a line of authorities, the Court held that parties cannot contract out of the statutory procedure for specific performance by agreeing that an arbitrator will decide and award specific performance.

The Court addressed the petitioner's reliance on Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (general jurisdiction of courts over civil suits) by observing that any express or implied bar to cognizance must be found in statute. The Specific Relief Act operates as a special statute governing suits for specific performance and thus controls the courts' jurisdiction and the manner in which specific performance is to be granted or refused.

The Court also invoked Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act to explain that an agreement whose object, if carried into effect, would defeat the provisions of any law is unlawful and void. An agreement to refer disputes to arbitration with the object or effect of obtaining an award directing specific performance (thereby bypassing the statutory controls of the Specific Relief Act) would, in the Court's view, have the object of defeating the statute and therefore be unlawful.

The Court considered and distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioner: the Fertilizer Corporation decision was not on point because it concerned an injunction rather than specific performance and the Specific Relief Act was not argued before that Bench; the Punjab decision (Laxmi Narain) was a post‑award matter where the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and Nazir Ahmed were not placed before the judge. On that basis the Court declined to follow those authorities.

The Court concluded that an arbitrator is not permitted to make an award directing specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property because such an award would be contrary to the provisions and purpose of the Specific Relief Act and would amount to evasion of the statutory scheme.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition for enforcement of the agreement to sell (referred to in the opinion as a petition under Section 26 of the Arbitration Act) is not maintainable; the petition is rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Implications:

  • The Court held that it is impermissible for an arbitrator to give an award directing specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property, because such an award would defeat the statutory scheme established by Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The Court reasoned that an agreement to refer such a dispute to arbitration (with the effect of enabling specific‑performance awards) would have an unlawful object under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Act and is therefore void to that extent.
  • As a direct consequence, the petitioner was held to have no cause of action in the instant forum and the petition was dismissed at the threshold under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC.
  • The Court recorded respectful disagreement with certain High Court decisions (the Bombay Division Bench decision and the Punjab Single Judge decision) that had been relied upon by the petitioner, on the ground that those decisions had not considered the Specific Relief Act provisions or the Nazir Ahmed principle as applied here.

The opinion confines its conclusions to the question of whether arbitrators may award specific performance in the face of the statutory regime; the decision directly affects the parties in this petition by dismissal. The opinion does not purport to record the creation of any broader rule beyond the statutory interpretation and applications explicitly stated above.

    Sulochana Uppal v. Surinder Sheel Bhakri .

    Mahinder Narain, J:— This petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act has been filed for the purpose of enforcement of the agreement to sell dated 8-10-1989, executed the parties to the suit whereby the respondent is alleged to have agreed to sell plot bearing No. O-11/41, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, to the petitioner. It is stated in this petition that in the said agreement there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, The clause relating to arbitration is in the following terms:

    “That in the eventuality of any dispute in between the parties, on any matter concerning this agreement, or any matter incidental thereto, the same shall be referred to an Arbitrator appointed mutually, as per the Indian Arbitration Act, in force and the award of the Arbitrators so appointed, shall be final and binding on between the parties thereto.”

    3. I had put to Mr. R.K Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time when the matter came up for admission on 9-8-1990, that in view of the face that the arbitration would ultimately result in specific performance of the alleged agreements sell between the parties, whether it is permissible in law to refer the alleged dispute between the parties in connection with the allowed agreement to sell between the parties to arbitration, in view of, inter alia, the provisions of Section 10 and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under:—

    “Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court be enforced—

    (a) when there exist no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or

    (b) when the act agreed to be done in such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief.

    Ezplanation—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume—

    (i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money; and

    (ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the following cases:—

    (a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;

    (b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff.”

    It is, therefore, clear from the said section that grant of specific performance is in the discretion of the court.

    4. Apart from this, there is Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as follows:—

    “20(1). The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal:

    (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance—

    (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not viodable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or

    (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee whereas its non performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;

    (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.

    Explanation I.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (d).

    Explanation 2—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract.

    (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance.

    (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party.”

    5. It appears to me that the jurisdiction to grant specific relief has been controlled by statute. In India, prior to Specific Relief Act, 1963, there was the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Act No. 1 of 1877). The 1963 Act had repealed the earlier enactment. Therefore the power of the court to grant specific relief in England is different from the power of the court to grant specific relief in India. Whereas specific reliefs can be given by courts in England on the basis of common law and precedents, and contractual obligations between the parties, grant of specific relief has been, and is controlled in India by the provisions of the aforementioned statutes.

    6. 1 had put to Mr. R.K Makhija that in view of the judgment of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253(2), the suit was not maintainable, as the Privy Council had stated that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular way, it must be done in that manner, or not at all. Every other method is forbidden. This proposition laid down by the Privy Council in a criminal case, has not been held to be confined to only criminal matters by the Supreme Court, which has followed this proposition in a large number of cases, both “criminal'’ and “non-criminal”, (See Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindh P, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 322; Ballabhdas Agarwala v. J.C Chakravarty AIR 1960 Supreme Court 576; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Girdharilal Moti Lal and another, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 267; and Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by LRs. v. Govind Joti Ghavare & Others.) In fact in 1975 Supreme Court 915, the Supreme Court stated that the aforesaid principle had been stated much earlier than 1936 PC 253, in Taylor v. Taylor, reported as (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426.

    7. It is, therefore, not right for Mr. Makhija to contend that the dicta of the Privy Council is applicable only to criminal cases, and does not extend to civil cases.

    8. It is then contended by Mr. Makhija that in view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all suits of civil nature can be tried by courts. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:—

    “The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

    Explanation I A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religions rites or ceremonies.

    Explanation II. For the purposes of this sections, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.”

    9. The express or implied bar to the cognizance of the civil suits would have to be found in statutes. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 is one such statute. The specific reliefs are controlled by special statutes which would govern ail suits in which specific performance is sought and specific performance cannot be granted by courts otherwise than as provided in the aforesaid Specific Relief Acts.

    10. Mr. Makhija refers to 1973 Bombay Law Reporter 335 (The Fertilizer Corporation of India v. Chemical Construction Corporation), a case decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. A perusal of that judgment indicates that the Hon'ble Judge of the Division Bench of that Court, had gone on the principle of civil nature being determinable by court. Ft was not urged before them that the Specific Relief Act is a special statute, and, therefore, will control the courts jurisdiction to grant, or not to grant specific performance. Besides this, that matter related to the issue whether the arbitrator can, or cannot grant an injunction. That matter is somewhat different from the issue involved in the instant case, that is to say, whether if is open to an arbitrator to award specific performance.

    11. Mr. R.K Makhija also relied upon AIR (43) 1956 Punjab 249 Laxmi Narain & Others v. Raghbir Singh & Others, at page 250. This case was a post-award matter, and objections have been raised to the award, and the Hon'ble Single Judge of the Punjab High Court had rejected the contentions of the counsel that suits in which granting of relief is entirely on discretion of the court, cannot be referred to arbitration. A pernsal of the judgment shows that the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judge, nor was the judgment of N-tizir Ahmed's case was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judge.

    12. In addition to the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed's case. which principal has been approved fey the Supreme Court in cases criminal in nature, and cases not criminal in nature, it is now well settled that when a statute requires a thing to be done is a particular manner, it can only be done in that manner, or not at all. Ail other methods are forbidden.

    13. In this connection, one has also to take note of the provisions of Section 23 of the Contract Act, which reads as follows:—

    “The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless—

    it is forbidden by law; or

    is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any Jaw; or

    is fraudulent; or

    involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or

    the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

    In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful, is void.”

    14. It is apparent from the provisions of Section 23 of the Contract Act, that when the consideration or the object of any agreement, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of any law, and Specific Relief Act, 1963 is law, then such a consideration or object is unlawful. Section 24 of the Contract Act says that, “If any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void”.

    15. An agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration, the effect of which would be to have an award directing specific performance of an agreement to sell, would have for its object to defeat the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, especially Sections 10 and 20 thereof. It is clearly intended by the aforesaid’ provisions that it is only courts, add courts alone who would have jurisdiction to grant or refuse specific performance.

    16. In view of the provisions of Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act read with Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Act, I am of the view that it is not permissible to any arbitrator to give an award, directing specific performance of an agreement to sell. Such an award would go contrary to the terms and spirit of the Specific Relief Act.

    17. In this view of the matter, I am in respectful disagreement with the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, and the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge of the Punjab High Court, before whom the aforesaid contentions were not raised, nor were they considered.

    18. For the aforcstated reasons, this petition under Section 26 of the Arbitration Act for enforcement of an agreement to sell is not maintainable. In this view of the matter, the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent, and I, therefore, reject the petition under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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    Comments

    Sulochana Uppal v. Surinder Sheel Bhakri .
    (Aug 30, 1990)