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  • Section 9, 11(a), 11(e), 12(1) and 18(1) of the Trade & Merchandise Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Section 11 (e)
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  • Section 9, 11(a), 11(e), 12(1) and 18(1) of the Trade & Merchandise Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Section 11 (e)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Sunanda Bhandare, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner applied on 16 April 1968 (Application No. 248584) to register the word mark "YERA" in Class 3 for perfumery, cosmetics and non‑medicated toilet preparations. The application was advertised on 1 November 1968. The respondent, M/s Alembic Glass Industries Limited, who already held registrations for the same mark "YERA" in various other classes (9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20 and 21), objected on 26 February 1969 under sections 9, 11(a), 11(e), 12(1) and 18(1) of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

By order dated 8 June 1973, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi, rejected the petitioner's application on the grounds that registration in Class 3 would be likely to deceive or cause confusion and that the petitioner, not being the proprietor, was not entitled to protection under Section 11(e) of the Act. The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present petition under Section 109 of the Act and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether registration of an identical/coincidentally identical trade mark in a dissimilar class (Class 3) should be refused under Section 11(a) of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 on the ground that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion, notwithstanding the goods are not similar.
  2. Whether the petitioner is disentitled to protection in a court of law under Section 11(e) of the Act because he is not the proprietor of the mark or adopted the mark with dishonest intention or by misrepresentation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Registration should not be refused for goods that are not similar unless there is a real, tangible danger of confusion or deception; mere identity of mark does not automatically bar registration across dissimilar classes.
  • The petitioner had applied for registration within three months of commencing manufacture of the perfumery; in the years since commencement the respondent had taken no action for passing off or infringement, so the balance of convenience favours the petitioner and refusal would cause hardship.
  • There is no trade connection between petitioner and respondent and no similarity of goods, so Section 11(a) is not attracted; reputation attaches to goods and respondent's goods are distinctly different from petitioner's goods.
  • The petitioner's application could not be rejected under Section 11(e) because if the goods are different, the respondent cannot maintain a passing off action — therefore sub‑section (e) should not disqualify the petitioner.
  • The petitioner relied on Bridgestone Co. (P) Ltd. v. Bridgestone Tyre Co. Ltd. (2 D.L.T. 1966 p. 143) and Nestle's Product Limited & Others v. Milkmade Corporation & Others (AIR 1974 (Delhi) 40) to support these contentions.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Where a trade mark is a coined or rare word, the first user intends to monopolise it; a subsequent identical mark, even on dissimilar goods, may deceive or cause confusion if the prior user has acquired reputation.
  • The respondent had adopted "YERA" as a house mark for glassware (jars, bottles) and had registrations for the mark in various classes since 1953; between 1958 and 1968 sales and advertising expenditure by respondent ran into lacs, producing wide reputation.
  • Even though goods differ, registration by the petitioner would be likely to deceive or cause confusion among the general public, particularly because petitioner’s perfumery and cosmetics are sold in glass bottles/containers (products of the respondent), increasing potential for confusion that the respondent manufactured the cosmetics.
  • The petitioner offered no satisfactory explanation for adopting "YERA" (claiming similarity to "YARA" in a chemical dictionary was not believable); burden of proving registration would not cause confusion lay on the applicant, which petitioner failed to discharge.
  • The respondent relied on several authorities (including Jugmug Electric & Radio Co. v. Telerad Pvt. Ltd., Eastman Photographic Materials Co‑op Ltd. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corporation Ltd., the Edward Hack matter, Sunder Parmanand Lalwani v. Caltex, and Cibs Limited Basle v. M. Ramalingum) to show that in the case of a coined mark the Registrar must consider opponent's reputation and potential for public confusion even across different goods.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bridgestone Co. (P) Ltd. v. Bridgestone Tyre Co. Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, (2) D.L.T. 1966 p. 143 Cited by petitioner to support that registration should not be refused where goods are not similar unless there is real danger of confusion. The court recorded the petitioner's reliance on this authority but did not accept the broader proposition that absence of trade connection or dissimilarity of goods automatically precludes danger of confusion.
Nestle's Product Limited & Others v. Milkmade Corporation & Others, AIR 1974 (Delhi) 40 Cited by petitioner for the proposition that reputation attaches to goods and dissimilar goods may not require refusal of mark registration without real danger of confusion. The court noted the reliance but found the petitioner's factual position (recent adoption, lack of reputation, poor explanation) distinguishable and insufficient to avoid refusal under Section 11(a).
Jugmug Electric & Radio Co. v. Telerad Pvt. Ltd. & Another, 1978 (1) I.L.R. 667 (Telerad case) Shows that for a coined mark the first user will seek monopoly and copying leads to suspicion; factors beyond mere trade connection must be considered in assessing likelihood of deception under Section 11(a). The court relied on this Division Bench decision to reject the petitioner's contention that trade connection is a necessary precondition and applied its reasoning to hold that other factors can establish likelihood of confusion.
Eastman Photographic Materials Co-operative Ltd. & Another v. John Griffiths Cycle Corporation Ltd., 15 R.P.C. (1898) 105 Authoritative source cited by respondent on principles concerning reputation and protection of coined marks. Cited as part of the body of authorities supporting the proposition that a coined distinctive mark with established reputation can bar registration by later users even in dissimilar classes; court accepted the general principle as relevant.
In the Matter of an Application by Edward Hack for registration of a trade mark, 58 R.P.C. 91 Authority on assessment of distinctiveness and protection of invented marks. Referenced by respondent in support of the proposition that registrar must consider reputation and potential deception; court treated it as part of persuasive authority aligned with other cited cases.
Sunder Parmanand Lalwani & Others v. Caltex (India) Limited, AIR 1969 (Bombay) 24 (Caltex case) Summarised factors relevant to assessing likelihood of deception under Section 11(a): nature of the mark, class of customers, extent of reputation, existence of trade connection, and other factors to be considered together. The court reproduced and approved the Caltex formulation, emphasizing that all relevant factors must be considered in combination and that trade connection is not invariably decisive.
Cibs Limited Basle Switzerland v. M. Ramalingum & Others, AIR 1958 (Bombay) 56 Authority relied on by respondent concerning distinctiveness and protection of coined marks and the Registrar's duty to consider reputation when assessing confusion. Used by the court as supporting authority for the proposition that a coined mark with strong reputation may render registration of an identical mark in other classes likely to confuse the public.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying statutory provisions and the cited authorities to the facts:

  1. The court accepted the principle, supported by the Division Bench in the Telerad case and the Caltex decision, that assessing likelihood of deception under Section 11(a) requires consideration of a combination of factors — including the nature of the mark, class of customers, extent of reputation, existence (or absence) of any trade connection or common trade channel — and that no single factor is inevitably decisive.
  2. The court rejected the petitioner's submission that absence of trade connection or dissimilarity of goods automatically precludes refusal under Section 11(a). It held that the opponent need not always prove a common trade channel for Section 11(a) to be attracted.
  3. The court examined the facts: the word "YERA" is a rare, coined word (not a common dictionary word); respondent coined and used it as early as 1952 and had registered it in various classes since 1953; respondent expended substantial amounts on advertising and had sales running into lacs between 1958–1968, indicating a wide reputation.
  4. The petitioner's use began only three months before his application and he produced no evidence of reputation. His explanation for adopting "YERA" (that it was similar to "YARA" from a chemical dictionary) was found not persuasive ex facie, and counsel offered no satisfactory explanation for adoption.
  5. The court observed that the onus of proving the absence of likely deception or confusion rests on the applicant. The petitioner failed to discharge that burden because he produced no evidence showing lack of likelihood of confusion or acquisition of reputation.
  6. The court considered the particular fact that the petitioner’s perfumery and cosmetics are sold in glass bottles and containers, and the respondent manufactures such glassware. This increased the probability that the public might think the cosmetic goods bearing "YERA" were those of the respondent, thus creating a real likelihood of confusion.
  7. The court found that the balance of convenience did not favour the petitioner given his short period of use and lack of evidence of reputation; therefore equitable considerations urged by the petitioner did not override the statutory and factual concerns under Section 11(a).
  8. Although the Assistant Registrar also relied on Section 11(e) (the petitioner not being the proprietor and being disentitled to protection), the court observed that mere disbelief of the petitioner's explanation alone would not, without more, justify disqualification under Section 11(e). However, because the court found the petitioner was not entitled to registration under Section 11(a), it was unnecessary to decide the separate question under Section 11(e).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is dismissed.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Assistant Registrar's rejection of the petitioner's application to register "YERA" in Class 3 is upheld and the petition is dismissed; the petitioner will not obtain registration by this challenge. No costs were awarded.
  • On precedent and broader law: The opinion applies and endorses existing principles (as set out in the Telerad and Caltex authorities) that a coined/rare mark with an established reputation can give rise to likelihood of deception even where the goods are dissimilar; the court emphasised that assessment under Section 11(a) depends on the totality of relevant factors rather than any single factor such as trade connection. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel principle beyond applying those precedents to the facts of this case.

This summary contains only information that appears in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

    Surjit Singh v. Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. .

    Sunanda Bhandare, J.:— The petitioner on 16th April, 1968 filed an application being Application No. 248584 with the Registrar of Trade Marks to register in Part A of the Register, a trade mark consisting of the word “YERA” in Class 3 in respect of perfumery, cosmetics and non-medicated toilet preparation. The application was duly advertised in the Trade Mark Journal No. 466 dated 1st November, 1968. The respondent—M/s. Alembic Glass Industries Limited who held registration in respect of the same trade trade mark “YERA” in respect of various goods falling Class 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20 and 21 objected to the registration of the aforesaid trade mark on 26th February, 1969 under section 9, 11(a), 11(e), 12(1) and 18(1) of the trade & merchandise act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the act). By order dated 8th June 1973, Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi rejected the application of the petitioner for registration on the ground that the trade mark applied for, if allowed to be registered in Class 3 as prayed by the petitioner was liable to deceive or cause confusion and also that the petitioner not being the proprietor of the said trade mark was not entitled to protection in the court of law within the meaning of Section 11(e) of the Act. The petitioner has challenged this order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks in this petition under Section 109 of the Act and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    2. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a two fold challenge. Firstly, it was contended that unless there was a real tangible danger of causing confusion or possibility of deception, registration of a trade mark of goods which are not similar should not be refused. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had made the application for registration of the trade mark within three months of its commencement of the manufacture of the perfumery-and though several years have passed since then, till today no action has been taken by the respondent against the petitioner alleging either for passing off or infringement of the trade mark, the balance of convenience is, therefore, in favour of the petitioner and considerable hardship would be caused if the trade mark applied for by the petitioner is not registered. Learned counsel’ further submitted that since there is no trade connection between the petitioner and the respondent and there is no similarity in the goods, Section 11(a) of the Act will not be attracted in the present case. Learned counsel submitted that the reputation is attached to the goods and the goods manufactured by the respondent are distinctly not similar to the goods manufactured by the petitioner. Learned counsel relied on Bridgestone Co. (P) Ltd. v. Bridgestone Tyre Co. Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, (2) D.L.T 1966 p. 143 and Nestle's Product Limited & Others v. Milkmade Corporation & Others, AIR 1974 (Delhi)’ 40 in support of this contention. Secondly, it was contended that petitioner's, application could not be rejected on the ground that the petitioner would be disentitled to protection in the court of law because once it is held that the goods are not of the similar description and are different, no case for passing off can be filed by the respondent and, therefore, Sub-section (e) of Section 11 of the Act would not be attracted.

    3. On behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed on Jugmug Electric & Radio Co. v. Telerad Pvt. Ltd. & Another, 1978 (1) I.L.R 667 The Eastman Photographic Materials Co-operative Limited & Another v. The John Griffiths Cycle Corporation Ltd. & Others, 15 R.P.C (1898) 105. In the Matter of an Application by Edward Hack for registration of a trade mark, 58 R.P.C 91, Sunder Parmanand Lalwani & Others v. Caltex (India) Limited, AIR 1969 (Bombay) 24 and Cibs Limited Basle Switzerland v. M. Ramalingum & Others, AIR 1958 (Bombay) 56 in support of the contention that once it is found that the trade mark is distinctive inasmuch as the word is coined, rare, exclusive and not an ordinary dictionary word, the Registrar of Trade Marks has to consider whether the reputation of the opponent already using the trade mark is such that if registration of the same mark is allowed it was likely to deceive or cause confusion in the minds of the ordinary public. It was submitted that in the present case, the respondent was manufacturing glassware including jars and bottles and had adopted the word “YERA” as a house mark to connote and denote the special character and quality of the products sold thereunder and the respondent had acquired the registration of the trade mark “YERA” in different classes as far back as in the year 1953, It was submitted that the sales of the respondent in respect of its goods bearing the trade mark “YERA” between the periods 1958 to 1968 run into lacs. The respondent had spent several lacs of rupees on publicity and had acquired a reputation in the trade and public and, therefore, though the petitioner did not manufacture goods of the same description if his application for registration of the same trade mark is permitted it was likely to deceive or cause confusion in the minds of the general public. It was further submitted that the petitioner had not given any valid reason as to why he was wanting to adopt this trade mark and the respondent being prior user and responsible for coining this word, was justified in objecting to the registration of the said trade mark by the petitioner, though in another case. Learned counsel also opposed the registration for the petitioner stating that since the petitioner was not the proprietor of the said trade mark he would not be entitled to any protection in a court of law. Learned counsel further submitted that the burden of proving that the registration of the said trade mark was not likely to deceive or cause confusion in the minds of the public, was on the petitioner and the petitioner had not led any evidence and had not discharged the burden in any manner whereas the respondent had produced affidavits of several parties to show that the reputation was very wide and the registration of the trade mark was likely to cause confusion in the minds of the general public who was likely to buy the products manufactured both by the petitioner as well as by the respondent. Learned counsel submitted that the perfumery manufactured by the petitioner is sold in glass containers and such glass containers manufactured by the respondent were supplied to other manufacturers of perfumery which was likely to cause confusion. Moreover, the public at large may be led to believe that it is the respondent-company who was manufacturing the said perfumery and cosmetics.

    4. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jugmug Electric & Radio Co. Limited (supra) popularly known as the Telerad case has held that if a trade mark is invented one then the first user of such a trade mark obviously intents to have a monopoly of it and he will make every attempt to satisfy the authorities acting under the Act to protect his monopoly of the same. When a person copies as his own trade mark, a word previously invented by another person, suspicion immediately arises why the copyist is trying to immitate the person who has the priority in the trade mark. This Court on the facts of that case found that there was a common trade channel and thus there was likelihood that confusion or deception would be caused in the minds of the customers and the applicant was likely to take illegitimate advantage of the reputation attached to the goods manufactured and or marketed by the opponents. The Division Bench of this Court further referred to a summary of the factors to be taken into account in assessing the degree of deception or confusion under Section 11 (a) of the Act found in the case of Sunder Parmanand Lalwani & Others (Supra) popularly known as the Caltex case. In the Caltex also, as in the present case, an argument was advanced that the principle of trading on another's reputation as a factory likely to cause confusion or deception would apply when the user of both the marks was confined to the same or similar classes of goods and, therefore, trade connection in competing goods was the detertmining factor. It may be useful to re-produce herein the observations of the Bombay High Court in the Caltex case:—

    “One must never forget that what Section.11 (a) requires to be decided is whether the mark sought to be registered is likely to deceive or cause confusion. That likelihood must vary on the facts of each case. Human conduct is varied and complex. The importance of a particular fact may increase or diminish when considered in combination with different sets of facts. What has to be decided in a case is whether on the totality of the facts of that case, it is likely that there would be deception or confusion. It would, therefore, be totally misleading to rely only on some individual fact or facts from a decided case and put emphasis on them without taking into account other facts in combination with which that particular fact was looked upon as yielding any principle. All factors which are likely to create orally deception or confusion must be considered in combination. Broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be, for example the nature of the mark itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation the trade challans, the existence of any connection in the course of trade, and several others. Of course, it need not be stated, that it would not be that all such factors would exist in each and every case.”

    The Division Bench of this Court approved of the factors enumerated by the Bombay High Court and held that apart from the trade connection all other factors relevant for consideration under Section 11 (a) of the Act as explained by the Bombay High Court were present in that case. I, therefore, find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in every case the opponent must prove trade connection and common trade channel, between competing goods.

    5. In the present case, admittedly, the goods are totally different, There is also no finding that there is any trade connection between the applicant and the opponent. However, it is equally admitted that the word “YERA” is rare and a coined word and not a common dictionary word or a word which is used in common parlance. Though a meak attempt was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to say that the word “YERA” was adopted by the petitioner because of its similarity with the word “YARA” found in the chemical dictionary, one finds it difficult to accept this argument because ex-facie, there is no similarity between the word “YERA” and “YARA” either in its pronounciation or in the meaning. On being asked, learned counsel for the petitioner had no explanation to give as to why this word “YERA” was adopted except saying that it was a name of a chemical: found in the chemical dictionary. The respondent had coined this word as early as in the year 1952 and by the time the petitioner had applied for the registration of the word “YERA” the opponent had already spent lacs of rupees in popularising the word by way of advertisement and the sales of the opponent had also run into several lacs. It appears that this word which was coined by the respondent and popularised by it was being copied by the petitioner in order to take advantage of the reputation acquired by the trade mark. It is well-settled that the onus of proving that the mark is not calculated to deceive or cause confusion lies on the applicant. The opponent company which manufactures glassware with the trade mark “YERA'’ is a company having ample resources capable of starting new industry or trade and the goods i.e perfumery and cosmetics manufactured by the petitioner are sold in bottles and glass containers and if the trade mark “YERA” appears on these bottles and glass containers, there is likelihood that a common man who would go to buy these perfumery and cosmetics would be led to believe that these goods were manufactured by the opponent company.

    6. On the facts of the present case the argument of balance of convenience is not available for the petitioner because of his own admission that the petitioner had started using the mark “YERA” only three months prior to the application. The petitioner has also not placed on record any material to show that the goods of the petitioner had acquired a reputation under that name.

    7. In the present case, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks has held that the explanation given by the petitioner that the mark was adopted by the petitioner because it was similar to word “YARA” is difficult to believe, he would be disentitled to get protection in a court. This by itself would not be sufficient to disqualify the petitioner from registration of the trade mark under Section 11 (e) of the Act. In order to deny registration on this ground, it is necessary to prove that apart from the disqualifications envisaged in Sub-sections (a) to (d) of Section 11 of the Act, there is something more which would disentitle the applicant from getting protection in a court. If it is found that the applicant has adopted, the trade mark with dishonest intention or because of misrepresentation, it would certainly disentitle the applicant to protection in a court. Be that as it may, since in my opinion in the present case, the petitioner was not entitled to registration under Section 11 (a) of the Act, it is unnecessary to further go into the question whether on facts the petitioner was disqualified under Section 11 (e) as well.

    8. In the result, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Surjit Singh v. Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. .
    (Feb 17, 1987)