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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sachar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1 was employed as a conductor by the appellant and was charge-sheeted on 21 December 1970 on three charges alleging that he collected fares but did not issue tickets. A departmental domestic enquiry was held: the enquiry officer found charges No. 1 and 2 proved and recorded no finding on charge No. 3. The disciplinary authority (the General Manager) issued an order on 6-8-1973 purporting to hold charges 1, 2 and 3 proved, including charge No. 3 despite the enquiry officer recording no finding on it.

While an industrial dispute was pending the appellant applied under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for approval to remove the respondent. The Additional Industrial Tribunal granted approval by its order dated 28-1-1974. The workman thereafter raised an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labour Court (upon reference) concluded that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse and that the management had failed to establish the alleged misconduct under charge No. 2; it ordered reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages. The appellant filed a writ petition which the learned single Judge dismissed, agreeing with the Labour Court's conclusions. The present appeal challenges that dismissal of the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Additional Industrial Tribunal's approval under Section 33(2)(b) operates as res judicata and thus bars subsequent adjudication of the same dismissal when the matter is referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  2. Whether the employer was denied a fair opportunity because the Labour Court did not suo motu invite the management to lead additional evidence before adjudication.
  3. Whether the Labour Court was justified in holding that charge No. 2 was not proved (i.e., whether the enquiry officer's finding was perverse and justified interference).
  4. Whether reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is the appropriate relief where dismissal was held illegal or unjustified, and whether a plea of loss of confidence or the passage of time can justify refusal of reinstatement or reduction of back wages.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Malhotra)

  • The appellant contended that the Labour Court ought to have permitted the management to lead additional evidence before adjudication; failing to do so introduced a serious infirmity in the Labour Court's order.
  • The appellant argued that approval obtained under Section 33(2)(b) from the Additional Industrial Tribunal amounted to a conclusive finding that the enquiry was proper and the charges were proved, and that the subsequent reference under Section 10 is therefore barred by res judicata.
  • The appellant urged that even if the dismissal was set aside, reinstatement should not be ordered because the management had lost confidence in the employee; alternatively, compensation (rather than reinstatement) should be awarded.
  • The appellant argued that full back wages should not be payable (the management invited a reduction on account of the lapse of time and the employee's alleged failure to seek alternative employment).
  • Mr. Malhotra also suggested that Section 11A did not materially change the law because it is procedural and did not enlarge the powers of the Tribunal under Section 33.

Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The workman maintained that the disciplinary charges were not proved (the Labour Court found the enquiry officer's findings to be perverse), and therefore he was entitled to reinstatement with continuity and full back wages.
  • In evidence the workman stated that he had been unemployed since dismissal; the court records that he admitted not making efforts to obtain work, but nonetheless found no evidence that he was gainfully employed during the period of enforced idleness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Limited Supports the principle that if an employer wishes to adduce additional evidence before a tribunal it must apply to do so; the tribunal is not obliged to suo motu offer that opportunity. The court relied on this principle to reject the appellant's grievance that the Labour Court should have itself invited the management to lead additional evidence when the management had not made a clear, timely pleading to do so.
Atherton West & Co. v. S.M. Mazdoor Union Explains that permission to dismiss under provisions pari materia to Section 33 removes a statutory ban on dismissal during pendency of proceedings but does not extinguish the workman's right to raise an industrial dispute. The court cited the case to show that approval under Section 33 only removes the ban and does not prevent subsequent adjudication under Section 10; it undermines the res judicata argument advanced by the appellant.
Automobile Products Of India Limited v. Rukmaji Bala Emphasised the limited nature of the jurisdiction under Section 33: the tribunal's role is to grant or withhold permission (lift the ban), not to adjudicate the dispute. The court invoked this authority to support its conclusion that Section 33 proceedings are not adjudicatory in the full sense and cannot operate as res judicata in later Section 10 adjudications.
L.D. Sugar Mills v. Pt. Ram Sarup Clarifies that the tribunal dealing with a Section 33 application must determine whether a prima facie case has been made to lift the ban, not adjudicate the industrial dispute. The court cited this to reinforce that the scope of Section 33 is limited to permission and does not decide merits that would preclude later adjudication.
G. Mukerjee & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen Holds that proceedings under Section 33 do not adjudicate an industrial dispute and any finding thereunder will not operate as res judicata. The court relied on this decision to reject the appellant's contention that approval under Section 33 acted as a bar to later adjudication under Section 10.
Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Management Demonstrates that an order of dismissal passed even with permission can still be the subject matter of a dispute and referred for adjudication. Used by the court to support the proposition that approval under Section 33 does not prevent a subsequent reference and adjudication under Section 10.
Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh Contains observations suggesting that a tribunal which approved dismissal under Section 33 may be treated as having regarded the enquiry as proper; used by appellants to argue res judicata. The court examined these observations but rejected the appellant's attempt to read them as establishing that Section 33 approval operates as res judicata in later Section 10 proceedings, noting that such a reading would conflict with settled law.
Indian Iron & Steel Co. (referenced) Sets out the limited grounds (want of good faith, victimization, breach of natural justice, perverse findings) on which interference in disciplinary matters might be justified. The court invoked the limitation principles to explain the historical constraints on a tribunal's interference and contrasted them with the broader reappraisal powers conferred by Section 11A.
Workmen of Firestone / Firstone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Management (vide) Referred to in connection with Section 11A and the Tribunal's capacity to re-appreciate evidence and interfere with findings and punishment. The court used this authority to illustrate that Section 11A empowers tribunals, on adjudication, to reappraise evidence and to impose or alter punishment, widening the scope beyond what Section 33 permits.
1973 I.L.L.J. 278 (paras 31, 48) Recorded the view that what is done under Section 33(2)(b) is not adjudication and that Section 11A did not change the principles applicable to Section 33 applications. The court relied on these observations to confirm that Section 33 remains non-adjudicatory and Section 11A's enhancement applies to adjudication under Section 10, not to expand Section 33 jurisdiction.
Hindustan Tin Works v. Its Employees States the rule that reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination is invalid; rejects doctrines (common law contract enforcement or mitigation) that would prevent such relief in industrial jurisprudence. The court relied on this decision to affirm that reinstatement with continuity is the normal and appropriate relief where dismissal is found illegal or unjustified, and that denial of full back wages would impose an undeserved penalty on the workman.
Ruby General Insurance Co. v. Chopra Example where reinstatement was refused because of the special and trust-based relationship of the employee (stenographer). The court cited this as one of the rare instances where loss of confidence justified refusal of reinstatement, distinguishing such facts from the present case.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. A.K. Roy Another example where retention was found undesirable because of security verification and a specialised post (blast furnace context). Invoked to explain the limited circumstances in which loss of confidence can justify denial of reinstatement; the present facts did not meet that standard.
Management of Paniiole Tea Estate v. Workman Affirms that loss of confidence must be substantiated by cogent evidence before a court will deny reinstatement; absent such material, reinstatement is appropriate. The court relied on this authority to require cogent evidentiary support for the appellant's loss of confidence plea, which was absent here.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha States the general rule that full back wages is the normal remedy for wrongful termination and that the party opposing full back wages must prove circumstances justifying departure. The court applied this principle to hold that, since the appellant produced no evidence that the workman was gainfully employed during the period, full back wages were properly ordered by the Labour Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing the questions in sequence as they arose in the appeal and as framed by the pleadings and oral argument.

First, on the evidentiary point about charge No. 2: the court agreed with the learned single Judge and the Labour Court that the finding of the enquiry officer was perverse and that the appellant (D.T.C.) failed to establish the alleged misconduct under charge No. 2. Because no valid findings remained on any of the charges (charge No. 3 had no finding of proof by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority's treatment of it was "patently illegal"), the court concluded there were effectively no proved charges on which termination could stand.

Second, on the contention that the Labour Court should have invited the employer to lead additional evidence: the court explained the legal position that an employer may adduce additional evidence before a tribunal but must request the opportunity to do so; a quasi-judicial tribunal is not obliged to suo motu invite a party to produce further evidence. Citing authoritative precedent, the court held that where no timely and clear application to lead additional evidence was placed before the Labour Court (the purported application in the record appeared to have been filed at best on the date arguments concluded, and there was no clear evidence it was brought to the tribunal's notice), no duty fell on the Labour Court to call for additional evidence. Moreover, the appellant in fact chose when it wished to adduce evidence (for example producing a survey report marked M1), demonstrating that it exercised the right to produce evidence when it deemed necessary. Consequently the grievance on this ground was rejected.

Third, on the res judicata argument based on Section 33(2)(b) approval: the court undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory scheme and the authorities. It held that Section 33 proceedings are limited in scope: they remove or maintain a statutory ban on dismissal during proceedings and empower the tribunal only to grant or withhold permission to dismiss; they do not amount to an adjudication of the industrial dispute. Numerous precedents were cited to establish that the grant of permission under Section 33 does not operate as res judicata and does not bar a subsequent reference under Section 10. The court rejected the appellant's attempt to infer that approval under Section 33 conclusively established that the enquiry was proper and the charges were proved.

Fourth, the court considered the effect of Section 11A (an amendment) which, when an industrial dispute is referred to a tribunal under Section 10, authorises the tribunal to re-appreciate evidence and to satisfy itself whether the evidence justifies a finding of misconduct and the punishment imposed. The court explained that Section 11A enlarges the power available to tribunals on adjudication under Section 10 (for example permitting imposition of lesser punishment even where guilt is found), but it does not alter the limited nature of the Section 33 permission jurisdiction. That separation reinforced the conclusion that Section 33 findings cannot be treated as having the finality of res judicata in subsequent Section 10 adjudication.

Finally, on relief: the court analysed established principles on reinstatement and back wages. It endorsed the rule that where termination is held invalid, reinstatement with continuity of service is a proper and normal remedy in industrial jurisprudence; common law doctrines about personal service contracts do not bar such relief. The court held that an employer's ipse dixit claim of loss of confidence is insufficient; loss of confidence must be supported by cogent evidence showing a rational relation to misuse of trust or special circumstances (examples being stenographers or security-sensitive posts). The appellant's reliance on the workman's earlier warnings or censures was insufficient because the employer had previously continued his service and treated him as employable. Regarding back wages, the court reiterated the normal rule that full back wages are payable unless the employer proves the employee was gainfully employed during the period; the appellant produced no such evidence. For these reasons the court upheld the Labour Court's direction for reinstatement with continuity and full back wages.

The court therefore found no merit in the appellant's appeal and dismissed it with costs assessed at Rs. 500.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed.

Consequences and implications drawn in the opinion (as stated by the court):

  • The Labour Court's order directing reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages in favour of respondent No. 1 is affirmed and the appeal fails.
  • The court held that approval or permission granted by a tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not operate as res judicata and does not bar subsequent adjudication of the dismissal under Section 10. Section 33's scope is limited to lifting or maintaining the ban on dismissal; it is not an adjudication of the industrial dispute.
  • Section 11A empowers a tribunal on adjudication under Section 10 to re-appreciate evidence and to alter findings and punishment (including imposing lesser punishment) — widening the tribunal's scope on adjudication as distinct from Section 33 proceedings.
  • An employer must make a timely and explicit request if it seeks to lead additional evidence before a tribunal; the tribunal is not required to suo motu offer that opportunity, and failure to be invited does not vitiate proceedings where no application was before the tribunal.
  • Loss of confidence is not a self-sufficient justification to deny reinstatement; it must be substantiated by cogent evidence demonstrating a rational nexus between the loss of trust and the nature of the employment. Absent such evidence, a workman whose dismissal is held unjustified is ordinarily entitled to reinstatement.
  • Full back wages are normally payable where termination is found to be illegal or unjustified, except to the extent the employer proves the workman was gainfully employed during the period. The appellant produced no evidence of gainful employment by the workman; hence full back wages were proper.

Note on precedent and novelty: the court framed its decision on settled principles and prior authorities; the opinion affirms existing law concerning the limited nature of Section 33, the non-application of res judicata from Section 33 approval to Section 10 adjudication, and the normal entitlement to reinstatement and back wages. The opinion does not purport to create a new principle beyond these applications of established authority.

Order: Appeal dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 500.

    Management Of Delhi Transport Corporation () v. Ram Kumar And Another (S).

    Sachar, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant by which it had challenged the order of the Labour Court holding that the removal of respondent No. 1 wa??? illegal and unjustified and that he is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service with back wages.

    2. Respondent No. 1 was a conductor with the appellant. He was charge-sheeted on December 21, 1970 on three charges which related to his allegedly having collected the fare from the passengers but not having given them the tickets. A domestic enquiry was held and the enquiry officer held that charge No. 1 & 2 were proved against the workman. No finding was recorded on the third charge. The disciplinary authority, the General Manager, after issuing a show-cause found that charge No. 1 was not proved and without adverting to the fact the enquiry officer had not found charge No. 3 proved he (the General Manager) purported to hold that the charges 1, 2 & 3 were proved by the order of 6-8-1973. As at that time there was an industrial dispute pending the appellant moved an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Aditional Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the management had made out a prima facie case for the removal of the respondent No. 1 from service and thereafter accorded his approval to the removal of respondent No. 1 by his order of 28-1-1974 Thereafter the workman raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred for adjudication under section 10(1) of Industrial Disputtes Act. Before the letterned single Judge the counsel for the management only laid emphasis on proof of charge No. 2, alter going through the matter the learned Judge has come to the conclusion in agreement with the Labour Court that the finding of the enquiry Officer was perverse and that the D.T.C had failed to establish the alleged misconduct under Charge No. 2. The learned Judge also rejected the contention of the appellant that no opportunity was given to them to lead additional evidence before the Labour Court, in support of the charges. Finding no reason as to why reinstatement should not be ordered the learned Judge as mentioned above dismissed the writ petition. That is why the present appeal. It is apparent that why the only argument addressed before the single Judge was about the charge No. 2 because on charge No. 3 no finding had been given by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority holding charge No. 3 established was patently illegal. Thus only charge No. 2 called for consideration. No reason has been given to us to take a different view from the view taken by the learned single Judge about the failure to prove charge No. 2 against the respondent No. 1. Thus the result would be that there would be no charges proved against the respondent No. 1 on basis of which his services could have been terminated. That is why Mr. Malhotra sought to make a grievance that the appellant should have been asked to lead additional evidence to prove the charges made before Labour Court and this not having been done a serious infirmity has been introduced in the order of the Labour Court.

    3. Now there is no doubt that it is open to the management to adduce additional evidence before the Tribunal seeking to justify its order of discharge or dismissal. But the employer, if it wishes to do so, must ask for the same and it is no part of duty of the Labour Court itself to voluntarily offer to the maaagement the opportunity to do so. Any party appearing before the Labour court must make a claim to lead evidence. But the quasi judicial Tribunal is under no obligation to advise the party about its rights. If no pleading to adduce additional evidence is put forth at the initial stage or during the pendency of the proceedings, there ari???es no duty in law on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law, f???ilure to give such opportunity will not vitiate the proceedings, Thus if no opportunity is sought by the employer no duty is cast on the tribunal suo motu to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges. See (Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Limited) (1). In the present case as it is not even clear as to at what stage the application was made by the management. Mr. Malhotra seeks to invoke aid from the application filed as annexure with his counter affidavit It is admitted that this application was at the best filed on the date of the conculsion of the arguments. It is not clear as the learned Judge has pointed out whether this application was filed in the office or whether it was at all placed before the Labour Court. There is no reference of this application before the Labour Court and it cannot, therefore, be ???aid that the attention of the Labour Court was drawn to such an application. In this case it is relevant to note that in main body of the writ petition no specific plea was taken that the application was brought to the notice of the Labour court and he refused to pass any order. All that was stated in ground No. 9 was to make a grievance that in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court an application was not necessary to be made before the Tribunal to produce evidence and that the Labour Court should itself have given opportunity to the writ petitioner to adduce evidence on merits in order to justify the dismissal of course it was added that in any event such an application had been made before the Labour Court before he beard the arguments but somehow the Tribunal has ignored this application. It was relevant to note that no plea was taken that the application was filed before arguments were heard and concluded before the Labour Court. If the application was filed before the Labour Court it is quite possible that it was filed in the office and the same not having been brought to the notice of the Labour Court obviously no blame can be attached to it for not dealing with the matter. Moreover this plea ill befits the appellant because wherever it wanted to lead evidence it did so, and the learned single Judge has noticed that the appellant availed of the right to produce evidence produced a survey report regarding the distance between Najfgarh and Uttam Nagar which hat been exhibited as Ml by the Labour Court. This shows that wherever appellant wanted to adduce evidence it did so. Not finding it necessary to produce evidence it cannot now make a grievance that it was not asked suo motu by the Labour Court to do so. ???oreover it should be emphasised that the Labour Court has not found that enquiry was not held or was defective, rather it has held that the findings by the enquiry officer were perverse. In such a case there was no question of other evidence being led by the management because it was specifically relying upon the evidence recorded before the enquiry officer. The management must exercise its right in asking the Labour Court for an opportunity to produce evidence. Not having done so the grievance on this score is without any basis and this contention is rejected.

    4. The main contention urged by Mr. Malhotra, the learned Counsel for applicant was of resjudicate. The argument was that as the appellant had sought approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and the same had been given by the order of the tribunal dated 28-1-1974 the present reference under Section 10 of the Act was barred by principles of resjudicata because the effect of approval having been given by the Additional Industrial Tribunal was to hold that not only the enquiry was proper but that the charges were proved and, therefore, the Labour Court now cannot hold contrary to the finding given by the Industrial Tribunal that the charges were not proved against the respondent. This argument assumes that the jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 10 of the Act is identically the same and therefore any finding given in application under section 33(c)(2)(b) for approval for the action of dismissal must act as resjudicate if and when such a dismissal is subject matter of any reference is made under Section 10 of the Act. We find no substance in the contention. This plea has bee??? raised and negatived in series of cases by the Supreme Court. Atherton West & Co. v. S.M Mazdoor Union (2) was a case under clause (23) of the Notification of U.P Government under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act which was in pari materia to section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it stood at that time and corresponds to the present section 33(i) an argument was raised that the order made by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer giving the management permission to dismiss some of the arguments was final and conclusive in regard to, the appellant's right to dismiss them from their employ and therefore dismissal by the appellant???could not be the foundation???of an industrial dispute which could be referred to the Conciliation Board and the Board would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same and the award, therefore, was???void. Negativing this contention the Supremeg???Court observed at para 18 “that it is clear that Cl. 23 imposed a ban on the disc???arge or dismissal of any workman pending the enquiry of an industrial dispute before the Board or an appeal before the Industrial Court and the employer, and the only effect of such written permission would be to remove the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of those proceedings. That a right to raise such a dispute would continue to exist notwithstanding the per???i???ion was emphasised by the Supreme Court when it said that once the written permission was granted by the officer concerned, the ban again???t the di???charge or dismissal of the workman would be removed and the employer, his agent or manager could in the exercise of his discretion discharge or dismiss the wo???man but in that event an industr???al dispute within the meaning of its definition contained in S2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would arise and the workmen who ha??? been discharged or dismissed would be entitled io have that industrial dispute referred to the Regional Conciliation Board for enquiry into the same (emphasis supplied). That right of the workman to raise an industrial dispute could not be taken away in the manner suggested by Shri C.K Daph???ary by having resort to the provisions of Cls. 23 and 24 (*1) aforesaid. That right was given to the workman by the terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 28 of 1947 and would remain unaffected by any of the provisions herein-before referred to.”

    5. That the jurisdiction under section 33 of the Act is only to impose a ban on the right of the employer and the only thing that the authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission, i.e to lift or maintain the ban. See Automobile Products Of India Limited v. Rukmaji Bala., (3). That case also emphasised the limited nature of the jurisdiction under Sec. 33. With regard to the scope of enquiry under Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act it is now well settled that “the Tribunal before whom an application is made under that Section has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute (emphasis supplied) arising between the employer and the workman but has only got to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer in the matter of altering the conditions of employment to the prejudice of the workman or his discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted. A prima facie case has to be made out by the employer for the lifting of ???uch ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is not resorting to any unfair practice of victimization.” See L.D Sugar Mills v. Pt. Ram Sarup (4). Notwithstanding this clear law an effort was again made before the Supreme Court to urge that a decision given while approving or refusing permission for dismissal would amount to resjudicata in subsequent adjudication when a reference is made under Section 10. Thi??? plea was however again negatived in G. Mukerjee & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (5) wherein it was held that ‘proceeding under Section 33 does not confer any jurisdiction on a Tribunal to adjudicate one dispute (emphasis supplied) but it merely empowers the Tribunal to give or withhold permission to the employer during the pendency of an industrial dispute to discharge or punish a workman concerned in the industrial dispute. The plea of resjudicata was unmistakeably rejected when the Court further observed as follows:—

    “As the purpose of S. 33 of the Act is merely to give or withhold permission and not to adjudicate upon and industrial dispute, any finding under S. 33 would not operate as resjudi???ate and bar the raising of an industrial dispute”.

    (emphasis supplied).

    6. Thus the law is well settled that Section 33 only imposes a ban. An order of dismissal or discharge passed even with the permission or approval of the Tribunal can form the subject of a dispute and as such referred for adjudication See Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Management (6), The main thrust of the argument of Mr. Malhotra however seems to ???est on the observations made in Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh (7). In that case while disposing of an appeal against the dismissal of a workman which was referred under section 10 of the Act challenge was made that no finding had been given by the tribunal that the enquiry was proper and this vitiated the award and that the dismissal was mere victimization. In rejecting this the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal had apparently held that the enquiry was proper though ??? has not said so in so many words in its award, nor did it find that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse or baseless.” It however, also added “that it could hardly be otherwise as it had already approved of the action taken on an application made under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and if the enquiry had not been proper the Tribunal would not have approved of the dismissal.” Mr. Malhotra says that this observation means that if an approval has been given under section 33(3)(b) the finding about enquiry and charges being proved amounts to resjudicata in subsequent proceeding under Sec. 10. We cannot read this observation to lay down as if by a side wind that reference under Section 10 of the Act in cases where the approval has been obtained under Section 33(2)(b) is incompetent, because that is the real effect of acceptance of this argument. But this would be against the settled law laid down by various Supreme Court decisions both before and after the decisions in the Bengal Bhatade's case (supra) that notwithstanding the approval obtained under Section 33(2)(b) for the dismissal of an employee, this dispute can form the subject of a dispute and of a reference under Section 10 for adjudication.

    7. If this then be the law that notwithstanding the permission accorded by the Industrial Tribunal an industial dispute can be raised, it is not understood by what logic it can be ouggested that any finding given under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act would be barred on the principles of re???judicata in adjudication under section 10 of the Act. We say this because if it is open to the workman to raise an industrial dispute under section 10 of the Act with regard to the termination of his services for which approval had already been obtained from the Industrial Tribunal under section 33 it cannot stand to reason that the Labour Court no sooner the matter comes before it for being adjudicated should just fold up its hands and hold the reference incompetent on the plea of resjudicata. Even Mr. Malhotra was not willing to contend that the approval obtained under. Section 33 could bar the reference of the dispute of termination of services to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, under Section 10 of the Act B???t once that is conceded we cannot see any purpose in holding the reference to bs valid but at the same time stultifying it on the ground of resjudicata. This interpretation would make the whole exercise futile, absurd and meaningless and on no sound canon of interpretation can it be accepted. This argument of Mr. Malhotra really assumes that as what is to be done under section 33 of the Act is the same as under section 10 of the Act and that as the scope being the same the earlier finding under Section 33 proceeding should be res judicata under Section 10 proceedings. This fallacy of course flows from assuming a??? if there is an industrial adjudication when approving or refusing the permission, under section 33. It is nothing of the kind as the Supreme Court has stated that all that is done under Section 32???is to give or refuse permission and there is no industrial adjudication. Industrial adjudication comes only when the matter is referred under Section 10 to the Labour Court or the Tribunal.

    8. Whatever little conceivable plausibility (though we have already rejected that there is any merit in this argument at all) may have been the ???aid argument loses all its force because of the amendment made in the Act by Section 11A which has now changed the whole scope of adjudication By virtue of powers under section 11a the industrial Tribunal has now full power to re-appreciate the evidence and to satisfy itself whether the evidence justifies the finding of misconduct. The Tribunal is now under no limitation that if it finds that the enquiry is proper it cannot act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that its interference is restricted to the limitation laid down in the Indian Iron and Steel Company (8) case, on the ground only of want of good faith or where there is victimization or unfair labour practice or on the violation of the principles of natural justice or ‘the finding is completely baseless or perverse.’ The Tribunal is now even competent to give and impose lesser punishment even if it agrees with the finding of the management as to the guilt of the employee. The scope of enquiry under Section 10 now is much wider than the scope of enquiry for according or refusing approval under Section 33(2)(b). Section 11A now permits a Tribunal even in cases where enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at to differ from that finding in proper course and hold that no misconduct is proved. The Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not merit punishment by ways of discharge or dismissal and it can even impose lesser punishment instead. The power to even interfere with the punishment is conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11A, Vide Workmen of Firstone Tyre, & Rubber Co. v. Management. Mr. Malhotra however, sought to urge that Section 11A has made no difference because the same is only procedural and the same powers can be exercised by the Labour Court or the Tribunal while disposing of the matter either uader Section 33(2)(b) or under Section 10 of the Act. The argument is misconceived. To invoke Section 11A it is necessary that an in???ustrial dis???ute of the t??? mentioned therein should have been referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Vide (1973) I.L.L.J 278 ???ara 31 Su???reme Court has already laid down that what is done under Sec 33(21(b) is not adjudication. That Sec. 11A has not enhanced the ???ower of a Tribunal while dealing with an ???application under Section 33 was also emphasised in (1973) I LLJ. 278 para 48 wherein it was observed that ‘it is to be noted that an application made by an employer under Section 33(1) for permission ???or S. 33(2) for approval has still to be dealt with according to the principles laid down by this Court in its various decisions. No change has been effected in that Section by the Amendment Act.

    9. Thus the amendment by Section II-A having not brought change of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions and the Section 11-A having enchanced the nower of Tribunal when adjudicating under Section 10, the argument that the findings while dealing with the grant of approval or permission to t???e action of discharge or dismissal will operate as a bar of res judicata in a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is without sub???tance and is rejected. The furt???er argument of Mr. Malhotra that atleast the validity of the enquiry and the bona fides of the em???loyer which have been u???held by the Labour Court under Section 33 should operate as resjudicata on a reference under section 10 are equally of no avail because it not ???ossible to ???lit up and direct the findings given under Section 33 to attribute the quality of finality to some findings and not to others. The whole argument against the acceptance of plea of res judicata is that the scope of pro ceedings under Section 33 or 10 is different, and the relief is also different. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of an authorit??? in application under Section 33 is of a limited character and not of the appellate or a revisionary character. The position under Section ??? is now completely changed by Section 11-A wherein the Tribunal can now itself reappraise the evidence and act almost as a court of appeal. Thus the scope being so different the plea of res judicata advanced by Mr. Malhotra has no substance.

    10. The last contention urged by the appellant was that even after Betting aside the order of dismissal the relief of reinstatement shou??? not have been allowed. Mr. Malhotra made much of the fact that as the management had lost confidence in the employee, therefore, in such a case relief of reinstatement should not have been ordered Reference was to (1963) III S.C.R 457 : (1970) 3 SCC 353 and 1966 (2) S.C.R 455 to persuade us to hold that compensation in???tead of ???instatement of amount anything ranging from, 2 to 3 years sa???arv was an adequate remedy. This argument assumes as if there is an equal balance of choices before the Labour Court whether to order reinstatement or compensation even after it has found that the dismissal was illegal or unjustified as in the present case. This is not so.

    11. The recent case of Hindustan Tin Works v. Its Employees (9) set out the rule on reinstatement and back wages when the order of discharge is demolished:—

    “It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial juri???prulence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine and contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctri???e of mitigation of damages does not haunt this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid”.

    12. We must also emphasise that the ipse-dixit of the management that it has lost confidence in the workman is not a mantra ot charn, that it can be used at management's pleasure to deny the normal relief of reinstatement to a workman, even when the dismissal has been found to be unjustified. The plea of loss of confidence must have some rational relation to the fact that the employee bad misused his position of trust and rendered it undesirable to retain him in service. The cases where reinstatement was refused related to the special relationship of a Steno grapher attached to an employer as in the case of Ruby General Insurance Co. v. Chopra (10) or Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. A.K Roy (11) where it was found undesirable to retain a person in service because of the recommendation of the Senior Security Officer based on verification report of the police that it would not be desirable to retain him in service particularly when the workman was employed in a blast furnance—a crucial part of the work, with respect to which the workman had been employed. Mr. Malhotra tried to ma???e capital by referring to the past record of the respondent/workman from which it appears that he was previously warned or censured for some dereliction of duties. But this record is of no consequence because it is apparent that notwithstanding these warnings it was not considered improper or hazardous to continue with the service of the employee. But for the present disciplinary proceedings the employer was apparently Satisfied that continuance of the workman was not hazardous or risky for the establishment. If that be so then how can it be urged with any justification that even when the charges have not been established the workman should be penalised by being denied his normal right of reinstatement on the vague and unsub stantiated plea of ???oss of confidence:—

    “Loss of confidence in the integrity of an employee should be substantiated by cogent evidence before the Labour Court. If a workman is entitled as a general rule to be reinstate??? after his wrongful dismissal is set aside and on the facts it is not possible to find cogent material on which the establishment can genuinely be considered to have lost confidence in the integrity of the workmen, he is entitled to be reinstated”. Management of Paniiole Tea Estate v. Workman (12).

    13. Mr. Malhotra then sought to urge that even though reinstatement may be ordered the workman is not entitled to full back wages. We cannot agree. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. ‘If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains him self, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved’ Hindustan Tin case (supra). Mr. Malhotra then contends that full back wages cannot be paid because it cannot be expected that the workman must have been out of employment for all this period Now the evidence of workman is clear wherein he has stated that eversince dismissal he had been unemployed. Mr. Molhotra seeks to catch on to the further part of his evidence where he stated that be did not make any efforts to get a job and says that this shows an attitude of slackness on the part of the employee which should deprive him of entitlement to full back wages. We feel that Mr. Malhotra misappreciates the principles on which fall back wages are paid. The principle is that when an employee after protracted litigation with the employer succeeds in showing that the termination of his services was unjustified he would normally be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages excepting of course if it could be shown that he had been gainfully employed in the meanwhile. Thus ‘full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure.’ See Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha (13). Thus if the employer wishes to show that workman was gainfully employed he must establish and prove that fact no presumption of being gainfully employed can he raised. It is not disputed that no evidence has been led or even shown on the record by the appellant which shows that the workman was at any time in between employed el???where. In that view there would be n??? justification for denying him full back wages. ???he mere fact of long time having elapsed is certainly not a reason to deny him his normal relief of reinstatement, b???cause as said in Panitole Tea Estate case (P. 240) “if his dismissal was wrongful then merely because proceedings for adjudication of the industrial disputes have taken a long time is by itself no reason for not directing his reinstatement if it is otherwise justified being in accordance with normal rule”. As nothing has been shown to the contrary the order of the Labour Court di???ecting reinstatement with full back wages cannot be faulted. The result is that we find no merit in the appeal. The same is therefore dismissed with co???t???, which we assess at Rs. 500.

    14. Appeal dismissed.

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