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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • (1950) 67 R.P.C 209. (pages 329-330 Venkateswaran, Law of Trade Marks Act, 1963, Edition).7.
  • Section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act or Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales-tax Act
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act of 1941 and the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971,
  • (Article 632; Narayanan's Trade Marks Act, 2nd Edition).
  • Section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
  • Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971.
  • Merchandise Marks Act 1958 (hereinafter
  • Sec. 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act.
  • Section 45 (7) refers to Section 45 (1)
  • Section 45 (7) only to Section 45 (1).
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Section 45 (2) to Section 45 (7).
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 12
  • sub-clause (1) of Section 45)
  • Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1973
  • Section 151, C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • (1950) 67 R.P.C 209. (pages 329-330 Venkateswaran, Law of Trade Marks Act, 1963, Edition).7.
  • Section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act or Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales-tax Act
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act of 1941 and the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971,
  • (Article 632; Narayanan's Trade Marks Act, 2nd Edition).
  • Section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
  • Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971.
  • Merchandise Marks Act 1958 (hereinafter
  • Sec. 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act.
  • Section 45 (7) refers to Section 45 (1)
  • Section 45 (7) only to Section 45 (1).
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Section 45 (2) to Section 45 (7).
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 12
  • sub-clause (1) of Section 45)
  • Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1973
  • Section 151, C.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of the learned single Judge who accepted the opposition of the respondents to the registration of the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ in favour of the appellant, reversing the earlier decision of the Assistant Registrar who had allowed the appellant's registration application. The respondent company, incorporated in 1944, has been manufacturing and selling various goods including agricultural equipment, razor blades, tractors, washing machines, motorcycles, shock absorbers, thermometers, and other medical appliances since 1951. The respondents obtained registration of the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ in 1961 for goods including electric irons, electric kettles, soldering irons, and elements for these appliances. The appellant applied in 1963 for registration of the trade-mark ‘Escort’ in respect of the same goods, leading to opposition by the respondents under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant’s trade-mark ‘Escort’ can be registered despite the respondents’ prior registration and use of the similar trade-mark ‘Escorts’ for the same or similar goods.
  2. Whether the use of the appellant’s mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion under Section 11(a) and Section 12(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
  3. Whether the appellant is entitled to registration under Section 12(3) of the Act on the basis of honest concurrent use or other special circumstances.
  4. The extent to which the discretion exercised by the Assistant Registrar in granting registration can be interfered with by the appellate court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The discretion exercised by the Assistant Registrar in granting registration should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate court.
  • The appellant claimed to have used the trade-mark ‘Escort’ since 1958 and relied on Section 33 of the Act to support entitlement to registration.
  • Argued that a trade-mark is not necessarily disentitled to protection merely because its use might deceive or cause confusion, emphasizing the power to register under Section 12(3).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondents had been using and selling goods under the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ since 1951, well before the appellant’s application.
  • The respondents’ trade-mark was well known and its registration predated the appellant’s application for the same or similar goods.
  • The registration of the appellant’s mark would be likely to deceive the public and cause confusion, invoking Sections 11(a) and 12(1) of the Act.
  • The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving honest concurrent use sufficient to justify registration under Section 12(3).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pirie and Sons Ltd's Application (1933) 50 RPC 147 (H.L.) Judicial recognition of factors to be considered under Section 12(3) regarding concurrent use of trade-marks. Used to emphasize that the Registrar's discretion must be judicially exercised and is subject to review by the court.
Distributing Corporation (London) Limited's Application (1927) 44 RPC 225 Control and review of discretion exercised by Registrar in trade-mark registration. Supported the view that the court must exercise its own mind and not merely rubber-stamp Registrar’s discretion.
Evans v. Bertlam (1937) AC 473 (H.L.) Judicial control over discretion in trade-mark matters. Cited to affirm that Registrar's discretion is liable to judicial review.
London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Incorporated AIR 1963 S.C 1882 Trade-mark protection despite likelihood of deception or confusion if honest concurrent use exists. Noted that Section 11 does not override registration under Section 12(3) but circumstances must be considered case-by-case.
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Dunlop Lubricant Co. (1898) 16 R.P.C 12 Protection of trade-mark name against use by others even for different goods to prevent deception. Illustrated that substantial identity of name can justify injunction to prevent confusion.
"Players" Trade Mark Application (1965) R.P.C 363 Refusal of registration due to likelihood of deception despite different goods. Used to show that reputation in one product category can prevent registration in another if confusion is likely.
Radio Corporation Proprietary Ltd. v. Disney 57 C.L.R 448 Refusal of registration due to strong public association of mark with opponent’s goods. Demonstrated that public association with a mark can bar registration even for unrelated goods.
Jugmug Electric and Radio Co. v. Telerad (P.) Ltd. ILR (1978) 1 Delhi 667 Cancellation of registration where likelihood of confusion exists despite different goods. Supported refusal of registration on ground of reputation and probability of deception.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the prior registration and extensive use of the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ by the respondents since 1951, well before the appellant’s 1963 application for registration of ‘Escort’ on similar goods. It noted that the Assistant Registrar had erred in disregarding the affidavit evidence showing significant sales and advertisement expenditure by the respondents, which established their mark’s reputation and use on goods of the same or similar description.

The court emphasized that Sections 11(a) and 12(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act prohibit registration of marks likely to deceive or cause confusion, especially where a similar mark is already registered and well known. The appellant bore the burden of proving honest concurrent use sufficient to satisfy Section 12(3), which the court found not discharged due to the short period and limited extent of the appellant’s use compared to the respondents’ longstanding and substantial use.

The court further explained that the Registrar’s discretion, while deserving respect due to expertise, is subject to judicial review and the appellate court must exercise its own judgment on the facts and law. The similarity between the marks and the respondents’ extensive reputation meant that registration of the appellant’s mark would likely cause confusion and deception, justifying refusal of registration.

Judicial precedents were relied upon to illustrate that reputation and public association with a mark can bar registration of a similar mark even on dissimilar goods if confusion is likely, reinforcing the court’s conclusion.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal, upholding the learned single Judge's decision to refuse registration of the trade-mark ‘Escort’ in favour of the appellant.

The direct effect of this decision is that the appellant’s application for registration of the trade-mark ‘Escort’ is rejected, preserving the respondents’ exclusive rights in the mark ‘Escorts’ for the goods concerned. No new legal precedent was established; the court applied established principles concerning likelihood of confusion, prior use, and the limits of concurrent registration under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

    Dalip Chand Aggarwal And Others v. M/S. Escorts Ltd. New Delhi .

    SACHAR, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge by which he accepted the opposition of the respondents to the registration of the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ in favour of the appellant which had been allowed by the Assistant Registrar.

    2. The respondent company was incorporated under the Companies Act as far back as 1944. It manufactures and sells various agricultural equipment, razor blades, tractors, washing machines, motor cycles, shock absorbers, thermometers and other medical appliances since 1951. In 1961 the respondents sought and obtained registration of its trade-mark of the word ‘Escorts’ in Clause (9) and (ii) of Schedule 4 of the Rules framed under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958 (hereinafter to be called the Act.) This trade-mark relates to goods amongst others to electric irons, electric kettles, soldering irons and elements for electric irons and kettles.

    3. On 23-3-1963 the appellant sought registration of a trade-mark of the word ‘Escort’ under clause (9) in respect of electric irons, electric kettles, soldering irons and elements of electric irons and kettles. It is not disputed that these items are covered by the earlier registration obtained by the respondents in 1961. The respondents naturally put in opposition to the registration application of the appellant. Section 9 of the Act lays down the requisites for registration in part A and B of the Register. Section 11 (a) prohibits registration of a mark, the use of which would be likely to deceive and cause confusion. section 12 (1) further lays down that no trade-mark shall be registered in respect of any goods or description of goods which is identical with or deceptively similar to a trade-mark which is already registered in the name of a different proprietor in respect of the same goods or description of goods. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is however subject to sub-section (3) which empowers in the case of honest concurrent use or of other special circumstances which, in the opinion of the Registrar, make it proper to do so, that it may permit the registration by one or more than one proprietor of trade-marks which are identical or nearly resemble each other (whether any such trade mark is already registered or not) in respect of the same goods or description of goods.

    4. The Assistant Registrar found that trade-mark sought by the appellant was prima facie distinctive within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. With regard to section 12 (1) he found that there was hardly any difference from a trade mark point of view between the word ‘Escorts’ which was the registered trade-mark of the respondents and the word ‘Escort’ for which registration was sought by the appellant. He, therefore, found that the applicant/appellant's trade-mark was similar to the opponent's/respondent's. He also found that the applicant's goods are the same or of a similar description as some of the items covered by the registered trade-mark in favour of the respondents. Thus section 12 (1) of the Act stood as a bar to the registration. The respondents had also objected to the registration being given to the appellant by invoking Section 11 (a). This the Assistant Registrar did not find in their favour as according to him the use of the trade-mark ‘Escort’ by the respondents has not been proved. He however, held the case of the appellant established under Section 12 (3) of the Act. He also found that as the goods had been sold by the appellant under the Trade Mark ‘Escort’ since 1958 the appellant's case fell within Section 33 of the Act and therefore, they were entitled to registration.

    5. In appeal the learned single Judge however, found that from the statement of the sales for the period from 1950 onwards, it is clear that the respondents have been able to establish that their mark ‘Escorts’ was well known in the trade and that if the registration of the trade-mark was allowed in favour of the appellant it is likely to deceive the public and would be hit both under Section 11 (a) as well as under Sec. 12 (1). He, therefore, did not think that it was a case in which applicants/appellants deserve registration under Section 12 (3) of the Act. The learned Judge also has found that the appellant/applicants have not been able to discharge the heavy onus laid upon them that notwithstanding the similarity in the trade-mark, it will not cause confusion and deception. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for registration filed by the appellant-applicants.

    6. The first objection raised by the counsel for the appellant, Mr. Kanwal Krishan was that as the discretion had been exercised by the Registrar in granting registration the learned single Judge wash error in reversing it. Put so broadly, the proposition is unacceptable. Of course if it is meant to emphasise that the discretion exercised by the Assistant Registrar, in a matter where he is expected to have expert familiarity with the subject should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate court, the same can be readily accepted. But the way the counsel for the appellant raised this objection, he almost put forward as a bar to any interference by the appellate court. Naturally, we could not accept this extreme proposition which will reduce a statutory appeal to a mere form and inanity. Though the official of the registry are peculiarly fitted to deal with all these matters like S. 12 (3) and where the Registrar has exercised his discretion in the matter the court would be slow to interfere, yet the court while determining the weight to be attached to the Registrar's view, must exercise its own mind upon the solution of the problem under consideration. Vide (1933) 50 RPC 147 at p. 158 (H.L) in Pirie and Sons Ltd's application (Article 632; Narayanan's Trade Marks Act, 2nd Edition). The Registrar's decision in exercise of its discretion does not relieve the court of its own individual responsibility. His discretion like the discretion of everybody else is liable to be controlled by the superior tribunal. Vide (1927) 44 RPC 225 at p. 234 in Distributing Corporation (London) Limited's application. Like all discretions the Registrar's discretion must be judicially exercised: and such an exercise of discretion is liable to review on grounds which are well understood. See (1937 AC 473 (HL) Evans v. Bertlam and (1950) 67 R.P.C 209. (pages 329-330 Venkateswaran, Law of Trade Marks Act, 1963, Edition).

    7. It is common case that the trademark which is sought by the appellant is similar to the one for which registration has already been obtained by the respondent. It is also common case that the goods covered by the appellant's proposed registration application are also covered by the registered trade-mark which was obtained by the respondent in 1963. Prima facie, therefore, the applicant's application for registration would be liable to be rejected because of the bar both under Secs. 11 (a) and 12 (1) of the Act. Even the Registrar had found on this aspect against the appellant. The only reason why he was persuaded to allow the registration was because he took the view that the user by the respondents of the trade-mark was only from May 1961 and the period of a year and 10 months was hardly sufficient to have discharged the onus of proving use and reputation which was upon the opponents. So far as the evidence of user of the trade-mark by both the appellants and the respondents is concerned there was the affidavit of Mr. Hazari on behalf of the respondents in which he had given the figure of the sale of goods under the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ from the year 1961 to 1964 which showed that the figures of the sale from 1961 of about Rs. 7 lakhs went to Rs. 20 lakhs in 1962 and Rs. 29 lakhs in 1963 and was Rs. 92 lakhs in 1964. Of course, the material date for establishing the use and the reputation of the mark in the market, both by the appellant and respondents would be 22-3-1963 when the application for registration was moved by the appellants. But even then the sales in terms of the affidavit of the respondent which could no be rebutted shows that it was to the extent of about Rs. 20 lakhs. Not only that advertisements of the respondents under their trade-mark including ‘Escorts’ were said to be about over Rs. 3 lakhs and 82 thousands in the year 1963. Another affidavit of Mr. Charanjit Singh. Secretary of the respondent company filed in August, 1966 which had been ignored by the Assistant Registrar, and which the learned single Judge for reasons mentioned by him and in our view rightly took into consideration shows that the company had been selling electric iron, vessels and heating elements etc. These are the very goods of the same description for which registration had been sought by the appellant. The sale of these goods starting with over Rs. 81,000/- in 1961 rose to Rs. 2 lakhs and 84 thousands in the year 1963. What is, however, more important is that the said affidavit also shows that the respondents were selling the goods mechanical and electrical since 1951 and the figures showed that starting with sales of over Rs. 31 lakhs, the said figure had risen to over Rs. 3 crore and 40 lakhs in the year 1962. The Assistant Registrar wrongly excluded the affidavit of Charanjit Singh, with the result that it did not take into account the large sales which the respondents had been able to build up by 1962, and which were marketed under the trade name ‘Escorts’. This fact was naturally very relevant for the purpose of Section 11 (a) of the Act. It is well settled that when a person like the appellant applies for registration of his mark, he bears the burden of satisfying the Registrar, who has to be satisfied, whether having regard to the reputation acquired by use of a mark or a name, the mark at the date of the application for registration it used in a normal and fair manner in connection with any of the goods covered by the proposed registration, will not be reasonably likely to cause deception and confusion amongst a substantial number of persons. It should also be remembered that S. 11 (a) covers cases where the goods may not be of the same description, but if it is likely to deceive and cause confusion, registration would be refused. See (1965) RPC 363 “Players” Trade Mark Appln. Thus for the purpose of finding out whether the use of the trade-mark ‘Escorts’ would be likely to deceive or cause confusion under Section 11 (a) it was necessary in bear in mind not only the sales which took place from the period 1961 to March’ 1963 of the goods of the same description but also of the general acceptability of other goods sold by the respondents under their mark ‘Escorts’ in the market. It is no doubt true, as urged by appellants' counsel that a trade-mark is not necessarily “disentitled to protection” because its use might deceive or cause confusion and to that extent Section 11 does not override” the power to register given in Section 12 (3), vide (AIR 1963 S.C 1882) London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Incorporated. But circumstances of each case have to be considered and no generalisation can be attempted. Though the Registrar had correctly summarised the factors which ought to be considered while disposing of application under Section 12 (3) and which has received judicial recognition in Pirie and Sons Ltd.'s Appln., (1933) 50 RPC 147 (HL); and John Fitton and Co. Ltd's Appln. (1949) 66 RPC 110 at p. 112. We feel that he has not given proper relevance to the requirement of the quantum of concurrent user shown by the applicants having regard to the duration, area and volume of trade and also to the degree of confusion likely to ensue from the resemblance of the applicant's and the opponent's mark. It is no doubt true that the trade mark ‘Escorts’ was registered in the name of respondents in 1961 for those goods for which the appellants now seek the registration but what can not be forgotten is that the respondents were in the market selling their goods under their mark ‘Escorts’ right from 1951 onwards. Where the Assistant Registrar erred was in assuming that as there was only a short period from 1961 onwards with regard to the goods of the same description as the appellant, this period and the extent of user by the respondent was not enough to justify refusal of registration being given to the appellants. In this he seems to have assumed as if the resemblance that has to be taken into account about the mark is necessarily only with respect to the same description of goods. In this he obviously erred. What has to be found is whether this mark which the applicants seek registration of, has come to be known and associated with the name of the opponent, not necessarily with the particular goods of the same description but generally with its goods. Thus if it could be shown that the mark has been quite extensively used in the market by the respondent with the result that any goods which may be marketed under the same mark will be associated with the name of the respondent so that people buying may feel that it is the product of the respondents, this could be a sufficient justification for refusing registration of a similar trade mark in favour of the appellants.

    8. In (1898) 16 R.P.C 12, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Dunlop Lubricant Co., the plaintiffs were the manufacturers of cycle accessories under the name of ‘Dunlop’. Defendants were selling burning oil or lubricants under the name of Dunlop which was not even being manufactured by the plaintiff. Nevertheless an injunction was issued on the ground that the name was substantially identical with that of the plaintiffs and the defendants are not to be allowed the use of the name which the plaintiffs were using.

    9. In (1965) R.P.C 363 (supra), an applicant applied for registration of trade mark of the word ‘Players’ in respect of non-medicated sugar confectionery and biscuits. The opponents were proprietors of a registered trade mark consisting of the word ‘Players’ in respect of manufactured tobacco. Even though the court came to the conclusion that tobacco cigarettes and confectionery cigarettes are not goods of the same description and the opponent's case under Sec. 12 (1) would fail, nevertheless the registration was refused on the ground that the public would regard cigarettes made from Chocolate as emanating from respondent company and accordingly use by the applicants of the mark applied for in respect of confectionery cigarettes would be liable to deceive and cause confusion.

    10. In 57 C.L.R 448 Radio Corporation Proprietary Ltd. v. Disney, the applicants applied for registering the words ‘Mickey Mouse’ and ‘Minnie Mouse’ as trade marks in respect of radio receiving sets and kits. The application was opposed by Walter E. Disney, who had created the cinema characters ‘Mickey Mouse’ and ‘Minnie Mouse’. Registration was refused and this refusal was upheld by the High Court of Australia on the ground that the opponents had shown that names and figures are so closely associated in the public mind, with Walter E. Disney that the use of either the names or the figures in connection with any goods at once suggests that the goods are in some way or the other connected with Disney.

    11. In ILR (1978) 1 Delhi 667 Jugmug Electric and Radio Co. v. Telerad (P.) Ltd., the respondents were registered user of trade mark ‘Telerad’ in respect of radio receiving sets and components thereof. The appellants got it registered with the trade mark telerad in respect of domestic electric appliances. It was common case that the respondents did not manufacture domestic electric appliances. Nevertheless their application for rectification was allowed and the registration granted in favour of the appellant was cancelled on the ground that there was some probability that the customers purchasing electric goods may think that the domestic electrical appliances are connected with the respondent's firm at the stage of manufacture or at the stage of sale including that either they are manufactured by the respondents or marketed by it and, therefore, the reputation attached to the manufacture or the marketing of goods of respondents would tend to be attached to the goods of the appellant.

    12. It will thus be seen that in all these cases even though the opponent was not manufacturing the goods of similar description for which registration of the trade mark was sought by the applicant, the application was refused on the ground that because of the reputation in the market of the opponents, the goods of the applicants may be taken to be those of the opponents. In the present case admittedly the sales by the respondents of their various goods and which are accepted in the market under the trade mark ‘Escorts’ have run into over crores. The respondents are undoubtedly a well known manufacturing company and have a reasonably known name. They had also started manufacturing goods even of the same description as that of the applicant though it was in the range of a few lakhs by 1963. The user by the appellant was undoubtedly very limited as of his own showing it was to the tune of about 2 1/2 lakhs, though as pointed out relevantly by the learned Judge the invoices did not relate to the period subsequent to 1960. In that state of affairs it could not really be said that there was an extensive user by the appellant as to satisfy the test of concurrent user within the terms of Section 12 (3) of the Act. It is no doubt true that it is not necessary for the applicant's trade to be larger than the opponent's but then the extent of the business along with the extent of the business interest of the proprietor and the interest of the public have all to be correlated in deciding whether applicant's mark should be registered or not. In this connection it is relevant to note that there is no absolute right to have the mark registered and if the court is in any doubt that if the mark will cause confusion, registration will be refused. There is of course no fixed rule as to the minimum period of honest concurrent use necessary to lead to registration. In Kerley's Law of Trade Mark and Trade Names', 9th Edition at Article 340, it has been stated that there was no reported case in which a period of concurrent use, so short as 2 1/4 years has been proved to be sufficient to bring the application within the advantage of Section 12 (2). Even if this view was strictly applied and even a smaller use was held to be established from 1958 on which there is, to say the least, fair amount of doubt the period would be too short to satisfy the test of extent of user for the purpose of Section 12 (3) of the Act. It cannot be forgotten that the word ‘Escorts’ was in the market right from 1951 onwards with a very considerable sale. It is correct that prior to 1961 the goods which were sold by respondents were different but that will not take the case out of Section 11 and would at least show some indication as to why the appellant had used the word ‘Escorts’. Considering however, that the respondents were in field with the trade mark even though of other goods from 1951 onwards and considering that there was a very small amount of goods sold by the appellant in a period of a year or two prior to the registration by the respondents the onus which was on the applicant, was rightly held not to have been destroyed. We, therefore, see infirmity in the judgment of the learned single Judge. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed

    AIR 1981 DELHI 1 (FB) (JAN PART.)

    Narula Trading Agency v. S.T Commr., Delhi (FB)

    Narula Trading Agency v. Commissioner of Sales Tax.

    Note:— In this case, the Judges of the Full Bench differ; the majority view is taken by Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J. and B.N Kirpal, J., and the minority, by S.B Wad, J.

    The judgment of Avadh Behari Rohatgi J. is already published as, AIR 1981 Delhi 1 (FB) and represents the majority view. At the time it went to the press, the judgments of S.B Wad and B.N Kirpal, JJ and order of the Court were not received. They are given here in continuation of AIR 1981 Delhi 1 (FB). The inconvenience caused is very much regretted — Ed.).

    S.D WAD, J. (minority view) 32:—The question referred to the Full Bench is “whether in a reference which is pending or where an application has been filed under Section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act or Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales-tax Act the High Court has jurisdiction to grant stay of recovery of tax?” I agree with Avadh Behari, J. that we should answer only the question relating to Sec. 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act. I have the benefit of reading the opinion of the learned brother on this question. I beg to differ.

    33. I think the reference to Full Bench became necessary because Section 45 (7) refers to Section 45 (1) only. It does not refer to Section 45 (2) at all. I will assume for a moment that High Court has no jurisdiction to grant stay of recovery of tax where an application is made under Section 45 (1) of the Act. The question is, can we by a judicial interpretation add Section 45 (2) to Section 45 (7). Plainly not. That is legislating. Is it permissible to supply omissions in taxing statutes by implication? Is it legitimate to look to supposed intention of the legislature? Can fear of ‘absurd result’ give such a power to us which otherwise we do not have? No such exercise is permissible. I treat express words of Section 45 (7) as my guide. There I feel myself to be on more firm ground. Finding out supposed intentions of legislature or reconciliation of apparently ‘incongruous’ provisions or ‘absurd results’ would land us on slippery grounds.

    34. The submission of the counsel for the Revenue is that the words “or any reference made in consequence thereof” are wide enough to cover both section 45 (1) and section 45 (2). I think there is misconception about the remedies in section 45 (1) and sec. 45 (2). section 45 (1) and section 45 (2) are mutually exclusive. They cannot co-exist. If a relief is given under Section 45 (1) there is no necessity of the remedy in Section 45 (2). Conversely, if the application under Section 45 (1) is refused nothing more can be expected of the Tribunal. That is the end of the matter at that forum. Thereafter, can an assessee not go to a superior Court and invoke its special jurisdiction? The answer is given in Section 45 (2). An assessee can approach the High Court. He can pray for mandamus to the Tribunal. When a High Court is seized of the matter and is inclined to grant mandamus, the crucial stage of granting stay of recovery of tax comes”. The words “or any reference made in consequence thereof” qualify the word ‘application’. The word ‘application’ occurs in Section 45 (1) as also in Section 45 (2). After the failure of an application made under Sec. 45 (1) a second application is made, Now, under Section 45 (2). These are two distinct applications. They are directed to two different judicial authorities. Indeed one is superior to another. The nature of remedy is also different. Application under Section 45 (1) appeals to the discretion of the Tribunal. Application under Section 45 (2) invokes a special order from a superior Court obliging the Tribunal (from without) to make a reference, Can we say that the second application is a consequence of the first application? When an application is granted under Section 45 (1) and the reference comes to a High Court, this reference can be said to be the consequence of an application under Section 45 (1). But whet the application is refused and a distinct remedy is pursued, can a reference under Section 45 (2) be described as a ‘consequence’ of an application under Section 45 (1). ‘Consequence’ cannotes causal connection. One must be a cause and the other must be its result. Applications under Sections 45 (1) and 45 (2) are not strangers to each other. They are related. But I find that they are not causally related. I do not think that the words “or any reference made in consequence thereof” can be used as a convenient peg to hang this hat on. Truly they are of no assistance.

    35. I do not think that any absurd results would follow if Section 45 (2) is not read in Section 43 (7). Section 30 of the Act is an independent provision for refund of taxes collected illegally or by mistake. The right to refund is not created by Section 45 (7). It is already there. Section 45 (7) merely restates it. If after a reference under Section 45 (2) and on the opinion given by the High Court, an assessee becomes entitled to refund, he can claim it under Section 30, simply because Section 45 (7) does not refer to Section 45 (2), the right to refund is not lost.

    36. I also do not appreciate the submission of the revenue that incongruous results would follow by restricting Section 45 (7) only to Section 45 (1). But assuming that there would be some incongruity the legislature should remove it not courts. Where the Tribunal finds that a question of law arises, there is no stay of recovery of tax. But when the Tribunal holds that no question of law arises and refuses to make a reference stay can be granted. These are incongruous results, the revenue submits. Is there any factual basis for this apprehension? The Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1973 was passed to consolidate and amend the law of sales tax as applicable to Delhi. The object of the amendment has been stated in the statement of Objects and Reasons as :

    (i) To plug loopholes in the law, and

    (ii) to tighten up administration machinery responsible for collection of tax. The Select Committee stated that sub-clause (1) of Clause 45 (which corresponds with sub-clause (1) of Section 45) was amended with a view to bring it on the lines of an identical provision of. Income-tax Act, 1961. As regards the other clauses including clauses 45 (2) and 45 (7), the Committee observed that the amendments made were of consequential nature. It is clear from this legislative history that no loopholes were found in the original Section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and, therefore, no changes in Section 45 (7) were found necessary by the legislature. The original powers of the Commissioner under the bengal finance act are now exercised by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, only that consequential change was made. These provisions are on the statute book for the last forty years but there is no material nor any decision to support this apprehension.

    37. The counsel for the assessee submits that since it is doubtful whether S. 45 (2) also falls within the mischief of S. 45 (7) or not, the doubt must be resolved in favour of the assessee. The counsel states that an assessee should not be deprived of a possible legal relief from the higher court, by straining the language of Section 45 (7). This submission has a merit. Relief of the stay of recovery of tax is no doubt a discretionary relief. The main consideration is justice of the matter. But if an assessee succeeds in persuading the High Court on the justice of his case why should he be deprived of this relief unless there are expressed words to that effect in the statute. Being a provision of a taxing statute Section 45 (7) must be strictly construed. In ease of a doubt, construction favouring an assessee should be preferred. These are time honoured principles of interpretation of a tax statute.

    38. Imposing fetters of Section 45 (7) on an application under Section 45 (2) (which is not warranted by plain reading of the section) would make serious inroads on the powers of the High Court as a superior court. High Court has inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C to grant stay, including stay of recovery of tax. There are no express words of prohibition in Section 45 (7) in regard to this plenary power. The question is, can we by implication take away the inherent powers of the High Court? As stated earlier this provision is on the statute book for about forty years. It must be presumed that the legislatures, while passing the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act of 1941 and the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971, were aware of the inherent powers of the High Court. These powers are not the creatures of the sales tax statute. The legislature could, of course, in relation to sales tax say that the High Court shall not exercise a particular power. But it must do so loudly and clearly. I do not even hear a whisper, in its wisdom, the legislature thought that the assessee should not be stopped at the stage of Tribunal only but that he should have a chance before a High Court, armed with all powers to give directions to do full justice. Whether this was the intention of the legislature or not, total absence of any mention of Section 45 (2), is a sufficient indication to preserve (and not destroy) the inherent powers of the High Court.

    39. The powers of High Court under Section 45 (2) are in the nature of mandamus. They are of the same genere of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Power to grant stay of recovery of tax dues (where justice demands it), is a power incidental to the power to issue a mandamus. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider whether it is merely an ‘advisory’ power or an ‘appellate’ power. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 45 (2) a High Court renders a ‘judgment’. It finally determines the question of law referred to it. This judgment is binding and the tribunal can act only conformable to it.

    40. I have assumed earlier that High Court cannot grant stay where a reference arises out of an application under Section 45 (1). I will now examine whether the assumption is correct. Here we go to the submission of the assessee that the High Court is not powerless to grant stay of recovery of tax even in this situation. His counsel says that Section 45 (7) stops merely at the stage of Tribunal. It does not address itself to the High Court, he submits. This argument appears to be plausible. A Tribunal while exercising the appellate power under Section 43 can grant stay of recovery. The Supreme Court has held that this power is incidental to the appellate power. But where the Tribunal is not able to resolve a question of law and when it finds it necessary to seek the guidance of the High Court, it makes a reference to High Court. Thus where a reference is made the matter (at least temporarily) goes out of the control of the Tribunal. What is the necessity of retaining the powers of stay of recovery when it has no control left on the matter. The High Court has to resolve the principal question of law referred. It is the High Court that will need the incidental power to grant stay of the recovery of tax. When the legislature has advisedly conferred this special function on the High Court, namely, to pronounce authoritative judgment on the question of law, can it be said that it was grudging to give incidental power of stay of recovery of tax. Can it be said that legislature was ignorant of the inherent powers and powers incidental to mandamus (of High Court) when it decided to entrust this additional function to High Courts. However, it is unnecessary to express any final opinion on this question because the reference is limited to Section 45 (2) only.

    41. My conclusions are :

    (1) There are no express and categorical words of prohibition on the powers of the High Court to grant stay of recovery of tax, in Section 45 (7) of the Act, or otherwise.

    (2) By process of interpretation a court of law cannot add new words, namely, “Section 45 (2)” in Section 45 (7) of the Act.

    (3) By virtue of the inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C and by virtue of its special powers as a superior court to issue orders in the nature of mandamus, High Court has undoubted powers to grant stay of the recovery of tax, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 45 (2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1971. The question is answered affirmatively.

    B.N KIRPAL, J.:— 42. I agree with Avadh Behari, J.

    ORDER BY THE COURT

    43. The application for stay (C.M 617 of 1980) is dismissed.

    44. The matter will now be placed before the Division Bench for disposal of these cases in accordance with law.

    Order accordingly.
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    Dalip Chand Aggarwal And Others v. M/S. Escorts Ltd. New Delhi .
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