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  • Order 1 rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 9 (1) and 13 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Order 1 rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 9 (1) and 13 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (Sat Narain, Savitri Devi and Ram Kumar) filed an application under sections 9(1) and 13(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act asking that one Bura Mal be declared insolvent and that a Receiver of his estate be appointed. The Insolvency Court appointed the Official Receiver as Interim Receiver of Bura Mal's estate.

In April 1966 Ram Murti Devi filed a partition suit in respect of properties comprised in Bura Mal's estate against Manbhari Bai and Bura Mal; the Official Receiver was impleaded as a defendant and contested the suit, alleging collusion. The trial court decreed the suit on April 5, 1966. The Official Receiver appealed to this Court (R.F.A. 131-D of 1966) after obtaining the Insolvency Judge's permission.

Subsequently, the District Judge on appeal set aside the Insolvency Court's order appointing the Official Receiver as Interim Receiver. The respondents then applied under Order 1 Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be impleaded as appellants in place of the Official Receiver, alleging they had a subsisting interest because the Insolvency Court appointed the Official Receiver on their application and, following vacation of that appointment, they were entitled to be substituted.

The learned single Judge allowed the respondents' application and directed their substitution in place of the Official Receiver; the order also directed the substituted appellants to move to implead the legal representatives of the deceased respondent (Ram Murti Devi had died in the interim).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the learned single Judge accepting the respondents' application to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver is a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) and therefore appealable under that clause.
  2. Whether, if the Official Receiver (the sole appellant) was no longer in position after vacation of his appointment, the substitution of the respondents in his place amounts to a decision against the appellant such that the appeal must be dismissed.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was not competent because clause 10 provides for appeals from a "judgment" and the impugned order was not a "judgment".
  • The respondents asserted they had a subsisting interest in the subject-matter of the appeal because it was on their application that the Insolvency Court had appointed the Official Receiver as Interim Receiver, and after the vacation of that appointment they were entitled to be substituted in his place.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants argued that the Official Receiver was the sole appellant; after the vacation of his appointment there was effectively no appellant left, and thus the appeal had to be dismissed.
  • They further argued that the impugned order permitting substitution of the respondents amounted to a decision against the (original) appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.V. Tuljaram Row v. M.K R.V Alagappa Chettiar (35 Indian Law Report Madras 1) Adjudication is a "judgment" if its effect is to put an end to the suit or proceeding (regard to effect, not form). The Court relied on the dictum that a decision is a "judgment" if its effect is to dispose of the suit or proceeding; used as foundational authority for construing "judgment" in clause 10.
Union of India v. Khetra Mohan Banerjee (AIR 1960 Calcutta 190) Where all cardinal issues are determined so as to produce final adjudication, a judgment is final; distinction between final and interlocutory. Used to support the proposition that only orders determining cardinal issues and producing final adjudication qualify as "judgment" for Letters Patent purposes.
Dayabhai Jiwandass & ors v. A.M.M. Murugappa Chettiar (AIR 1935 Rangoon 267) Same view as Madras and Calcutta benches: "judgment" to be understood in the effect/ finality sense. Cited as part of a consistent line of authority endorsing the limited meaning of "judgment" for Letters Patent appeals.
Khatizan v. Sonairam Daulatram (AIR 1920 Calcutta 797) Order transferring a suit from a Small Cause Court to High Court was not a "judgment" within clause 15 (corresponding clause) and thus not appealable. Applied to illustrate that procedural or preliminary orders which do not affect merits are not "judgments" under the Letters Patent.
Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. (17 WR 364) (Sir Richard Couch, C.J.) "Judgment" means a decision which affects the merits by determining some right or liability; may be final, preliminary, or interlocutory but must affect merits. The Court quoted this definition to show that an adjudication must affect the merits to be a "judgment" for the purpose of Letters Patent appeals.
Asrumati Debt v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot & others (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 198) Endorsed Rangoon and Calcutta High Courts: transfer order neither affects merits nor terminates suit; transfer orders not to be treated as "judgment". Relied upon to confirm that orders not affecting merits or terminating the suit are not "judgments" for Letters Patent appeal purposes.
Begam Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chand Khanna (AIR 1969 Delhi 85) Letters Patent contemplate judgments that have the effect of a decree and affect merits; to decide "judgment" regard should be had to the effect, not form. Quoted for the principle that the effect of the adjudication (whether it puts an end to the suit or affects merits) determines whether it is a "judgment". The Court applied the same test here.
R.N. Selvam Mudaliar & others v. P.A. Raju Mudaliar & another (AIR 1953 Madras 816) An order adding a party to a suit is not a "judgment" under the Letters Patent; it is a step towards final adjudication and confers at best a right to be heard. Applied directly to the facts: the Court treated the substitution/adding of parties as procedural and not affecting merits, supporting the conclusion that the single Judge's order was not a "judgment".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by addressing the respondents' preliminary objection that the appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was not competent because the impugned order was not a "judgment" within the meaning of that clause. The Court analysed the meaning of "judgment" under the Letters Patent by reference to established authorities.

The Court recited the principle, derived from a Full Bench decision in Tuljaram Row and reiterated in subsequent cases, that the word "judgment" should be construed with reference to its effect: an adjudication is a "judgment" if its effect is to put an end to the suit or proceeding before the court, or if its non-compliance would put an end to the suit or proceeding. It emphasized that it is not necessary that the decision determine the merits to be a "judgment" only if the effect is final or dispositive.

The Court surveyed authorities from other High Courts and the Supreme Court (including Union of India v. Khetra Mohan Banerjee, Dayabhai Jiwandass, Khatizan, Asrumati Debt, and Begam Aftab Zamani) to show a consistent line of decisions holding that procedural orders which do not decide the merits or terminate the suit are not "judgments" for the purpose of Letters Patent appeals.

Applying that settled law to the facts, the Court found that the impugned order — accepting the respondents' application to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver — did not deal with or decide the merits of the controversy in the appeal, nor did it determine any disputed right or liability. The order merely placed the impleaded respondents "on the road to a judgment" (i.e., was a procedural step), and at best conferred a right to be heard on the merits. The Court relied particularly on R.N. Selvam Mudaliar to demonstrate that adding or substituting parties is not a "judgment."

The Court also considered and rejected the appellants' contention that substitution amounted to a decision against the appellant (on the ground that the Official Receiver was the sole appellant and his appointment had been vacated). The Court observed that the learned single Judge had not adjudicated the respondents' rights in the contested properties and that the substitution order was expressly without prejudice to the parties' rights on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) is not maintainable and is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court's dismissal was on the ground of incompetence under clause 10 — the impugned order permitting substitution of parties is not a "judgment" within the meaning of that clause because it does not decide the merits nor terminate the proceeding.
  • The direct effect is that the present appeal is dismissed and the objection to maintainability succeeds; the opinion records "No order as to costs."
  • The opinion does not purport to establish any new precedent beyond applying and reaffirming the existing line of authority that procedural orders which do not affect the merits are not "judgments" for Letters Patent appeal purposes.

Appeal dismissed.

    Manbhari Bai (Deceased) Through Her Lrs. v. Sat Narain And Others S

    S.N Shankar, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order of the learned single Judge accepting the application of the respondents for being substituted in place of the Official Receiver who was the only appellant in R.F.A 131-D of 1966.

    Sometimes in February, 1963 the respondents, Sat Narain, Savitri Devi and Ram Kumar, moved an application under sections 9 (1) and 13 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act before the Insolvency Court praying that one Bura Mal be declared an insolvent and a Receiver of his estate be appointed. In this petition, the Insolvency Court appointed Official Receiver as the Interim Receiver of the estate of Bura Mal. In April, 1966 one Ram Murti Devi, wife of a son of the brother of Bura Mal filed a suit for partition in respect of the proper-lies comprised in the estate of Bura Mal against Manbhari Bai, widow of a real brother of Bura Mal, and Bura Mal. The Official Receiver was also impleaded as a defendant in this suit. Ram Murti Devi alleged that she owned the properties along with Manbhari Bai and Bura Mal. The Official Receiver contested the suit and took the plea, amongst others, that it was collusive. On April 5, 1966, however, the learned trial court decreed the suit. Against this decree, the Official Receiver filed an appeal to this Court (being RFA 131-D of 1966) after obtaining permission of the Insolvency Judge. Thereafter, it appears that the learned District Judge on appeal set aside the order of the Insolvency Court appointing the Official Receiver as the Interim Receiver of the estate of Bura Mal. The respondents thereupon applied under Order 1 rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as appellants in place of the Official Receiver with the allegations that they had subsisting interest in the subject-matter of the appeal as it was on their application that the Insolvency Court had appointed Official Receiver as the interim Receiver of the estate of Bura Mal and after the vacation of the order appointing Interim Receiver they were entitled to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver. The learned single Judge by the impugned order accepted this application and held that the respondents were entitled to prosecute the appeal and directed them to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver. As one of the respondents to the appeal, Ram Murti Devi, had in the meantime died, the substituted appellants were also directed to move an application for impleading the legal representatives of the deceased respondent.
    The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that this appeal is not competent under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as this clause provides for appeals from a “judgment” and the order under appeal is not a “judgment”. The submission, in our view, has substance.
    Clause 10 of the Letters Patent provides for appeals from a “judgment” of the nature mentioned in the clause. The expression “judgment” is not defined in the Letters Patent but it has always been construed to mean a final adjudication of the controversy so as to put an end to the suit or proceedings in which it is passed. This question came up before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in T.V Tuljaram Row v. M.K R.V Alagappa Chettiar (35 Indian Law Report Madras 1), (1). With reference to clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Madras), White C.J said: —
    “An adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause if its effect, whatever its form may be and whatever may be the nature of the application in which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned or if its effect, if not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding. It is not necessary that the decision must affect the merits by determining some right or liability. An adjudication based on a refusal to exercise discretion, is appealable if the effect of the adjudication is to dispose of the suit so far as the Court making the adjudication is concerned.”
    This dictum has all through been followed not only by the Madras High Court but the other High Courts also. In Union of India v. Khetra Mohan Banerjee (AIR 1960 Calcutta 190) (2). Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the context of clause 15 of the Letters Patent (which corresponds to clause 10 of the Letters Patent before us) observed: —
    “It is only where all the cardinal issues in the particular matter being considered by the Court are being determined that a judgment can be said to have come into existence; where along with the determination of these cardinal issues the subsidiary issues are also being determined so that there is a final adjudication of any matter in issue, the judgment is a final judgment.”
    A Full Bench of Rangoon High Court in Dayabhai Jiwandass and others v. A.M.M Murugappa Chettiar (AIR 1935 Rangoon 267) (3) also took the same view. In Khatizan V. Sonairam Daulatram (AIR 1920 Calcutta 797) (4), Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that an order made by learned single Judge transferring a suit from Calcutta Small Cause Court to High Court for trial was not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and consequently not appealable. For arriving at this conclusion, reliance was placed on the following observations of Sir Richard Couch, C.J, in the case of the Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. (17 WR 364) (5): —
    “We think that “judgment” in Cl. 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final, judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined.”
    In Asrumati Debt v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 198) (6) the Supreme Court endorsed the view taken by the Rangoon High Court as well as Calcutta High Court in the cases of Dayabhai Jiwandass and others v. A.M.M Murugappa Chettiar and Khatizan v. Sonairam Daulatram (supra) and said: —
    “. . .. The order in the present case neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground. An order for transfer cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting a plaint or one dismissing a suit on a preliminary ground . . . .”
    In the following observations the Full Bench of this Court in Begam Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chand Khanna (AIR 1969 Delhi 85) (7) also reiterated the same position:
    “The Letters Patent, when providing for appeals from judgments, in our view, contemplate judgments which have both the effect of a decree as defined in the Code and of such order as may affect the merits of a controversy between the parties by determining some disputed right or liability. A judgment may thus be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. In order to decide whether an adjudication should be treated as a “judgment” within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, we feel that regard should be had not to the form of the adjudication but to its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever, its form and whatever the nature of the proceeding in which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, or if its effect, if not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, the adjudication is indisputably a “judgment” within the meaning of this clause. Other decisions or determinations adjudicating upon a disputed controversy on the merits in a suit or proceeding may also appropriately fall within the contemplation of the word “judgment” . . . . . . Each case would thus depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.”
    This being the law on the subject, we are clear in our mind that the order under appeal accepting the respondents’ application to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver, in the facts of this case, is not a “judgment” within the meaning of clause 10 of Letters Patent (Lahore). The order does not at all deal with or decide the merits of the controversy in appeal, nor does it determine any disputed right or liability. All that it purports to do is to place the impleaded respondents, so to say, on the road to a judgment. So long, therefore, as there is no final adjudication or determination in form or in effect, clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not attracted and appeal will not lie.
    It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the Official Receiver was the sole appellant in this appeal and after the vacation of the order of his appointment there was no appellant left and so this appeal had to be dismissed. The impugned order, therefore, substituting the respondents in place of the Official Receiver amounted to a decision against the appellant. The argument has no merit. The learned single Judge has not decided as to the rights of the respondents in the properties in suit. The order permitting them to be substituted in place of the Official Receiver is without prejudice to the rights of the parties on the merits of the controversy. Reference in this context may be made to R.N Selvam Muddliar and others v. P.A Raju Mudaliar and another (AIR 1953 Madras 816) (8) where Division Bench following the rule in Tuljaram's case (35 Indian Law Reports Madras 1) in the case of an order adding a party to a suit held that such an order was not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Madras) as it did not put an end to the suit but was a step towards a final adjudication and at best conferred a right to be heard and nothing more.
    For these reasons, we are of the view that the present appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) is not maintainable and has to be dismissed as such. Ordered accordingly. No order as to costs.
    Appeal dismissed.
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    Manbhari Bai (Deceased) Through Her Lrs. v. Sat Narain And Others S
    (Aug 27, 1973)