| Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. and others (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1381) |
That formation of Government opinion under section 3 may be proved by evidence and affidavits (i.e., the formation of opinion need not be recited in the notification itself). |
Cited to show that a resolution need not itself recite the Government's formation of opinion as long as such formation can be proved by evidence; the Court accepted that principle but noted the subsequent s.11 notification indicated the original resolution was not under s.3. |
| The State of Jammu and Kashmir & others v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad & another (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 122) |
Same principle as above — formation of opinion can be evidenced outside the notification. |
Used with similar effect to support that formation of opinion need not be in the text of the resolution but can be shown by affidavit; did not decide the legality of the original resolution here. |
| Ganga Bishnu Swaika & another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society & others (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 615) |
Authority for the proposition that formation of an opinion can be proved by extrinsic evidence. |
Cited to buttress the Court's discussion on proving Government opinion for s.3 appointments; Court relied on the same doctrine in analysing whether the Commission had been appointed under s.3. |
| Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & another (1959 Suppl. S.C.R. 319) |
Similar authority cited in the context of proving Government opinion and other procedural points. |
Referred among earlier authorities to support the Court's view that proof of opinion can be made by affidavit; used to frame the interpretation of s.3 and the effect of subsequent s.11 notification. |
| Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & others (1959 S.C.R. 279) |
Limits to a Commission's competence to recommend punitive action; Commission's report is recommendatory and s.6 renders its evidence inadmissible; a Commission cannot properly recommend punishment to be imposed proprio vigore. |
The Court relied on this authority to hold that term (i) (power to recommend further action against particular officials) was beyond the scope of the Act and ordered its deletion; Dalmia formed the principal legal basis for that conclusion. |
| P.V. Jagananath Rao & others v. State of Orissa & others [1968 (3) S.C.R. 789] |
Supports the proposition that conduct of an individual can, in some circumstances, amount to a definite matter of public importance. |
Used to reject the petitioner's contention that individual conduct could not be a matter of public importance; Court applied the principle to hold the terms of reference were within scope. |
| Krishna Ballabha Sahay & others v. Commission of Inquiry & others [1969 (1) S.C.R. 387] |
Reinforces that individual conduct may be a public matter where it prejudicially affects public interest. |
Relied on to support the proposition that the matters before the Commission (alleged mismanagement of public undertakings) qualified as definite matters of public importance. |
| The State of Bihar v. D.M. Ganguly & others (1959 S.C.R. 1191) |
Consideration of interplay between specific enactments and section 21 of the General Clauses Act (power to amend notifications/orders). |
Rejected by the Court as distinguishable and not controlling on whether extensions (amendments) of time for the Commission were permissible under the General Clauses Act. |
| Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957 S.C.R. 575) |
Test for bias: whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that bias attributable to a tribunal member might have affected the tribunal's final decision; the appearance of justice must be preserved. |
Applied as the governing test for evaluating the petitioner's allegations of bias against the Commission and its presiding member; the Court used the test to assess whether reasonable apprehension of bias existed. |
| Gullapalli Mageswara Rao etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & others (1960 (1) S.C.R. 580) |
Two principles: (1) no man shall be judge in his own cause; (2) justice should appear to be done; any situation of bias disqualifies a judge/quasi-judicial authority. |
Relied upon to underscore natural justice principles when examining allegations that the Commission, having undertaken preliminary work, could not act impartially. |
| Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Sri Satyanarayana Transports (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1303) |
Principle that quasi-judicial authorities must act impartially and above suspicion; prior conduct may disqualify if it shows inability to act with an open mind. |
Quoted to reinforce the standard to be applied in assessing apprehension of bias against the Commission. |
| Payyavula Vengamma v. Payyavula Kesanna & others (1953 S.C.R. 119) |
Relates to arbitrators taking statements of a party behind the back of the other party — concerns fairness and ex parte communications. |
Referred to in the context of allegations that the Commission allowed inspection or communications to Choudhury that were not available to others; the Court found no evidence of unfair ex parte procedures akin to those cases. |
| Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1955 (1) S.C.R. 941] |
Also concerns fairness where one party takes evidence or communicates without other party's knowledge — relevant to ex parte allegations. |
Invoked to assess accusations of unfair behind-the-scenes communications; Court concluded allegations were unsubstantiated and did not demonstrate bias. |
| Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya [1955 (2) S.C.R. 1] |
Deals with procedural fairness and improper communications in adjudicative contexts. |
Cited as part of the jurisprudence on ex parte conduct; Court found the facts here distinguishable and the allegation of such unfairness unproven. |
| A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 652) |
Emphasises importance of verification to ensure genuineness/authenticity of allegations in affidavits. |
The Court distinguished Nambiar: held that defective verification may render affidavits inadmissible in evidence, but the Commission could use affidavits as allegations (not as evidence) for the purpose of issuing notices and identifying matters to be inquired into. |