Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 3 LIMITATION ACT
  • Sec. 148 read with Section 151 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC.
  • Order IX R. 7 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151 of the CPC
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order VIII Rule 10 nor Section 151 of the CPC
  • Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC
  • Order VIII. Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order VIII Rule 10
  • Order VIII Rule 9
  • O. IX Rule 7.14.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 3 LIMITATION ACT
  • Sec. 148 read with Section 151 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC.
  • Order IX R. 7 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151 of the CPC
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order VIII Rule 10 nor Section 151 of the CPC
  • Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC
  • Order VIII. Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order VIII Rule 10
  • Order VIII Rule 9
  • O. IX Rule 7.14.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Sada Ram filed a suit on 17-5-1971 against the Delhi Development Authority seeking an injunction to restrain demolition of shops on plot No. 55, Harijan Colony, Delhi. The plaintiff alleged the construction was according to plan and that the defendant had no authority to object or demolish it.

The defendant appeared on 3-6-1971 but failed to file a written statement in time. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on several hearings. On 13-1-1972 the trial Court refused further adjournment and stated that the defence stood struck off and that the trial would proceed "as if there is no defence of defendant to make" with the trial set to continue for plaintiff's witnesses.

The defendant did not seek revision of that order. Some plaintiff's witnesses were examined on 29-1-1972 and the rest were to be examined on 3-3-1972. On 3-3-1972 the defendant applied for permission to file a written statement late, explaining that the office file had been misplaced and noting that the defendant was a body corporate and should not suffer for employees' mistake.

On 14-11-1972 the trial Court allowed the defendant to file the written statement within a fortnight on payment of Rs. 50/- costs, observing that the non-filing was not intentional and that it would be expedient in the interest of justice to permit a corporate defendant to file late because of negligence of its officials.

The plaintiff filed the present petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) challenging the trial Court's 14-11-1972 order allowing late filing of the written statement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order of 14-11-1972 constituted a "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 CPC (i.e., whether it was a decision affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties such that revision lay).
  2. Whether the trial Court acted without jurisdiction or exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in allowing the defendant to file the written statement late.
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary power under Section 115 CPC to interfere with the trial Court's order even if the conditions for revision under Section 115 are satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff challenged the trial Court's order of 14-11-1972 allowing late filing of the written statement and sought revision under Section 115 CPC.
  • It was contended that the order of 13-1-1972 (that the suit would proceed as if there was no defence) was passed under Section 151 CPC and was an adverse final order; since the defendant did not file revision against that order, it had become final and could not be set aside later by the Court using its inherent powers.
  • The plaintiff's counsel also urged that the defendant was negligent in failing to file the written statement and that, absent a good cause shown to "put the clock back", the defendant should not have been permitted to file the written statement late and defend the suit as if it had filed in time.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant applied to be permitted to file a written statement late on the ground that the office file had been misplaced and therefore the written statement could not be filed in time.
  • The defendant contended that non-filing was not intentional and that, being a corporate body, it should not be made to suffer for negligence of its employees; accordingly, in the interest of justice permission to file late should be granted.
  • The trial Court accepted these grounds and allowed late filing on payment of costs (Rs. 50/-), treating the matter as appropriate for exercising its discretion in favour of permitting the corporate defendant to defend the suit).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors etc., (1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406 Definition of "case decided" — a decision on part of a case may be revisable if it affects rights and liabilities; distinction between orders on merits and interlocutory/procedural orders. The Court relied on this authority to explain that not every order during trial is a "case decided" and used it to determine that the impugned order allowing late filing did not amount to a "case decided" under Section 115 CPC because it did not affect substantive rights and liabilities.
Central Bank of India v. Gokulchand, AIR 1967 SC 799 Used in tandem with Baldevdas to illustrate what constitutes a "case decided" and examples of interlocutory orders not amounting to a case decided. Applied to support the conclusion that the trial Court's order was procedural and did not affect the merits so as to attract revision under Section 115 CPC.
Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, (1964) 3 SCR 495 : AIR 1964 SC 1336 Distinction between orders attackable for jurisdictional defect and those which are not; if an order is contrary to a statutory mandate (e.g., Limitation Act s.3) it is jurisdictional. The Court used this distinction to explain that where no statutory limitation or bar exists for filing written statements, the trial Court's allowance of late filing does not amount to an exercise of jurisdiction in excess of or contrary to law.
Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (1955) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1955 SC 425 Procedural rules are intended to facilitate justice; courts should avoid "snap decisions"; natural justice requires parties not be condemned unheard; discretion should be left unfettered to meet ends of justice. The Court repeatedly cited this case to justify a liberal exercise of discretion in permitting defendants to be heard and to file defences late, emphasizing that procedure is for facilitating justice and that courts should avoid decisions made behind a party's back.
Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 The Court has power to extend time even after an apparently final order denying further extension; orders couched in in terrorem terms do not oust the Court's power to extend time. Applied to support the proposition that the trial Court could extend time under Section 148 CPC (and related provisions) even after an earlier order indicating no further extensions, thereby validating the 14-11-1972 order allowing late filing.
Union of India v. N.K. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1972 Delhi 202 Analogy drawn between the High Court's power under Section 115 CPC and constitutional supervisory powers under Articles 226 and 227. Used to describe the supervisory nature of Section 115 jurisdiction and to underline that the High Court's exercise of such jurisdiction is discretionary.
S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497 Observations on the discretionary nature of the High Court's powers under Section 115 CPC — even when conditions are met, exercise of revisionary jurisdiction is not obligatory and depends on interlocutory character, existence of alternate remedies, and equities. The Court invoked these observations to assess whether it should exercise discretion to interfere; it concluded the impugned order was interlocutory and procedural, alternate remedies existed, and equities favoured allowing the defendant to defend, thus supporting refusal to interfere.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis followed a structured approach based on the statutory requirements for invoking Section 115 CPC and established precedents.

  1. The court set out the three requirements for revision under Section 115 CPC: (1) the impugned order must be a "case decided"; (2) the trial Court must have acted without jurisdiction or exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; and (3) the High Court has discretion to make such order as it thinks fit.
  2. On the "case decided" issue, the court relied on authorities (Baldevdas; Central Bank) emphasizing that a "case decided" can include part of a case but must affect rights and liabilities as to the merits; interlocutory or purely procedural orders are typically not "case decided." The court concluded the 14-11-1972 order allowing late filing of a written statement did not affect the substantive merits and therefore was not a "case decided" within Section 115 CPC.
  3. As to jurisdictional defect or material irregularity, the court observed the trial Court's orders may have been passed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC (or Section 151 CPC) and that both provisions grant a wide discretion to make orders "as it thinks fit" when a party fails to file a written statement. The court emphasized there is no uniform judicial view on the scope of Order VIII Rule 10 but that its language confers wide discretion; accordingly, it would be difficult for the petitioner to show the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
  4. The court considered the plaintiff's contention that the 13-1-1972 order (proceed as if no defence) was final and could not be reopened. The court found it unnecessary to resolve the precise statutory label (Section 151 vs. Order VIII Rule 10) because under either provision the trial Court had a wide discretion to pass appropriate orders and such orders are reviewable only within the narrow limits of Section 115.
  5. The court relied on Sangram Singh to support a liberal view of procedural rules and to stress that courts should avoid "snap decisions" and should, where appropriate, afford defendants a real opportunity to fight their cases; costs and other terms can adjust equities. The court noted that neither Order VIII Rule 10 nor Section 151 requires that "good cause" be shown before permitting late filing (in contrast with O. IX r. 7 CPC or Section 5 Limitation Act), and decisions about "good cause" under those provisions are not directly applicable.
  6. The court invoked Section 148 CPC to hold that a Court's discretion to enlarge time is wide enough to permit extension "even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired." Mahanth Ram Das was cited for the proposition that apparently final orders in terrorem do not oust the power to extend time.
  7. Finally, the court applied the discretionary principles governing Section 115 (as summarized in S.S. Khanna). Even if the impugned order were treated as a "case decided" or as irregular, the High Court should not necessarily exercise Section 115 jurisdiction; factors such as interlocutory character, availability of alternative remedies (e.g., appeal from final decree), and the equities of the case weigh against interfering. Here, the order was procedural and interlocutory, alternate remedies existed, and equity favoured allowing the defendant to defend; hence interference was inappropriate.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: REVISION DISMISSED.

The court dismissed the civil revision challenging the trial Court's order of 14-11-1972 permitting the defendant to file a written statement late (the civil revision was dismissed "but without any order as to costs"). The trial Court's order allowing late filing on payment of costs (previously Rs. 50/-) was upheld by the High Court as a valid exercise of discretion under the relevant provisions of the CPC (Order VIII Rule 10, Section 148 and Section 151 considered in the reasoning).

Immediate consequences:

  • The plaintiff's petition under Section 115 CPC failed; the trial Court's order permitting the defendant to file its written statement late stands.
  • The defendant retains the opportunity to defend the suit by filing the written statement as allowed by the trial Court (subject to the terms imposed by that court).

Broader implications: The opinion did not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it applied established authorities to emphasize that procedural discretion should facilitate justice and that High Court interference under Section 115 is discretionary and is not warranted where the order is interlocutory, alternative remedies exist, and equities favour permitting a defendant to be heard. No new precedent was set beyond application of these existing principles.

    Sada Ram v. Delhi Development Authority .

    1. Plaintiff Sada Ram filed a suit against the defendant Delhi Development Authority for an injunction to restrain the latter from demolish ins the shops on plot No. 55. Harijan Colony, Delhi. The plaintiff had alleged that the construction had been according to plan. The plaintiff had to show that the plan was an approved one and that the defendant had no authority to object to the construction and to demolish it the suit was filed on 17-5-1971. The defendant appeared on 3-6-1971. As the defendant failed to file written statement in time, costs were awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant on several hearings. Ultimately on 13-1-1972, the trial Court refused to grant further adjournment to the defendant and stated that:—

    “The ease will proceed as if there is no defence of defendant to make. The defence shall stand struck off. The case will now to come up for PWs in the absence of any defence on 29-1-1972.”

    2. The defendant did not file any revision against this order. Some of the plaintiffs witnesses were examined on 29-1-1972 and the rest were to be examined on 3rd March, 1972. The defendant made an application on 3rd March, 1972 for permission to file a written statement on the grounds that the office file of the case had been misplaced and hence the written statement could not be filed in time and also that the defendant is a body corporate whose interests should not be allowed to suffer because of the mistake on the part of its employees. On 14th November, 1972, the defendant's application was allowed by the trial Court on the following grounds:—

    “The non-filing of written statement was not intentional on the part of the applicant/defendant. But the order-sheet shows that the written statement could not be filed because the learned counsel for the defendant had no instructions from the defendant. There is no mention of the fact that because the file was misplaced therefore the defendant was unable to file the written statement. Thus, the order sheet falsifies the grounds taken by the defendant in its application. However, the defendant is a corporate body and due to negligence of its officials. It should not be allowed to suffer and it would be expedient in the interest of justice that a concession in the form of permission to file written statement may be granted to the defendant The defendant is allowed to file its written statement within a fortnight on payment of costs of Rs. 50/-.”

    3. In this petition under section 115 of the cpc, the plaintiff has challenged the order of the trial Court dated 14th November, 1972 allowing the defendant to file the written statement late on payment of costs.

    4. In considering the application, the following requirements of section 115 of the cpc have to be borne in mind, namely:—

    (1) That the impugned order was a “case decided”:

    (2) That the trial Court has acted either without jurisdiction or exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity:” and

    (3) That the High Court has a discretion to make such order in the case as it thinks fit”

    5. Let us consider whether the plaintiff applicant satisfies the above requirements with a view to succeed in this revision petition.

    6. The word “case” does not refer necessarily to the case as a whole but can include even a part of the case. Therefore, a decision on a part of the case is also revisable even though it does not dispose of the whole of the case. It is necessary however, that such a decision must affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. It should not be merely an interlocutory order like the orders of stay injunction or receiver which are designed to preserve the status quo or to preserve the property pending the litigation or merely a procedural order like the orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of document, issue of commissions for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises or fixing a date of hearing or granting or refusing an adjournment or admitting a document in evidence as relevant or rejecting it. (Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors etc., (1969) 2 SCC 201: (AIR 1970 SC 406) and Central Bank of India v. Gokulchand, AIR 1967 SC 799 at p. 800).

    7. It may therefore, be said that such an order should be on the merits of the case. The distinction, therefore, is between an order on the merits of the case and an order which does not affect the merits of the case. The former can be said to affect the rights and obligations of the parties while the latter may be regarded as not doing so. The difference is, of course, often a difference of degree and may not be a difference of kind. For it could be difficult to imagine an order which does not prejudicially affect either of the parties at all. In an adversary proceeding the parties are so much pitted against each other that every step, even if it is merely procedural is likely to affect either of the parties prejudicially though the amount of the prejudice may be small or big depending on the circumstances of each case. It cannot be said, however that every order which is passed by the Court during the trial of a suit amounts to a “case decided” within the meaning of section 115 of the cpc. The distinction has therefore, to be maintained even though it has to be applied to the facts of each particular case and sometimes such application may be a matter of considerable argument.

    8. In the present case, the impugned order has only allowed the defendant to file a written statement. It thus does not affect the merits of the case at all Of course, the plaintiff can claim to be prejudiced thereby because he was hoping to set a decision against the defendant without the defendant being allowed to defend itself. But such prejudice is not the test of an order which can be said to affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. Such rights and liabilities apparently mean the substantive rights and liabilities relating to the merits of the case. I am of the view, therefore, that the impugned order could not be said to have amounted to a “case decided” within the meaning of section 115 of the cpc. As to jurisdiction, it was not contended that the trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. It was however, contended that the trial Court exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in doing so. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of 13 January, 1972 by which the trial Court decided to proceed against the defendant as if the defendant was not defending itself should be taken to have been passed under section 151 of the cpc. It was an order which was adverse to the defendant. As the defendant did not file any revision against that order, it had become final against the defendant Such a final order could not be set aside by the Court later in exercise of its inherent powers under section 151 of the cpc as it purported to do by passing the impugned order.

    9. In my view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the order of 13th. January, 1972 and the impugned order of 14th November, 1972 were passed under Section 151. They may have been passed under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC which authorises the Court, to “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” where any party from whom a written statement is so required fails to present the same within the time allowed by the Court. There is no agreement among the judicial decisions as to whether Order VIII Rule 10 applies when the Court requires the written statement to be filed under Order VIII Rule 9 only or whether it applies even when the written statement has to be filed by the defendant under Order VIII. Rule 1 of the CPC. But we need not enter into this controversy because the words “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” used in Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC give the trial Court a very wide discretion in passing such order as it thinks fit as may be suitable in the circumstances of a particular case. It would appear to me however, that the impugned order as also the order of 13th January, 1972 could be passed under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC because they were passed on the failure of the defendant to file the written statement within the time fixed by the Court. Just as an order passed under section 151 of the cpc could be the subject of a revision similarly the order passed under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC could also be the subject of revision. It is immaterial whether and under which of these provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure the impugned order was passed in considering its revisability. The conditions to be satisfied by the impugned order under section 151 of the cpc would be the same in either case Both under Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151 of the CPC the discretion of the trial Court in passing an appropriate order is very wide. This enhances the difficulty of the plaintiff to show that the trial Court exercised the jurisdiction in passing the order either illegally or with material Irregularity.

    10. In Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, (1964) 3 SCR 495: (AIR 1964 SC 1336) the Supreme Court brought out the distinction between an order which could be attacked for a jurisdictional defect and an order which could not be so attacked. If the trial Court had passed an order contrary to a provision of the Limitation Act then Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoined the Court to dismiss any suit etc., filed after the period of limitation and therefore, in passing such an order, the Court would be acting contrary to its jurisdiction. Such an order would, therefore, be liable to be interfered with in revision under section 115 of the cpc. On the other hand, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court had the discretion to admit an application etc., even after the expiry of the specified period of limitation if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the prescribed time. In that case such an application was allowed by the trial Court But the decision of the trial Court was reversed by the High Court on the ground that no good cause for delay was shown and that the application had been made after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for it. The decision of the High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court with the following observations at page 503:—

    “The Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to decide both the questions of fact, viz whether the appellant had sufficient cause for not making an application for setting aside the abatement of the suit within the period prescribed and therefore had sufficient cause for the Court's exercising its discretion in extending the period of limitation in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and also the fact whether the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause from not making an application for the substitution of the legal representatives within the prescribed period of limitation and thus continuing with the suit The Court had the jurisdiction to decide both the questions of fact and also to proceed with the suit as a result of its decision”.

    11. The present case is even simpler. No period of limitation had been prescribed for the filing of a written statement by the defendant. It could not be said, therefore, that the delay on the part of the defendant in filing the written statement created any right in the plaintiff to object to the late filing of the written statement on the ground of limitation. If the trial Court had the discretion in allowing the written statement to be filed, though late, then it could not be said that the discretion was exercised illegally or with material irregularity. The rule as to the exercise of such discretion has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (1955) 2 SCR 1: (AIR 1955 SC 425) repeatedly at several places in the following words:—

    “A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties, not a thing designed to trip people up. (Page 8) ……… Next there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. (Page 9) ……… But broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavour should be to avoid snap decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity of fightings out their cases fairly and squarely. Costs will be adequate compensation many cases and in others the Court has almost unlimited discretion about the terms it can impose provided always the discretion is judicially exercised and is not arbitrary (page 16) ……… The general rule founded on principles of natural justice, that proceedings in a Court of justice should not be conducted behind the back of a party in the absence of an express provision, to that effect is no less compelling (page 17) ……… If these considerations are to weigh, then surely the sounder rule is to leave the Court with an unfettered discretion so that it can take every circumstance into consideration and do what seems best suited to meet the ends of justice in the case before it. (page 19).”

    12. The rule is of course, subject to an exception that if the facts of the case are such that the defendant should be harshly dealt with, the Court may not allow him to file a written statement but allow him to participate in the case only from the stage at which he has appeared and then deliver a judgment which would be most probably against him.

    13. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly urges that the defendant was negligent in not filing the written statement and unless it showed a good cause for putting the clock back it should not have been given the opportunity of filing the written statement and defending the suit as if it had filed the written statement in time. He seeks support from the analogy of order ix r. 7 of the cpc under which the Court is empowered to allow the defendant to defend himself if the defendant appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance. The permission to defend would then have the effect as if the defendant appeared on the date he was required to do so. The clock is allowed to foe put back. The question therefore, is how one should construe the power of the Court to put the defendant in a position to defend himself subject, if necessary, to payment of adjournment costs to the plaintiff. It is the every day experience of courts that defendants or respondents are not able to file their written statements or counter-affidavits within the time which is prescribed by the rules of the court or which may be allowed by the courts. It is extremely rare for the courts to refuse to wait for the filing of the written statement or a counter affidavit and to deliver a judgment on the merits of the case without allowing the defence to be filed. That would be what Bose, J., called a “snap decision” in Sangram Singh's case, (1955) 2 SCR 1: (AIR 1955 SC 425) referred to above. The courts avoid making such snap decisions because justice demands that parties should be heard before a case is decided unless the facts of a particular case demand that the defendant should not be heard. Suppose the court refuses to put the clock back. Even then the court has to allow the defendant to participate in the case from the time he appears to defend himself even if he is not allowed to file a written statement. Suppose the court insists on the defendant showing a good cause before he is allowed to put the clock back. At page 14 of the report of Sangram Singh's case. Bose. J., asked the following question; ‘‘What exactly does that import?.” His Lordship then observes at case 17:—

    “It would be anomalous to hold that the efficacy of the so-called ex carte order expends itself in the first Court and that thereafter a defendant can be allowed to appear in the appellate Court and can be heard and can be permitted to urge in that Court the very matters he is shut out from urging in the trial Court: and in the event that the appellate Court considers a remand necessary he can be permitted to do the very things he was Precluded from doing in the first instance without getting the ex parte order set aside under O. IX Rule 7”.

    14. The fact that the defendant can participate in the defence even if he is not allowed to file a written statement would militate against a strict construction of the necessity of a good cause which the defendant has to show before he is allowed to file a written statement. It would be a very unsatisfactory method of trial of the suit if the defendant is allowed to argue his defence but is not allowed to file a written statement or even if he is allowed to point out the defects in the plaintiff's case he is not allowed to plead his own case. Neither Order VIII Rule 10 nor Section 151 of the CPC refers to the necessity of any good cause being shown by the defendant before he is allowed to file the written statement late. This is to be contrasted with Order IX R. 7 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decisions under those provisions as to what would be a good cause in a particular case are not, therefore, applicable to the exercise of the discretion by the trial Court under Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151 of the CPC. For every defendant or respondent who does not file a written statement or a counter-affidavit without a good cause within time is ex hypothesi negligent to the extent that he could not file the written statement within the time allowed by the rules or by the Court But where no period of limitation is prescribed by law the discretion of the Court is wide enough to allow a defendant to file a written statement, subject to adjustment of equities by payment of costs etc., even if the defendant is negligent in not filing the written statement in time.

    15. Under section 148 of the cpc, “where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may in its discretion, from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired”. The order dated 13th January, 1972 was passed by the trial Court because the time extended by the Court for filing the written statement had expired and the Court was not willing to grant more time. The order of 14th November, 1972, however, granted the defendant time to file the written statement. The question is whether the Court had power to do so. In my view the discretion given to the Court to extend time for filing the written statement by section 148 of the code is wide enough to sustain the order of 14th November, 1972. Section 148 expressly says that such time may be extended “even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.” In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das., AIR 1961 SC 882, the High Court had thought that it had no power to extend time after the final extension had been given to the appellant in the following terms namely, “if the amount is not paid within the time given, the appeal will stand dismissed”. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court and held that the said order was only in terrorem. The Court had power to extend time even after having passed such an apparently final order. In the present case, the order of 13th January, 1972 was not couched in such absolute terms as was the order of the High Court in Mahanth Ram Das case. A fortiori therefore, the trial Court had the power to extend time to the defendant to file the written statement as It did by its order of 14th November, 1972. Even if at a particular stage of the proceeding namely 13th January, 1972. the Court thought that no further time would be extended, at a later stage of the same proceedings, the Court can extend such time under Sec. 148 read with Section 151 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC. The Court was thus empowered as well as justified in passing the order of 14th November, 1972. I am of the view, therefore, that the petitioner has not been able to show that the discretion exercised by the trial Court was such that it amounted to the exercise of its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity.

    16. The power of this Court under section 115 of the cpc is analogous to the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution inasmuch as in both these types of cases this Court acts in a supervisory capacity (Union of India v. N.K Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1972 Delhi 202) and has a discretion in granting the relief prayed for. In S.S Khanna v. F.J Dillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 at P 417 : (AIR 1964 SC 497) Shah J. speaking for the majority made the following observations regarding the discretion of the Court in exercising its powers under section 115 of the cpc:

    “That is not to say that the High Court Is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case Is decided by a subordinate court and the conditions in clauses (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: The High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied. The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by wav of an appeal from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction.”

    17. Taking the above observations as laying down the criteria for exercising the discretion of this Court, what is the result in the present case? Firstly, the impugned order is not only interlocutory but is purely procedural. Secondly, the plaintiff has the alternative remedy of attacking the said order in an appeal from the decree which may be passed against him, Lastly, the general equities of the case are in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. All that the defendant wants is an opportunity to defend itself.

    18. It can hardly be denied that this is in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The impugned order, therefore, squarely fulfils the test laid down by the Supreme Court for the exercise of the discretion of this Court. Even if therefore, it is assumed that the impugned order was a “case decided” and that the trial Court had illegally exercised the jurisdiction vested in it still this Court would be reluctant to exercise the discretion to interfere with the said order under section 115 of the cpc for the above reasons.

    19. The Civil Revision is therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.

    20. Revision dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sada Ram v. Delhi Development Authority .
    (Jan 29, 1973)