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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Sathish Parasaran
  • Mr. T.R Rajagopalan Senior Counsel for Mr. A.A Mohan
Judges
  • R. Banumathi
  • K.K Sasidharan, JJ.
Acts
  • Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XXXVI Rule 9 of the Original Side Rules read with clause 15
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Authorities:18.
  • Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
  • Sections 28(1), 28(3) and 29(1) of the Trademarks Act.(iii)
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.(iv)
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure20.
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 29 of the Trademarks Act, 1999
  • Order VII Rule 11
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Sathish Parasaran
  • Mr. T.R Rajagopalan Senior Counsel for Mr. A.A Mohan
Judges
  • R. Banumathi
  • K.K Sasidharan, JJ.
Acts
  • Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XXXVI Rule 9 of the Original Side Rules read with clause 15
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Authorities:18.
  • Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
  • Sections 28(1), 28(3) and 29(1) of the Trademarks Act.(iii)
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.(iv)
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure20.
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 29 of the Trademarks Act, 1999
  • Order VII Rule 11
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.K. Sasidharan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (and two others) originally operated under marks incorporating "Annapoorna" for hotels, boarding/lodging and later for packaged condiments and instant foods under the trade name "Sree Annapoorna". They alleged long and continuous use of the mark such that "Annapoorna" had become distinctive of their products. The appellant marketed condiments and instant foods under trade names including "Knorr Annapurna" and "Kissan Annapurna".

In C.S. No. 866 of 2002 the respondents sued the appellant (and others) for passing off and sought a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from selling goods under "Annapoorna" or deceptively similar names. During litigation before a Division Bench (O.S.A. No. 246 of 2003) the appellant undertook not to sell spices and condiments under "Knorr Annapurna" in the State of Tamil Nadu; that undertaking remains on record and in force. The suit in C.S. No. 866 of 2002 remained pending.

While C.S. No. 866 of 2002 was pending, the respondents filed a fresh suit, C.S. No. 674 of 2010, alleging that the appellant had begun marketing products under the mark "Annapurna" per se (identical or deceptively similar to the respondents' registered "Annapoorna") and sought relief for infringement and consequential reliefs.

The appellant entered appearance in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 and filed Application A. No. 5296 of 2010 under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC praying for rejection of the plaint on grounds including re-litigation, relinquishment, delay/laches/acquiescence, abuse of process, and on statutory grounds under the Trade Marks Act. A learned Single Judge dismissed that interlocutory application by order dated 28 February 2011. The unsuccessful petitioner (appellant before this Court) filed the present Original Side Appeal under Order XXXVI Rule 9 read with clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 is liable to be rejected/quashed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC on the ground of re-litigation (res judicata / relinquishment) or other statutory bars.
  2. Whether the relief of infringement/passing off claimed in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 is barred by provisions of the Trade Marks Act (specifically, reliance in the appeal on Section 29 and Sections 28(1) & 28(3) / 29(1) as argued by the appellant).
  3. Whether allegations of delay, laches, acquiescence or gross abuse of judicial process, based on facts and materials before the appellant, suffice to reject the plaint at the prima facie stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The second suit (C.S. No. 674 of 2010) was barred under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 because the appellant was the registered proprietor of the mark "Annapurna" (claimed registration since 1999) and the respondents were aware of that.
  • The infringement relief claimed in the second suit is barred by Sections 28(1), 28(3) and 29(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
  • The respondents, by omitting the present relief in the earlier suit C.S. No. 866 of 2002, had relinquished that cause of action; the present suit therefore amounts to an impermissible relitigation/relinquishment.
  • The application under A. No. 5296/2010 was brought under Order VII Rule 11 and under Section 151 CPC; the learned Single Judge did not properly consider the scope of these provisions.
  • The appellant also alleged delay, laches and acquiescence by respondents and that the respondents made false statements to the court to create the appearance that they only recently learned of the appellant's marketing under "Annapurna" per se.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The relief claimed in C.S. No. 866 of 2002 (passing off in respect of "Knorr Annapurna") was different from the relief claimed in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 (infringement/passing off in respect of "Annapurna" per se); there was therefore no relinquishment.
  • The second suit was filed because of subsequent events — the manufacture and sale by the appellant of products under the trade name "Annapurna" per se — giving rise to a new cause of action and making the suit maintainable despite pendency of the earlier suit.
  • None of the four grounds raised by the appellant satisfy the ingredients of Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint; factual matters (delay, laches, abuse) cannot be determined on an Order VII Rule 11 application.
  • The learned Senior Counsel for respondents conceded that the Single Judge did not consider the matter on merits and requested that the court decide the merits rather than remand for reconsideration; both sides agreed it would be preferable to decide the application on merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. (AIR 1997 SC 1398) Established that a fresh deceitful act or recurring act of passing off/infringement gives a fresh cause of action; a subsequent infringing act can sustain a new suit. The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that a subsequent deceitful act or fresh act of infringement can give rise to a new cause of action, supporting the position that the second suit could be maintainable if it arises from subsequent acts.
Bhau Ram v. Janak Singh (2012) 6 Scale 530 When considering a rejection application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must examine the averments in the plaint alone; pleas in the defendant's written statement are irrelevant for that purpose. The Court cited this decision to reinforce that review on an Order VII Rule 11 petition is limited to the plaint's averments and to confirm that factual disputes and defense pleadings are not determinative at that stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the sole question for this intra-court appeal as whether the plaint in the subsequent suit (C.S. No. 674 of 2010) was liable to be quashed on the ground of re-litigation and related grounds raised under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC. The Court proceeded to analyze the factual matrix and the legal submissions in the following steps:

  1. Contextual review: The Court noted the earlier suit C.S. No. 866 of 2002 concerned alleged passing off in respect of "Knorr Annapurna" and that the appellant had given an undertaking recorded before a Division Bench not to market "Knorr Annapurna" in Tamil Nadu. The undertaking remained in force and the respondents did not allege breach of that undertaking.
  2. Examination of cause of action: The plaint in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 expressly stated that the cause of action for the second suit arose during the pendency of the earlier suit because the appellant had started marketing products under the mark "Annapurna" per se. The Court found that the earlier pleadings in C.S. No. 866 of 2002 did not contain any specific reference to "Annapurna" per se (they referred to "Annapurna" in combination with "Kissan Annapurna" or "Knorr Annapurna" but not to the mark in isolation).
  3. Application of the Order VII Rule 11 standard: The Court reiterated that for an Order VII Rule 11 application, only the averments in the plaint are germane and the petitioner must show on the face of the plaint that it is liable to be rejected for failure to disclose a cause of action or because it is barred by law. Reliance was placed on Bhau Ram to emphasize that the defendant's pleadings are irrelevant in this limited inquiry.
  4. Assessment of the four grounds raised in the interlocutory application:
    • Relief of infringement claimed not maintainable (statutory bar / registered proprietor): The Court found the appellant did not assert that it was registered proprietor of "Annapurna" per se (registration claims related to "Annapurna" in combination with other marks were produced, and a rectification petition concerning registration No. 720333 was pending). The Court therefore concluded the second suit relating to "Annapurna" per se could not be said to be not maintainable on that ground.
    • Res judicata (Section 11 CPC): The Court observed that res judicata requires a final decision in a former suit between the same parties on the very issue; since C.S. No. 866 of 2002 was still pending and had not attained finality, res judicata could not be invoked to bar the second suit.
    • Delay, laches and acquiescence: The Court held that these are questions of fact and evidence which cannot be resolved on an Order VII Rule 11 application; therefore, these grounds did not warrant rejection of the plaint at the initial stage.
    • Gross abuse of judicial process (alleged falsehood about knowledge of the mark): This too involved factual inquiry and could not be decided on the limited scope of an Order VII Rule 11 application.
  5. Prima facie assessment of relinquishment: The Court found no materials to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the respondents intentionally relinquished any relief concerning "Annapurna" per se in the earlier suit. The plaint in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 disclosed the pendency of the earlier suit and averred that the cause of action for the second suit arose subsequently; the record did not indicate that "Annapurna" per se had been referred to in C.S. No. 866 of 2002 such that the omission would amount to abandonment or relinquishment.
  6. Use of precedent: The Court referred to the principle in Bengal Waterproof that a fresh act of deceit or recurring act of infringement gives a fresh cause of action and hence may sustain a subsequent suit; and to Bhau Ram for the limited scope of scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. While the Single Judge had relied on a number of Supreme Court decisions, the present Court considered it unnecessary to discuss each decision because none of the appellant's grounds, on the face of the plaint, qualified for rejection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Original Side Appeal is dismissed. The Court held that, on the materials produced in A. No. 5296 of 2010 and on a perusal of the plaint in C.S. No. 674 of 2010, the plaint could not be axed at the initial stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The connected miscellaneous petition (MP) is closed and no costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaint in C.S. No. 674 of 2010 will proceed; the interlocutory application to reject that plaint was rightly dismissed at the initial stage and the suit is not barred on the grounds argued in the application.
  • Scope of adjudication: The Court emphasized that factual disputes (delay, laches, acquiescence, abuse, intentional relinquishment) cannot be resolved on an Order VII Rule 11 application and must be examined on the evidence at a later stage of proceedings.
  • Precedential effect: The Court did not purport to lay down a new principle of law; rather it applied established principles (including that fresh acts of infringement may give rise to fresh causes of action and that the plaint's averments alone govern Order VII Rule 11 scrutiny). No broader new precedent was declared beyond these applications of settled law.
Show full summary ...

    M.P No. 1 Of 2012 Hindustan Uniliver Limited No. 101, Santhome High Road R.A Puram, Chennai-600 028. Rep.By Its Chairman v. Sree Annapoorna Foods No. 643/3-B Vanaprastha Edyarpalayam Road Vadavalli Coimbatore - 641 004 Rep. By Its Managing Partner Mr. R. Velumani

    Prayer:-

    Original Side Appeals filed under Order XXXVI Rule 9 of the Original Side Rules read with clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 28 February 2011 in A. No. 5296 of 2010 in C.S No. 674 of 2010 on the file of this Court.

    JUDGMENT

    K.K SASIDHARAN, J.

    This appeal is at the instance of the unsuccessful petitioner in Application No. 5296 of 2010 in C.S No. 674 of 2010 and the challenge is to the order dated 28 February 2011 dismissing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reject the plaint in C.S No. 674 of 2010.

    The Litigative Journey

    2. The respondents filed a suit in C.S No. 674 of 2010 praying for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from in any manner infringing their registered trade mark “Annapoorna” and for other consequential reliefs. According to the respondents, their predecessor-in-interest adopted the mark “Annapoorna” originally for his boarding and lodging business and chain of hotels owned by the group under the name and style of “Sree Annapoorna and Sri Gowri Shankar”. Subsequently, a partnership was formed during the year 1980 under the name and Style of “Sree Annapoorna Gayathri Foods” which was reconstituted on 24 November 1985 and the name of the firm was changed to “Sree Annapoorna Foods”. The respondents have been marketing condiments and instant foods under the name and style of “Sree Annapoorna”. By virtue of long, continuous and extensive use, the trademark “Annapoorna” has become distinctive of and is immediately identified by the trade and public with the products manufactured and marketed by the respondents. The appellant attempted to sell condiments and instant food items under the name and style of “Knorr Annapurna” and “Kissan Annapurna”. This made the respondents along with other partners Latha and Vijayaprasad to file a suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 against the appellant. The respondents in the said suit prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from in any way passing off their goods of the description set out in the schedule to the plaint or its related products as that of their product either under the name and style of “Annapoorna” or under any name deceptively similar thereto. The respondents have filed an interlocutory application in the said suit. Finally, the matter was taken up before a Division Bench in O.S.A No. 246 of 2003. Before the Division Bench the appellant has given an undertaking that the spices and condiments under the trade mark “Knorr Annapurna” will not be sold in the State of Tamil Nadu. The said undertaking was recorded by the Division Bench. The suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 is still pending on the file of this Court.

    3. It was only during the pendency of the suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002, the respondents have filed the present suit in C.S No. 674 of 2010 on account of the subsequent events.

    4. The appellant entered appearance in the subsequent suit and filed an application in A. No. 5296 of 2010 invoking Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer was to reject the plaint on the ground of re-litigation. The appellant raised four substantial grounds in the affidavit filed in support of the application to reject the plaint. Those four grounds relates to non-maintainability of the relief of infringement in view of the registration obtained by the appellant, res judicata, delay, laches, acquiescence and gross abuse of judicial process. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant contended that the respondents have relinquished the claim by restricting the relief in the earlier plaint and as such it was not open to them to file a fresh suit at a later point of time.

    5. The respondents filed a detailed counter affidavit in Application No. 5296 of 2010 disputing the claim made by the appellant. The respondents contended that the second suit was filed on account of the subsequent events and as such the suit was maintainable in spite of the pendency of the earlier suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002.

    6. The learned Single Judge considered the issue in the light of several judgments of the Supreme Court and ultimately dismissed the application. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant is before us.

    Summary of preliminary submissions:

    7. The learned counsel for the appellant made extensive submissions with regard to the merits of the case pleaded by the appellant. According to the learned counsel, other than re-producing the judgments of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge has not made any attempt to answer the questions raised by the appellant.

    8. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents fairly conceded the fact regarding non consideration of the matter on merits by the learned Single Judge. The learned Senior Counsel made a request before us to consider the matter on merits instead of remanding the matter for fresh consideration by the learned Single Judge.

    9. The learned counsel for the appellant also agreed that it would be in the interest of both parties to decide the application once for all on merits instead of setting aside the impugned order for the purpose of re-consideration by the trial Court. Accordingly, we have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents at length on the merits of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    Rival contentions on the mertis of the application:

    10. The learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions:

    (i) The suit filed by the respondents in C.S No. 674 of 2010 was barred under Section 29 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 The appellant is the registered proprietor of the trademark “Annapurna” ever since 1999 and the same was known to the respondents. The respondents having filed a Civil Suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 for the relief of passing off against the appellant, was not entitled to file another suit for the very same relief.

    (ii) The relief of infringement sought for by the respondents was barred on account of Sections 28(1), 28(3) and 29(1) of the Trademarks Act.

    (iii) The respondents while filing the earlier suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 relinquished the present relief. The cause of action for filing the present suit was very much available to the respondents. However, they have not chosen to include the said relief and the same would amount to relinquishment and as such the second suit was not maintainable.

    (iv) The application in A. No. 5296 of 2010 was not only under Order VII Rule 11 but also under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Single Judge without considering the scope of the provisions, dismissed the application.

    11. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents would contend:

    (i) The relief claimed in C.S No. 866 of 2002 has nothing to do with the relief claimed in the present suit in C.S No. 674 of 2010. Therefore, there is no relinquishment as such.

    (ii) The manufacture and sale of products under the trade name “Annapurna” per se by the appellant subsequent to the initiation of the suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 made the respondents to file the present suit. Since the cause of action for filing the second suit was entirely different, the suit was clearly maintainable.

    (iii) None of the four grounds raised by the appellant would satisfy the ingredients of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of rejecting the plaint.

    Analysis:

    12. The only issue that arises for consideration in this intra-court appeal is as to whether the plaint in C.S No. 866 of 2002 is liable to be quashed on the ground of re-litigation.

    13. The respondents along with two others earlier filed a suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 against the appellant praying for a decree of injunction in respect of the trademark “Annapoorna” or any other name deceptively similar thereto. The respondents in the said suit contended that the cause of action has arisen to file a Civil Suit in view of the manufacture and sale of similar products by the appellant under the name and style of “Knorr Annapurna”. The appellant has given an undertaking in the said suit that they would not market spices and condiments under the trademark “Knorr Annapurna” in the State of Tamil Nadu. The said undertaking is still in force. The respondents have no case that the appellant is marketing spices under the tradename “Knorr Annapurna” in the State of Tamil Nadu.

    14. The respondents in the cause of action paragraph in C.S No. 674 of 2010 submitted that the cause of action for filing the present suit has arisen on account of the manufacture and sale of products by the appellant under the trademark “Annapurna” per se, which is identical and deceptively similar to their registered trade mark “Annapoorna”. According to the appellant, the very same cause of action was available to the respondents while filing the suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002. However, they have not included the present prayer in the earlier suit. The present suit based on the earlier cause of action would amount to an act of relinquishment and therefore, the second suit was not maintainable.

    15. The appellant in the counter affidavit filed in the interlocutory application in O.A No. 854 of 2002 in C.S No. 866 of 2002 contended that they have been using the trademark “Annapurna” along with the mark “Kissan” for the last few years. Though the appellant has made a claim that they have been using the trademark “Annapurna”, the fact remains that there was no mention in the counter affidavit with respect to the adoption of trademark “Annapurna” per se. There was a reference about “Annapurna” and “Kissan Annapurna”. However there was no specific reference with regard to “Annapurna” per se in the earlier round of litigation.

    16. On the other hand, the respondents claimed that the appellant, not withstanding the earlier undertaking given in O.S.A No. 246 of 2003 started marketing the products under the brand name “Annapurna” per se. The appellant has produced the registration obtained by them in respect of various trademarks. The appellant has obtained the trademark registration with respect to “Annapurna” and “Kissan Annapurna”. There are no materials before this Court to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that there was an intentional relinquishment on the part of the respondents with respect to the relief regarding the trademark “Annapurna” per se and as such, the second suit was legally not maintainable.

    17. The appellant in the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure raised the following four grounds to reject the plaint:

    (i) Relief of infringement claimed not maintainable:

    Contention:

    According to the appellant, they have registered the trademark “Annapurna” and “Kissan Annapurna” and as such they are the registered proprietors of the said trademark “Annapurna”. It was the contention of the appellant that the first respondent has already filed a rectification petition seeking cancellation of the registration obtained by them for its trademark “Annapurna” under No. 720333 and the rectification petition is still pending on the file of Intellectual Property Appellate Board. It was under the said circumstances, the appellant has taken up a contention that the suit was not maintainable.

    Our finding:

    The present suit in C.S No. 674 of 2010 relates to “Annapurna” per se. The appellant has no case that they are the registered proprietor of the trademark “Annapurna” Per se. Therefore, it cannot be said that the subsequent suit relating to the trademark “Annapurna” per se was not maintainable.

    (ii) The relief of passing off claimed is barred by res judicata:

    Contention:

    The appellant contended that the very same relief was claimed in C.S No. 866 of 2002 and as such the subsequent suit was not maintainable.

    Our finding:

    There is absolutely no merit in the contention with respect to res judicata. In order to axe the subsequent suit under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure the party must demonstrate that the issue raised in the subsequent suit was substantially and directly in issue in a former suit between the same parties, and the Court competent has already decided the matter and the issue therefore has attained finality.

    Admittedly, the suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 is still pending. Since the earlier suit has not attained finality, it cannot be said that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata.

    (iii) The plaintiff is guilty of delay, laches and acquiescence:

    Contention:

    It is the contention of the appellant that the first respondent already filed a suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002 and in the said suit, a counter affidavit was filed on 25 December 2002. It was long thereafter the present suit has been filed with respect to the very same cause of action.

    Our Finding:

    Prima facie there is absolutely no merit in the said contention. The question of delay, laches and acquiescence are all matters of evidence. The same cannot be decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    (iv) The present suit constitutes gross abuse of judicial process:

    Contention:

    According to the appellant, the respondents deliberately made false-hood to appear as if they came to know of the trademark “Annapurna” per se only recently. In view of such false statement, the suit is liable to be struck off.

    Our Finding:

    The fourth question raised by the appellant also involves question of fact, which cannot be decided on the basis of the statement made in the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    Authorities:

    18. We have been referred to several decisions of the Supreme Court by the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents. Since the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on as many as 18 judgments in the order dated 28 February 2011, and in view of the finding that none of the grounds raised by the appellant would qualify for rejection of plaint, we consider it not necessary to discuss each and every decision in this judgment.

    19. Though the learned counsel for the appellant has argued extensively on facts and on law, the fact remains that the application filed by the appellant in Application No. 5296 of 2010 does not contain any such contention. The appellant prayed for a positive order to reject the plaint on the basis of the alleged act of reliquishment and suppression of material particulars. None of the grounds raised by the appellant would constitute valid grounds to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure

    20. It is trite that for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the avements in the plaint alone are germane. The petitioner in an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure must demonstrate that on a simple perusal of the plaint, it is liable to be rejected either on account of failure to disclose cause of action or barred by law.

    21. The Supreme Court in Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. (AIR 1997 SC 1398) held that a subsequent deceitful act would give a new cause of action to file a fresh suit. The Supreme Court said:

    “20. ………. It is now well settled that an action for passing off is a common law remedy being an action in substance of deceit under the Law of Torts. Wherever and whenever fresh deceitful act is committed the person deceived would naturally have a fresh cause of action in his favour. Thus every time when a person passes off his goods as those of another he commits the act of such deceit. Similarly whenever and wherever a person commits breach of a registered trade mark of another he commits a recurring act of breach of infringement of such trade mark giving a recurring and fresh cause of action at each time of such infringement to the party aggrieved. It is difficult to agree how in such a case when in historical past earlier suit was disposed of as technically not maintainable in absence of proper reliefs, for all times to come in future defendant of such a suit should be armed with a licence to go on committing fresh acts of infringement and passing off with impunity without being subjected to any legal action against such future acts…..”

    22. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram v. Janak Singh(2012) 6 Scale 530 referred to the earlier decisions relating to Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed that while considering the application for rejection of plaint, the Court has to examine the averments in the plaint alone and the pleas taken by the defendants in the written statement would be totally irrelevant.

    Summary of Conclusion:

    23. The main points urged by the appellant relate to relinquishment of the cause of action and re-litigation. The plaint filed in C.S No. 674 of 2010 contains a clear statement that the cause of action for the second suit has arisen only during the currency of the suit in C.S No. 866 of 2002. The plaint in C.S No. 866 of 2002 does not contain any reference about the marketing of products by the appellant under the trade name “Annapurna” per se. According to the respondents, it was only during the year 2010, they came to know about the marketing of products by the appellant under the trademark “Annapurna” per se which is identical and deceptively similar to that of their registered trademark “Annapoorna”. The respondents have also disclosed the pendency of the earlier suit filed by them against the appellant. The materials on record does not contain any indication that the product “Annapurna” per se was also referred to in C.S No. 866 of 2002 and in spite of the same, no relief was claimed with respect to the said trade mark. It is therefore not possible to reject the plaint on the basis of the grounds taken in the application.

    Disposition:

    24. We are, therefore, of the considered view that on the basis of the materials produced by the appellant in Application No. 5296 of 2010, the suit in C.S No. 674 of 2010 cannot be axed at the initial stage. In the result, the original side appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the connected MP is closed. No costs.

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    M.P No. 1 Of 2012 Hi... v. Sree Annapoorna Food...
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