Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitions were filed by the owners, two prospective purchasers, and one tenant of the first floor of the property bearing Door No. 25, Wallace Garden, III Street, Madras-34 (S. No. 62/28, Block No. 13). The property measures 3 grounds and has a building with ground and first floors, each floor having about 2,200 sq. ft. The petitioners challenged an order dated 29-10-1994 of the Appropriate Authority directing compulsory purchase of the property at a discounted sale consideration that was stated to be less than the agreed price of Rs. 25 lakhs for each floor (with undivided half-share in the land to the two purchasers). The first-floor tenant is a private limited company of which the two purchasers are directors; the tenant had occupied that portion for over 30 years and was paying rent of Rs. 4,000 per month when the impugned order was made.

The Appropriate Authority's order followed a show-cause notice which compared the subject property with at least two transactions (one being sale to Alacrity Housing Ltd. of two grounds and 2,207 sq. ft.). The show-cause notice did not enclose the documents underpinning those transactions nor explain who had modified values or on what basis. The Authority relied on a Valuation Officer's worksheet and calculated a fair market value, concluding that the sale consideration was discounted by 40%.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appropriate Authority's order of compulsory purchase was valid in view of alleged defects in valuation (use of allegedly non-comparable transactions and an unexplained discount) and in the consideration (or non-consideration) of relevant factors such as long-standing tenancy and the relationship between purchasers and tenant.
  2. Whether the Authority's failure to furnish copies of the documents it relied upon (and to explain modifications to values) constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice that vitiated the order.
  3. Whether the statutory time-limits prescribed by section 269UD(1) of the Income Tax Act preclude the High Court from setting aside an order made within the statutory period and remitting the matter to the Appropriate Authority for fresh consideration.
  4. Whether, as a matter of discretion, the High Court should remit the matter to the Appropriate Authority for fresh consideration despite the possibility of prejudice to the parties arising from changes in market value during the intervening period.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (owners / prospective purchasers / tenant) Arguments

  • The transactions relied upon by the Authority (notably those on Khadernawaz Khan Road) were not comparable: that road is a well-established commercial location commanding high premium, whereas Wallace Garden is interior, residential and away from the main commercial road.
  • The subject property was used for residential purposes while the comparable properties had potential commercial user; potential user differences were not addressed.
  • The existence of a long-standing tenant (over 30 years) and the fact that the purchasers are directors of the tenant required a lower valuation; the Authority ignored or inadequately addressed the effect of tenancy on market value and the purchaser-tenant relationship.
  • Documents relied upon by the Authority (including the comparable sale documents and modifications to values) were not furnished despite requests, prejudicing the petitioners and preventing effective response.
  • The petitioners argued that remitting the matter would prejudice them because property values in Madras had risen significantly; they submitted they should not be penalised for procedural defects attributable to the Authority.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The learned senior counsel for the Revenue supported the Authority's order (the opinion records that he sought to support the order by reading it).
  • The opinion does not set out any further detailed arguments advanced by the Revenue beyond its reliance on the Authority's written order and on various judicial decisions invoked in submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Appropriate Authority, Government of India v. Naresh M. Mehta (1993) 200 ITR 773 Interpretation of proviso to section 269UD(1): period within which Authority must make order (two months as then applicable) and effect of Authority failing to act within that period. The Court observed that the decision is of no assistance to the petitioners because in that case the Authority had not made an order within the stipulated time and the Court declined to grant the Authority further time; here the question was whether remand after quashing was permissible.
Krishnakumar Agarwal v. Appropriate Authority (Gujarat) (1996) 217 ITR 274 Whether, on facts where the Authority passed an order without affording opportunity, the court should remit matter back to Authority. Referenced for the proposition that refusal to remit is a matter of discretion; the cited case declined to remit on its facts. The present Court noted such discretion but found the present facts warranted remand.
CIT v. Dharmodayam Co. (Kerala) (1997) 225 ITR 686 Dealing with appeal proceedings under sections other than Chapter XX‑C; guidance on remand where evidence collection and fact-finding by authority were deficient. The Court observed the case did not arise under Chapter XX‑C and the position there (appellate context and concerns about endless proceedings) did not apply to the present writ; it therefore found the reasoning not directly applicable here.
Mrs. Nirmal Laxminarayan Grover v. Appropriate Authority (Bombay) (1997) 223 ITR 572 Requirement to disclose relevant material and comparable cases to affected parties; principles of natural justice in acquisition/valuation proceedings. The Court noted that the Bombay High Court held the Authority's show-cause notice defective and that material must be disclosed; however, the present Court held that the defect in this case lay in the final order and thus that decision was of limited assistance on the point of curing defects after a final order.
Vysya Bank Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority of Income-tax (Calcutta) (1998) 233 ITR 560 Whether an Authority may make a fresh order after expiry of prescribed period; consequence of Authority considering irrelevant materials rendering its order perverse. The Calcutta High Court took the view that after expiry of the period the Authority had no jurisdiction to make a fresh order. The present Court expressly disagreed with that view and held limitation does not preclude remand and fresh order directed by the superior court.
Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall & Sons (1974) 96 ITR 390 (SC) Scope of statutory time-limits (section 132(5) in that case) and the power of the court to set aside an order and direct fresh disposal where reasonable opportunity was not afforded. The Court relied on Pooran Mall to conclude that statutory time-limits for initial orders do not necessarily prevent a court from setting aside an order made within that period and directing the authority to hear and decide afresh.
CIT v. National Taj Traders (1980) 121 ITR 535 (SC) Interpretation of limitation in a taxing statute (section 33B(2)(b) of Indian Income Tax Act, 1922) and distinction between charging provisions and procedural/machinery provisions. The Court cited it for the proposition that limitation period in a machinery provision does not automatically bar fresh proceedings when a higher authority or court directs reconsideration; this supported the conclusion that section 269UD(1)'s time-limit does not preclude remand.
C. B. Gautam v. Union of India (1993) 199 ITR 530 (SC) Presumption that a transaction may have been entered into with intent to evade tax where market value exceeds apparent consideration by 15%; such presumption is rebuttable and a positive finding of intent is not essential to validity of compulsory purchase order. The Court noted that this decision does not support the petitioners' submission that absence of an express finding of intent to evade tax in the show-cause notice vitiated the proceedings; the Court observed that no positive finding is essential and the presumption is rebuttable by the parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused analysis of the Authority's order and the procedural steps leading up to it. The principal elements of its reasoning are these:

  1. Defects in valuation and comparison: The Court found that the Authority's comparison of the subject property with transactions on Khadernawaz Khan Road was on its face unsatisfactory. The Authority treated FSI (floor space index) as determinative (subject property FSI 2.00; comparable 1.5), but did not address or record consideration of the locational advantages and premium attached to the comparable properties. The Court held that the chosen comparables were not demonstrably comparable on relevant factors (location, approach, potential commercial user) and that these distinguishing features were neither discussed nor weighed.
  2. Failure to account for tenancy and purchaser-tenant relationship: The Court emphasised that the Authority had essentially ignored the importance of a long-standing tenancy (tenant in occupation for decades) and had not examined the extent to which tenancy reduced market value. The Authority did not note that the purchasers were directors of the tenant company — a fact that may explain willingness to sell at a discount — nor did it quantify any discount attributable to tenancy.
  3. Non-disclosure of materials: The Court found that documents relied upon by the Authority were not made available to the petitioners despite requests. This denial of access to documents that the Authority proposed to rely upon was held to be a breach of natural justice — an ineffective opportunity to contest the materials used against them. The Court stated that the Authority must furnish copies of relied documents and that denial vitiates the order.
  4. Procedural haste and time-frame considerations: The Court noted the statutory time-frame for the Authority's action is computed from the filing of Form No. 37-I and observed that, because notices were issued late, the Authority had an unduly brief period to conclude its enquiry and make an order. The Court criticised the apparent haste and stressed the Authority's duty to issue show-cause notices promptly.
  5. Discretion to remit despite statutory time-limits: The Court analysed authorities (including Pooran Mall & Sons and National Taj Traders) and concluded the prescribed statutory periods apply to the initial order but do not preclude a superior court from setting aside a validly-made original order and remanding the matter to the Authority for fresh consideration. The Court rejected the view that the expiry of the original statutory period absolutely bars a fresh order when a superior court directs reconsideration.
  6. Appropriate remedy: Balancing the petitioners' concern about prejudice from changes in market values against the need to correct procedural defects, the Court held that the normal rule is to remit for fresh consideration where an order is vitiated by procedural defects (failure to observe natural justice or failure to consider relevant factors). The mere possibility of changed market values did not justify refusal to remit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned order of the Appropriate Authority dated 29-10-1994 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Appropriate Authority to make a fresh order in accordance with law.

Key directions and consequences:

  • The Appropriate Authority is directed to make a fresh order within four months of receipt of a copy of the Court's order.
  • In making the fresh order, the Authority shall confine itself to the materials already on record.
  • Before proceeding to make any fresh order, the Authority must furnish to the parties copies of all documents on which it proposes to rely.
  • Parties are to be given an opportunity to be heard in person or through counsel before any fresh order is made.
  • The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly; the interlocutory matters (WMPs) are closed and no costs are awarded.

Implications: The direct effect is that the original compulsory-purchase order is quashed and the Authority must re‑examine valuation and procedure with disclosure and hearing. The Court indicated no intention to create a new legal rule; rather it applied existing principles (natural justice and the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts) and confirmed that statutory time-limits for an initial order do not, by themselves, preclude remand and fresh consideration when a superior court sets aside an order for procedural defects.

    Ch. Kamala v. Narasimha Looms And Investments Pvt. Ltd.

    These writ petitions are by the owners and the prospective purchasers as also by one of the tenants of the first floor of the property bearing Door No. 25, Wallace Garden, III Street, Madras-34, comprised in S. No. 62/28, Block No. 13, measuring an extent of 3 grounds with a building thereon consisting of ground and first floors, each of the floors having about 2200 sq. ft. of built-up area. Their grievance is against the order made by the Appropriate Authority on 29-10-1994 directing compulsory purchase of the property at a discounted sale consideration which is less than the agreed price of Rs. 25 lakhs for each floor with undivided half-share in the land to the two purchasers. The tenant of the first floor is a private limited company of which the purchasers of the first floor are directors. The tenant has been in occupation of that portion for over 30 years. The rent being paid by the tenant at the time the order was made by the Authority was at Rs. 4,000 p.m.

    2. The order of the Authority was preceded by a show-cause notice in which it was stated that the two transactions referred to in the notice were relevant and comparable to the sale by a third party of two grounds and 2207 sq. ft. to Alacrity Housing Ltd. The rate per sq. ft. of land in that transaction was mentioned as Rs. 23.86 lakhs per ground if this building there was valued at its scrap value of Rs. 21.62 lakhs per ground after pending for the depreciated cost of building. That rate when adjusted up to the date of agreement was mentioned as Rs. 37.91 lakhs per ground. That transaction was on 9-7-1994. The date of second transaction mentioned was on 4-5-1992. If that property was 19, Khadernawaz Khan Road, the land rate by taking scrap value of the building is mentioned as Rs. 21.34 lakhs. The modified rate as on the date of agreement is mentioned as 25.05 lakhs per ground. As to who modified the value and the basis for the modification made is not setout in the show-cause notice. The documents under which the two transactions referred to in the notice took place were also not enclosed to the notice. To the notice, the working sheet prepared by the Valuation Officer is enclosed. It was stated therein that the land value based on the scrap value in the transactions among the petitioners was Rs. 15,93,129. A statement of the calculation of the fair market value was also enclosed in which the property compared was one at 20, Khadernawaz Khan Road with two grounds and 2207 sq. ft. This property apparently is the one mentioned at S. No. 1 in the show-cause notice. The land rate of that property was taken at Rs. 21,62,000. Fair market value of this property was calculated at the rate of Rs. 21,62,000 per ground and the property at Rs. 36,67,000. The discounted value of the sale consideration was, therefore, held to be less by 40 per cent.

    3. In the objections sent by the vendors and prospective purchasers after the show-cause notice was issued, they raised three grounds. Their case is that the properties were not comparable as Khadernawaz Khan Road is a long established and very well-known commercial area where the land commands high premium and in that part of the road, where the plot of Alacrity Housing Ltd. is situated land value is very high and that value cannot be compared with the value of the land in Wallace Garden which is in the interior and is away from the main commercial road. They also objected on the ground that the property in this case is used only for residential purposes whereas the property sought to be compared with by the Authority was potentially capable of commercial user. It was their further case that the valuation of this property on account of the fact that there was a tenant of 30 years standing had necessarily to be valued at a much lower price, the purchasers being none other than the directors of the tenant. All these objections were overruled by the Authority. The Authority brushed aside their objections that there was a tenant and, therefore, valuation is not comparable with the valuation for an untenanted land capable of commercial user on a prominent road, namely, Khadernawaz Khan Road, by observing that no eviction proceeding is pending against the tenant, that the tenant was there for 50 years and that the rent had been increased to Rs. 4,000 per month. The Authority merely made an observation that even if the tenancy is taken into account, difference would be more than 50 per cent. The extent to which the tenancy contributed to reduction in the market value for the property was not discussed and reason for and the extent to which the valuation should be discounted, was not stated.

    4. The objection on the ground that the property situated on the Khadernawaz Khan Road is not comparable was rejected on the ground that the FSI permissible in respect of the subject property is 2.00, whereas the FSI permissible in respect of 20, Khadernawaz Khan Road is 1.5 according to the sanctioned plan. The authority thought that FS1 was determinative for the purpose of comparison. The locational advantages and also the premium attached to the land on that road were not considered and discussed.

    5. As regards the objection on the ground that this property was situated away from the main road, that factor was not even specifically adverted to. The distance as between the main road and this road and the kind of approach to that road, the impact on the value by reason of its location as also the fact that the building is situated at a 30 road, were not discussed.

    6. In addition to those defects in the order, it was submitted by the counsel that the documents relied upon by the authority were not made available to the petitioners and despite a request for copies of those documents, the same were not furnished. This, according to the petitioners, resulted in prejudice and prevented them from pointing out from the documents those factors which would explain the higher value of the property covered by those documents, when compared to the value of the property in question.

    7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of the Authority cannot be sustained and is required to be set aside.

    8. The learned senior counsel for the revenue sought to support that order by reading the same. A perusal of that order does not in anyway detract from the validity of the criticism levelled against it by the counsel for the petitioners. The non-consideration of the relevant aspects of the matter is evident. The property with which comparison has been made, is, on the face of it, not a property which can be regarded as comparable. The importance of the tenancy in estimating the value of the property has been practically ignored. The fact that purchasers were none other than the directors of the tenant company has not been noticed though that is a factor which would explain the vendors' willingness to sell the property to them at a price which may even be less by 15 per cent of the market value. The difference in the potential user of the land has also been ignored.

    9. The material document on basis of which the impugned order was made had not been made available to the petitioners. Though the authority is required to make an enquiry expeditiously, that fact does not empower the authority to refuse to make available to the parties before it the copies of the documents on which the authority seeks to rely to the prejudice of the parties. The rules of natural justice would require that opportunity provided to the parties is an effective opportunity. The materials which are to be used against them must be disclosed and if any documents are relied upon, the same must be made available to those against whom it is sought to be used. The parties have a right to inform themselves of the contents of the documents relied upon by the authority, as those contents may disclose the distinguishing features, if any, between the properties which are the subject-matter of those documents and the property in respect of which Form No. 37-I had been filed. Denial of such opportunity to the parties has vitiated the order and the order cannot be sustained for more reasons than one.

    10. The time-frame in the Act for making an order is to be computed from the date of filing of Form No. 37-I even though notice was issued after considerable time had elapsed resulting in the Authority having a very brief period within which to complete the enquiry and make an order. The order evidently was made in a hurry. It is for the Authority to ensure that the show-cause notices are issued within a short period of time after Form No. 37-I is filed.

    11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that court should refrain from remitting the matter back to the Authority as any such remand would result in prejudice to the parties having regard to the fact that the value of the property in a major urban centre like Madras has gone up considerably and to permit the authority to acquire the property after an interval of four years would only be to allow the government to enrich itself at the cost of innocent parties. The denial of proper opportunity, it was submitted by the counsel, was not the fault of the parties and for which parties should not be penalised.

    12. It was also the further submission that the scheme of Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as 'the Act') is such as to require the Authority to make a final order within the time specified therein. That time-frame has been prescribed with a view to protect the parties concerned as the parties should be free to transact their properties if compulsory purchase is not made and in case compulsory purchase is made, vendors should receive the value immediately and the vendee would be free to look at other property and make his investment elsewhere. That object would be defeated if the authority were to be allowed several years after the initial order to proceed to make a further order and direct compulsory purchase by adopting the valuation which prevailed at the time of filing of Form No. 37-I.

    13. The counsel in this context referred to a number of decisions of this and other High Courts.

    14. Attention was invited to the decision of a bench of this court in the case of Appropriate Authority, Government of India v. Naresh M. Mehta (1993) 200 ITR 773 wherein this Court observed that the proviso to section 269UD(1) of the Act specifically states that no order for the purchase by the Central Government shall be made after the expiry of a period of two months from the end of the month in which the abovesaid statement was received by the Appropriate Authority. Even taking into account the statement in Form No. 37-I that was submitted for the second time and the writ petition which was filed subsequent to the expiry of these two months, within which period it was to make either an order of purchase under section 269UD(1) or to issue certificate of no objection, the matter could not be remanded back to the Authority to consider the question of compulsory purchase. That decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. In that case, the Authority had chosen not to make an order of compulsory purchase within the time stipulated and this Court declined to grant time to the Authority to make such an order in the writ petition filed by the parties to Form No. 37-I. The counsel referred to the decision of the Gujarat High court in the case of Krishnakumar Agarwal v. Appropriate Authority (1996) 217 ITR 274, wherein that court on facts and circumstances of that case declined to refer the matter back to the Appropriate Authority. In that case, the Authority had passed an order without affording any opportunity to the petitioner therein. The court was also of the view in that case that the order of the authority was not otherwise sustainable. The court also observed that as to whether or not the matter should be remitted back to the authority is within the domain of the discretion of the court.

    15. The counsel also referred to the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. Dharmodayam Co. (1997) 225 ITR 686. That case did not arise under Chapter XX-C but under sections 269F and 269G. The order for compulsory acquisition by the original authority had been set aside by the Tribunal on appeal by the assessee and the order of the Tribunal was the subject-matter of the challenge before the High Court. The High Court did not decline to accede to the revenue's prayer to set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the matter for fresh consideration. The court confirmed the order of the Tribunal and no question of remanding the matter, thus, arose f or consideration. The court therein further observed that the Authority had failed to collect the evidence and decide the matter on the evidence collected and found to be unworthy of credence and that it would not be safe and proper exercise of power for an appellate authority under the Act to remit the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner with liberty to restart the whole proceedings and keep it pending against the transfer or and transferee probably till the end of their lives and even thereafter. No such situation arises here. This is not an appeal. The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked to set aside the impugned order. As to what consequence should follow thereafter is a matter in the discretion of the court. The fear expressed by the learned Judge in that decision that the matter was going on endlessly has no bearing herein as there is no difficulty in setting the time-frame within which the Authority should conclude its proceedings.

    16. The counsel also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mrs. Nirmal Laxminarayan Grover v. Appropriate Authority (1997) 223 ITR 572 (Bom), a decision rendered by a Division Bench. It was held therein that the relevant material for the conclusion that there has been under valuation of the property, must be disclosed and the details regarding the comparable cases also made known to the parties. The court held in that case that the order made by the authority was not in consonance with the basic principles of natural justice. The court therein found that the show-cause notice was defective. In the context of that finding, it declined to remit the matter to the Authority to issue a fresh show-cause notice and thereafter held the enquiry.

    17. That decision is also not of much assistance to the petitioner. The defective show-cause notice cannot be made good subsequent to the final order. The defect alleged herein is not in the show-cause notice but in the order made by the authority.

    18. The counsel finally relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Vysya Bank Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority of Income-tax (1998) 233 ITR 560 (Cal) wherein it was held that the authority had come to a finding by considering irrelevant materials which rendered the order perverse. It was found therein that the question of giving the Authority liberty to make a fresh order could not arise as after the expiry of the period of three months the Authority had no further jurisdiction to exercise such power of pre-exemptive purchase.

    19. With great respect, I am unable to agree with that view. The fixing of period of four months in the statute does not in any manner come in the way of the authority making an order afresh if the order made by it within the period allowed by law is subsequently set aside by the High Court and the matter remanded back to the Authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The period fixed in the statute is the period within which the Authority must make an order. If it fails to do so, it cannot make such an order at a subsequent point of time. The quashing of an order made within the time allowed by law does not compel one to record that order as not having been made at all and ignore the fact that the jurisdiction had been exercised to make an order of compulsory purchase even though that order might have been subsequently set aside by the High Court or by the Supreme Court. It is for the court which exercises jurisdiction to decide in its discretion as to whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrant the remitting of the matter to the authority. The period of limitation prescribed in the statute within which period the authority is required to make the order does not come in the way of or prevent the superior courts from directing the authority to make a fresh order and when so directed, the original period of limitation prescribed in the statute will not operate in respect of the fresh order which the authority is required to make.

    20. The Supreme Court in the case of Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall & Sons (1974) 96 ITR 390 (SC), wherein section 132(5) of the Act was considered, held that the period of 90 days mentioned in that provision was not in all circumstances mandatory and it was open to the Court in a writ petition to set aside the order of the Income Tax Officer and direct a fresh disposal of the matter on the ground that no reasonable opportunity had been afforded to the affected party.

    21. In the case of CIT v. National Taj Traders (1980) 121 ITR 535 (SC), while considering the scope of section 33B(2)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, the court held that the limitation of two years mentioned therein, was applicable only to the suo motu orders of the Commissioner in revision and not to the orders made by him pursuant to the direction or order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (4) or by the higher authority. It was pointed out by that court that the principle that the taxing statute should be construed strictly is applicable only to charging provision or provisions imposing penalty and not to those parts of the statute which contain machinery provision. Section 33B was held to be not a charging provision; in that case, the court referred to the case of Pooran Mall & Sons (supra) and observed, inter alia, as under:

    "It may be pointed out that in section 132, there is no provision removing or relaxing the bar of limitation contained in section 132(5) enabling the Income Tax Officer to pass an order afresh pursuant to any direction issued to him by a higher authority under section 132(12) and even then this court took the view that the limitation prescribed under section 132(5) will be applicable only to the initial order to be made by the Income Tax Officer and not to an order that would be made by him pursuant to a direction from the Board or notified authority. . . ."

    22. The specification of the period of two months up to June 1993 and three months subsequent thereto in the proviso under section 269UD(1), therefore, does not preclude the superior courts from directing the authority to make a fresh order after setting aside the one made within the time specified in the Act. The period of limitation specified in the section is not applicable to the fresh order so directed to be made.

    23. This Court, therefore, need not refrain from remanding the matter solely on the ground that the period of limitation mentioned in section 269UD(1) is over. That limitation is confined only to the original order and not to the order directed to be made by this court after the original order is set aside.

    24. As to whether the remand should be made is a matter which is entirely within the discretion of the court. The normal rule, however, is to remand the matter to the authority whose procedural error has vitiated the order to correct those errors after a fresh hearing and after following the requisite procedures. It was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Pooran Mall & Sons (supra) that the court in exercising its powers under article 226 of the Constitution has to mould the remedy to suit the facts of a case, and that the power to quash an order tinder article 226 can be exercised not merely when the order sought to be quashed is one made without jurisdiction in which case there can be no room for the same authority to be directed to deal with it, or where the order of the authority which has exercised the jurisdiction is vitiated by circumstances like failure to observe the principles of natural justice, in which case the court may quash the order and direct the authority to dispose of the matter afresh after giving the aggrieved party a reasonable opportunity of putting forward its case,

    "... otherwise it would mean that where a court quashes an order because the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, it should not while passing that order permit the Tribunal or the authority to deal with it again irrespective of the merits of the case."
    There can therefore, be no doubt whatsoever that on the quashing of the order this court is not bound to hold its hands and in all circumstances refuse to remand the matter to the original authority, for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

    25. This court and the other High Courts in the country have had to deal with a large number of petitions like the present one wherein orders of the appropriate authority directing compulsory purchase have been the subject-matter of challenge. The normal rule that has been adopted in these matters has been to remand the matter to the authority. In cases where it is found that the order of the authority is vitiated not on account of want of jurisdiction, or its failure to make an order of compulsory purchase within the time specified in the relevant section and ground on which the order is set aside, is on the ground of breaches of the principles of natural justice or on the ground that material factors had not been considered, the normal rule is to remand the matter. In the present case, there are no extraneous circumstances which require a different course being adopted.

    26. It is no doubt true that by reason of the lapse of time between the date of the order of the Tribunal and the date of the disposal of the writ petition, the market value of the property may have changed. Such change may result in prejudice to the parties if the authorities were to direct compulsory purchase after the matter is remanded back to the authority. That consideration alone cannot suffice to decline remitting the matter having regard to the fact that the authority under the provisions of the Act is required to make a final order within a relatively short period of time and on account of that limitation of time, procedural errors may have crept in. If in all cases, the court were to decline to remit the matter to the authority, even when the order had been quashed on account of procedural errors, the very object of the provision would be defeated. I am, therefore, unable to accede to the prayer of the petitioners not to remit the matter back to the authority.

    27. Before concluding it is necessary to advert to one other argument that was advanced by the counsel for the owner. It was submitted that the show-cause notice did not set out that the transaction was being entered into with a view to evade tax and that there was no such finding in the final order also. This, it was submitted, vitiated the entire proceedings. The counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. B. Gautam v. Union of India (1993) 199 ITR 530 (SC). That decision does not support the submission of the counsel. The Court held therein in clear terms that in cases where the authority found that the market value is more than the apparent consideration by 15 per cent there could be a presumption that the transaction was being entered into with an intent to evade tax and that such presumption was a rebuttable one. It was, therefore, for the parties to the transaction to rebut that presumption. A positive finding by the authority in the show-cause notice issued, or after the investigation in the final order that the transaction was entered into with the intent to evade tax is not an essential requirement for the validity of the order of compulsory purchase.

    28. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remanded back to the authority to make a fresh order in accordance with law. Such orders shall be made within four months of the receipt by it of a copy of this order. In making such order, the authority shall confine itself to the materials which are already on record and before proceeding to make a fresh order, it shall furnish to the parties copies of all the documents on which it proposes to rely. Parties shall also be given opportunity to be heard in person or through counsel. These writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. Consequently, no orders are necessary on the WMPs and are closed, no costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ch. Kamala v. Narasimha Looms And Investments Pvt. Ltd.
    (Nov 6, 1998)