AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner in the connected matters is Secretary Ulagappar Higher Secondary School, Ramachandrapuram, Pudukkottai District. The School began as a High School and was upgraded to a Higher Secondary School in 1986. It was originally a fee-levying school receiving two-third grant until 1964, and from 1964-65 it became a 100% Government aided school under the Free Education System.

On 23.10.1991 four teachers were found to have committed serious misconduct. A School Committee enquiry was held and, relying on that report, the management (petitioner) applied on 13.05.1982 under Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act to the Chief Educational Officer (C.E.O.) for approval to terminate the four teachers. Records of the enquiry and misconduct were submitted. The C.E.O. granted approval by proceedings dated 26.8.1992, and the school terminated the services with effect from 1.9.1992.

The dismissed teachers appealed under Section 23. The Appellate Authority granted a stay of termination; that stay was challenged in Writ Petitions Nos. 17191–17194 of 1992. This Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose the appeals within four weeks. Following those directions, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeals on technical grounds (orders dated 29.4.1993 and 4.5.1993). The matter returned to this Court in subsequent writ litigation (including W.P. Nos. 9613–9616 and W.P. No. 9616 of 1993), where earlier directions were set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration. Despite remand, the Appellate Authority again allowed the appeals by orders dated 5.5.1994 and 11.7.1994, directing reinstatement.

The petitioner then pursued remedies under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act (appeal to the Tribunal under Section 42). Appeals were filed as E.A.T.C.M.A. Nos. 7/94, 1/95, 2/95 and 3 of 1995. While filing those appeals, the petitioner sought exemption from the requirement to deposit the arrears of salary of the four dismissed teachers. Although an initial approval is mentioned as being granted by the C.E.O., the Tribunal, by order dated 16.8.1995, dismissed the exemption applications and directed the petitioner to deposit the arrears within 15 days.

The petitioner challenged the Tribunal's order by filing C.R.P. Nos. 2183 to 2190 of 1995 and associated applications (C.M.Ps). This Court, by order dated 30.8.1995, granted a stay of the Tribunal's order subject to the petitioner depositing 50% of the arrears before the Tribunal by 15.9.1995. The petitioner filed Special Leave Petitions in the Supreme Court (S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 20402 to 20409 of 1995). The Supreme Court directed the petitioner to approach the State Government for funds and directed the Government to examine the matter; the SLPs were dismissed with those directions on 22.9.1995.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's directions, the petitioner made a representation to the Government on 30.9.1995 requesting necessary funds to enable deposit of the arrears. By an order dated 11.4.1996 the Government rejected that request, relying on Section 44 of the Act and stating that the management, not the Government, is liable to pay any arrears of pay and allowances. The petitioner challenged the legality of the Government's order by filing Writ Petition No. 8268 of 1996 and connected Civil Revision Petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for a fully government-aided private school, Section 44(1) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act can be applied to require the educational agency (management) to deposit arrears of pay and allowances in circumstances where the State is the employer or is otherwise liable to pay those salaries.
  2. Whether the Tribunal has power under Section 44(4) to dispense with or exempt the educational agency from the deposit requirement upon showing of sufficient cause, and whether that power was properly exercised in the petitioner's case.
  3. Whether the Government's refusal (order dated 11.4.1996) to provide funds—relying on Section 44 and asserting management's liability—was legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 44(4) permits the Tribunal to waive or exempt the educational agency from the deposit requirement if it shows sufficient cause; thus the Tribunal has discretion to permit appeal to proceed without deposit in appropriate cases.
  • The petitioner relied on the Division Bench decision in Vivekananda Middle School, M.K. Puram v. State of Tamil Nadu (1983-II-MLJ 280) to support the proposition that Section 44(1) is not inflexible and the Tribunal may waive the deposit requirement.
  • Because the school is fully aided (100% grant) the obligation to pay salaries lies on the State; prior to termination the State was paying salaries and the grant was reduced proportionately after termination—if reinstatement is ordered the State's obligation to pay resumes. Therefore the management cannot be compelled to deposit arrears it was not legally obliged to pay.
  • The Supreme Court's order in the S.L.P.s directed the petitioner to approach the State Government for funds and contemplated compliance "whenever they are made available," supporting the petitioner's position that State funds (if provided) should be used for deposit rather than making the management liable in the first instance.
  • Section 44(1) should apply to schools that actually pay salaries; it should not be interpreted to make a fully aided school (where the State pays salaries) solely liable to deposit arrears.

Respondent / Government's Position (as recorded)

  • By the impugned order dated 11.4.1996 the Government relied on Section 44 of the Act and took the position that the management (educational agency) is liable to pay all arrears of pay and allowances and that it is not the Government's responsibility to make that payment.

Second Respondent (a dismissed teacher) — Counsel's Participation

The opinion records that one of the dismissed teachers was impleaded as a second respondent and that his counsel was heard, but the text does not set out any specific, detailed submissions made on behalf of that respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vivekananda Middle School, M.K. Puram v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983-II-MLJ 280 Holds that Section 44(1) is not inflexible; the Tribunal may, under Section 44(4), exercise discretion to permit an educational agency to proceed without depositing arrears if sufficient cause is shown. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that the Tribunal has discretion to waive the deposit requirement and that the deposit requirement is not an absolute bar to appeal in every circumstance.
Decision referred to as W.A. No. 496 of 1978 (Division Bench) — (as cited in Vivekananda judgment) Expresses the view that the prescription in Section 44(1) regarding deposit is not of universal application and that sub-section (4) confers discretion on the Tribunal in appropriate cases. The Court referenced the same interpretive principle to reinforce that Section 44(1) may be read subject to the Tribunal's discretionary power under Section 44(4) and that waiver may be appropriate where sufficient cause exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out relevant statutory provisions from the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, including definitions of "educational agency" and provisions concerning grant (Section 14) and the Tribunal and deposit requirement (Section 44).

In interpreting Section 44, the Court noted the text of sub-sections (1) and (4): Section 44(1) requires deposit of all arrears of pay and allowances with the Tribunal as a condition for further appeal in certain cases of restoration; Section 44(4) provides that if the educational agency fails to deposit, the Tribunal shall, unless sufficient cause is shown, stop proceedings and direct restoration. The Court observed that prior Division Bench authority (Vivekananda and the W.A. No. 496/1978 reference) treats the deposit requirement as not inflexible and recognizes the Tribunal's power to exercise discretion under sub-section (4).

Applying the statutory scheme to the facts, the Court emphasized that this petitioner is a fully aided (100% grant) school. Before termination, the State bore the liability to pay the teachers' salaries; after the management obtained C.E.O. approval for termination the grant was reduced proportionately. When the earlier termination was set aside on appeal and reinstatement directed, the earlier termination was effectively effaced (at least temporarily) such that the teachers were to be deemed in service again.

The Court reasoned that where the obligation to pay salaries rests on the State (because of full grant), it is improper to construe Section 44(1) in a manner that shifts that liability onto the educational agency in all cases. The Court held that the interpretation adopted by the first respondent (Government)—that the management alone is liable to pay arrears irrespective of the State's obligation—was incorrect in the context of a fully aided school.

Consequently, Section 44(1) must be read down so that the educational agency is required to deposit arrears only when it is legally obliged to pay them, and not where the State remains the obligor. The Court further held that the Government's refusal to provide funds (order dated 11.4.1996) was not proper in these circumstances and that the State's failure to provide funds constituted sufficient cause to justify either the Tribunal's dispensing with the deposit or the Government being directed to make funds available for the deposit.

On these foundations the Court quashed the Government order dated 11.4.1996, directed the first respondent to provide necessary and adequate funds to the petitioner to enable deposit of the arrears until the Tribunal's proceedings conclude, and allowed the writ petition to that limited extent. In the connected Civil Revision Petitions the Court held that the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for not depositing the arrears and that the Tribunal ought to have exempted the petitioner; the Court therefore allowed the revisions and exempted the petitioner from depositing the arrears (and from continued deposit) until the appeal before the Tribunal ends, subject to the condition that if the Government provides funds before the termination of the appeal, the petitioner must deposit them.

The Court also expressly clarified that its order in the Civil Revision Petitions does not prevent the Tribunal from disposing of the appeal on merits and urged early disposal; no order as to costs was made.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Government's order dated 11.4.1996 is quashed, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated, and the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

  • The first respondent (Government) is directed to provide necessary and adequate funds to the petitioner to enable deposit of the arrears of salary of the four teachers until the Tribunal proceedings conclude.
  • The petitioner-school is exempted from depositing the arrears of salary and from making continued deposits under Section 44(1) and (2) until the appeal before the Tribunal comes to an end, on the basis that the State's failure to furnish funds amounts to sufficient cause for non-deposit and because the State bears the liability for salaries of a fully aided school.
  • If, before the termination of the Tribunal appeal, the Government provides the necessary funds, the petitioner must deposit the amount before the Tribunal.
  • The Tribunal remains free to dispose of the appeal on merits; this order does not prevent adjudication on the substantive appeal.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the writ petition and the connected civil revision petitions.

The Court's decision was grounded in statutory interpretation of Section 44 and the relationship between grant/State liability and the deposit requirement; the opinion relies on prior Division Bench authority (cited above) rather than purporting to establish a novel precedent.

    Secretary, Ulagappar Higher Secondary School v. Joint Director Of School Education

    Secretary Ulagappar Higher Secondary School, Ramachandrapuram, Pudukkottai District, is the petitioner in all the Revision Petitions and Writ Petition.

    2. Facts which are common to all these cases may be stated as follows:—

    The School represented by Secretary stated that the same was started as a High School and later upgraded as a Higher Secondary School in the year 1986. Originally the School was a fee-levying school, receiving two third grant upto the year 1964, but subsequently it became 100% Government aided school from 1964-65 on the introduction of Free Education System. The School was governed by the Madras Educational Rules till the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and Rules 1974 were enacted. It is further stated that on 23.10.1991, four teachers of the School committed grave acts of misconduct and, therefore, enquiry was conducted by a duly constituted School Committee, and based on its Report, to terminate the services of the four teachers, petitioner submitted an application dated 13.05.1982 under Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act to the Chief Educational Officer, Pudukkottai, seeking approval for the termination of the services of the four teachers. Records pertaining to misconduct and the entire records pertaining to enquiry were also submitted to the Chief Educational Officer. The C.E.O, by proceedings dated 26.8.1992, granted approval for the termination of the services of the four teachers. In pursuance of the approved granted by the C.E.O, petitioner also terminated the services of the four teachers with effect from 1.9.1992

    3. The dismissed teachers preferred appeals under Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Private School (Regulation) Act, challenging the termination of the services. The Appellate Authority granted stay of the termination. The order of stay was challenged before this Court in W.P Nos. 17191 to 17194 of 1992. This Court allowed the Writ petitions and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeals within four weeks.

    4. After direction by this Court, as per order dated 29.4.1993 and 4.5.1993, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeals on a technical ground. The matter was again challenged before this Court in W.P Nos. 9616 of 1993. In the meanwhile, the teachers, with the help of certain anti-social elements and political parties, pressurised the school for their reinstatement. They also caused extensive damage to the school and its properties. Therefore, the petitioner filed an application before this Court seeking police protection. The same was granted by this Court. Thereafter, Writ Petition Nos. 9613 to 9616 of 1993 were heard by this Court. The direction to the Appellate Authority, was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration to the Appellate Authority. Even after, subsequent remand the Appellate Authority, by order dated 5.5.94 and 11.7.1994 allowed the appeals again and directed reinstatement of the teachers. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioners again filed before this Court W.P Nos. 10193, 13853 and 13854 of 1994. When these Writ Petitions came for arguments, this Court observed that the proper remedy of the petitioner is to file appeal under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Act. Pursuant to the same, petitioner filed appeals before the Tribunal constituted under Sec. 42 of the Act. The Appeals were numbered as E.A.T.C.M.A Nos. 7/94, 1/95, 2/95 and 3 of 1995.

    5. While preferring the appeals, the petitioner also sought dispensation of deposit of arrears of salary of the four teachers, who had been dismissed, and which was approved by the C.E.O The Tribunal, by order dated 16-8-1995, dismissed those applications and directed the petitioner to deposit the amount within 15 days. The matter was taken to this Court in C.R.P Nos. 2183 to 2190 of 1995. In the C.R.Ps also, C.M.Ps were filed as CMP 12129 to 12137 of 1995, seeking stay of order of the Tribunal. This Court, by order dated 30-8-1995, granted stay of order of the Tribunal, however, subject to the condition that the petitioner should deposit 50% of the arrears of salary before the Tribunal on or before 15.9.1995 The petitioner was aggrieved by the order and, therefore, moved a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court as S.L.P (Civil) No. 20402 to 20409 of 1995. The Supreme Court passed the following order on 22.9.1995:—

    “Since the petitioner claims that the entire salary of their staff was being reimbursed by the State Government the petitioner may approach the State Government for providing it funds and whenever they are made available to the petitioner, the orders of the High Court may be complied with.

    The petitioner to approach the Government within two weeks and the Government is required to examine the matter most expeditiously and pass appropriate orders thereon.

    The S.L.Ps stand dismissed with these directions.”

    Pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court petitioner filed a representation before the Government on 30-9-1995. In that representation, they said that necessary funds be provided for depositing the arrears of salary before the Tribunal.

    6. By the impugned order, dated 11-4-1996, the Government rejected the request relying on Sec. 44 of the Act. In that order, the Government further said that it is the Management and not the Government that is liable to pay all the arrears of pay and allowances. According to the Government, the entire responsibility is only on the Management to pay all the arrears of pay and allowances. The legality of the order is challenged in the Writ Petition.

    7. I will first consider the writ petition wherein the legality of the order of the Government is questioned. Before going to the facts, certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools. (Regulation) Act, 1973 may be considered. Sec. 2(3) defines ‘educational agency’. It reads thus:—

    “2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-

    (1) & (2)

    (3)“educational agency” in relation to

    (a) any minority school, means any person who, or body of persons which, has established and is administering or proposes to establish and administer such minority school; and

    (b) any other private school, means any person or Body of persons permitted or deemed to be permitted under this Act to establish and maintain such other private school.”

    In this connection, it may be noted that the petitioner is not a minority school.

    7. Section 2(5) defines ‘grant’ which means ‘any sum of money paid as aid out of State Funds to any private school’. ‘Private School’ is also defined in Sec. 2(7) of that Act. (The same is not incorporated). Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Recognition of Private School’, and Chapter V deals with Terms and conditions of service of teachers and other persons employed in Private Schools’. Chapter III which deals with ‘Recognition of Private School’ also deals with payment of grants by Government. That is provided in Section 14(1) of the Act. It says: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any decree, order or direction of any Court or other authority,- (i) no private school shall, only on the ground of having been granted recognition under this Act, be entitled to any grant or other financial assistance from the Government, (ii) the Government may subject to, (a) the availability of funds; (b) the norms and conditions specified in the Grant-in-aid Code of Tamil Nadu Education Department; (c) the condition that every private school receiving any grant or financial assistance from the Government levies and collects from the pupils only such fee, charge or other payment, as may be specified by the competent authority, which shall not be in excess of the fee, charge or other payment levied and collected from the pupils studying in the schools or institutions established and administered or maintained by the State Government, or any local authority in the locality’.

    The relevant portion of that Section further says thus:

    (d) the rules, orders and notifications issued by the Government, from time to time; and (e) such other conditions as may be prescribed, pay to the private school grant or other financial assistance at such rate and for such purposes as may be prescribed.). (2) The Government may withhold permanently or for any specified period the whole or part of any grant referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of any private school,- (i) which does not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or any Rules made or directions issued thereunder in so far as such provisions, Rules or directions are applicable to such private school, or (ii) in respect of which the pay and allowances payable to any teacher or other person employed in such private school are not paid to such teacher or other person in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the Rules made thereunder, or (iii) which contravenes or fails to comply with any such condition as may be prescribed. (3) Before withholding the grant under sub-section (2), the Government shall give the educational agency an opportunity of making its representation’.

    8. Chapter VIII deals with ‘General provisions regarding Appeal and Revision’. Section 42 deals with Tribunal, and how Appeal has to be preferred. Section 44 deals with ‘Deposit with the Tribunal of pay and allowances of teachers and other persons employed in private schools in certain cases’. It reads thus:—

    “44. (1) If the Appellate Authority referred to in Section 23 has in any appeal under that section against the dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or the termination otherwise of the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school, made an order restoring such teacher or other employee as such, no appeal against the order of such restoration shall be preferred to the Tribunal and no appeal (against the order of such restoration), which, under Section 25, stands transferred to the Tribunal, unless the educational agency deposits with the Tribunal all arrears of pay and allowances due to such teacher or other person from the date of his dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or termination otherwise of his appointment upto the date of deposit, and continues to deposit the pay and allowances due to such teacher or other person until the termination of the proceedings before the Tribunal.

    (2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed

    (3) Where there is any dispute as to the amount to be deposited under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, on application made to it either by the educational agency or by such teacher or other person, and after making such inquiry as it deems fit, determine summarily the amount to be so deposited.

    (4) If the educational agency fails to deposit the amount as aforesaid, the Tribunal shall, unless the educational agency shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the educational agency to restore such teacher or other employee as such:”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the provisions of S. 44(4) (extracted above), the Tribunal is empowered to exempt the educational agency from depositing the pay and allowances of the teachers and also continued deposit if sufficient cause is shown. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision reported in 1983-II-M.L.J 280 (Vivekananda Middle School, M.K Puram v. State of Tamil Nadu). In paragraph 5 of the judgment, a Division Bench of this Court considered a similar question and held thus:—

    “It is no doubt true that sub-section (4) of Section 44 of the Act proceeds to say that if the deposit is not made as per sub-section (1) of Section 44, the Tribunal shall, unless the educational agency shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make aft order directing the educational agency to restore such teacher or other employee as such. Thus, the aforesaid sub-section contemplates an educational agency showing sufficient cause for not depositing the arrears, in which case the Tribunal may permit the said educational agency to continue the appeal without the requisite deposit contemplated by Section 44(1). This is the interpretation placed on this Section by another Division Bench in the decision in W.A No. 496 of 1978 referred to already.

    In that case, the Division Bench has observed as follows:

    “It may therefore be seen that the Legislature itself has provided that the prescription in Section 44(1) regarding the deposit of arrears of salary, allowances, etc., is not a sine qua non of universal application., Under sub-section (4) the Tribunal has been conferred power to exercise its discretion in the matter of insisting upon the management making the deposit before its appeal under Section 24 is barred on merits.”

    The Bench was of the view that the mandate contained in Section 44(1) of the Act was not inflexible in nature and that it was open to the Tribunal to waive the deposit contemplated by Section 44(1) of the Act in exercise of its discretion in appropriate cases.”

    On the basis of the above decision, learned counsel submitted that in this case proper reasons have been mentioned. At any rate, since it is a fully aided School, it is the duty of the Government to pay the arrears of salary. Counsel also brought to my notice the directions of the Supreme Court.

    10. Learned counsel states that since it is a fully Aided School, it is the duty of the Government to pay the salary and that is why it is not collecting the fees, except as provided under the Act. It is further said that when the educational authority approved the dismissal of the four teachers of the school, the grant was also proportionately reduced. If that be so, it is the duty of the Government to pay that amount in case reinstatement is ordered. Even if no appeal is filed before the Tribunal, and the teachers are reinstated, the obligation is only on the part of the Government to pay salary. If that be so, there cannot be any change when a stay is moved, and the Act provided for deposit of arrears of salary. The obligation is only on the State and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to compel the State to pay the amount to it. Learned counsel also submitted that even though the Writ Petition has been filed in the year 1996, till date Government has not cared to file any counter. It is further said that Section 44(1) compelling the private school to deposit the amount will apply only to schools which pay salary to the teachers and not to schools which are not paying salary.

    11. One of the teachers whose services were terminated also got impleaded at his own request, as second respondent in the Writ Petition. His counsel was also heard. On going through the relevant provisions of the statute, I find that there is substance in what the learned counsel for the petitioner says. Before the termination, the liability was on the State to pay salary to the teachers. They were terminated from service and it was also approved by the Chief Educational Officer. Consequently, the grant was also reduced in proportion to the salary payable to the four teachers. Their termination of service was set aside in appeal and they were directed to be reinstated. That means, the earlier order of termination was effaced at least temporarily, and they were deemed to be in service. The obligation in that case also will be only on the State if 100% grant is given by it. Interpretation given by 1st, respondent to Section 44 of the Act, according to me, is not correct. True, under the statute, educational agency is directed to deposit the amount before the appeal is being proceeded with. But, when the obligation is not on the educational agency to pay salary, it cannot be made liable to pay arrears of salary as well. In case there is no appeal preferred and the teachers are reinstated, what will be the legal consequence. The liability is only on the State. Merely because they preferred an appeal and moved for stay, the agency cannot be in a worse position. This is why the Supreme Court said in the S.L.P that the deposit will be made as and when the State funds are made available. So, to that extent, Section 44(1) will have to be read down, and the educational agency must be made liable when the State funds are made available to it for deposit.

    12. The Management has got a right of appeal under Sec. 44 of the Act. It has got grievance against certain teachers. According to it, it will not be in the best interest of the institution to permit those teachers to continue in that school. When that grievance was put forward before the Appellate Authority, they should not be burdened with a further obligation to pay the arrears of salary since anterior to the disciplinary proceedings, they did not have that obligation. If no disciplinary proceedings are initiated, the Government is bound to pay. Because of some misconduct, the agency has taken disciplinary proceedings That should not be taken as a ground to direct the educational agency to deposit the arrears of salary. That is not contemplated under the statute. Obligation of the State to pay salary to the teachers whose services have been terminated pending appeal continues with the State so long as the petitioner is a 100% aided school.

    13. The State has no case that the petitioner has not complied with any of the directions of the Government, nor has violated any Rules or Notifications, nor has taken any action for withdrawing the grant. Under the above circumstances, the rejection of the representation by the Government was not proper. The petitioner is entitled to the remedy sought for by it. The order of the first respondent dated 11.4.1996 is quashed, and I direct the first respondent to provide necessary and adequate funds with the petitioner enabling it to deposit the arrears of salary of the four teachers who were terminated, till the appeal before the Tribunal comes to an end. Writ Petition No. 8268 of 1996 is allowed to the above extent. There will be no order as to costs.

    14. In the connected Revision Petitions, the grievance of the petitioner is that the Tribunal has not exercised the power under Section. 44(4) of the Act. When power is given to the Tribunal to exempt the petitioner from depositing the arrears, if sufficient cause is shown, it has not been exercised by it, is the grievance of the petitioner. While disposing of the writ petition, I have already said that the educational agency cannot be burdened with the liability of depositing the arrears of salary, nor is it under any obligation to pay salary. The Government did not provide the necessary funds, and that is sufficient cause, and the Tribunal ought to have dispensed with the petitioner from depositing the salary as contemplated under S. 44(1) of the Act. Now that the Government has refused or rejected the representation of the petitioner, there cannot be a further obligation on the part of the educational agency to deposit the arrears of salary. I find that sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioner for not depositing the amount. The exemption petition filed by the petitioner ought to have been allowed. The Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, and the petitioner-School is exempted from depositing the arrears of salary and also from continued deposit, till the appeal before the Tribunal comes to an end. But I make it clear that if before termination of the appeal before the Tribunal, the Government provides necessary and adequate funds for deposit of the salary, the petitioner, on receipt of the same, shall deposit the amount before the Tribunal.

    15. I further make it clear that the order in the C.R.P will not stand in the way of the Tribunal disposing of the appeal on merits. It is in the best interest of both parties, the appeal may be disposed of as early as possible, and I am sure, the Tribunal will take such steps for the said purpose. There will be no order as to cost in these Revision Petitions.

    KA/RR/VCS

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Secretary, Ulagappar Higher Secondary School v. Joint Director Of School Education
    (Mar 25, 1997)