The unsuccessful tenant is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. The respondent landlady filed H.R.C.O.P No. 97 of 1990 on the file of the Rent Controller, Pondicherry, praying for the eviction of the petitioner under Section 14(1)(b) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1980 on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. According to the landlady, the building in question is a brick built structure covered with Asbestos roof in an area of 5 metres east-west and 6 metres north-south, bearing door No. 212, Kamaraj Salai, Pondicherry. The superstructure is part of the area under the occupation of the tenant and the remaining portion situate on the north of the said superstructure is vacant. According to the landlady, the demised premises under the occupation of the tenant does not yield good return and as per the present condition, the building cannot be properly utilised. Therefore, she intends to demolish the existing superstructure and construct a new building for better utility and for good return. She also obtained approval of the Pondicherry Planning Authority and she has issued a lawyer's notice on 20th September, 1987 calling upon the tenant to vacate the premises. The landlady has enough resources and source of income to bear the expenditure liable to be incurred in the proposed construction of the building. She also undertakes that the work of demolishing the material portion of the building shall substantially commence by her not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date of recovery of possession of the entire building.

2. The eviction petition was resisted by the tenant, who filed a counter affidavit, denying all the allegations made in the petition. According to him, he has been carrying on business as a tenant since 1964, the father of the landlady and the tenant maintained good relationship, the deceased father of the landlady gave consent to him to carry out all the repair works and alterations in the shop, on the basis of which, he had also done some alteration, change of flooring, erection of water pump, putting rolling shutters etc., in the said shop and since the landlady has decided to sell the said property to somebody else, there is no bona fide in the requirement of the premises by the landlady for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The shop in question is in good condition and there is no need or necessity for reconstruction, since all the repairs and necessary works have already been done by the tenant himself.

3. Learned Rent Controller at Pondicherry on a careful consideration of the entire materials placed before him ordered eviction, holding that both factually and legally there is no reason for rejecting the claim of the landlady and that therefore the requirement of the premises by the landlady is bona fide and she can get the respondent evicted from the premises for the purpose of demolishing the premises and to construct a new building in its site.

4. The unsuccessful tenant filed an Appeal before the Principal District Judge at Pondicherry. Apart from reiterating the various contentions raised before the learned Rent Controller the tenant also has raised the question of title of property to the landlady. According to him, the landlady did not have title to the property and the entirety of the property, of which the demised premises is a part, was the subject matter of the suit for declaration of title and the suit was dismissed on merits by Principal Sub Court, Pondicherry. Therefore, the tenant prayed that the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry may remand the matter for fresh enquiry and disposal. On 18-8-1994 at the time of argument, a reference was made to the Judgment and Decree in O.S No. 223 of 1987, dated 4-10-1991 by the Principal Subordinate Judge against which A.S No. 23 of 1994 was pending on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry. The H.R.C.O.P scheduled property did not disclose the Block No., Ward No. T.S No. etc., to find out whether it is the same or different property from the one concerned in O.S No. 223 of 1987. Hence, the learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry directed the tenant to file the schedule of property with the above particulars by way of petition for incorporation. Accordingly, I.A No. 179 of 1994 was filed in M.A No. 1 of 1993 and the schedule of property was amended and incorporated in red ink in M.A No. 1 of 1993 with the particulars of Block No., Ward No., T.S No., etc., I.A No. 139 of 1994 for additional evidence was filed by the tenant. The said I.A No. 139 of 1994 was partly allowed and the tenant was recalled and examined as R.W 1 and Exs. B1 and B2 were marked. As rebuttal, the evidence of P.W 1 was recalled and examined on 8-9-1994. The evidence of R.W 1.tenant was that he came to know of Exs. B1 and B2 about six month prior to the date of his examination before the principal District Judge and that the demised premises and the suit schedule property in O.S 223 of 1987 formed part of one and the same property. The rebuttal evidence was given by P.W 1 before the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry, denying the above evidence.

5. Learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry framed the following two points for determination:

“(1) Whether the petitioner Sundarammal @ Prema is the owner of the demised premises?

and

(2) Whether the petitioner bona fide required the premises for immediate demolition and reconstruction?”

On a detailed consideration of both the point Nos. 1 and 2, learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry, confirmed the order of the learned Rent Controller and ordered eviction. He has also held that the tenant is estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from questioning the title of the landlady, that Exs. B1 and B2 are in respect of T.S No. 66 and as per Ex. A1, the demised premises is T.S No. 68 and that therefore Exs. B1 and B2 have nothing to do with the demised premises. Learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry also has held that the landlady is the owner of the demised premises. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of both the Authorities below, the tenant has preferred the present Civil Revision Petition in this Court.

6. When this Civil Revision Petition came up for admission before this Court, notice of motion was ordered on 8-12-1994. On behalf of the landlady, Mr. T.P Manoharan took notice. However, as a condition to grant interim stay, this Court directed the tenant to deposit the entire arrears of rent and to produce the Challan in proof thereof, before this Court, in the meanwhile.

7. On 6-1-1995, it was represented before this Court that the tenant has complied with the the interim direction given by this Court. Consequently, by consent of both parties, the main Civil Revision Petition itself was taken up for final hearing and disposal.

8.I have heard Mr A.L Somayajee, learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr. G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.

9. The demised premises consist of brick walls constructed with mud mortar with asbestos sheets roof and vacant site apartment thereto on its rear side. Admittedly, the petitioner has been a tenant of the demised premises since 1964 and the premises originally covered with thatched roofing was replaced with asbestos sheets during the year 1975. The demised premises is in Kamaraj Salai, Pondicherry which is admittedly a busy locality. The landlady in her petition described the premises as follows: “a brick built structure covered by asbestos sheet. The landlady described her intentions of proposed action as follows:

.. To demolish the existing super-structure and construct a new building with better utility and for good return”.

The landlady also has mentioned in her petition that she has obtained necessary approval from Pondicherry Planning Authority for the proposed construction. She has further stated that she has sufficient means to do the demolition and reconstruction. She also has given an undertaking that she would commence the work of demolition of the building within a month of eviction and would complete the work before the expiry of three months. The tenant filed a counter affidavit, contending inter alia that the building is in good condition and that he had done certain repairs to the building etc. The landlady examined her husband as a witness on her behalf, besides marking eight documents in support of her pleadings, whereas the tenant examined himself as a witness and marked no documents. Accepting the claim of the landlady, the learned Rent Controller, Pondicherry allowed the petition for eviction. Thereafter, the appeal preferred by the tenant was unsuccessful. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition was filed by the tenant before this Court.

10. Mr. A.L Somayajee, learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner urged the following points at the time of hearing:

(1) There is neither pleading nor evidence on the side of the landlord as to the condition of the building. As such the main requirement of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act has not been established.

(2) The landlord, though avers in the petition that he wants to demolish the existing structure and put up a new construction to enable her to get better return, has got an approved plan only for a single storeyed residential portion. As such there is no bona fide in her claim.

(3) The sanction plan under Ex. A3, has been obtained in 1988, whereas the petition has been filed only in the year 1990.

(4) The petitioner has denied the title of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal. According to the petitioner the denial is bona fide, based on the Judgment of the Civil Court in O.S No. 223 of 1983, which has been marked as Ex. B1 in the appellate Court.

(5) The appellate authority has not given any finding as to whether the denial of title is bona fide or not.

(6) The appellate authority was in error in declaring the title of the landlord in the appeal for which it has no jurisdiction.

(7) The fact that in the description of property in the petition filed in the RCOP did not contain the survey number, Pymash number or even the boundaries, would show that the denial of title by the petitioner is bona fide.

(8) The measurements of the property has been changed in the appellate Court, the measurements of the vacant site were also given only in the appellate Court.

11. On the first point Mr. A.L Somayajee, learned senior counsel invited my attention to the only plea raised by the landlady in the RCOP regarding the condition of the building, which runs as follows:

“The petitioner submits that the demised premises under his occupation does not yield good return and as in the present condition it has not been properly utilised. The petitioner intends to demolish the existing structure and construct a new building with better utility and for good return”.

According to learned senior counsel, there is no allegation that the building is in a bad condition and it requires immediate demolition. On the other hand, the tenant has specifically pleaded in the counter affidavit as follows:

“It is further submitted that now the said shop is in good condition and not necessary for reconstruction and all repairs and necessary works already done by the respondent”.

Hence, according to the learned senior counsel, in the absence of necessary pleadings and proof the orders of the Court below based on surmises and conjectures are liable to be set aside.

Mr. A.L Somayaje, learned senior counsel also invited my attention to the following decisions in support of his contentions:

(a) P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) (1990 (2) MLJ = 1990-2-L.W. 547) particularly to paragraphs 27 and 28. of the said judgment, which read as follows: “These decisions in sofar as they have disregarded the vital importance of the condition of the building as a necessary circumstance for the landlord to prove before the Controller could make an order under Section 14(1)(b) directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building for the purpose of demolition have not correctly stated the law on the point”.

“Various circumstances such as capacity of the landlord, the size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment of capital on reconstruction may be taken into account by the concerned authority while considering an application for recovery, but the essential and overriding consideration which in general interests of the public and for the protection of the tenants from unreasonable eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building that demands timely demolition by reason of the extent of damage to its structure making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs. While the condition of the building by itself may not necessarily establish the bona fide requirement under clause (b), that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Controller, but it is the essential condition in the absence of which it would not be possible for the landlord to prove that he has a bona fide requirement, which is timely, directly and solely for the purpose of demolition of the building. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a bona fide requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building, in the context of relevant circumstances, requires demolition. These matters are to be proved by evidence”,

(emphasis supplied).

In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court, Mr. A.L Somayajee, learned senior Advocate contended that in the absence of any pleading or evidence on the side of the landlady, the Courts functioning under the Rent Control Act cannot order eviction of a tenant under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. He also cited the decisions reported in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1981 S.C 1711) and in Ramalingam Pillai and 7 Others v. Murugesan and Another (1993-1-L.W. 356.). The aforesaid two cases deal with the law of pleadings which require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. In Hasmatrai's case (AIR 1981 S.C 1711), the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“The burden to establish both the requirements of Section 12(1)(b) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved the law of pleadings that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore when a landlord seeks eviction under Section 12(1)(f), the Court, after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings, must frame two issues viz. (1) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable not residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned, without elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleading is generally of no relevance”.

Likewise in the decision reported in Ramalingam Pillai (1993-1-L.W. 356), this Court has held as follows:

“As the petitioners herein (tenants) have to succeed on the question of absence of necessary pleadings, the question of bona fides need not be gone into in this case and therefore the decision of the Supreme Court is also of no relevance”.

Therefore, Mr. A.L Somayajee, contended that in the absence of necessary pleadings in the petition, the orders of both the Authorities below will have to be interfered with.

12. Mr. G. Masilamani, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the landlady during the hearing of the main Civil Revision Petition argued that while considering such applications, the Court should also take into account the present day conditions and the nature of the buildings put up. Again, under Ex. A3, what is sought to be put by the landlady is not a multi-storeyed structure but a single storeyed residential accommodation. The husband of the landlady who had deposed as P.W 1 has stated in his evidence that the landlady herself may reside in the new building. Hence, according to Mr. A.L Somayajee, the argument of Mr. G. Masilamani that the present day conditions should be taken into account, cannot be accepted. It was also argued by learned senior counsel for the landlady that the Court should take notice of the nature of the building. The petition premises being an asbestos roofed structure, deserves to be demolished. This argument of Mr. A.L Somayajee cannot be accepted as the same had been made for the first time before this Court. Further there is neither plea nor evidence to support the said argument. The definition of a building under Section 2(4) of the Act does not make any distinction whatsoever between a terraced building and an asbestos roofed structure.

13. Learned senior counsel for the tenant, while reiterating his argument on point No. 2 that the sanctioned plan under Ex. A3 is only for a residential structure, that too single storeyed, would go a long way to show that there is no bona fide in the claim of the landlady and that though the landlady had obtained a sanctioned plan under Ex. A3 as early as on 22-3-1988, she has filed the petition only on 23-8-1990, i.e almost after two years and five months. The said plan has also not been renewed. In so far as point Nos. 4 to 8 are concerned, learned senior counsel for the petitioner tenant contended that the petitioner has denied the title of the respondent landlady in the appellate court on the ground that a competent civil court has found that the respondent/landlady has no title over the suit property and other properties. The judgment of the civil court in O.S No. 223 of 1987, a suit instituted by the respondent/landlady has been filed and marked as Ex. B1 before the Appellate Court. Even in the trial court the husband of the respondent landlady in his cross examination has admitted that the suit is pending. In view of the abovesaid judgment of the civil court in O.S No. 223 of 1987, in which a specific finding that the partition deed, dated 28-1-1992 under which the respondent landlady claims title to the suit property does not confer any title on the ancestors of the respondent landlady. In view of the fact that neither the Survey number nor the Paimash Number were given in the schedule of property in the RCOP, the fact that a different Survey number is sought to be given to the petition property in the appeal will not make the bona fide denial by the petitioner as mala fide. The husband of the respondent/landlady herein who was examined as P.W 1 has admitted the pendency of the civil dispute, even though he says that it is with regard to the vacant site abutting the petition premises. However, the plea of the respondent/landlady is that the revision petitioner is tenant in respect of the vacant site also.

14. The lower Appellate Court has held that the petitioner having become a tenant under the respondent is estopped from denying the title of the petitioner. This finding of the lower appellate Court is not correct, according to Mr. A.L Somayajee. A Division Bench of this Court in K. Appa Rao v. Maragathammal (1981 (1) MLJ 71 = 93 L.W 681) has held that there can be no estoppel. In paragraph 9 at page No. 75 of the said decision, it has been held as follows:

“In the present case there is no controversy that the tenants denied the title of the petitioner (landlord) only by putting forward the contention that some body else has become the owner of the property and to such a situation admittedly, the principle of estoppel contemplated by Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act will not apply”.

In such a situation, Mr. A.L Somayajee, learned senior counsel contended that the Appellate Court ought to have examined the bona fides of the denial. But the Appellate Court has not done so. The very point of determination framed by the appellate Court is beyond its jurisdiction. The Appellate Court constituted under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act cannot go into the question of title and decide the same.

15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner/tenant again relied on the decision in East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (AIR 1991 SC 1994 = 1991-2-L.W. 654 (S.C) wherein it has been held as follows: Para 9 at page 1098:

“But the decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides and not the correctness or validity of the denial or claim, for, these difficult questions are by the statute for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters”. According to learned senior counsel for the tenant, it is clear that the Appellate Authority has not framed the right question and has overstepped its jurisdiction in holding that the respondent/landlady has got title to the petition premises, and that the bona fides of the denial can be gone into only in a case based on the ground of denial of title, cannot be accepted. He also cited a decision in M. Subbarao v. P.V.K Krishna Rao (AIR 1989 SC 2187), in support of his contention that a denial of title by the tenant in the course of the proceedings is by itself sufficient to pass an order of eviction, if it is found that the denial is not bona fide, but on the other hand, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the denial is bona fide, it has to dismiss the eviction petition. The mere fact that eviction has been ordered on concurrent findings will not fetter the powers of this Court from interfering in revision, is the yet another contention of Mr. A.L Somayajee, learned senior counsel for the revision Petitioner/tenant. He also invited my attention to the decision in AIR 1987 SC 2179, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the High Court sitting in revision under Section 25 can interfere with concurrent findings, if they are based on assumptions and conjectures. He also relied upon my judgment in C.R.P No. 119 of 1990, dated 28-2-1995, where under I have held that in order to enable the landlady to obtain eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the condition of the building should be such that it requires immediate demolition. Concluding his arguments, Mr. A.L Somajayee, learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant contended that since there is no plea or evidence to show the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition and the denial of title is bona fide, he prays that this Court may allow the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the orders of both the Authorities below.

16. Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the landlady/respondent answered each and every one of the contentions of Mr. A.L Somayajee.

17. I have carefully considered the entire pleadings and the evidence adduced, both oral and documentary, and also the arguments advanced by both the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties. The main contention of the petitioner/tenant is that the landlady had not averred in her petition that the condition of the building is old and dilapidated and that the same is required for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. As already stated, much reliance was placed in the decision reported in P. Orr & Sons case (1990 (2) MLJ 12 = 1990-2-L.W. 547 (SC). It was further contended that on the strength of the said decision (Page 21 para 28) that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Rent Controller, but it is the essential condition, in the absence of which it would not be possible for the landlady to prove that she has a bona fide requirement which is timely, directly and solely for the purpose of demolition of the building. Therefore, the petition for eviction in the absence of a specific pleading that the building is old and dilapidated and therefore the same is required to be demolished immediately, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The contention of the revision petitioner/tenant according to Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady is untenable. In my opinion, the following reasons given by Mr. G. Masilamani in support of his contentions are quite convincing and acceptable to this Court:

(a) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the beginning of paragraph 28 of the Judgment has held a various circumstances, such as the capacity of the landlord, size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors, justifying investment of capital on reconstruction may be taken into account by the concerned authorities, while considering the requirement of the building on the essential and overriding consideration in the general interest of the public and for the protection of the tenant from unreasonable eviction.”

(b) Section 14(1)(b) of the Act stipulated that an order for eviction under the said section may be made, if the Controller is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolishing is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished.

(c) In the said Section, the basic stipulations for passing an order for eviction is the test and satisfaction of bona fide requirement. Therefore, the bona fide requirement could be established by several ways and one important circumstance which ought to be taken into consideration by the Court is the condition of the building.

(d) The condition of the building cannot be restricted to the stability of the building. The consideration of the condition of the building would include the nature of construction of the building. For an example, a fifty years old country tiled building, situate in a busy locality like Mount Road, or even a good residential locality however well maintained it may be, it cannot be said that the building should not be demolished for giving place to multistoreyed building. The word condition in the present context is given the following meaning in Oxford Encyclopaedic English Dictionary: The state of being or fitness of a thing, circumstances i especially those affecting the functioning or existence of something. It is apparent from the above said meaning, the word ‘condition’ cannot be assigned very restrictive meaning.

18. In the present case, the landlady/respondent has specifically stated in her petition that the building consists of brick built structure covered by Asbestos sheet. Further, the premises does not yield good return, and in the present condition it has not been properly utilised. Hence, she intends to demolish the existing structure and construct a new building with better utility and for good return. As stated already, the building is situate at Kamaraj Salai, which is admittedly a busy locality. It is borne out from the evidence of both the landlady/respondent and the tenant/petitioner that there is a large vacant space behind the existing building. A cumulative reading of all the above facts would make it clear that in a busy locality in Pondicherry town, the demised premises which is more than 30 years old, with asbestos roof, occupying one third of the site leaving two third of the site vacant, behind the building. I have already extracted the rulings made by the Supreme Court in P. Orr. & Sons case (1990 (2) MLJ 12 = 1990-2-MLJ 547 (SC) To the above facts, if the decision in P. Orr. & Sons case (cited supra) is applied, every requirement referred in paragraph 28 of the said decision shall be fully satisfied to deserve an order of eviction.

(a) Capacity of the landlord to demolish and to reconstruct is undisputed and also proved satisfactorily.

(b) The size of the existing building occupies only one third of the site, leaving two third behind vacant and unutilised

(c) Demand for additional space:

The demised premises is situated in a busy locality. Therefore, there is a great demand for additional space in the locality which could be met by demolishing the existing small building and putting up a larger building providing for future development vertically also, by building pucca terraced building.

(d) The economic advantage: A modern construction of a larger building shall certainly yield better revenue and also appreciate in value, when compared to the asbestos sheet roofed, old building.

I may also consider the other factors, viz., public interest and the object of the Act, as pointed out by the Apex Court. In the public interest also, old, out model asbestos sheet roof buildings should be replaced with better and modern buildings which would provide for better quality accommodation to the needs of the present day. The preservation of an old asbestos roofed building in the midst of modern construction, in a busy locality of a town, shall, not only be an eye sore but also against the soaring public demand for additional space. Stalling growth, development and increases of quality and quantity construction for the sake of one tenant, who is in occupation of the premises consisting of brick walls constructed with mud mortar with asbestos sheets roof occupying one third of the site, leaving two third behind vacant and unutilised shall be in my humble opinion against the public interest. The object of the Act, as stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 28 of the above said Judgment ‘the essential and overriding considerations which, in the general interest of the public and for the protection of the tenants from unreasonable eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building that demands timely demolition by reason of the extent of the damage to its structure making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs. In the present case, needless for me to say that the old asbestos roof building occupying only one third of the site would be uneconomical to maintain the same, as such, for ever or to repair the same. Further, the Supreme Court also has mentioned the consideration in the general interest of the public, when a big site should yield to a larger modern building with an increased and enlarged accommodation having better facilities, to solve the ever increasing demand for more space in the light of the population explosion in our country.

19. While construing the bona fide requirements under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the structural and physical features, the nature of the construction of the building cannot be ignored. As a matter of fact, I had an occasion to interpret “the phrase viz., residential and non residential building appearing in Section 3 of the Act, while deciding a Civil Revision Petition No. 2208 of 1989 (dated 6-3-1995). I also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in (1977 (2) SCC 835) for the proposition that the usage or purpose test is not at all the criteria to find out whether a building is structural or non residential, but one must go by structural and physical features of the building. Even though the above observations had been made in a different context of a case, nevertheless, the general principle can be applied to the case on hand also to find out the condition of the building which was sought to be demolished by examining its structural and physical features.

20. In the light of the aforesaid facts, there are enough pleadings and evidence on record to test the bona fide requirement of the landlady/respondent under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. The Rent Control cases being in the nature of summary proceedings, the very strict test of pleadings as required in regular civil cases need not be applied In the decision reported in 100 L.W 258. it has been laid down by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice Chandurkar, J, as follows:

“Pleadings in such matters cannot be construed with’ the strictness with which pleadings in civil suits are construed”.

Therefore, the contention of the revision petitioner/tenant that there was not enough and specific pleading to support the oral evidence cannot be upheld. The various decisions cited by me in this regard and the oral evidence adduced on the side of the landlady/respondent are in my opinion in conformity with and supportive of the pleadings in each and every respect. This Court exercising powers of revision under Section 25 of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act cannot be called upon by the revision petitioner tenant to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at a different conclusion as against the concurrent findings of both the Authorities below. I am therefore of the view that this is not a fit case, where this Court is called upon to exercise the revisional power and interfere with the concurrent findings of both the Authorities below in the present revision. In my opinion, no error, much less a material error or commission of impropriety has been established against the verdicts of the Courts below for the revision petitioner to interfere with the verdicts of the Courts below. The decision relied on by learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner in AIR 1981 SC 1711 cannot be applied to the facts of this case. That was a case under Section 12(1)(e) & (f) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act. The facts and circumstances of the said case are totally so different that the principles laid down in that case cannot be imported to the present facts of the case. Similarly, the relevant provision of law considered in that case also cannot be compared with Section 14(1)(b) of Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In the present case, there are enough and sufficient pleadings and evidence based thereon on the side of the landlady/respondent and the very admissions made by the revision petitioner/tenant are sufficient enough to disclose the condition of the building in question and all other germane factors which are necessary to decide the case on merits. Likewise the decision in 1993 (1) L.W 356 relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner/tenant cannot be applied to the facts of this case.

21. The attempt on the part of the revision petitioner/tenant to deny the title of the landlord at the appellate stage cannot be countenanced for the following reasons:

(a) The property which is the subject matter of eviction is bearing door No. 212, Kamaraj Saiai, whereas Exs. B1 and B2 marked before the Appellate Tribunal relate to a property situate in Meera Sahib Lane. Therefore the properties are different. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent/landlady is not the owner of the demised premises and therefore she is not entitled to seek eviction.

(b) The revision petitioner/tenant having admitted that the respondent/landlady is the owner of the premises and having paid the monthly rent to her for so many years, cannot contend that she is not the owner of the premises. No reliance can also be placed on Exs. B1 and B2 which relate to different property and to which proceedings the revision petitioner tenant is not a party too.

(c) Under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act), the landlord is defined as a person entitled to receive rents. In the present case, the respondent/landlady has been receiving the monthly rent continuously for so many years. Therefore, the revision petitioner/tenant cannot dispute the right of the respondent/landlady.

(d) The petition for eviction was one on the ground of demolition and reconstruction and not, on the ground of denial of the title of the landlady only in cases, where eviction is sought for on the ground of denial of title of the landlord, the Court should go into the question, whether such denial is bona fide or mala fide and to pass order accordingly. This is not one of such cases.

22. In the light of the aforesaid reasons and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that this Civil Revision Petition has got to be rejected. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

KA/CH/VCS