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  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Central Act 28 of 1987)
  • Prisons Act, 1984 (Central Act IX of 1894)
  • Sec. 59 the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Central Act 28 of 1987)
  • Prisons Act, 1984 (Central Act IX of 1894)
  • Sec. 59 the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The common question in the grouped petitions was whether G.O. Ms. 972, Home (Prison-B), dated 8.6.1992 (a proviso introduced to Rule 541(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules) is unconstitutional and invalid. The proviso restricted personal interviews with accused and undertrial prisoners under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ("TADA Act") to only a legal adviser and enumerated close family relatives (father, mother, husband, wife, brother, sister, son and daughter); distant relatives could interview only after obtaining orders of the State Government in the Home Department; friends were categorically barred. One writ petition (W.P. No. 8710 of 1992) had become infructuous because the petitioners' clients were no longer in detention, but the court chose not to dismiss it because the same constitutional question arose in other petitions. The petitions challenged the validity of the proviso primarily on two grounds: (1) impermissible classification/discrimination against TADA prisoners, and (2) arbitrariness/unreasonable restriction on prisoners' rights under the law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether G.O. Ms. 972, Home (Prison-B), dated 8.6.1992 (the proviso to Rule 541(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules) is unconstitutional and invalid.
  2. Whether the proviso impermissibly discriminates by classifying prisoners under the TADA Act into a separate class for more restrictive visitation rules.
  3. Whether the proviso is arbitrary and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the visitation rights of undertrial prisoners, including complete prohibition of visits by friends and restrictive, undefined treatment of "distant relatives".

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The proviso discriminates against undertrial prisoners under the TADA Act by treating them as a separate class without nexus to the object of the proviso, thereby denying them constitutional rights.
  • The proviso is arbitrary and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the rights of prisoners to receive visits; it prevents undertrial TADA prisoners from enjoying constitutional protections and reasonable facilities for communication.

State Government / Respondents' Arguments

  • The State justified the proviso on grounds of security: friends and distant relatives who are permitted to interview TADA prisoners allegedly indulge in indiscipline and can be instigated by the accused to create problems outside the prison.
  • The State asserted that it is open to the Government to impose restrictions for security reasons and to take into account various factors including the nature and gravity of offences involved, relying on Supreme Court precedent (A.K. Roy) that each detention-related restrain must be examined in context.
  • The State urged that the proviso could be upheld by applying the doctrine of "reading down" to save its constitutional validity.
  • The State also relied on procedural safeguards said to be in place (e.g., obtaining a list of relatives at custody, antecedent verification) as supporting the measure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710 (1982) 1 S.C.C. 271 The difficulty of framing a uniform code for treatment of detenus; each case must be examined to determine whether restraints are excessive and unrelated to detention's object (paragraph 108 quoted). The State relied on this authority to justify case-by-case security restrictions; the court acknowledged this principle but proceeded to examine the proviso on its own textual and constitutional merits.
David Patrick Ward v. Union of India, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 154 Where authorities have taken a conscious security-based decision to detain persons at a particular jail and offer visiting facilities there, courts are reluctant to order shifts (passage quoted regarding security and visits). The court noted the passage cited by respondents to support the security rationale but did not allow it to validate the impugned proviso that the court found arbitrary in its terms.
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579 Visits by family and friends are a humane amenity; subject to search, discipline and security, the right to be visited under reasonable restrictions has constitutional status; liberal visits by family and close friends are part of prisoners' rights. The court treated these principles as authoritative guidelines for framing permissible rules and explicitly directed that any future rules must fall within the guidelines in Sunil Batra.
Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746 (also cited with other reporters) Restrictions (such as allowing only one interview a month) were held unreasonable and arbitrary; restrictions on interview with legal adviser of the prisoner's choice were unconstitutional; principle that certain classes of prisoners can be distinguished for legitimate reasons. The court relied on Francis Coralie both to recognize permissible classification among prisoners (as supporting the separate treatment of TADA prisoners) and to show that unreasonable restrictions on visits are unlawful; the case informed the court's assessment of reasonableness and minimality of restrictions.
Usmanbhai Davoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922 Characterized the TADA Act as an extreme measure enacted because ordinary penal law was inadequate; the Act provides special machinery to combat terrorism, thereby supporting distinct legislative treatment. The court invoked this authority to reject the petitioners' argument that TADA prisoners could not constitute a separate class for regulatory purposes.
Sampath Prakash's case, 1969 Crl.L.J. 1555 (as cited in Francis Coralie) Restrictions placed on a detenu must, consistent with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal. Referenced (via Francis Coralie) to support the proposition that detention-related restrictions should be minimal; informed the court's view that excessive restrictions would violate Arts. 14 and 21.
Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu etc., 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 606 Upheld the validity of Rule 530A (fibre glass partition) and set out detailed safeguards and operational guidelines for interviews through partitions (screening, frisking, monitoring, counsel interview procedures, documentary censoring in certain cases, etc.). The court cited the Division Bench's detailed guidelines to show that adequate safeguards to prevent security risks already existed in prison rules, and therefore the impugned proviso—being more restrictive and indefinite—was unnecessary and unreasonable.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101 Limits the scope of the doctrine of "reading down": if plain and literal meaning of a provision violates natural justice or the Constitution, it cannot be saved by adding words or reading it down. The court invoked this authority to refuse the State's plea that the offending proviso be saved by reading down; the doctrine could not be used to rewrite the plain wording of the proviso to make it constitutional.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. Framing the question: The court identified the common issue of whether the G.O. introducing a proviso to Rule 541(1) restricting visitors for undertrial TADA prisoners was unconstitutional and invalid.
  2. Petitioners' contentions: The court noted two principal contentions — that the proviso discriminated against TADA prisoners by treating them as a separate class without nexus to the object of the proviso, and that the proviso was arbitrary and imposed unreasonable restrictions on prisoners' visitation rights.
  3. On classification: The court rejected the challenge to classification. It explained that the TADA Act itself was enacted to provide special machinery for dealing with terrorism and disruptive activities, representing a legislative judgment that such offences may be treated differently from ordinary offences. The court relied on Usmanbhai Memon and Francis Coralie to conclude there was no error in classifying TADA prisoners as a separate group for regulatory purposes.
  4. On arbitrariness and reasonableness: The court found the second contention meritorious. It analysed the language of the proviso and found it clumsy and arbitrary: the proviso enumerated certain "close family relatives" and used the word "alone", thereby excluding all others; it then permitted "distant relatives alone" to apply to the Home Department for permission, without defining "distant relatives". The court illustrated the absurdity with factual examples (e.g., mother-in-law, wife's brother, father's brother) showing that persons who could reasonably be regarded as close relations were excluded by the proviso's wording. The absolute prohibition on friends interviewing undertrials ("under no circumstances, friends shall be allowed") gives no discretion to authorities and could leave some prisoners with no means of contact outside the prison, which the court found wholly unreasonable.
  5. Consideration of State's security justification: The court recorded the State's assertion that antecedent verification and other safeguards justified the proviso. The court noted, however, that the prison rules already provided for safeguards (e.g., Rule 530 requiring screens or wiremesh partitions; Rule 530A providing fibre glass partitions). The Division Bench decision in Nalini (upholding Rule 530A) had articulated detailed procedures (frisking, partitions, monitoring, intercoms, counsel interview exceptions, documentary controls) that provided practical security mechanisms.
  6. Weighing necessity and efficacy: The court reasoned that even close relatives could be complicit in escape or disruptive activities, and those same relatives were permitted to meet the prisoner under the ordinary rule without seeking Home Department permission. Thus, the proviso's chosen categories and its total bar on friends did not coherently serve the stated security objective. Given that other less restrictive safeguards existed, the proviso was unnecessary and disproportionate.
  7. Doctrine of reading down: The court rejected the State's submission that the proviso could be saved by reading down. It relied on the Delhi Transport Corporation decision that the plain literal meaning of a provision cannot be rewritten to save it if that meaning violates constitutional norms.
  8. Final application: On the basis of the textual analysis, constitutional norms (including the guidance in Sunil Batra and Francis Coralie), and the availability of less restrictive safeguards, the court concluded the proviso is arbitrary, unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional and illegal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held that G.O. Ms. 972, Home (Prison-B) dated 8.6.1992 is unconstitutional and illegal and accordingly quashed the said G.O.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The writ petitions were allowed to the extent of quashing the G.O.; other reliefs sought in one writ petition (W.P. No. 9630 of 1992) were found to be outside the scope of the petitions and were not considered; in other respects the petitions were dismissed.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The court expressly left open to the State Government the power to frame rules consistent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and the Division Bench's guidelines in Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu, thereby indicating that appropriately tailored, constitutionally compliant rules addressing security and procedural safeguards could be enacted in place of the quashed proviso.

Broader precedent status: The opinion applied and relied upon existing Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities to resolve the matter; it did not purport to create a novel general principle beyond applying established authorities to the facts and the text of the proviso.

    Dr. M. Karunanidhi And Others v. State Of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Its Secretary, Home (Prison) Dept. And Others

    In all these cases, the common question is whether G.O.Ms 972, Home (Prison-B), dated 8.6.1992 is unconstitutional and invalid. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor points out that W.P No. 8710 of 1992 has become infructuous inasmuch as the persons on whose behalf the petition was filed are not now in detention. But, we do not want to dismiss the petition on the ground that it has become infructuous since we are considering the same question in the other writ petitions.

    2. The Prisons Act, 1984 (Central Act IX of 1894) empowers the Government to make rules. Sec. 59 provides for the same. Sec. 40 of the said Act provides that due provision shall be made for the admission at proper times and under proper restrictions, into every prison of persons with whom civil or unconvicted criminal prisoners may desire to communicate, care being taken that, so far as may be consistent with the interest of justice prisoners undertrial may see their duly qualified legal advisers without the presence of any other person. Under Sec. 59 the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules have been framed by the State Government. Rule 541 (1) thereof is to the effect that unconvicted criminal prisoners and civil prisoners shall be granted all reasonable facilities at proper times and under proper restrictions for interviewing or otherwise communicating either orally or in writing, with their relatives, friends and legal advisers. The State Government passed G.O.Ms No. 972 Home (Prison-B) dated 8.6.1992 introducing a proviso to the said rule, which is in the following terms:

    “Provided that in respect of accused and undertrial prisoners under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Central Act 28 of 1987) only legal adviser and close family relatives, namely father, mother, husband, wife, brother, sister, son and daughter of prisoner shall alone be allowed for interviewing such prisoners. If the prisoner does not have any such close relative, then distant relatives alone shall be allowed to have interview, after obtaining orders of the Government in the Home Department. Under no circumstances, friends shall be allowed to interview the prisoner.”

    It is the validity of the said proviso that is challenged in these cases. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners are mainly two-fold. (1) The proviso makes a discrimination against the prisoners under Central Act 28 of 1987. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘TADA Act’) It is contended that the persons who are undertrial prisoners under the said Act cannot be treated as a separate class. It is submitted that persons who are convicted for grave offences are given a better treatment but the proviso prevents the under-trial prisoners under the said Act from enjoying their Constitutional rights. (2) The proviso is arbitrary and it imposes an unreasonable restrictions on the rights of the prisoners recognised by law. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary to refer to the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners.

    3. The stand taken by the State Government is that the friends and distant relatives who get permission to interview remand prisoners and undertrial prisoners under TADA Act are always indulging in indiscipline inside and outside the prison premises. The accused and undertrial prisoners instigate their friends to create problems outside. After viewing the situation, especially in the case of the prisoners under the TADA Act, the Government thought fit to bring the amendment and introduced the proviso. It is submitted by learned counsel that it is open to the Government to impose restrictions for reasons of security. The Government can, according to him, take into account the various factors including the nature and gravity of the offences involved. It is submitted that each has to be determined on the relevant circumstances as decided by the Supreme Court in A.K Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R 1982 S.C 710: 1982 Crl.L.J 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C 271: 1982 S.C.C (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J 68: 1982 M.L.J (Crl). 524. Reliance is placed upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph 108 of the judgment:

    “It is difficult for us to frame a code for the treatment of detenus while they are held in detention. That will involve an exercise which calls for examination of minute details, which we cannot undertake. We shall have to examine each case as it comes before us, in order to determine whether the restrains imposed upon the detenu in any particular case are excessive and unrelated to the object of detention.”

    4. Our attention is also drawn to the observations made in David Patrick Ward v. Union of India, (1992) 4 S.C.C 154. The following passage is referred to:

    “If the authorities concerned have taken a conscious decision, as is disclosed from their counter-affidavits that the need for security requires that the petitioners should be kept in Naini Jail at Allahabad and have come forward to offer all facilities to the officers of the British High Commission desirous of visiting them at Naini Jail, Allahabad to have easy access to the petitioners, we find it difficult to grant the prayer in the petition seeking the shifting of the petitioners from Naini Jail, Allahabad to Tihar Jail, Delhi. 28 . . . ..

    But in this case, having regard to its facts and a conscious decision taken by the respondents, from the point of view of security, to detain the petitioners in Naini Jail, Allahabad, we do not think we could concede to their request to shift them to Tihar Jail at Delhi, more so, when the counter-affidavit indicates that whenever visits are desired by officers of British High Commission, proper arrangements will be made in that behalf :”

    5. It is submitted that in present case, the proviso is introduced by the Government after taking into account all the relevant facts and in particular the security risk involved in permitting the distant relations and friends to interview the under trial prisoners, under the TADA Act. Finally it is contended by learned counsel that in any event, the validity of the proviso must be upheld by applying the doctrine of reading down.

    6. It is by now well settled that the prisoners should not be deprived of their constitutional rights inside the prison. The Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines with regard to the handling of prisoners inside the prison by the authorities in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R 1980 S.C 1579. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to refer to the following passage in the judgment.

    “Visits to prisoners by family and friends are a solace in insulation; and only a dehumanised system can derive vicarious delight in depriving prison inmates of this humane amenity. Subject, of course, to search, and discipline and other security criteria, the right society of fellow-men, parents, and other family members cannot be denied in the light of Art. 19 and its sweep. Moreover, the whole habitative purpose of sentencing is to soften not to harden, and this will be promoted by more such meetings. A sullen, forlorn prisoner is a dangerous criminal in the making and the prison is the factory. Sheldon Krantz rightly remarks: Sheldon Krantz, Corrections and Prisoners Rules PP 129-130.

    In 1973, the National Advisory Commission argued that prisoners should have a “right” to visitation. Task Force Report. Corrections (1973) at 66. It also argued that correctional officials should not merely tolerate visiting but should encourage it particularly, by families. Although the Commission recognised that regulations were necessary to contend with space problems and with security concerns, it proposed that priority be given to making visiting areas pleasant and unobstrusive. It also urged that Corrections officials should not eavesdrop on conversations or otherwise interfere with the participants privacy. Thus, although there may be current limitations on the possible use of the Constitution on visitations by family and friends, public policy should dictate substantial improvements in this area, in any event, we see no reason, why the right to be visited under reasonable restrictions should not claim current constitutional status. We hold, subject to considerations of security and discipline, that liberal visits by family members, close friends and legitimate callers, are part of the prisoners, kit of rights and shall be respected.

    7. In Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 M.L.J (Crl.) 33: A.I.R 1981 S.C 746: 1981 Crl. L.J 306: (1981) 1 S.C.C 608: 1981 S.C.C (Crl.) 212: (1981) 2 S.C.J 18: (1981) 2 S.C.R 516, the question as regards the interview by the legal adviser with the prisoner has been considered in detail. While doing so, the Court also referred to the relevant rule which restricted the interview by relatives to once in a month and observed that it was unreasonable and arbitrary. The Court also held that the restrictions imposed with regard to the interview with the legal adviser of the choice of the prisoner in the particular rule was unconstitutional. The court said:

    9. Now obviously when an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews with relatives and friends twice in a week under Rule 559-A and a convicted prisoner is permitted to have interviews with his relatives and friends once in a week under Rule 550, it is difficult to understand how sub-clause (ii) of clause 3 (b) of the conditions of Detention order, which restricts the interview only to once in a month in case of a detenu can possibly be regarded as reasonable and non-arbitrary, particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an under-trial prisoner or a convict and, as held by this Court in Sampath Prakash's case, 1969 Crl.L.J 1555 restrictions placed on a detenu must “consistent with the effectives of detention, be minimal”. We would therefore unhesitatingly hold sub-clause (ii) of clause 3 (b) to be violative of Arts. 14 and 21 in so far as it permits only one interview in a month to a detenu. We are of the view that a detenu must be permitted to have at least two interviews in a week with relatives and friends and it should be possible for a relative or friend to have interview with detenu at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission from the Superintendent of the jail and it should not necessary to seek the permission of the District Magistrate Delhi, as the latter procedure would be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view of security and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say that even independently of Rules 550 and 559-A we would regard the present norm of two interviews in a week for prisoners as furnishing a criterion of what we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary.

    8. In this background the validity of the G.O has to be considered. The first contentions of the petitioners is that the proviso makes a hostile discrimination against the prisoners under the TADA Act. It is their contention that there is no nexus between the classification of TADA prisoners and the other prisoners and the object of the proviso. It is submitted that security risk is present in the case of all prisoners and the TADA Prisoners cannot be classified into a separate group. There is no merit in this contention. The Act itself was passed in order to make special provisions for the prevention of and for coping with the Terrorist and Disruptive activities and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Some of the provisions are a departure from the ordinary law, since the common law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the special class of offenders indulging in terrorist and disruptive activities. The legislature considered such crimes to an aggravated nature which could not be checked or controlled under the ordinary law and enacted deterrent provisions to combat the same. The Supreme Court has said in Usmanbhai Davoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 S.C 922 that the Act is an extreme measure to be resorted to when the police cannot tackle the situation under the ordinary Penal law and the intendment is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. Hence, there is no merit in the contention that TADA prisoners cannot be classified as separate group. The principle of classification among the prisoners is recognised by the Supreme Court in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 M.L.J (Crl). 33: A.I.R 1981 S.C 746: 1981 Crl.L.J 306: (1981) 1 S.C.C 608: 1981 S.C.C (Crl.) 212: (1981) 2 S.C.J 18: (1981) 2 S.C.R 516. In the passage extracted already, it is pointed out that the detenus under the COFEPOSA Act stand on a higher pedestal than under trial prisoner or a convict. Hence, we do not find any error in the classification of TADA prisoners as a separate group.

    9. The Second contention that the proviso is arbitrary and imposes unreasonable Restriction is well founded. In fact, the languages used in the proviso appears to be somewhat clumsy. The first sentence deals with legal adviser and close family relatives. But it specifies the persons who are considered to be close family relatives for the purpose of the proviso viz., father, mother, husband, wife, brother, sister, son and daughter of such prisoner. The sentence also uses the expression ‘alone’. Thus, all the other relatives are excluded from the category mentioned in the first sentence. The second sentence does not refer to the other relatives, but, it uses the expression ‘distant relatives’. Here again, the word ‘alone’ is used. In W.P No. 10158 of 1992 the petitioner is the mother-in-law of the prisoner. The prisoner has no other near relation in this country. His wife is also outside the country. In those circumstances the mother-in-law wants to have an interview with the prisoner. But, the proviso does not bring within its ambit, mother-in-law. Can it be said that mother-in-law is a distant relation ? If the proviso contemplates that all persons who are not mentioned in the first sentence are distant relations, the proviso is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable. For example, it cannot be said that a wife's brother and father's brother are distant relations. Even such persons are excluded from the named category. If the second sentence had been made applicable to all the relatives, other than the named relative, there might not have been any difficulty in understanding it. But, it uses the expression ‘distant relatives alone’. But, persons who, are in fact close relations and cannot be classified as ‘distant relatives’ have no place at all. They cannot interview the prisoner under any circumstances as the second sentence provides for ‘distant relatives alone’ without defining the expression distant relatives. It is only the distant relatives who can approach the Home Department for permission to interview. Even if the word ‘distant’ is understood as meaning ‘either’ in the contest the word ‘alone’ will be meaningless. The word ‘alone’ leads us to think that there were some relatives who are neither close nor distant. Thus, the first sentence does not refer to close relatives other than those expressly named while the second applies only to distant relatives.

    10. As regards friends, the last sentence in the proviso reads that under no circumstances, friends shall be allowed to interview the prisoner. No discretion is given to the authority. As the proviso now stand, if a prisoner has not close family relatives, named in the first sentence or any distant relatives no friend of the prisoner can interview him. If the undertrial prisoner has only friends, then he cannot have interview with anybody from outside world. That is wholly unreasonable as pointed out by the Supreme Court.

    11. The contention of the Government is that at the time when the prisoner is taken into custody a list of relatives is obtained from him and the Government verifies whether the particulars of such relatives are true. Their antecedents are said to have been checked up by the Government. It is contended that if any other person is to interview the prisoner, the Superintendent of prison will not have sufficient machinery or time to verify their antecedents and permit them to have interview and that is the reason why such instant relations are made to apply to the Home Department and get orders. If the object of introducing the proviso is for security reason, then sufficient safeguards can be made otherwise than by the proviso not introduced. In fact, Rule 530 provides that screens or wiremesh partition shall be put up, if necessary between the prisoners and the persons interviewing them to prevent the passage or introduction of any prohibited articles between them. The Government introduced Rule 530A providing for a partition with fibre glass. The validity of that Rule was challenged in this Court in Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu etc., 1993 L.W (Crl.) 606. The Division Bench which considered the question has referred to the relevant judgment of the Supreme Court and upheld the validity of the said rule. Ultimately, the Division Bench said thus:

    “Keeping in view, the Courts will have to strike a just balance between the right of the prisoner and the preservation of internal order, discipline and maintenance of institutional security against threat to lives and escape attempts by prisoners, in the background of community as well, the final picture which emerges out, can be formulated as follows:

    (1) The State Government has power under Secs. 40 and 59 of the Prisons act, to introduce Rule 530-A in the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual and the said rule cannot be struck down as ultra vires of the constitution or null and void on any reasonable basis.

    (2) A distinction will have to be made regarding interviews between defending counsel and prisoners and prisoners and other visitors.

    (3) Visitors can have interviews with prisoners in the interview room only with the existence of fibre glass partition. They will have to be frisked, checked and monitered before interviews, and if need arises after interviews as well. Visitors will not be permitted to touch the prisoners. Obviously, such touching is not feasible due to existence of fibre glass partition.

    (4) Defending counsel normally shall interview prisoners one at a time, on either side, through fibre glass partition, conversation between them being through inter-com facilities, which shall be maintained without any defect and effectively, by prison authorities at all times.

    (5) In the event of an emergent need for communication between counsel and prisoner on non-court hearing date, a single prisoner and a counsel can engage themselves in interview, on the basis of a documents which need mutual reading, through an opening in the fibre glass partition, or sliding of the fibre glass partition to the extent necessary and sufficient for the said purpose. A prisoner will be searched before and after the interview and similarly the counsel will have to undergo the process of frisking, checking before and after conclusion of such special interviews.

    (6) Counsel shall continue to have interviews with prisoners in court hall, with the permission of the Designated judge, on hearing date, either individually or collectively, with the prisoners subject of course, to security arrangements, which are now in existence, and admittedly not causing any hindrance, for effective communication, between counsel and client, for the security men are stationed within vision of interviewer and the interviewed, but at non-hearing distance. In the event of a dire need, with the permission of the Designated Judge, Court sitting time can be modulated to facilitate interview in Court hall, between client and defending counsel.

    (7) Interviews between visitors and prisoners can be monitered through a third intercom instrument kept in the prisoner's side of the interview room, as is being done now, but such monitoring shall not be done, when defending counsel interview prisoners, the only exception being, when specific intelligence material, is available, needing such monitoring in which event, counsel shall be apprised of such monitoring in advance.

    (8) Neither the visitor nor the counsel, will be allowed to touch the prisoner under any circumstances, at least so far as the present exigencies, exist.

    (9) Whenever circumstances so demand, documentary communication if any, between counsel and prisoner can be censored, for the need to detect passing of incriminating material would certainly outweigh the prisoner's right to unmonitored communication with counsel.”

    12. The observations made by the Division Bench show that there are sufficient safeguards in the Rules and introduction of the proviso to R. 541 (1) may be wholly unnecessary. If a visitor is not going to be permitted to touch the prisoner or to have direct contact with him, or to have an interview with him in the absence of an official, there is no question of any risk of the security by allowing him to have the interview. At any rate, it will be certainly open to the Government to provide for such safeguards as would ensure that there is no attempt by the prisoners to escape or his friends or relatives to help him in doing so or engage in any disruptive activities. On the other hand, the proviso now introduced will not serve that purpose. Even a close relative who is now permitted by the rule to meet the prisoner without approaching the Home Department, but on living a requisition to the Superintendent of Prison can help the prisoner to escape or engage in undesirable activities. In fact, it can be said that the close relatives may be mere interested in getting the prisoner out than friends or distanct relatives. Thus, the proviso may not enable the fulfilment of the object for which it is said to have been introduced.

    13. The contention of the respondents that the doctrine of ‘reading down’ be applied and the validity of the Rule should be upheld, cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the doctrine in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress, A.I.R 1991 S.C 101 and observed that where the plain and literal meaning that follows from a bare reading of the provisions of the Act, Rule or Regulations violates the principles of natural justice or the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot be read down to save the said provision from constitutional invalidity by bringing in or adding words to the same.

    14. In the circumstances, the proviso is undoubtedly arbitrary and unreasonable. The restriction imposed on the distanct relatives i.e, to approach the Government in the Home Department before having an interview with the prisoner is an unreasonable one. So also the prevention of interview by friends under any circumstances.

    15. In the circumstances, we held that G.O Ms. 972, Home (Prison-B) dated 8.6.1992 is unconstitutional and illegal. The said G.O is quashed. In one of the writ petitions viz., W.P No. 9630 of 1992, some other reliefs are prayed for. They are not consequential to the quashing of the G.O They are entirely outside the scope of the writ petition. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to consider the same.

    16. The writ petitions are allowed to the extent of quashing the said G.O only. In other respects, they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. It is open to the Government to frame rules, which would fail within the guidelines fixed by the Supreme Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administratiton, A.I.R 1980 S.C 1579 and the Division Bench in Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu etc., 1993 L.W (Crl.) 606.

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