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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 29(A) of the Hindu Succession Act introduced by T.N Amending Act 1 of 1990
  • S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.15. S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989:(v)
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act,
  • assets.35. S. 1 of Tamilnadu Act 1 of 1990
  • S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 29(A) of the Hindu Succession Act introduced by T.N Amending Act 1 of 1990
  • S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.15. S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989:(v)
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act,
  • assets.35. S. 1 of Tamilnadu Act 1 of 1990
  • S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (first respondent) instituted C.S. No. 63 of 1982 seeking partition and separate possession of a 1/8 share in various properties described in the plaint schedules and an accounting of income from those properties. The principal defendant and appellant is the father (aged about 79 at institution of the suit), a prominent public figure with a complex family history and multiple marriages. The parties are his children by earlier marriages and the 9th defendant, whom the trial court found not to be the legally wedded wife of the appellant; the daughter of the 9th defendant was not originally a party but was later sought to be impleaded in the appeal as 10th defendant.

At trial the Subordinate Judge found that a large body of the schedule properties were joint family properties and passed a preliminary decree awarding each of plaintiff and certain defendants an equal 1/8th share in the items described (with some items not pressed by plaintiff during trial). The trial court also held that the 9th defendant was not the appellant's legally wedded wife and that her daughter was not a necessary party. The appellant appealed the preliminary decree and sought (inter alia) to admit additional documents, to implead the 10th defendant, and to challenge the classification of multiple properties as joint family assets.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court correctly characterized the various schedule properties as joint family (coparcenary) property or as the separate self-acquisitions/separate property of the appellant (including whether specific items were already alienated and therefore not available for division).
  2. Whether additional documentary evidence (six documents identified by the appellant) should be admitted in the appellate court under Order 41, Rule 27(b), C.P.C.
  3. Whether the 10th defendant (daughter of the 9th defendant) is a necessary party and whether she is entitled to be impleaded.
  4. Whether the 9th defendant was the legally wedded wife of the appellant (i.e., whether cohabitation raised a presumption of marriage) and the consequences of that finding for the status of the 10th defendant.
  5. Whether the mother's life-estate properties (items 9–11) were enlarged into absolute ownership by operation of S.14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and, if so, whether those items are separate property of the appellant not subject to partition.
  6. Whether item 22 (allotted to the appellant in the 1932 partition allegedly as remuneration for discharging family debts) is convertable into separate property or remains coparcenary property vis-à-vis the appellant's sons.
  7. Whether the Tamil Nadu amendment introducing S.29A (making daughters coparceners) applies so as to entitle the newly impleaded daughter (10th defendant) to a share comparable to the sons, given that only a preliminary decree, but not a final decree, had been passed before the amendment's commencement.
  8. What is the proper order as to costs in this partition suit — whether costs should be borne personally or come out of the estate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as reported)

  • Many schedule items (numerous enumerated items) do not belong to the family and therefore should not be subjected to partition; some items were sold away or exchanged and thus are not available for division.
  • Certain items (particularly items 26–41 bought between 1923–1926) were purchased by the appellant prior to the 1932 partition and were self-acquisitions or were allotted to his brother under Ex. A1, hence not family property.
  • Item 22 was allotted to him in lieu of his undertaking to collect and discharge family debts and therefore should be treated as his separate property (relying on Narayanan v. Ranganadhan).
  • The appellant contended that he and the 9th defendant were legally married (marriage in 1969) and that the daughter (10th defendant) is his legitimate child.
  • The appellant sought to file six additional documents in the appellate Court (sale deed, exchange deed and four letters) explaining age, advanced illness and loneliness in litigation as cause for earlier non-production of documents.
  • Regarding costs, appellant submitted that ordinary partition costs should be borne by the estate or that parties bear their own costs; he challenged the trial court's order requiring him to pay plaintiff's costs (including stamp duty/penalty on certain documents).

Plaintiff / Respondent Arguments (as reported)

  • Plaintiff alleged that the bulk of the properties were joint family properties — acquired out of family (ancestral) funds or treated as family property — and thus available for partition among father and sons.
  • Plaintiff denied the 9th defendant was the appellant's legally wedded wife and denied that the daughter of the 9th defendant was born to the appellant; hence resisted impleadment of the 10th defendant as a necessary party.
  • In opposition to admission of additional evidence the plaintiff contended there was no sufficient cause for non-production at trial and that the documents were not necessary or relevant; the plaintiff did not dispute genuineness in his counter affidavit but later faintly challenged authenticity.
  • Plaintiff sought inclusion of a compensation deposit (in L.A.O.P. No. 4 of 1982) as an item in Schedule II and argued entitlement to a share in that amount.

Other Defendants

  • Defendants 2–6 largely supported the plaintiff's stance, though some defendants claimed particular items were their separate acquisitions (e.g., second defendant claimed purchase of item 52; third defendant claimed items 70 and 71; fourth and fifth defendants claimed some items were self-acquisition).
  • Defendants 7 and 8 remained ex parte at trial; the 9th defendant filed a written statement but later reported no instructions and did not appeal the trial court's finding.
  • The 5th defendant sought to file a cross-objection in the appeal limited to sub-items 5–8 in item 11 of Schedule II (leave to file was allowed after condonation of delay).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayanan v. Ranganadhan (AIR 1976 S.C. 1715) Properties allotted in lieu of a personal undertaking to discharge family debts can be separate property (case where partition deed gave property absolutely in consideration of assuming debt liability). The appellant relied on this decision to argue item 22 was his separate property. The Court distinguished Narayanan on the ground that that case was between brothers and the instant dispute was between father and sons, and therefore the principle could not be equated to convert the appellant's allotment into separate property vis-à-vis his male issue.
Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P. (AIR 1971 S.C. 1454) Referenced (by Narayanan) on characterization of remuneration-like transfers; principle that a property given absolutely as remuneration may be separate. Cited in the exposition of Narayanan; the Court referenced the chain of authority but ultimately found Narayanan distinguishable and did not apply the remuneration analogy to convert item 22 into separate property in the father-sons context.
Mallesappa v. Mallappa (AIR 1961 S.C. 1268) When a manager of joint family claims acquisition by his separate funds, the onus is on him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that purchase money was from his separate fund. The Court applied this principle to reject the appellant's generalized claim that many later acquisitions were from his separate earnings; absence of clear proof led to classification of those acquisitions as joint family property.
Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar (AIR 1952 S.C. 231) Continuous cohabitation and treatment of a couple as husband and wife for a number of years raises a presumption of lawful marriage. The Court relied on this and similar authorities to draw the presumption that the 9th defendant was the appellant's lawful wife and that the 10th defendant was their legitimate daughter.
Sivachakravarthi v. Sivasankaran (84 L.W. 280) Where man and woman have been proved to have lived together as man and wife, law presumes the cohabitation is consequent upon a valid marriage until contrary is proved. Used to support the presumption of marriage and the conclusion that the 10th defendant is legitimate.
Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan (AIR 1992 S.C. 756) Continuous cohabitation under same roof for years gives rise to presumption of marriage. Reinforced the Court's finding in favour of presuming a valid marriage between appellant and 9th defendant.
Nuri Miah v. Ambica Singh (AIR 1917 Calcutta 716) It is permissible in a court of last resort to entertain a question of law raised for the first time when it concerns construction upon facts admitted or proved beyond controversy and is expedient to do so in interest of justice. The Court invoked this authority to justify entertaining the claim under the Amending Act (S.29A) raised at appellate stage and permitting the altered claim to be considered though first raised on appeal.
Phool Chand v. Gopal Lal (1967 (3) S.C.R. 153) In partition suits, events occurring after a preliminary decree and before final decree may justify variation of shares; courts can pass a second preliminary decree to correct shares. Applied to permit the Court to vary the preliminary decree (i.e., alter shares) because of intervening legislative change (S.29A) that affected entitlement of daughters.
Sai Reddy v. Narayana Reddy (1991 3 S.C.C. 647) Clarified when a partition is "effected" for the purposes of applicability of amended law (i.e., partition is not complete until final decree/allotment and delivery of possession), and therefore an intervening amendment may apply if only a preliminary decree has been passed. The Court held itself bound by Sai Reddy and applied the principle to rule that the Amending Act (S.29A) applied because only a preliminary decree had been passed before the amendment; hence the newly impleaded daughter was entitled to a coparcenary share.
Neelatooru Venkatarangacharlu v. Neelatooru Sampath Kumara Aiyangar (11 L.W. 5) In family partition suits where neither party guilty of unfair contention, costs until preliminary decree should come out of the estate. The Court relied on this authority in concluding that costs of all parties throughout should come out of the estate rather than be personally borne in full by the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded methodically through the contested procedural and substantive points. Key steps in its reasoning included:

  1. Admission of additional evidence: Under Order 41, Rule 27(b), C.P.C., the Court found sufficient cause (advanced age, infirmity, solitary litigation against his children and due diligence) to admit six documents produced belatedly by the appellant. The two registration documents were relevant to establishing alienations/exchanges; four letters written by the plaintiff to the appellant were authenticated by comparison with admitted letters (Exs. B1, B2) and admitted as Exs. B40–B45.
  2. Impleadment of the 10th defendant: Although the trial court had held that the 10th defendant (the daughter of the 9th defendant) was not a necessary party and the 9th defendant did not appeal, the appellate Court held that the status of the 10th defendant was in issue in the appeal because the appellant asserted the 9th defendant was his lawful wife and the 10th defendant was his child. The Court therefore allowed impleadment, reasoning that she ought to have been impleaded earlier but should now be added as a necessary party.
  3. Amendment to plaint: The Court permitted amendment (under O.6 R.17) to include compensation deposited in L.A.O.P. No. 4 of 1982 as item 12 in Schedule II — the plaintiff had omitted it by oversight and no counter was filed to this application.
  4. Characterization and deletion of specific items from preliminary decree: The Court examined documentary evidence (sale deeds, exchange deed, registration copies) and concluded that several items included in the trial court's preliminary decree were not available for division because they had been parted away by sale or exchange (e.g., items 82 & 83 exchanged under Ex. B41 for item 90; items 47, 48 and 51 sold under Exs. A-28 and A-29). Correspondingly, those items were deleted from the preliminary decree.
  5. Mother's life-estate items (items 9–11): Applying S.14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation, the Court held that the limited estate held by the mother was enlarged into full ownership by operation of S.14(1); on her death the appellant succeeded to those items as her heir. Property inherited from a female is the inheritor's separate property and male issue do not take an interest by birth. Accordingly, items 9–11 were held not to be subject to division among father and sons.
  6. Item 22 and the "remuneration" argument: The appellant's contention that item 22 was allotted to him as remuneration for discharging family debts (invoking Narayanan) was considered. The Court distinguished Narayanan on the ground that it was a dispute between brothers, whereas here the contest was between father and sons; and, applying pre-1956 doctrine (as explained in Mulla) that shares obtained on partition remain ancestral as regards male issue, it concluded that item 22 (allotted in Ex. A1) did not become the appellant's separate property and remained coparcenary vis-à-vis his sons.
  7. Claims of self-acquisition for later purchases (items 42–92 range): The Court reiterated the principle in Mallesappa v. Mallappa that a manager/coparcener who claims purchases were made from his separate funds bears the onus of proving that fact by clear and satisfactory evidence. The appellant's evidence was found to be solitary and self-serving and insufficient to discharge that burden; accordingly many of the later acquisitions were held to be joint family properties (with specific deletions where documents showed alienation).
  8. Presumption of marriage and legitimacy: Considering letters written by the plaintiff (admitted and newly admitted) and testimony indicating cohabitation since 1968, the Court applied authority establishing that long-standing cohabitation and treatment as husband and wife raise a presumption of lawful marriage. On that basis, the Court drew the presumption that the 9th defendant was lawfully married to the appellant and that the 10th defendant was their legitimate daughter.
  9. Application of the Tamil Nadu Amendment (S.29A) and allocation of shares: The Court considered S.29A (introduced by T.N. Amending Act 1 of 1990) which makes a daughter a coparcener by birth and entitles her to the same share as a son. Relying on the Supreme Court's guidance (Sai Reddy) and Phool Chand, the Court held that because only a preliminary decree (and not a final decree) had been passed before the amendment came into effect, the amendment applied. Consequently the 10th defendant is entitled to a share equal to a son. The Court therefore altered the shares so that the father, the plaintiff and defendants 2–7 and the 10th defendant each get 1/9th.
  10. Costs: On costs the Court concluded that, in the circumstances and following precedent, the proper order was that costs of all parties throughout should come out of the estate rather than be personally borne (or otherwise apportioned as in the trial court).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed in part; the trial court's judgment and preliminary decree are modified.

The Court specifically:

  • Admitted six additional documents as Exs. B40–B45.
  • Allowed impleadment of the 10th defendant and held she is a necessary party; found that the 9th defendant was to be presumed the lawful wife of the appellant and the 10th defendant their legitimate daughter.
  • Allowed amendment to include the compensation deposit as item 12 in Schedule II.
  • Deleted from the preliminary decree certain items that had been alienated or otherwise were not available for division (for example items 82, 83, 47, 48, 51, 28, 29, 39 and 41 as identified in the judgment).
  • Held that items 9–11 (life-estate items formerly enjoyed by the mother) became the appellant's separate property by operation of S.14(1) and therefore are not subject to partition among the sons; conversely item 22 (allotted to appellant under Ex. A1 as burdened for debt discharge) was held to remain coparcenary and subject to partition vis-à-vis his sons.
  • Applied S.29A of the Hindu Succession Act (as introduced by the Tamil Nadu amendment) and relevant precedent to hold that the 10th defendant is a coparcener and is entitled to a 1/9th share; accordingly the plaintiff and defendants 2–7 and the father (appellant) each get 1/9th.
  • Directed that costs of all parties throughout shall come out of the estate and provided directions for final decree proceedings including provision for discharge of a usufructuary mortgage debt due under Ex. B33.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The preliminary decree passed by the trial court is modified so that the shares are recalculated to 1/9th each for the father, the plaintiff and the other children (including the newly impleaded daughter). Several items were excluded from division because they were shown to have been alienated or to belong separately; certain items (items 9–11) were held to be appellant's separate inheritance. The costs are to be paid out of the estate.
  • On the law: The Court applied established authorities (including S.14(1) HSA interpretation and precedent on onus of proof for self-acquisitions, and on the effect of the S.29A amendment) rather than laying down any new legal principle. The decision adjusts the distribution consistent with the then-applicable statutory amendment and extant case law; it does not purport to create new precedent beyond applying settled principles to the facts of this family partition.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. Quotations and references in the summary reflect the positions and authorities expressly discussed in the opinion.

    M. Shanmugha Udayar v. Sivanandam And 8 Others

    JUDGMENT — Thangamani, J.

    The appellant is the first defendant in the suit. He was aged about 79 when the suit came to be instituted. He is a public man and a leading personality in Villupuram Town. He was M.L.A for three terms. He was Municipal Councillor continuously for half a century from 1926 to 1976. He was also Chairman of Villupuram Municipality on three occasions. He was a Director of the Cooperative Sugar Factory, Mundiyambakkam. Besides, he was the Chairman of local Building Society. His first wife Alagi died in 1930. Then he married one Thaiyanayagi as his second wife. She also passed away in 1957. Plaintiff and defendants 2 to 7 are his sons and 8th defendant is his daughter through Thaiyanayagi. The present first respondent/plaintiff instituted C.S No. 63 of 1982 on the file of learned Subordinate Judge of Villupuram claiming partition and separate possession of his 1/8 share in the plaint schedule mentioned items and for his share of the income from the said properties from the date of plaint till date of possession.

    2. The allegations in the plaint are that on 11.7.1932 there was division of the family properties between the appellant and his brothers under the original of Ex. A1 partition deed. Plaint items 1 to 25 came to his share in the said partition. Items 26 to 41 of Schedule I were purchased by the appellant from the year 1923 to 1926. They were not included in Ex. A1 partition deed and retained by the appellant for the benefit of the family comprising of himself and his sons. Items 42 to 76 of schedule I were purchased in the name of the appellant from out of the income of ancestral properties when he was the manager of the joint family. The acquisitions were also out of joint exertions of all the members of the joint family. They were thrown into the hotch-pot and dealt with as joint family properties throughout. Items 77 to 92 were purchased under the sale deeds Ex. A10 dated 20.1.1941 and Ex. A-15 dated 24.6.1948 by the appellant with joint family funds and treated as joint family properties by the appellant. Besides, the family owns cash and fixed deposits in several banks, jewels worth 150 sovereigns and other movables described in plaint schedule II. The 9th defendant is not the legally wedded wife of the appellant. Her daughter, impleaded as 10th defendant during this appeal, is not born to the appellant. In spite of the demand made by him on 1.3.1981 and thereafter, the appellant is not amenable for division. Provision for the marriage expenses of his sister 8th defendant has to be made in the partition.

    3. Defendants 2 to 6 more or less sailed with their brother plaintiff except that the second defendant pleaded that item 52 of plaint ‘A’ schedule was purchased by him with his savings from his income as Village Munsif. The third defendant claimed that he is decently employed at Neyveli and he has purchased items 70 and 71 from his professional income. According to the fourth defendant items 72 and 73 were acquired from the wherewithal provided by his father-in-law. The fifth defendant alleged that sub items 5, 6, 7 and 8 in item 11 tractor and its accessories are his self-acquisitions. However, the sixth defendant maintained that all the items are joint family properties including those to which defendants 2, 3, 4 and 5 laid separate claim. Defendants 7 and 8 chose to remain ex parte during trial. The counsel for the 9th defendant reported no instructions after filing of the written statement by her.

    4. The appellant resisted the action contending that he lost his father when he was 16 years old. His grandfather, grandmother and mother also died one after another. He had to meet all the expenses in connection with their death. Even then the family owed a debt of Rs. 1,200/-. He had to bring up his three brothers and two sisters. He educated his sons and daughters. The third defendant is a M.Sc Geologist while the 8th defendant daughter is a Doctor. There was no surplus to constitute nucleus. The appellant took on lease 25 acres in the village of Kakuppam, 19 acres in Erumanthangal, 16 acres in Maharajapuram and 12 acres in Kilperumbakkam and cultivated therein sugarcane crops. He also did building contract work for Police Department and road contract for Highways Department. He was also a Railway contractor. As per the terms of Ex. A1 partition deed the mother of the appellant was in enjoyment of items 9 to 11 as a life estate holder and on her death in or about 1971 all her sons took them absolutely. So plaintiff cannot claim any share in them. Under Ex. A1 the appellant got only items 1 to 8, 12 to 23 and 25 for his share. These properties have no irrigation facility and they are mainly dependent upon lake water that is available hardly for a month. Items 20 and 21 are not cultivable lands and there are only palmyrah trees in them. Item 22 called ‘Kosavan Kollai’ was brought under cultivation about 7 or 8 years prior to the suit. Till then potters were excavating earth from there for their professional work. Item 25 is not a cultivable land. Items 37, 47, 48 and 51 do not belong to the family. An extent of 10 cents in item 31, items 32 to 36, 11 cents, i.e, 34/1B in item 39 and item 42 belong to one Sivabushanam. Item 38 belonged to his wife Thaiyanayagi who died about 10 years prior to the suit and the appellant got it from her, and so it is his separate property. The extent of item 27 is only 6 cents and not 69 cents as described in the plaint. Item 29 is a repetition of item No. 17. Item 65 is a repetition of item 56. Item 79 is a repetition of item No. 6. Item No. 88 is a repetition of item No. 13. Item 89 is a repetition of item No. 52. Item 809 is a repetition of item No. 50. Item 39 is a repetition of item 16. Items 82 and 83 were given away in exchange of items 90 to 92.

    5. He also pleaded along with the 9th defendant that she is his legally wedded wife. He married her in 1969. The 10th defendant is his legitimate daughter. There were no cash or outstandings or jewels to the tune of 150 sovereigns as alleged. The car, tractor, trailor, Cultivator, disc and motor are his separate properties. There are debts to the tune of about Rs. 4,00,000/-.

    6. During trial the plaintiff did not press his claim in respect of items 26, 27, 30 to 38, 40, 42, 43, 65, 79, 80, 88 and 89. Learned Subordinate Judge found that all other items are joint family properties available for division among the father and sons. He also held that jewels noted by the Commissioner in his report Ex. C-1, debt due from one Jothilingam which is item 9 of Schedule II, and sub items 1 to 9 in item 11 in Schedule II, are also joint family properties and that there was no joint family debt to be discharged by the members of the family. The 9th defendant is not the legally wedded wife of the appellant and her daughter Tamilarasi is not a necessary party to the action. Accordingly, the preliminary decree was passed declaring that plaintiff and defendants 2 to 6 (evidently 6 is a mistake for 7) are each entitled to 1/8 share in items 1 to 25, 28, 29, 39, 41, 44 to 64, 66 to 78, 81 to 87 and 90 to 92 in plaint ‘A’ schedule and in the amounts which were available on the date of suit in items 1 to 7 and items 8 to 11 in schedule II and that in the final decree proceedings, if any movables are to be found out, those items also would be taken into consideration. The appellant was directed to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiff including the stamp duty and penalty paid by the plaintiff on Exs. A-21 to A-24. The other parties were directed to bear their respective costs. Account on income was to be determined in separate proceedings under O. 20, R. 18, C.P.C The actual partition and separate possession were relegated to final decree proceedings. Aggrieved by the said decision the first defendant has come forward with this appeal.

    7. In C.M.P No. 10101 of 1992 the 5th defendant was permitted to file cross objection regarding sub items 5 to 8 in item 11 of schedule II after condoning the delay. Others have not filed any cross objections.

    8. In C.M.P No. 15096 of 1992 the appellant seeks to file six documents detailed in the annexure therein as additional evidence. He states in his affidavit that he is an aged person and all his sons have aligned against him in this litigation and he has no one to support in conducting the proceedings before the Court below as well as in the present appeal. Due to advanced age his mobility is restricted, and so he, could not produce the required documents well in time. He was bedridden immediately before the trial of the suit and could not recollect many of the incidents and material documents in time. The first respondent/plaintiff alone resisted this application stating that there is no sufficient cause for the non-production of the documents at the time of trial. O. 41, R. 27(b) enables the party to produce additional evidence in the appellate Court if he establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the time when the decree under appeal was passed. Even the plaint filed in the year 1981 gives the age of the appellant as 79. There is substance in the contention of the appellant that in 1983 during trial he could not produce these six documents inspite of his due diligence since he was waging a lonely legal battle against all his sons and daughter who are eight in number in his advanced age.

    9. The first two documents are registration copies of a sale deed dated 20.8.1943 and an exchange deed dated 6.9.1956 While the sale deed relates to suit item No. 38, the appellant is one of the parties to the exchange deed which covers suit items 82, 83 and 90. So the relevancy and admissibility of these documents could not be disputed. The other documents are four letters purported to have been written by the plaintiff to the appellant during 1972 and 1980. The plaintiff in his counter affidavit simply states that these documents are not necessary or relevant for deciding the issues in the appeal and he does not admit them. However, he does not dispute the genuineness of these letters in the counter. Only during arguments he made a faint attempt to dispute their authenticity. But, we compared the signatures and writings therein with those found in Exs. B1 and B2 letters written by him and are satisfied that the letters sought to be filed as additional evidence are genuine. So we allow this application, receive them as additional evidence and mark as Exs. B40 to B45.

    10. The daughter of 9th defendant Lalitha has filed C.M.P No. 10100 of 1992 to implead her as the 10th defendant in the suit. Plaintiff, defendants 2, 3, 4 and 6 alone have filed counter affidavit in this application denying that the 10th defendant is the daughter of the appellant. They pleaded that as per the findings of the trial court there was no valid marriage between the appellant and the 9th defendant and that the daughter of the 9th defendant is not a necessary party in the suit. Since the 9th defendant has not filed any cross objections, that finding of the trial court has become conclusive and hence this application is not maintainable. But, the appellant who is the father has raised the question that the 9th defendant is his legally wedded wife and the 10th defendant is born to him. Thus the status of the 10th defendant is an issue in the case. So we are of the view that in this partition action the 10th defendant is a necessary party and accordingly this application is allowed. She ought to have been impleaded in the trial Court itself.

    11. In C.M.P No. 12682 of 1987, under O. 6. R. 17, C.P.C, the plaintiff seeks amendment of the plaint so as to include the compensation amount deposited in L.A.O.P No. 4 of 1982 of Sub Court, Villupuram as item 12 in Schedule II of the plaint. He alleges that this sum represents the compensation for the acquisition of the family land of an extent of 74 cents in S.F No. 6/2 of Maharajapuram village and is entitled to 1/8 share in this amount also. By oversight this was omitted to be included initially. It does not appear that any counter has been filed by the appellant in this application. So the proposed amendment is allowed and the said amount of compensation will be item 12 in Schedule 72 of the plaint.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellant assailed the findings of the trial Court on various grounds. He first submitted that there are still properties not belonging to the family covered by the preliminary decree. Items 82 and 83 of plaint schedule are Survey No. 99/1A and Survey No. 99/1B/1 each measuring 14 cents. The appellant has taken the plea in his additional written statement that these items were given away in exchange and suit items 90 to 92 were obtained. The trial court has rejected this plea on the ground that there is no record to substantiate this contention. However, we find from the Deed of Exchange dated 6.9.1956 entered into between the appellant on the one hand and one Kandasamy Udayar and Arunachala Udayar on the other, marked as Ex. B41 in this appeal, that Survey No. 99/1B and Survey No. 99/1A were parted away by the appellant, and he got in exchange for them Survey No. 73/1A of Kilperumbakkam village which corresponds to suit item No. 90. So items 82 and 83 are not available for division.

    13. Learned counsel for the appellant next points out that items 47, 48 and 51 have already been parted away under Exs. A-28 and A-29 and hence they are no longer in the family to be divided among the father and sons. The trial court has negatived this plea of the appellant for the reason that he has not produced any document to show that these items do not belong to the family. Ex. A9 is the registration copy of the sale deed dated 7.1.1941 under which items 47 and 48 which are Survey No. 85/10A and Survey No. 73/16A of Maharajapuram village were purchased by the appellant. Ex. A17 is the registration copy of the safe deed dated 4.5.1950 in favour of the appellant in respect of Survey No. 183/5C of Marudur village which corresponds to suit item No. 51. Ex. A-28, the registration copy of the sale deed dated 7.11.1979 discloses that suit items 47 and 48 were sold away by the appellant to one Panduranga Udayar. Similarly, as per Ex. A-29 suit item No. 51 was sold by the appellant in favour of one Kalyani Ammal on 6.5.1978 So these three items also cannot be covered by the preliminary decree and they have to be deleted.

    14. The preliminary decree takes in suit items 9 to 11 which are 98 cents in Survey No. 94/3. 25 cents in Survey No. 94/2 and 19 cents in Survey No. 117/2 of Kilperumbakkam village. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that these lands were allotted to the mother of the appellant for her life in the partition which took place among the appellant and his brothers as per Ex. A1 dated 11.7.1932 The partition deed provided that the appellant and his brothers are to take the same in equal shares absolutely on her death. The relevant recitals in Ex. A1 are as under:—

    And under S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the life estate held by the mother was enlarged and she became the full owner of the same, and on her death, it devolved on the appellant as one of her heirs, and so it is only his separate Property in which the sons cannot claim any right, earned counsel for the plaintiff countered this argument by contending that as per the terms of the partition deed, the mother was only permitted to enjoy the income of these items, and she was not allotted these lands in lieu of her maintenance. However, a careful reading of the above extracted provisions of Ex. A1 partition deed does not lend support to this claim. Even the caption for ‘E’ schedule which covers these items reads”

    Further; when the brothers divide their family properties after the demise of their father and certain properties are set apart for the mother in which she is given right to enjoy the income by paying kist and the corpus is to be taken by the brothers on her death, it is only a life estate given to her in recognition of her pre-existing right for maintenance. Though there is no specific recital in Ex. A1 partition deed that the properties are allotted for the purpose of maintenance, the intention is obvious. So, there is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the mother was only given right to enjoy the income from these items and there was no limited estate created in her favour which became enlarged under S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

    15. S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act reads that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. And as per sub-S. (2), nothing contained in sub-S. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. The Supreme Court has given “a most expansive interpretation” to the general rule enacted in sub-S. (1) of S. 14. In order to invoke the application of sub-S. (2) it is necessary to satisfy the essential condition that the instrument which limits or restricts the estate should itself be the source or foundation of the female's title to the property. If she had an existing interest in the property, the position of any instrument will not affect the operation of sub-S. (1).The instrument may be a deed of partition, but if the pre-existing right was there, sub-S. (2) cannot have the effect of taking the property out of the coverage of sub-S. (1). In any such case the mere fact that the instrument provides that the female Hindu is to have a limited estate or there is a restriction on her power of alienation or that the property will, on her death, revert to the next reversioner will not take the case out of the purview of sub-S. (1). Such terms are merely reiteration of the incidents of Hindu Law applicable to limited estate. When specific property is allotted to a widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance under an instrument which prescribes restricted estate, the acquisition of property by her is only by virtue of a pre-existing right. Such an acquisition would not be within the ambit of sub-S. (2) even if the instrument allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Sub-S. (2) must be read only as a proviso or exception to sub-S. (1) of S. 14, and its operation must be confined to cases where property is acquired for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under instrument, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. So the life estate given to mother Valliammal was enlarged to an absolute one by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, and when she died 10 years prior to the suit, the appellant succeeded to these items as her heir along with his other brothers. Property inherited by a person from any female is his separate property and his male issues do not take any interest in it by birth. So items 9 to 11 also cannot form, the subject matter of division in the decree.

    16. The plaintiff has claimed division of items 26 to 41 of plaint ‘A’ schedule on the basis that they were acquired by the appellant during the years 1923 to 1926 and were omitted to be included in Ex. A1 partition deed. They were retained by the appellant for the benefit of the family comprising of himself and his sons. It transpired during trial that out of items 26 to 41 only 4 items namely items 28, 29, 39 and 41 measuring in all 1.86 acres of dry land were available in the family and accordingly the preliminary decree was passed in respect of these items. Ex. A3 is the registration copy of the sale deed dated 14.4.1924 in favour of the appellant by one Sundarammal in respect of item 39. Ex. A10 is the registration copy of sale certificate in the name of the appellant in respect of suit items 28 and 29. The contention of the appellant on this aspect is that these items, though purchased in his name were allotted to his brother Vinayagam under Ex. A1 partition deed. P.W 1 admits such allotment though according to him they were enjoyed by their family. But neither of the schedules in Ex. A1 pertaining to the two brothers Vinayagam and Nagabushnam or the appellant covers these items. However, the fact that these items purchased by the appellant prior to the family partition under Ex. A1 do not find a place in that deed itself is an indication that they were the self-acquisilions of the appellant. And as we shall see later, there is evidence on record to prove that prior to 1932 the appellant was doing contract work and having separate income of his own. So the sons of the appellant cannot claim any right in these items. As per plaint, item 41 in Survey No. 123/1 of Erumanthangal village measuring 0.05 acres of dry land. The appellant contends that this item was purchased by him under Ex. A4 dated 19.8.1925 This sale deed refers to Survey No. 123/1 extent 5 cents in Kilperumbakkam village. And it has been allotted to the share of Vinayagam under Ex. A1. Perhaps the village has been wrongly described in the plaint. Anyway there is no evidence on the part of the plaintiff to indicate that item No. 41 as described in the plaint belongs to the family. So, these items have to be deleted From the preliminary decree.

    17. In the plaint, partition was claimed in respect of items 1 to 25 on the basis that they are properties allotted to the appellant in the earlier family partition under Ex. A1 dated 11.7.1932 Of these items the appellant disputed the right of his sons in item 22 alone and contended that it was his separate property. This item comprises of an extent of 7.32 acres of dry land in Survey No. 401/1 of Villupuram Town. In Ex. A1 the outstandings due to the family are given as Rs. 5.236/- and odd and the debt due by the family is mentioned as Rs. 6,000/-. The deed recites:

    There is no dispute that the debts have now been discharged by the appellant. The trial Court held that this item No. 22 is not the separate property of the appellant and it is joint family property available for partition. On the other hand Mr. E. Padmanabhan, teamed counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was given this item in the family partition as remuneration for his undertaking to collect the debts due to the family and discharge its liabilities, and so, it is his separate property in which his sons cannot claim any right.

    18. In support of his contention he relied on the decision in Narayanan v. Ranganadhan (AIR 1976 S.C 1715). The salient features of the deed of partition between the parties in that case were: (1) sole responsibility for discharge of the family debts which were payable to the outsiders was placed on one of the coparceners; (2) the liability cast on him for the discharge of the debts was not to the extent of the properties given to him, but was irrespective of the sufficiency or otherwise of the properties and any deficit or surplus was to be met or enjoyed by him exclusively; (3) the debts were to be discharged by such coparceners within a month of the registration of the deed and he was required to have it in writing from the creditors that the other coparcener was no longer liable for the debts; (4) in case, there was a default on the part of the former to discharge the debts as undertaken by him and any loss was caused to the latter, the former was to indemnify the latter: (5) exclusive dominion, control and enjoyment of the properties was vested in the former in consideration of the obligation undertaken by him to discharge the debts. The Apex Court held that the aforesaid salient features left no manner of doubt that the properties mentioned in the deed of partition were given to him in lieu of the personal undertaking given by him to discharge the aforesaid debts. The properties were given absolutely to him as his separate properties. By the aforesaid arrangement other members were absolved of the responsibility to discharge the family debts. Thus the arrangement being bona fide and its terms being fair, it was valid and the properties mentioned in the deed of partition became separate properties of such coparcener from the date of the execution of the deed of partition and were not liable to partition. The parties to the partition deed were Venkatachala and Narayana, the sons of the Rangaswami and Subramani, the son of Kuppuswami. In that division one item was conveyed absolutely to Venkatachala in lieu of his undertaking to be liable to discharge the entire debts mentioned in the partition deed whether the properties were sufficient or insufficient to discharge the same, and if there was any surplus out of the properties, he was to have the same absolutely, but if the properties were not sufficient, he was to discharge the debts on his own responsibility without making Subramani liable for the same. In a subsequent suit between Venkatachala and Narayana, the former claimed that the property earmarked was his separate property. The Supreme Court took the view that the conveyance of that property to Venkatachala was in the nature of remuneration for the services to be rendered by him. The mere fact that some amounts out of the joint family funds were used for discharge of the debts is of no consequence. If any amount out of the joint family funds was used for the discharge of the outstanding payable to the outside debtors, Venkatachala would be liable for them to account. The property allotted to Venkatachala was akin to the remuneration received in his capacity as a Managing Director of a Company by a member of a Hindu undivided family. After referring to the decision in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1971 S.C 1454) the Apex Court held that the properties given absolutely to Venkatachala were his separate properties.

    19. But on a close scrutiny of the decision referred to above, we are of the view that the two cases are clearly distinguishable on one vital aspect. While the dispute relating to the character of the property in that case was between two brothers, in the present action it is between father and sons. In our view this makes all the difference. The law as it stood before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is stated at page 248 of Mulla's Hindu Law, 1990, Edition in these terms: “The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issues. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate property……. Where the share allotted to a coparcener on partition consists of property which is subject to a mortgage, the fact that he subsequently clears it from the mortgage by his own self-acquisitions, does not alter the character of the property. The unemcumbered property still remains ancestral, and his male issue acquires an interest in it by birth.” So, though item 22 was earmarked and allotted in Ex. A1 partition deed dated 11.7.1932 to the appellant for the purpose of discharging the family debts, the ancestral character of the property could not be converted into separate property by the terms of that partition deed. It was still property obtained by the appellant in a family partition and so joint family property vis-a-vis his sons. That, that property was burdened with an obligation to discharge the debts cannot change the nature and character of property. Further, we find from Ex. A1 that the outstandings to be realised and debts to be discharged were more or less equal. There is nothing in the evidence of the appellant as D.W 5 to indicate that he salvaged the property without detriment to the joint family assets. While allotting suit items 1 to 25 in Ex. A1, this item 22 was burdened with an obligation to discharge the debts. This allotment cannot in any sense be compared with the Managing Director s remuneration of a member of a joint Hindu Family. So, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no difference between item 22 and other items allotted to the appellant in the family partition under Ex. A1 dated 11.7.1932, regarding their character. And hence it is coparcenary property in which his sons have a right by birth.

    20. In the plaint the allegations are that items 42 to 92 of schedule 1 are properties acquired by the appellant from out of the income of ancestral properties when he was the manager of the joint family. After deleting items not available for division the preliminary decree was passed in respect of items 44 to 64, 66 to 78, 81 to 87 and 90 to 92. We have now seen that division cannot be claimed in respect of items 82, 83, 47, 48 and 51. The extent of remaining items comes to 11.84-1/2 acres of dry lands. Besides, the appellant has purchased the houses specified in items 66 to 76. Of these houses item 76 is in Kilperumbakkam village while others are in Villupuram. It is the case of the plaintiff that the properties allotted to the appellant under Ex. A1 partition deed dated 11.7.1932 formed the nucleus for the acquisition and hence they belong to the joint family. The ancestral properties allotted to the appellant under Ex. A1, barring those set apart for the mother are items 1 to 8 and 12 to 25. They comprise of 5.81-1/2 acres of wet land, 10.12-1/2 acres of dry land and two small houses. Of the properties now under consideration items 44 and 45 were purchased by the appellant under Ex. A8 on 4.11.1940 Items 46 to 50, 78 and 81 were acquired in the year 1941 under Exs. A9. A10 and All. From 1946 to 1950 items 51.53 to 64 and 84 to 87 were purchased under Exs. A12, A13, A14, A15, A17 and A18. The relevant evidence of the appellant as D.W 5 on this aspect is to the effect that from 1923 he was having a brick kiln from which he was getting an annual income of Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 3,000/-.…

    [Discussion of evidence omitted — Ed.]

    xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

    Though it is his version that he took about 100 acres of land on lease and cultivated, he is unable to say from whom he took the lands on lease. Excepting the solitary and self-serving version of D.W 5 in the witness box, there is no other material to accept his contention. In Mallesappa v. Mallappa (AIR 1961 S.C 1268) the Supreme Court has held that

    “where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners”.

    Apart from the question of onus, in the absence of positive proof on the part of the appellant regarding the source of the wherewithal for the purchase of these items, we are unable to accept the claim of the appellant that these items now under consideration were purchased from his separate income.…

    [Discussion of evidence omitted — Ed.]

    xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

    33. There is no dispute that 9th defendant Lalitha and the appellant are living as husband and wife and the newly added 10th defendant Tamilarasi is the daughter of Lalitha. The Court below found that there was no satisfactory proof establish that the 9th defendant is the legally wedded wife of the appellant. This finding is also assailed by the appellant herein even though the 9th defendant has not preferred any appeal of her own accord. Respondents 1 to 8 nave taken the stand that there was no valid marriage between their father and the 9th defendant. At one stage they even questioned the paternity of the 10th defendant. However, Exs. B1 and B2 the letters admittedly written by the plaintiff to his father on 26.2.1976 and 8.4.1980 are significant in this connection. In Ex. B2 he states.…

    When confronted with this letter P.W 1 chose to say during cross-examination. ..

    Evidently, the plaintiff is referring to 9th defendant in Ex. B2. He foreswears in order to wriggle out of the situation. That he has chosen to address the 9th defendant as itself in an indication that she is the legally wedded wife of his father. Further, we have marked four more letters written by the plaintiff to his father as Exs. B42 to B45 in this Court. In Ex. B42 dated 15.11.1972 he writes

    In Ex. B-45 he addresses the letter both to the appellant and the 9th defendant as”

    The letter further reads:

    Besides we find from the evidence of D.W 1 that admittedly he was residing with his father till 1970. And it is the evidence of D.W 2 that the appellant and 9th defendant are living together since 1968. That the sons of the appellant chose to live with their father even after the induction of the 9th defendant in the household also probabilises the claim of the appellant that she is his legally wedded wife. Had she been only a concubine of the appellant, it is highly unlikely that the sons would have allowed her to reside with their father in the ancestral family house where their mother lived and died. As the Supreme Court has held in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar (AIR 1952 S.C 231). continuous cohabitation of a man and a woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage. Further law does not favour concubinage, but the presumption is in favour of a marriage when a man and woman are shown to have cohabited continuously for a long number of years. In Sivachakravarthi v. Sivasankaran (84 L.W 280) a Division Bench of this Court has held:

    “Where a man and woman have been proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, until the contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.”

    In Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan (AIR 1992 S.C 756) the Supreme Court has laid down that when a man and woman continuously lived together under the same roof and cohabited for a number of years, presumption that they lived as husband and wife arises. So we have no hesitation in drawing the presumption that there was a valid marriage between the appellant and the 9th defendant. As a necessary corollary it follows that the 10th defendant is their legitimate daughter.

    34. The next question we have to address ourselves is the share to which the 10th defendant is entitled. S. 29(A) of the Hindu Succession Act introduced by T.N Amending Act 1 of 1990 reads as follows:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 6 of this Act:

    (i) in a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara Law, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son, inclusive of the right to claim by survivoiship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son;

    (ii) at a partition in such a Joint Hindu Family the coparcenary property shall be so divided as to allot to a daughter the same share as is allotable to a son; Provided that the share which a predeceased son or a predeceased daughter would have got at the partition if he or she had been alive at the time of the partition shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such predeceased daughter:

    Provided further the share allotable to the predeceased child of a predeceased son or of a predeceased daughter, if such child had been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such predeceased child of the predeceased son or of the predeceased daughter, as the case may be:

    (iii) any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of clause (i) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary disposition:

    (iv) nothing in this chapter shall apply to a daughter married before the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989:

    (v) nothing in clause (ii) shall apply to a partition which had been effected before the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989”

    On the strength of this newly introduced provision of law, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the 10th defendant, his daughter, has become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as his sons and she has the same right in the joint family properties. Hence she also has to be allotted a share along with plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7. The objections on behalf of the respondents are that the said daughter of the 9th defendant has not preferred any appeal and in any event this plea has not been taken by the appellant in his appeal memorandum. Since the plea of the daughter to come on record as the 10th defendant has been negatived by the trial court holding that she is not a necessary party to the suit, evidently she could not have preferred any appeal. Now we have permitted her to come on record. So there cannot be any objection for the 10th defendant to raise this plea in this appeal. Further, as a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has laid down in Nuri Miah v. Ambica Singh (AIR 1917 Calcutta 716), when a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient, in the interest of justice, to entertain the plea. Ordinarily, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of its institution. But this principle is not of universal application. Where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary, to base the decision of the court on the later circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties, it is incumbent upon a court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made. And the Apex Court has laid down in Phool Chand v. Gopal Lal (1967 (3) S.C.R 153) that so far as partition suits are concerned, if an event happens after the preliminary decree and before a final decree is passed, and a change in the shares is necessitated, the trial court can and should pass a second preliminary decree correcting the shares; and, if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the Court deciding that dispute and making a variation in the shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. A partition suit is not finally disposed of till the final decree is passed and the Court has jurisdiction to decide all disputes, that may arise due to the death of some of the parties after the preliminary decree and before the passing of the final decree. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree in a partition suit, if circumstances justify it and if it is convenient and advantageous to do so. So there cannot be any impediment in passing another preliminary decree correcting the shares in case we find that the 10th defendant also has to be allotted a share in the division of family assets.

    35. S. 1 of Tamilnadu Act 1 of 1990 clearly states that the Amendment Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 25th day of March, 1989. The opening words of S. 29A(i) no doubt indicate that there should be a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara law in existence on 25.3.1989 in order that a daughter of a coparcener shall become a coparcener. If the family had ceased to be a joint family and got divided in status by reason of a preliminary decree or by a method known to Hindu Law, the Section will not apply. In Sundarambal v. Daivanayagam (1991 (1) L.W 97) one of us (Srinivasan, J.) took the view expressing dissent from the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayana Reddy v. Sai Redely (AIR 1990 A.P 263). But the latter judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Sai Reddy v. Narayana Reddy (1991 3 S.C.C 647). The relevant part of the judgment reads thus:

    “It is obvious that under the aforesaid provision, the difference between daughter and son of the Mitakshara Hindu family is removed and the daughter is conferred rights in the joint family property by birth in the same manner and to the same extent as the son. She is, therefore, now entitled to claim partition and her share in the family property. The amending provision is a beneficial legislation which, among other things, is also directed towards eradicating social evils such as dowry and dowry deaths. It also achieves the constitutional mandate of equality between sexes.

    The crucial question, however, is as to when a partition can be said to have been effected for the purposes of the amended provision. A partition of the joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, viz., by a family settlement, by a registered instrument of partition, by oral arrangement by the parties, or by a decree of the Court. When a suit for partition is filed in a court, a preliminary decree is passed determining shares of the members of the family. The final decree follows, thereafter, allotting specific properties and directing the partition of the immovable properties by metes and bounds. Unless and until the final decree is passed and the allottees of the shares are put in possession of the respective property, the partition is not complete. The preliminary decree which determines shares does not bring about the final partition. For, pending the final decree the shares themselves are liable to be varied on account of the intervening events. In the instant case, there is no dispute that only a preliminary decree had been passed and before the final decree could be passed the Amending Act came into force as a result of which clause (ii) of S. 29-A of the Act became applicable. This intervening event which gave shares to respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying shares of the parties like any supervening development. Since the legislation is beneficial and placed on the statute book with the avowed object of benefitting women which is a vulnerable section of the society in all its strata, it is necessary to give a liberal effect to it. For this reason also, we cannot equate the concept of partition that the Legislature has in mind in the present case with a mere severance of the status of the joint family which can be effected by an expression of a mere desire by a family member to do so. The partition that the Legislature has in mind in the present case is undoubtedly a partition completed in all respects and which has brought about an irreversible situation. A preliminary decree which merely declares shares which are themselves liable to change does not bring about any irreversible situation. Hence, we are of the view that unless a partition of the property is effected by metes and bounds, the daughters cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred by the Act. Any other view is likely to deprive a vast section of the fair sex of the benefits conferred by the amendment. Spurious family settlements, instruments of partitions, not to speak of oral partitions will spring up and nullify the beneficial effect of the legislation depriving a vast section of women, of its benefits.”

    We are bound by the above judgment and we hold that the 10th defendant is entitled to a share equal to that of a son. That means, she is entitled to 1/9th share, and the sons, namely, the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 7 will each be entitled to 1/9th and the first defendant, the father will have the remaining 1/9th. The 8th defendant, the elder daughter of the first defendant is not entitled to claim the benefits of the amendment Act as she was married prior to 25.3.1989

    36. The only remaining point we have to consider is the question of costs. The Court below has decreed that the appellant had to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiff including the amount paid by the plaintiff on Exs. A21 to A24 as impounding charges. The other parties are to bear their respective costs. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that ordinarily the order of costs in a suit for partition is either that the parties should bear their own costs or that the costs should come out of the property liable to be partitioned. A Division Bench of this Court has laid down in Neelatooru Venkatarangacharlu v. Neelatooru Sampath Kumara Aiyangar (11 L.W 5) that where a partition suit has to be brought for effecting a partition between the members of a family and neither party has been guilty of unfair contention, the costs till the preliminary decree should come out of the estate. In this case it cannot be said that there has been any unfair claim on the part of the appellant. Further, no demand in writing for partition preceded the institution of the suit by the plaintiff. No doubt, P.W 1 states in his evidence that he asked his father for division, and since he was not amenable, he was constrained to file the suit. But, there is nothing in writing to substantiate this plea. Even the averments in the plaint do not indicate that any notice was issued demanding partition prior to the filing of the suit. The submissions of learned counsel for the appellant included the correctness of the directions of the trial court to the appellant to bear the stamp duty and penalty paid on Exs. A21 to A24 also. They were based not only on the facts, but also on certain legal propositions. But it is unnecessary for us to go into that aspect of the question since we are of the view that in this action the proper order as to costs would be that it should come out of the estate.

    37. Before parting, we would like to point out that plaintiff alone has asked for partition and separate possession of his share and none of the defendants has paid court fee and prayed for a decree regarding his respective share. Evidently, the preliminary decree declaring that defendants 2 to 6 are entitled to 1/8 share each has to be modified suitably. All the sons of the appellant and the daughter, the 10th defendant are entitled to 1/9th share each. It is open to defendants 2 to 6 and 10 to pay court fee due from them and seek division and separate allotment of their respective shares.

    38. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and preliminary decree passed by the trial court are modified. The preliminary decree for partition and separate possession in favour of the plaintiff will be only in respect of 1/9th share in suit items 1 to 8, 12 to 25, 44 to 46, 49, 50, 52 to 64, 66 to 78, 81, 84 to 87 and 90 to 92 of plaint schedule I and sub items 5 to 8 of item 11 and item 12 of schedule II. During final decree proceedings provision is also to be made for the discharge of the usufructuary mortgage debt due to Akbar Sheriff under Ex. B33. Costs of all parties throughout shall come out of the estate.

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