Dr. Anand, C.J:— With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the main writ appeal is taken up for hearing.
2. The appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 12577 of 1989 decided on 19 September, 1989.
3. In short facts giving rise to the filing of the writ petition were that the second respondent corporation lodged a complaint to the police for offences under S. 408, 409, 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code against one P. Kothandapani and Deputy Manager (Traffic), Cheran Transport Corporation, Coimbatore. The appellant was the Deputy Manager (Traffic) at the relevant time. He was placed under suspension. The department also started disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Relying upon the judgment in Kusheshwar v. Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. [1988 — II L.L.J 470], the appellant filed a writ petition seeking a direction to restrain the departmental authorities from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against him. The learned Single Judge found that at that stage it could not be said whether the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings had been grounded upon the same set of facts and consequently dismissed the writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated the same arguments as were raised before the learned Single Judge, and reference has once again been made to Kusheshwar v. Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. (vide supra).
5. Learned Advocate-General has drawn our attention to the charge sheet, dated 28 March, 1989, framed in the disciplinary proceedings which enumerates various instances on which the appellant is sought to be proceeded departmentally.
6. There is a consensus of judicial opinion that domestic enquiry into misconduct of an employee during the pendency of parallel enquiry before criminal Court is permissible. Indeed in Kuslieshwar v. Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. (vide supra) their Lordships after referring to a catena of authorities expressed an opinion that if the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts, the disciplinary proceeding can be stayed. They, however, cautioned that each case had to be decided on its peculiar facts. The Bench while administering the foresaid caution observed:
“Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated, it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not intend to lay down any general guideline.”
7. In Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari [1969 — I L.LJ 567], the Apex Court observed:
“The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the employee is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to take action against him. The same issue may arise for decision in civil or criminal proceeding pending in a Court. But the pendency of the Court proceeding does not bar the taking of disciplinary authority. The civil or criminal Court has no such power. The initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice in the pending Court proceeding.”
Thus, in view of the settled law as noticed above, we find that there is no illegality in the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings in the fact and circumstances of this case when admittedly even no chargesheet has been drawn up against the appellant by any criminal Court. In view of what we have said above, we find no case to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal fails and is dismissed. The interim stay shall stand vacated. No costs.
8. Learned counsel, Sri Kalyanasundaram, appearing for the appellant, states that he had not participated in the enquiry till 30 October, 1989 on the ground that the writ appeal was pending before this Court. He states that his client will participate in the enquiry if another date is fixed for enquiry. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the corporation states that the corporation would extend him an opportunity which he has desired. For this purpose the appellant has to approach the enquiry officer for suitable date of hearing.