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  • S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the plaintiff in Ejectment Suit No. 40 of 1974 on the file of the II Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras (the Vasudeva Pillai Trust represented by its Honorary Secretary). The suit concerns ownership of 1 ground and 28 sq. ft. in R.S. No. 1523/4, Rathnasabapathi Pillai Street, Madras, with a superstructure bearing door No. 10. The plaintiff had leased the plot to Rajamanickammal at a monthly rent; she left behind large arrears and died intestate about 27 years earlier.

The plaintiff served notices (including pursuant to S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act) calling upon the defendant to prove succession from Rajamanickammal. The defendant (claiming to be Rajamanickammal's son and successor) replied and undertook to pay arrears but defaulted. The plaintiff filed the ejectment suit on 15.4.1974. The defendant filed M.P. 2747 of 1974 invoking S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922, alleging leasehold succession and that he had applied to purchase the land.

A Commissioner was appointed and, by order dated 4.8.1976, the extent was fixed at 2810 sq. ft. and a market value was assessed (initially described in the record as Rs. 16,000 per ground), with directions for payment in instalments. An ejectment appeal (E.A.20 of 1977) was allowed on 11.9.1978, fixing market value at Rs. 15,333 per ground. The defendant made repeated applications for review/extension (including M.P.1371 of 1979, M.P.115 of 1980 and M.P.1556 of 1984 invoking S.5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay), many of which were dismissed or rejected. M.P.1556 of 1984 seeking condonation was rejected on 11.2.1985.

The plaintiff filed M.P.1342 of 1984 under Ss.3 and 4 of the Act seeking appointment of a Commissioner to fix the value of the superstructure so the plaintiff could obtain possession and pay compensation for the superstructure. The trial court rejected that application, stating that "the suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976" (an order which, as the revising court found, related to M.P.2747 and not to the suit itself). The plaintiff challenged the trial court's rejection by way of the present revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court was correct in treating the ejectment suit as having been disposed of by the order dated 4.8.1976 (an order in M.P.2747 of 1974) and thereby rejecting the plaintiff's application under Ss.3 and 4 for valuation of the superstructure.
  2. Whether, after proceedings under S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922 and the tenant's failure to comply with payment directions (including rejection of an application for extension), the plaintiff (landlord) is entitled to have the underlying ejectment suit taken up and proceeded with, including invocation of remedies under Ss.3 and 4 of the Act.
  3. What the legal consequences are of a tenant's default under S.9(2) and S.9(3) — specifically whether the S.9 application stands dismissed and whether the underlying ejectment suit may be proceeded with.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The ejectment suit (E.S.40 of 1974) was never dismissed; the proceedings launched by the defendant (M.P.s under S.9 and subsequent appeals) kept the suit alive, and hence the plaintiff was entitled to invoke Ss.3 and 4 to value the superstructure and obtain possession after the tenant's failure.
  • The order dated 4.8.1976 related only to M.P.2747 of 1974 (the S.9 proceedings) and not to disposal of the suit itself; the trial court erred by treating that order as disposing of the suit.
  • Because the tenant failed to comply with the payment conditions under S.9 and his attempts to extend time were rejected, the tenant had lost the remedies under S.9 and the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed under Ss.3 and 4.

Defendant's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The defendant asserted succession to the leasehold rights as the son and successor of Rajamanickammal and relied on S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922, having claimed entitlement and applied for purchase of the suit land; he sought time and relief under S.9 and filed multiple interlocutory applications and appeals.
  • The defendant repeatedly sought extension of time to pay the sums directed by the court (including invoking S.5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay) and claimed inability to raise funds (financial difficulty) as a reason for non-payment; these applications for extension or review were ultimately rejected.
  • The defendant (implicitly) contended the plaintiff's M.P. under Ss.3 and 4 was not maintainable because, according to the trial court's reading, the suit had been disposed of by the earlier order (4.8.1976), an assertion the revising court found to be a mistaken characterization of the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohanambal v. Selvanayakt, 74 L.W. 382 = 1961-2 M.L.J. 261 That the stage at which a court may determine matters under S.4(2) of the relevant Act is when the court concludes the landlord is entitled to vacant possession — i.e., not before the final determination of the ejectment application. The court relied on this authority to justify the trial court's practice of keeping the suit pending while S.9 remedies were pursued and to explain that a substantive order under S.4(2) should follow the final determination that the landlord is entitled to vacant possession.
Arasan Chettiar v. Narasimhalu Naidu's Estate Trust, 93 L.W. 392 = 1980-2 M.L.J. 303 (D.B.) That when a tenant commits default in payment as directed by the court under S.9, the application under S.9 stands dismissed and the underlying suit or proceeding may proceed (or any decree/order in ejectment may stand). The court used this decision to support its conclusion that, following the tenant's failure and rejection of his extension application (M.P.1556 of 1984), the tenant had lost remedies under S.9, enabling the court to take up and proceed with the underlying ejectment suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The revising court undertook a focused procedural and legal examination of the record and the statutory framework. Its analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the material in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the relevant orders and their scope: the court observed that the order dated 4.8.1976 related to M.P.2747 of 1974 (the proceedings under S.9) and did not constitute an order disposing of Ejectment Suit No. 40 of 1974 itself. The trial court's statement that "the suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976" was therefore a mischaracterisation of what the record contained.
  2. Review of the procedural history: the court noted the series of appeals and miscellaneous petitions filed by the defendant (including the appeal E.A.20 of 1977 which revised the market value, multiple review/restore applications, and the application under S.5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay). These proceedings, some of which were dismissed or restored at various times, showed that the litigation around the S.9 remedy and valuation remained active up to February 1985.
  3. Examination of the statutory scheme: the court considered the provisions of S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922, including S.9(1)(b), S.9(2) (which provides that an S.9 application is to be dismissed if the tenant defaults in payment and that time may be granted for payment for sufficient cause, but extension is limited to three years), and S.9(3) (which addresses consequences when payment is made and how decrees for conveyance or dismissal operate).
  4. Application of precedent: the court applied Mohanambal v. Selvanayakt to emphasize that the court must be satisfied that the landlord is entitled to vacant possession before making orders under S.4(2) — supporting a practice of keeping the suit pending during the determination of S.9 remedies. It applied Arasan Chettiar to show that if a tenant defaults as directed and his S.9 remedy stands dismissed, the underlying suit may be proceeded with.
  5. Determination of the effect of the tenant's defaults: the revising court accepted that the defendant had failed to comply with the payment directions and that his later applications for extension were rejected (M.P.1556 of 1984 being dismissed on 11.2.1985), meaning that the defendant had lost the remedies under S.9. Consequently, the court concluded it was appropriate for the trial court to proceed with disposal of the ejectment suit and to deal with Ss.3 and 4 procedures as necessary for valuation of the superstructure and giving effect to the landlord's rights.
  6. Correction of the trial court's procedural finding: the revising court held that the trial court erred in asserting the suit "appears to have been disposed of" based solely on the M.P.2747 order without properly examining the suit file. The revising court criticized the lower court for failing to examine the record and for incorrectly equating the M.P. order with disposal of the suit.
  7. Relief directed: on the basis of the foregoing, and applying the statutory provisions together with the cited precedents, the revising court determined that the revision must succeed and the trial court should take up the ejectment suit and proceed to dispose of it, applying the procedures in Ss.3 and 4 when considering valuation of the superstructure and related relief.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed with costs.

Directives and immediate effect:

  • The court below (trial court) is directed to take up Ejectment Suit No. 40 of 1974 and proceed to dispose of it, bearing in mind the plaintiff's rights under the relevant Act and following the procedures contemplated in Ss.3 and 4 (including appointment of a Commissioner to value the superstructure, if appropriate).
  • The revising court found that the tenant had lost the remedies under S.9 by reason of default and rejection of extension applications, thereby permitting the trial court to proceed with disposal of the underlying suit.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authorities (Mohanambal and Arasan Chettiar) to the facts and clarifies the proper procedural relationship between S.9 proceedings and the underlying ejectment suit. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying and reconciling those authorities to the record; its primary effect is to correct the trial court's procedural error and to remand the matter for disposal in accordance with statutory procedure.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the provided opinion text.

    Vasudeva Pillai Trust, Madras v. Thtrugnanasambandam

    1. Plaintiff in ejectment suit No. 40 of 1974, on the file of the II Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras is the petitioner herein and the defendant is the respondent. Plaintiff filed the suit as owner of 1 ground and 28 sq ft. in R.S No. 1523/4, at Rathna-sabapathi Pillai St., Madras 7, and that a superstructure now exists thereon bearing door No. 10 Rathnasabapathi Pillai Street. Plaintiff leased out the plot of land originally to one Rajamanickammal on a monthly rent of Rs. 3-25 and she left behind huge arrears and expired 27 years ago intestate, and that in September 1970, on plaintiff being told that defendant is claiming to be the lessee of the property and collecting ground rent from sub-tenants, a notice was sent on 15.9.1970 calling upon him to prove that he is the successor-in-interest of Rajamanickammal. He replied through his counsel on 26.9.1970, stating that he is her son and may be treated as a lessee under the plaintiff and undertook to pay the arrears of rent for three years, but failed to do so, and therefore, under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a notice was issued on 7.10.1970 This was replied on 26.11.1970, by defendant promising to pay the arrears of rent, but committed default. Again, another notice was sent and reply was received and that having received only a sum of Rs. 117, for the balance of the amount, a separate suit is being filed for recovery of arrears. Hence, the suit has been laid for evicting the defendant. The suit was filed on 15.4.1974, by the plaintiff called Vasudeva Pillai Trust represented by its Honorary Secretary and that it was recognised in Appln. No. 241 of 1982 in C.S No. 246 of 1930 by order dated 22.4.1982 by the High Court. On filing the suit on 15.4.1974, defendant filed M.P 2747 of 1974 invoking S.9 of Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922, stating that originally the suit property had been leased to his grand-father Appavoo Chetti, who had settled the property in favour of his mother, Rajamanickammal, and after her death, as the only son, he had become entitled to the lease hold rights and that he has applied for the purchase of the suit land.

    2. The said petition was opposed and after the Commissioner having been appointed to ascertain the value of the property, on 4.8.1976 it was ordered that the extent involved is 2810 sq. ft. and that the market value was Rs. 16,000 per ground, and therefore, the defendant was directed to pay with interest a sum of Rs. 18,733 towards the value of the land, at Rs. 62,443 every month in 30 equal monthly instalments commencing from 1.11.1976

    3. Aggrieved against this order, Ejectment appeal No. 20 of 1977 was filed and it was allowed on 11.9.1978, fixing the market value at Rs. 15,333 per ground. In spite of it, he filed M.P 1371 of 1979 for review of the judgment so as to fix the market value at Rs. 10,000, per ground, and this was dismissed for default, once on 13.10.1979, and later it was restored and again on 17.12.1979 it was dismissed for non-appearance, and thereafter M.P 115 of 1980 was filed to restore it, and it was dismissed on 15.3.1980, holding that the tenant is bent upon protracting the proceedings during the past six years, and the reason claimed in the supporting affidavit for non-appearance by counsel and party was not correct.

    4. It is admitted by defendant that the order in ejectment appeal No. 20 of 1977 had become final and the instalment of Rs. 511 fixed therein to be paid monthly with interest at 6 per cent per annum had not been complied with because of financial difficulties. Defendant filed M.P.1556 of 1984 by invoking S.5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay of 42 months in paying the market value as fixed by the order dated 11.9.1978 claiming that he could not possess the necessary funds to pay on time. By order dated 11.2.1985, this was rejected. Reliance was placed by the court below on S.9(2) of the Act, which provides that even if the tenant commits default in payment of one instalment, the application under clause (a) of sub-S (1) has to be dismissed, and time could be granted for payment if sufficient cause is shown and that court can extend time for payment only upto three years.

    5. M.P 1342 of 1984 was filed by the plaintiff under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act for the appointment of a Commissioner to fix the value of the superstructure, so that it could get possession of the property in the ejectment suit and pay the value of the superstructure to the tenant. The Court below held as follows—

    “….The suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976 The plaintiff had not succeeded in the suit. If the plaintiff had applied for appointment of a Commissioner for valuing the superstructure immediately after the expiry of the time fixed for payment by the tenant or immediately after the first default, this objection now raised by the tenant about the application being not maintainable, may not be accepted. But as it is, the suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976 Even if it is a wrong order, this court cannot now review or set aside the same……”

    Hence it rejected the application, It is against the said order, this revision petition is preferred by the plaintiff.

    6. The main thrust of the contention of the plaintiff is that the suit having never been dismissed, and by institution of M.Ps by defendant the proceedings have been kept alive right through, and when tenant having interdicted the proceedings in the suit by filing a petition under S.9 of the Act, and having failed therein, the landlord is entitled to invoke the statutory rights under S.4 of the Act and consequently pay the compensation under S.3 Ejectment suit No. 40 of 1974 having not been disposed of, the court below was in error in holding that the suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976

    7. In narrating the various proceedings initiated by the parties, it has been stated that E.S.40 of 1974 having been filed on 15.4.1974, M.P.2747 of 1974 was filed on 27.7.1974 Thereafter, the court was concerned with the proceedings under S.9 of the Act, because that is the only aspect which could be done by the court, in view of S.9(1)(b) of the Act. Hence, the order passed on 4.8.1976 was only in M.P.2747 of 1974 and not in E.S.40 of 1974. E. A.20 of 1977 was filed only as against the order in M.P.2747 of 1974 and not against any order passed in the suit. This order passed on 4-8-1976 had not been looked into by the court below. The suit bundle does not disclose any order of dismissal or decreeing of the suit at all. It only contains the order in M.P.2747 of 1974. Thereafter, since the defendant had taken up the matter in appeal, and having not complied with the order of the appellate court, and again sought for review, and condoning the delay in paying the amount as fixed by order dated 4.8.1976, and in view of the pendency of these proceedings upto February 1985, the suit could not be disposed of. The petition by plaintiff under Ss.3 and 4 of the Act was filed on 27.7.1984 Hence, factually the suit is yet to be disposed of, and no order about disposal of the suit had ever been passed. That may be the reason why the court below has stated that the suit itself appears to have been disposed of on 4.8.1976 instead of extracting any order passed in the suit. Defendant had not filed into court any order passed in the suit dismissing it. This sort of approach made by the court below cannot be appreciated. Because of its failure to look into the records, it necessitated this Court in summoning the original records to find out whether any order had ever been passed dismissing the suit. It had been aware that such an order had not been passed, it had failed in its duty by making it ‘appear’ as if it had been disposed of, when it had full knowledge that the order dated 4.8.1976 was an order only in M.P 2747 of 1974 which had been subjected to an appeal in E.A.20 of 1977. Hence, this attitude of the Court below deserves condemnation.

    8. After the procedure under S.9(1)(b) is followed and in the instant matter, on an appeal, a revision of value having been effected; and in MP. 1556 of 1984, dated 11.2.1985 (the same day on which the order had been passed in MP. 1342 of 1984), holding that the tenant had not complied with the condition to pay the amount within the period contemplated under. S.9(2) of the Act, the court below ought to have taken up the suit for disposal. S.9(3)(a) deals with instances in which the price had been paid and as to what extent a decree could be passed for conveyance of the property to the tenant to the extent he had succeeded, and as to what a tenant will have to do in delivering the remaining extent of the land. It is only thereafter, under S.9(3)(b), the suit would stand dismissed, and any decree or order in ejectment that had been passed, and which has not been executed shall be vacated. Therefore, in a case of this nature, wherein the suit had not been dismissed, and the remedy available under S.9(1) having been availed of, but not complied with as in S 9(2); the tenant had lost his remedies invoked under the Act, and that was why the order in M.P 1555 of 1984 was passed as against him. Hence, the suit has to be taken up for further disposal and the plaintiff is one who would come within the expression ‘in which the landlord succeeds’ and who could invoke the relief under S.4 of the Act. In a suit filed for ejectment, on an application filed under S.9(1)(a) or (b), a suit cannot be dismissed, but will have to be kept pending on the file of the Court, till finality is reached in the proceedings under S.9 of the Act. This is what the trial Court had done and there was no illegality committed by it. This is the view taken in Mohanambal v. Selvanayakt . 74 L.W 382=1961-2 M.L.J 261., by holding that the stage at which a court could be called upon to determine under S.4(2) of the Act, is a date on which the court comes to the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to vacant possession and not at any time anterior to the final determination of the ejectment application itself. Before such an order could be passed in the instant matter. S.9 application having been filed, and an order having been passed on 4.8.1976 The suit had been kept on the file of the court below awaiting final determination in the remedies invoked by the defendant-tenant.

    9. In Arasan Chettiar v. Narasimhalu Naidu's Estate Trust . 93 L.W 392=1980-2 M.L.J 303 D.B while dealing with the scope of S.9, it has been held that when a tenant commits default in the payment of the amount as directed by the court, the application under S.9 shall stand dismissed and that the suit or proceeding will proceed or any decree or order in ejectment that may have been passed therein shall stand. Defendant herein by filing M.P 1556 of 1984, sought for extension of time, and which was rejected on 11.2.1985 and thus he made it quite clear that he had lost his rights under S.9 of the Act. The suit having not been disposed of, as held by the Division Bench of this Court, the court has the right to take up the suit and proceed to pass a decree.

    10. Except for those decisions no other authority is placed before this Court to hold that the pending suit should be deemed to have been dismissed on the day when an order is passed under S.9(1)(b) of the Act.

    11. Hence, the revision petition is allowed with costs, and the court below is directed to take up the suit and proceed to dispose it of bearing in mind the rights acquired by the plaintiff under the Act by following the procedures contemplated in Ss.3 and 4.

    VCS/RR.

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    Vasudeva Pillai Trust, Madras v. Thtrugnanasambandam
    (Jan 21, 1987)